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Prologue: Churchill’s Congress
From 7 to 10 May 1948, 722 representative figures from twenty-eight European 
countries met in The Hague to discuss paths and possibilities for a unification 
of Europe. Six former prime ministers of European countries took part in the 
gathering along with fourteen active and forty-five former ministers. In addition, 
West German governors, leading members of parliaments, business leaders, key 
representatives from organized labor, academics, artists and religious officials 
were present. Winston Churchill, Britain’s celebrated prime minister during the 
war years and now leader of the opposition in the House of Commons gave the 
opening address. Outside the official halls, public interest was evident. Around 
forty thousand people attended a public declaration during the third day of nego-
tiations. The congress led to the formation of the European Movement and indi-
rectly to the founding of the Council of Europe.1
Four Driving Forces
The Hague Congress set off crucial negotiations for the creation of European 
institutions. These negotiations—otherwise than the talks around the proposal 
for “a kind of federative association” among the peoples of Europe that had been 
proposed by French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand in September 1929 to the 
assembly of the League of Nations—would prove successful and lead to the foun-
dation of a European community that today has great influence over the lives 
of Europeans. This community concentrated movements that aimed to overcome 
the functional deficits of nation states and of the nation-state-dominated Euro-
pean political system and that had developed as early as the First World War. 
They were driven by four varying yet closely linked agendas. 2
The first objective was to deal with the problem of anarchy among states 
which had been the spark for all “classical” plans to secure the peace, ranging 
1 On the pre-history and course of The Hague Congress, cf. Frank Niess, Die europäische Idee aus 
dem Geist des Widerstands, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001, pp. 158–173 and 181–220; Wil-
fried Loth, “Vor 60 Jahren: Der Haager Europa-Kongress,” in: Integration 31 (2008), pp. 179–190; 
Jean-Michel Guieu and Christophe Le Dréau (eds.), Le “Congrès de l’Europe” à la Haye (1948–
2008), Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009.
2 This systematization was presented for the first time in Wilfried Loth, “Der Prozess der eu-
ropäischen Integration. Antriebskräfte, Entscheidungen und Perspektiven,” in: Jahrbuch für 
Europäische Geschichte 1 (2000), pp. 17–30. For a complete presentation developing these moti-
vations, cf. Wilfried Loth: Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939–
1957, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, 3rd edition, 1996.
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from Dante to Kant. The urgency of finding a better institutional solution to 
deal with its prospects was ever more pressing with the development of modern 
military technology and the resulting death of millions of victims followed by 
economic damage of a magnitude unimagined in the era of cabinet warfare. 
Hence, the experience of the First World War had led to multiple European 
peace initiatives, of which the “Pan-Europe” campaign by Count Richard Cou-
denhove-Kalergi and Aristide Briand’s Europe Plan were the most notable. With 
the peace order established at Versailles incrementally breaking down from 1938 
onward, this movement received further impetus. For example, Léon Blum, the 
French Socialist leader and prime minister of the People’s Front governments of 
1936 to 1938, wrote in the spring of 1941: “In one point, my convictions are pro-
found and unshakable, whatever the world may say. If this war does not at last 
give rise to fundamentally stable international institutions, to a really effective 
international power, then it will not be the last war.”3
A special challenge to secure the peace involved the German question: How 
to allow the strongest nation in the center of the European continent to develop 
while at the same time avoiding the consolidation of German hegemony? Or con-
versely: How to put a check on the Germans without provoking renewed desires 
for revenge via one-sided discrimination against them? Blum captured the view 
of many authors from the Resistance against the German occupation and the 
National Socialist regime as he wrote “there is only a single way to resolve the con-
tradiction, to make Germany harmless in a peaceful and stable Europe, and that 
is the incorporation of the German nation in an international community.”4 This 
would include not merely the supervision of the Ruhr District but also a common 
steering of all European heavy industry, not only a reduction of German military 
sovereignty, but a common command over all European armed forces. After the 
failure of the peace order established at Versailles and the rise of National Social-
ism, the value of these measures could not be ignored.
A third functional deficit of the nation-state system stemmed from the devel-
opment of productive forces in the industrial age. Over the course of time, it 
became more and more clear that national markets in Europe were too narrow 
for rational production methods. Mutual walling-off only made sense temporarily 
and for some sectors—over the long term, however, it resulted in a loss of produc-
tivity. This had an economic as well as a power-political aspect; both had been 
present since the 1920s, above all in the form of American competition. Thus, 
3 Léon Blum, For All Mankind, London and New York: Gollancz, 1946, pp. 116f. (French original 
written in 1941). Cf. Wilfried Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus. Die französischen Sozia-
listen und die Nachkriegsordnung Europas 1940–1950, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1977.
4 Blum, p. 121.
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unification initiatives in the economic sphere were correspondingly numerous, 
and here too the experience of the Second World War provided an additional 
motivational push: Whereas the Europeans largely exhausted their resources in 
that conflict, the US more than doubled its production for being the most import-
ant supplier of materiel to the Allied coalition in addition to being favored by the 
absence of European countries from the world market.
The fourth reason for European unification initiatives has thus already been 
touched upon: The effort of European nations to assert themselves vis-à-vis the 
new world powers. The concern over American economic and political suprem-
acy as well as the fear of an expansion of the Bolshevik Revolution had already 
provided motives for European unification plans in the 1920s. Both were strength-
ened by the power-political results of the Second World War. With the US as the 
leading world power and the Soviet Union as the strongest military power on the 
European continent, earlier divergences in interests among the European nation-
states lost meaning to the benefit of the common interest in autonomy and in 
avoiding a conflict between the two main victors of the war.
British Labour Party leader Clement Attlee, who was to serve as prime minis-
ter from 1945 to 1951 captured this dynamic best in 1939: “Europe must federate or 
perish.”5 This became a plausible slogan in several respects in the aftermath of the 
First World War already, when the insufficiency of the peace order established at 
Versailles was criticized. The plausibility increased when the Munich Agreement 
made it clear that the established order was no longer sustainable; and increas-
ingly from 1943 onwards when Allied victory was in the offing. This watchword 
evoked fascination in the most divergent political camps. It also created links 
extending across national borders and—as must be emphasized given the later 
fixation on the East-West conflict and the resultant ahistorical attitude toward the 
countries that belonged to the Soviet Bloc until 1990—it was by no means only a 
Western-European phenomenon. The European organizations had branches in 
Prague and Budapest, just as they did in Paris and Brussels.6
The numerous unification plans developed in the resistance all over Europe 
did not immediately coalesce at the end of the conflict into a concrete unification 
policy. Joseph Stalin blocked any kind of federation in Eastern Europe (so sys-
5 Speech before the Labour MPs on 8 Nov. 1939, in: Clement R. Attlee, Labour’s Peace Aims, 
London: Peace Book Co., 1940, pp. 12ff.
6 Cf. Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration 1945–1947. The Formation of the European 
Unity Movement, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982; idem. (ed.), Documents on the History of Euro-
pean Integration, vol. 1: Continental Plans for European Union, 1939–1945, Berlin and New York: 
De Gruyter, 1985; vol. 2: Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile, 1939–1945, Berlin 
and New York: De Gruyter, 1986; Michel Dumoulin (ed.), Plans des temps de guerre pour l’Europe 
d’après-guerre 1940–1947, Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 1995.
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tematically that such plans passed out of memory there); at the same time, every 
step toward unification in Western Europe threatened to deepen the division of 
the continent between East and West. This made it questionable whether the 
peace could be secured through unification initiatives. Many shrank back from 
making substantive decisions, including the British government under Winston 
Churchill—and that was decisive given the power relations among Hitler’s oppo-
nents in Europe. Furthermore, France under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle 
enmeshed itself in demands for separating the territories on the left bank of the 
Rhine along with the Ruhr District from the German federation, something for 
which his British allies had little enthusiasm.
Churchill was however the first European politician of rank to put the theme 
of European unification back on the agenda of international politics after the war. 
In July of 1945, just after his hard-won victory over Hitler, Churchill had been sent 
into the opposition following elections in Britain. In the winter of 1945–46, he 
then began to worry about an expansion of the Soviet domain beyond the “Iron 
Curtain.” In a spectacular speech in the town of Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 
1946, he warned for the first time publicly about the “expansive and proselytizing 
tendencies” of the Soviet Union and international communism.7 In order to avert 
the danger of such expansion, he thought it was now necessary to embark upon 
the unification of those European countries that had remained outside the Soviet 
sphere. He regarded the federation of such countries as the prerequisite not only 
for the economic recovery of Europe but also for the stabilization of democracy. In 
another speech, this time before students in Zurich on 19 October 1946, he there-
fore asserted that “we must build a kind of United States of Europe” based on 
“a partnership between France and Germany.” He saw Great Britain among “the 
friends and sponsors of the new Europe” rather than among its members. For 
Churchill, the island nation was to play a highly-active role in Europe’s creation.8
In order to mobilize public opinion, Churchill commissioned his son-in-law 
and close political ally Duncan Sandys to organize a non-partisan group of rep-
resentative figures who were to promote European unification ideas in Britain. 
Sandys’ efforts soon bore fruit: On 16 January 1947, he was able to present a pro-
visional “British United Europe Committee,” that included among its members 
not only conservative MPs (including Robert Boothby) but also Labour politicians 
7 Speech of 5 March 1946 in: Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill. His Complete 
Speeches, 1897–1963, vol. VII: 1943–1949, London: Chelsea House, 1974, pp. 7285–7293.
8 Speech of 19 Sept. 1946 in: Walter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth (eds.), Documents on the History 
of European Integration, vol. III: The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pres-
sure Groups in Western European Countries, 1945–1950, Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1988, 
pp. 662–666.
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and trade union representatives (Gordon Land, George Gibson, Victor Gollancz), 
representatives of the Liberal Party, church officials and even scholars such as 
Bertrand Russell and British federalists such as Frances L. Josephy. It was the 
case however that the executive committee of the ruling Labour Party spoke out 
against the endeavor as it neither wanted to promote Churchill’s idea of creating a 
Western bloc nor give the opposition leader a platform for domestic political suc-
cesses. Therefore, the activities of the group, which constituted itself definitively 
on 14 May 1947 as the “United Europe Movement” (UEM), developed predomi-
nantly in the conservative and liberal milieu.9
Parallel to the UEM, an “Independent League of European Co-Operation” 
(ILEC) was organized by Paul van Zeeland, a former Belgian prime minster, and 
Józef Retinger, a long-time colleague of Polish Prime Minister in exile Władysław 
Sikorski; this organization, working in Belgium, Luxembourg, Great Britain, and 
France, sought to build on the European customs union committees of the 1920s 
and 1930s. On 7 March 1947, they were able to announce the formation of a provi-
sional central committee on the international level. The group brought together 
influential economists, bankers, and managers who were worried about the hin-
drances to the rebuilding of Europe posed by national economic boundaries. By 
no means did they all share Churchill’s fear of Soviet expansion. Yet, given that 
they pushed for a rapid start to economic integration without taking Soviet reser-
vations into account and that they were just as little decided as to the particular 
method of integration as was the British opposition leader, they were predestined 
for cooperation with Sandys’ group. Many politicians such as former director of 
the International Labour Office Harold Butler and later British Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan were active in both organizations simultaneously.10
In the wake of the Churchill speech, Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the 
Pan-European Movement, once again became active in European politics. Ini-
tially, he suggested to Churchill that the Pan-European Union be revived “under 
our joint leadership.” After the Briton had responded with reluctance, Couden-
hove organized a poll in November of 1946 among Western European members 
of parliament. Over four thousand deputies were asked to decide, either posi-
tively or negatively, on the question of whether they supported “a European fed-
eration within the framework of the United Nations.” This was intended to show 
the general attitude towards unification in the countries of Western Europe and 
to put pressure on the governments to begin initiatives for creating a Western 
Europe at last. Those deputies in agreement were called upon to set up non-par-
9 Cf. Lipgens, History, pp. 317–334; Niess, Europäische Idee, pp. 131–144.
10 Lipgens, History, pp. 334–341.
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tisan committees in the parliaments that were to gather for a European Congress 
in Geneva in June of 1947.11
This action clearly demonstrated that the idea of a federation that excluded 
Eastern Europe from the beginning and hence that deepened the already-emerg-
ing division of Europe was not yet particularly popular in the winter of 1946–47. 
Only a few deputies were willing to identify themselves with such a conception. 
By the end of April of 1947, Coudenhove had received 660 answers of which 646 
were positive—but that was hardly more than an eighth of those who had been 
asked. The ambitious plans for a congress had to be postponed for the time being. 
Similarly, the efforts of René Courtin, co-publisher of Le Monde, to establish a 
committee in France parallel to the UEM remained without success. In most cases, 
French adherents of Europe baulked at the risk of being associated with Chur-
chill’s West-bloc conception.12 The voices advocating a unification even without 
Soviet approval did gradually become more numerous, but overall, the negative 
reactions to Churchill’s initiative predominated by a wide margin.13
Most Europeans saw a unified Europe as a “Third Force,” which under the 
leadership of a Britain ruled by the Labour Party would mediate between the US 
and the Soviet Union, thus avoiding a division of Europe. The adherents of the 
organized federalist movement, who in December of 1946 constituted themselves 
as the “Union Européenne des Fédéralistes” (UEF), were hoping for a Europe 
structured ultimately along social-democratic lines, one that could maintain its 
autonomy vis-à-vis the US as well as the Soviet Union. According to their program 
declaration passed on 15 April 1947 in Amsterdam, “We do not want a moribund 
Europe, marked out as a victim for ambitions of every kind, and governed either 
by pseudo-liberal capitalism that subordinates human values to the money 
power, or by some totalitarian system seeking, by fair means or foul, to exalt its 
idea of justice over the rights of man and communities. What we want is a Europe 
which shall be an open society, friendly to both East and West, prepared to co-op-
erate with all.”14
This changed only after the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan on 2 July 1947. 
The many adherents of a Europe that constituted a “Third Force” now came to the 
conclusion that European unification could only realistically begin in the West. 
In general, the conviction grew that in view of European reconstruction and the 
integration of the western parts of Germany—both of which were to be promoted 
11 Ibid., pp. 435–441.
12 Ibid. pp. 623ff.; Niess, Europäische Idee, pp. 145–147.
13 Cf. the collection of different reactions in Lipgens, History, pp. 341–345 and 432–435.
14 Quoted from Lipgens, History, p. 382; on the constituting of the UEF, ibid., pp. 107–153, 274–
278, 296–316, and 346–385.
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by the Marshall Plan—there was not much time to lose. On 16 July 1947, Courtin 
was able to announce the founding of a “Conseil français pour l’Europe unie,” 
which understood itself as the French counterpart of Churchill’s UEM. Leading 
representatives of the French Socialists declared themselves willing to join in—
figures such as Robert Lacoste, Francis Leenhardt, André LeTrocquer, and Prime 
Minister Paul Ramadier. Among those representing the Christian Democrats were 
Paul Coste-Floret, François de Menthon, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen; left liberals 
were represented by Paul Bastid and René Mayer, Independent Republicans by 
Paul Reynaud, the social-liberal UDSR by Édouard Bonnefous, chairman of the 
Foreign-Affairs Committee of the National Assembly. Among others belonging 
to the council were Michel Debré as representative of the Gaullists, Emmanuel 
Monick as governor of the Bank of France, trade union leaders, representatives 
of the churches, as well as prominent journalists and scholars (Raymond Aron, 
Paul Claudel, André Siegfried, and Edmond Vermeil among others). The honor-
ary chairmanship was assumed by Édouard Herriot, the long-time prime minister 
of the Third Republic.15
Coudenhove’s poll now had much greater resonance. After he had in April 
of 1947 once again reminded the deputies who had not replied, the number of 
positive responses reached 1,735 by the end of September. Altogether, some for-
ty-three percent of the deputies asked had thus spoken out in principle in favor 
of a “European federation,” among them sixty-four percent of Italian deputies, 
fifty-three percent of Dutch deputies as well as fifty percent of both French and 
Belgian deputies. However, only twenty-six percent of British MPs responded 
positively along with a mere twelve percent of Scandinavian deputies.16 After fed-
eralist parliamentarians had begun to organize themselves in France, Belgium, 
Italy, and Greece, Coudenhove-Kalergi was able to hold what was not a “pre-par-
liament” but nevertheless a gathering of 114 active deputies from ten countries at 
his residence in Gstaad. This group founded a “European Parliamentary Union” 
(EPU) and decided to work toward calling a European Constituent Assembly.17
For Duncan Sandys, it was now a matter of not only strengthening the unifi-
cation movement in the various countries but also of keeping it under control. He 
was convinced that the movement could be successful only if it initially concen-
trated on the functional cooperation among the governments. Only then could 
15 Ibid., pp. 622–625.
16 Ibid., pp. 437–441.
17 Ibid., pp. 601–614; Heribert Gisch, “The European Parliamentary Union,” in: Walter Lipgens 
and Wilfried Loth (eds.), Documents on the History of European Integration, vol. IV: Transna-
tional Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 
1945–1950, Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1990, pp. 112–185.
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British participation be ensured. He feared that without the UK, France would not 
dare to enter into a European Community alongside a strong West Germany. Con-
sequently, British participation in the work of unification was for Sandys much 
more indispensable than it was for his father-in-law.18 Therefore, in the run-up to 
the establishment of the “Conseil français,” he invited the other Europe groups 
to form a “liaison committee” of the European movements. This took place on 20 
July 1947 in Paris over the course of a luncheon on the Champs Élysées. Along 
with the UEM, the French Council, the ILEC, and the EPU, the European feder-
alists around the Dutchman Hendrik Brugmans and the Frenchman Alexandre 
Marc were represented.19
The Struggle for the Congress
The federalists were convinced that the time was ripe for a federalist reorgani-
zation of the peoples of Europe. Hence, they envisioned the summoning of an 
“estates general of Europe” that against national governments and parliaments 
was to develop into the constituent assembly of a United Europe. Based on a com-
prehensive mobilization campaign, the various societal groups were to be repre-
sented: “One might for instance envisage eight basic categories or ‘estates’: (a) 
employers, (b) workers, (c) farmers, (d) middle class, executives and profession-
als, (e) intellectual and religious groups, (f) consumer’s organizations (co-opera-
tives), (g) political and parliamentary bodies, the judiciary etc., (h) youth move-
ments.” This “sensational assembly” was not only to “impress public opinion” 
but also to create “standing committees” for working out the pending legal, 
social, economic, and cultural questions, among others; and “the heads of these 
committees would form the nucleus of a future European government.”20 Ver-
sailles was envisioned as the meeting place of this revolutionary manifestation.
To Sandys, these plans for a corporative federalism were dangerous pipe 
dreams that would discredit the European unification movement and ruin the 
chances of British participation. Even before the UEF leaders could begin organiz-
ing their initiative, he therefore came to an agreement with the leadership of the 
ILEC in late September of 1947 for the preparation of a very different type of con-
gress: a “conference of between 500 and 800 prominent Europeans” that would 
meet “during the first weekend after Easter” in order to pressure and encourage 
the European governments to take the first steps toward the unification of Europe. 
18 Cf. Lipgens, History, pp. 666–669.
19 Ibid., pp. 659–666.
20 Note by Hendrik Brugmans, 24 Sept. 1947, in: Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp. 41ff.
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Pieter Kerstens, a Dutch senator and former economy minister who was working 
to establish a branch of the ILEC in his country, agreed to provide the funds nec-
essary for such a congress. Accordingly, The Hague was chosen as the site of the 
meeting. The federalists were invited to participate as co-sponsors of the congress 
and for that purpose also to join the liaison committee.21
This invitation presented dangers for the federalists: On the one hand, there 
was the danger of accepting it and entering into an alliance with high-rank-
ing conservative politicians and economic leaders: “…[T]o go to the Hague 
under the auspices of a union vaguely outlined by Churchill instead of calling 
the Estates-General–did this not involve running the risk of losing not only the 
benefit of numbers but also the creative and revolutionary dynamism which the 
federalist doctrine brought with it?” Yet, if they persisted in their own plans for 
a congress, they would not only split the European movement but also run the 
“risk of courting rapid destruction or of becoming a sect.”22 What proved decisive 
in the end was the greater realism of the British project: It would definitely be 
implemented and would have significant resonance; on the other hand, it was 
unclear how the “Estates-General” could be financed and whether it would have 
the sought-after effect given the competing project undertaken by establishment 
forces. It was especially Brugmans who for this reason advocated acceptance of 
the invitation. Marc and the Italian federalists around Altiero Spinelli were in 
principle against it but kept a low profile. On 15 November 1947 the central com-
mittee of the UEF decided to participate in the congress in The Hague and to agree 
to the expansion of the liaison committee into a “coordinating committee.”23
In the vague hope of perhaps still being able to “transform” The Hague Con-
gress into an “Estates-General of Europe,”24 the federalists accepted a situation in 
which they were a minority in the coordinating committee, possessing a quarter 
of the votes; the UEM and the French Council and the ILEC, all of whom were in 
agreement programmatically, each had the same number of votes. The federalists 
had to concede the chairmanship to Sandys and a secretary’s post to Retinger.25 
Perforce, they also accepted the provisions for the organization of the congress 
21 Protocol of a meeting of Sandys, van Zeeland, Retinger, and Kerstens, 28 Sept. 1947 in Brus-
sels, quoted in Lipgens, History, p. 673.
22 The characterization of the dilemma after the fact by Denis de Rougement, “The Campaign of 
the European Congresses,” in: Government and Opposition, vol. 2, no. 3, April–July 1967, pp. 329–
349. here p. 338.
23 Lipgens, History, pp. 676–679.
24 According to Alexandre Marc writing to Marceau Pivert, 10 Dec. 1947, quoted in Lipgens, His-
tory, p. 679.
25 Ibid., pp. 674–676; Text of the agreement of 11 Nov. 1947 in Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Docu-
ments IV, pp. 325–328.
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that Sandys presented at a further meeting of the committee on 13 and 14 Decem-
ber 1947. It was “to demonstrate in striking fashion the powerful and widespread 
support which already exists for the European idea; to produce material for dis-
cussion, propaganda and technical studies.” It should therefore be put together 
in as representative a way as possible; the decision about the invitations was to be 
reserved for the coordinating committee, however. It was decided that the event 
would be called “Congress of Europe”; the presidency of the congress was offered 
to Churchill.26
In practice, the decision on invitation policy meant that Sandys and Retinger 
collected suggested names, decided who would actually receive an invitation, 
and then also registered the acceptances. Regarding the number of delegates per 
country, Sandys prevailed with a formula that would be moderately representa-
tive: fifteen delegates per country plus two more for each million residents. This 
meant a total of 104 delegates for France, 118 for Great Britain, 33 each for Belgium 
and the Netherlands, and so forth. Countries whose governments denied entry to 
representatives of the coordinating committee and which did not authorize the 
necessary visas for their citizens to participate in the congress were only to be 
represented by small observer groups.27 This meant that Western Europe would 
gather as comprehensively as possible. At the same time the self-exclusion of the 
Soviet Union and the countries dominated by it would be reinforced once again.
As to organizational implementation, the coordinating committee had a large 
Dutch bank set up a representational office. Kerstens collected so much in dona-
tions that the over seven hundred participants could be offered not only a free 
stay in The Hague but also payment of all their travel costs as well. Given the 
still-precarious conditions in war-torn Europe, this was a noteworthy achieve-
ment that was very decisive for the success of the endeavor. When a gap in the 
financing of the Congress did nonetheless appear, Sandys had Prince Bernhard 
of the Netherlands introduce him to the board of directors of Phillips, which then 
helped out with a very generous donation. In late January of 1948, the date of the 
congress was definitively set for 7 to 10 May of that year; Retinger as secretary 
could then send out the official invitations.28
Sandys, Retinger, and Brugmans too sought out prominent persons in the 
various countries to convince them to participate. In most cases, they were suc-
cessful: “We’ve done really great work,” as Retinger was able to report to former 
26 Draft by Sandys, 11 Dec. 1947 in Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp. 328–339; exerpts 
from the protocol of the session in Lipgens, History, pp. 682ff.
27 Appendix A of the draft by Sandys, 11 Dec. 1947. As “Appendix B,” Sandys immediately at-
tached a list intended to provide examples of possible members of the British delegation.
28 Niess, Europäische Idee, pp. 181ff.
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Romanian Foreign Minister Gregor Gafencu as early as the end of 1947: “Of the 
great statesmen (but this is still confidential) the following have given us their 
support: Mister Churchill and Sir Stafford Cripps from Great Britain, Monsieurs 
Herriot and L. Blum from France, Messrs. van Zeeland and Spaak from Belgium, 
as well as Sforza from Italy. The Dutch government with its prime minister at the 
head will receive us where our sessions will take place: in the historic Riddar-
zaal.”29
Paul Ramadier and Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi also agreed to 
participate. In the western German occupation zones, the organizers managed 
to gain the acceptance of the governor of North Rhine-Westphalia, Karl Arnold, 
and the mayors of Hamburg and Bremen, Max Brauer and Wilhelm Kaisen; like-
wise Konrad Adenauer, who was chairman of the CDU in the British Occupation 
Zone; Martin Niemöller of the council of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD); 
Gustav Heinemann as justice minister of North Rhine-Westphalia; as well as 
Thomas Dehler, Heinrich von Brentano, and Walter Hallstein as chairman of the 
South German Rectors Conference.30
Likewise, there was success in gaining the participation of the Christian-Dem-
ocratic “Nouvelles Équipes Internationales” (NEI); from February of 1948, it was 
another of the invited organizations on the coordinating committee.31 Conversely, 
all the efforts of the federalists failed to bring aboard the “Comité international 
pour les États-Unis socialistes d’Europe” (EUSE). After a visit to London, Henri 
Frenay of the French branch of the committee lamented that British members of 
the EUSE “fell into a kind of trance as soon as one mentioned the name of Chur-
chill, and that was an end of any possibility of rational discussion.” With a vote 
of nine to seven, the executive of the committee decided against participation 
in The Hague Congress.32 For his part, Coudenhove-Kalergi refused to ratify the 
agreement of July 1947 on forming the liaison committee and then repeatedly 
issued new conditions for his participation, ones that in principle amounted to 
having him take over the leadership of the project and control its programmatic 
29 Retinger to Gafencu, 27. Dec. 1947, quoted in ibid., p. 173.
30 Cf. Christoph Stillemunkes, “The Discussion on European Union in the German Occupation 
Zones,” in: Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents III, pp. 441–565, here p. 454.
31 Lipgens, History, p. 679; cf. Heribert Gisch, “The ‘Nouvelles Équipes Internationales’ (NEI),” 
in: Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp.  477–540; Michael Gehler and Wolfram Kaiser 
(eds.), Transnationale Parteienkooperation der europäischen Christdemokraten. Dokumente 
1945–1965, Munich: De Gruyter Saur, 2004; Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins 
of European Union, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 191–205.
32 Henri Frenay to Marcel Hytte, 15 Dec. 1947, quoted in Lipgens, History, p. 679; cf. Loth, Sozial-
ismus, pp. 199–201; Wilfried Loth, “The Mouvement pour les États-Unis d’Europe (MSEUE),” in: 
Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp. 277–318.
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direction. Only in early April of 1948 did he become willing to participate in the 
congress without preconditions, that is, after most of the substantive decisions 
had already been made. His contribution to the direction of the congress was cor-
respondingly marginal.33
More serious than the refusal of the socialist committee or the long hesitancy 
of Coudenhove and his parliamentary union was the opposition of the executive 
committee of the British Labour Party. Leaders such as Morgan Phillips, Hugh 
Dalton, and Denis Healey were decided opponents of British participation in a 
supranational Europe. Hence, they saw in the congress a very dangerous project 
that additionally constrained the freedom of action of Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin and, furthermore, gave impetus to the Conservative opposition. At a con-
ference of Socialist parties of all the countries participating in the Marshall Plan, 
held in London on 21 and 22 March 1948, the decision was made not to accept 
the invitation of the coordinating committee; forty Labour MPs who had already 
decided to take part in The Hague Congress were called upon to withdraw. In order 
to preserve the solidarity of international Socialism, the party executive commit-
tees of the French SFIO and the German SPD also banned their office-holders 
from participating.34
Not all Socialist or Social-Democratic European politicians were influenced 
by the bans. Some twenty-three of the forty Labour MPs held fast to their accep-
tance of the invitation, among them Ronald W.G. Mackay, the initiator of the “All-
Party Group for European Unity” in the House of Commons, who in the meantime 
was also playing a leading role in the European Parliamentary Union as Cou-
denhove’s deputy. Léon Blum, Paul Henri Spaak, Carlo Schmid, and Max Brauer 
stayed away from the congress; conversely, Paul Ramadier and Wilhelm Kaisen 
took part—in open revolt against the decisions of their party leadership.  Yet, 
they could not prevent the gathering from taking on a liberal-conservative flavor. 
The Hague Congress ended up not being as representative as Sandys—with good 
reason—had striven for it to be.35
33 Lipgens, History, pp.  679–681; Martin Posselt, “Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Eu-
ropäische Parlamentarier-Union,” Diss. Graz, 1987, pp. 234–237, 275–284; Heribert Gisch, “The 
European Parliamentary Union (EPU),” in: Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp. 112–185.
34 Loth, Sozialismus, pp. 204–209; Clemens A. Wurm, “Great Britain: Political Parties and Pres-
sure Groups in the Discussion on European Union,” in: Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents III, 
pp. 628–762; Wilfried Loth, “The Socialist International,” in: Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents 
IV, pp. 436–475.
35 Cf. his argumentation in the strategy paper of 11 Dec. 1947, ibid., p. 330.
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Negotiations and Decisions
Nevertheless, the gathering—which opened on the afternoon of 7 May 1948 in the 
presence of Princess Juliane and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands—had great 
political weight. In the end, some 722 delegates had accepted the invitation; there 
were additionally about two hundred fifty guests and observers from the press. 
France sent the largest delegation, with 185 members; along with Ramadier, the 
contingent included Édouard Bonnefous, Édouard Daladier, Edgar Faure, André 
François-Poncet, Edmond Giscard d’Estaing, Pierre-Olivier Lapie, François de 
Menthon, François Mitterrand, and Paul Reynaud. Some 147 delegates came 
from Britain, among them Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan. Italy was not 
so prominently represented, however: Due to the formation of a government 
after the elections of 18 and 19 April, De Gasperi and other leading politicians 
had needed to bow out. The representatives of Portugal, for whom twenty places 
were planned, stayed home after António Salazar had expressed his displea-
sure. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were 
only represented by exile politicians. Spain had to content itself with the role 
of an observer; this was exercised by four delegates led by the philosopher and 
former minister Salvador de Madariaga. One delegate each came from Iceland 
and Turkey.36
In accordance with the political goals that Churchill had specified, the Germans 
were invited as delegates with full status. Given that discussions about that 
had once again come up in the coordinating committee, their invitations were 
delayed. For many of those who were invited, there was thus no longer sufficient 
time to arrange the required exit permits from the occupation authorities or come 
up with foreign currency; in the end, the German delegation thus numbered 
only fifty-one. The Germans were pleased that in his opening address, Churchill 
explicitly greeted them as necessary partners in the construction of Europe and 
when for the first time since the end of the war they were able to appear on the 
international stage on a par with others once again. In the discussions of the con-
gress, however, they were mostly restrained due to their awareness of continued 
dependence on the decisions of the occupying powers. Instead, the Germans 
used the opportunity to make contact with prospective partners. For example, 
after the opening ceremony, Adenauer met with Churchill for the first time and 
found himself “treated with conciliatory kindness by him.”37 Within the German 
36 Niess, Europäische Idee, pp. 183ff. and 190–192.
37 Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945–1953, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965, p. 210.
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delegation, Adenauer got to know Walter Hallstein, who would later become his 
closest colleague in the area of European politics.38
Churchill’s opening address was followed by speeches by Ramadier, Couden-
hove-Kalergi, Brugmans,39 and van Zeeland. Right after Churchill spoke, there 
was an attempt by the federalists to pull the event more strongly in the direc-
tion of an “Estates-General” by reading a “preamble” that aimed for the creation 
of a “European Assembly where the live forces of all our nations shall be repre-
sented.” The efforts were rejected. Denis de Rougement, who had made the proc-
lamation of such a target for the congress a condition for his participation in the 
preparations, was able to read the text as edited by him only as a “Message to the 
Europeans” after statements by Sandys, de Madariaga, and Ramadier. After some 
thirty participants objected to the demand for a common defense, the signing of 
the message by all delegates—which had initially been conceded to the federal-
ists—did not occur.40
On the other hand, the administration of the congress ensured that Churchill 
was by no means able to dominate the gathering. The members of the coordinat-
ing committee had arrived five days before the opening of the congress and had 
agreed in detail about the course of events.41 The reports on political, economic, 
and cultural questions, which the committee members had been working on since 
the beginning of the year in groups of differing composition, were not simply 
put up for a vote. Instead, they were discussed intensively in the corresponding 
committees of the congress during the whole second day of talks and then once 
again on the evening of the third day, while undergoing substantial change once 
again. Immediately after his return from The Hague, Eugen Kogon, who had been 
recruited as a German participant by the UEF, recorded in his Frankfurter Hefte: 
“The participating Socialists, Christian Socials, Syndicalists, and Progressives 
were successful in decisively preventing Churchill—whose significance for the 
unification of Europe was by the way acknowledged by everyone—and his mostly 
38 Walter Hallstein, United Europe. Challenge and Opportunity, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962, p. 8. Further eyewitness reports on the German delegation in Niess, Eu-
ropäische Idee, pp. 193–197.
39 Text in Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp. 51–55.
40 De Rougement, “Campaign,” pp. 339–345; speeches and resolutions in: “Europe Unites. The 
story of the campaign for European Unity, including a full report of the Congress of Europe, held 
at The Hague,” London 1949; verbatim report of the congress (hectographed) in the Archives of 
the European Movement. Deposit in the Historical Archives of the European Union, Fonds ME, 
Florence; online in: Council of Europe. Documents and Archives.
41 De Rougement, “Campaign,” p. 342.
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wealthy and arch-conservative followers from being able to give the congress 
their imprint.”42
The negotiations of the Political Committee were characterized by disputes 
regarding the aims, methods, and tempo of European unification. Indirectly, the 
question of British participation was thereby present too, although many were 
not at all aware of it. In a framework draft for the Political Resolution of the con-
gress that he had drawn up in late 1947 and had circulated among the committee 
members, Sandys had called for the congress to speak out for “the ultimate goal 
of European unity” but in so doing the congress was only to “explain in extremely 
general terms the various forms which this unity might be expected to flow from 
it.” As the institution for promoting the unification process, he wanted to call 
for a “European Council” that would consist of “a system of regular conferences 
between European Ministers (…) with the object of developing as far as possible a 
common European point of view, and a permanent international secretariat” that 
would study current European problems and present proposals to the council.43
In the report submitted to the delegates after the vote in the coordinating 
committee, the supranational dimension of the “Political Union” to be created 
was more clearly addressed, being undertaken at the prompting of the federal-
ists: “Sooner or later,” incremental political integration “must involve the renun-
ciation or, to be more accurate, the point exercise of certain sovereign powers.” 
The report cited “the creation of a complete federation with an elected European 
Parliament” as the final goal of the development. The European Council was now 
termed an “Emergency Council” that was to be “responsible for directing joint 
action to secure not only economic recovery and military defence but also to pre-
serve democratic freedom.” Beyond that, the Council was to “plan the further 
stages of the political and economic integration of Europe.” Added to this was the 
call for creation of a “European Deliberative Assembly” that was “to give valu-
able support and advice to the European Council.” Its members would initially 
be sent by the national parliaments; “later, a system of popular election should 
be instituted.”44
Under the influence of Mackay, the idea of a European Assembly came to be 
the centerpiece of the catalogue of demands during negotiations within the com-
mittee. This entity was “to advise upon immediate practical measures designed 
progressively to bring about the necessary economic and political union of 
42 Eugen Kogon, “Der Haager Europäische Kongreß,” in: Frankfurter Hefte, vol. 3, no. 6, June 
1948, pp. 481–483, here pp. 481ff.
43 Duncan Sandys, “Suggested Outline of the Political Report for the Hague Congress,” 21 Dec. 
1947, in: Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp. 330–332.
44 Ibid., pp. 333–338.
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Europe” and to develop plans “to examine the juridical and constitutional impli-
cations arising out of the creation of such a union or federation…” The call for 
setting up a European Council was dropped. Instead, it was declared “that the 
time has come when the European nations must transfer and merge some portion 
of their sovereign rights.”45 The demand by the Italian federalists for the imme-
diate transformation of the European Assembly into a constituent assembly was 
rejected by a large majority. Also, only a few delegates were enthusiastic about a 
motion by Reynaud to call for the direct election of the assembly right from the 
beginning. Mackay correctly warned against provoking the British as well as the 
French government with such a proposal: It would only reduce the chances of 
actually being accorded an assembly charged with working out a draft constitu-
tion capable of winning a majority. The resolution was finally passed on the night 
of 9 to 10 May. Of over three hundred delegates that had worked together on the 
Political Committee, fewer than a dozen voted against it.46
On the Economic and Social Committee, the liberal integration conceptions 
of the ILEC, which had been in charge during the preparations,47 ran into criti-
cism from the Socialists and the trade union representatives. Hence, the goal of 
the sought-after “economic union” perforce remained somewhat vague. It was 
nevertheless stated that in regard to European reconstruction, “there is no hope 
of recovery if each country simply strives to rebuild its national economy by the 
old methods,” but that “progress in this direction will only be achieved if it is 
accompanied at every step by a parallel policy of even closer political union.” The 
measures called for were incremental elimination of trade and tariff barriers; a 
common, if not lower, external tariff; budget stabilization; convergence of prices 
and wages; free convertibility of currencies and in the end, a currency union; like-
wise, common planning for the development of agriculture and basic industries 
as well as coordination of budget and credit policy along with social legislation.48
By endorsing the principles of the social-welfare state, the majority of the 
commission accommodated criticism from the left. Hence, the professional, eco-
nomic, and social organizations of the individual countries were called upon “to 
study together ways and means of increasing production still further and ratio-
nalizing distribution while improving social conditions and ensuring a fair distri-
bution of the product of economic activity.” The promotion of the free movement 
45 Political resolution of The Hague Congress, ibid., pp. 345–347. The oft-reprinted translation in 
Europa-Archiv 3 (1948), pp. 1443ff., is of the penultimate draft, not the version that was passed.
46 Excerpts from the contributions to the debates in Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, 
pp. 339–345. Cf. also Henri Brugmans, L’idée européenne 1920–1970, Bruges, 1970, p. 133.
47 Text of the submitted report in Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp. 208–212.
48 Economic and social resolution in Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, pp. 347–350.
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of labor was to be linked with securing “the standards of wages, social security, 
living conditions of employment”; the economic policies of the individual coun-
tries were to be coordinated “so as to secure full employment.”49 The majority 
of the delegates did not want to commit themselves to concrete measures such 
as supranational control over the movement of capital or an Europeanization of 
Ruhr industry. Nor was there a majority for promoting the participation by workers 
and their organizations in the European entities. The protest by union represen-
tatives against this rebuff could only be contained—after prolonged negotiations 
that dragged into the wee hours of 10 May—by having the committee establish a 
“post-Congress Economic Committee” that was to “work out a compromise policy 
for Europe incorporating the best features from Capitalism and Socialism.”50
The Cultural Committee was presented with a report that Denis de Rouge-
ment had developed in contact with authors such as Étienne Gilson, Ignazio 
Silone, and Salvador de Madariaga. He spoke of a “common heritage of Christian 
and other spiritual and cultural values and our common loyalty to the fundamen-
tal rights of man” that were to be valid for the members of a “European Union.” 
Passages that were all too federalist were removed from the proposal at the last 
minute after intervention by Retinger. In concrete terms, there was a call for the 
establishment of a “European Cultural Centre” that would “promote an aware-
ness of European unity” independently of any governmental supervision and 
that would “provide a meeting-place for leaders of thought.” Further, there was 
a call to create a “European Institute for Childhood and Youth Questions” that 
would “encourage exchanges between the young people of all classes in Europe.” 
Lastly, the draft included the creation of a “Supreme Court with supra-state juris-
diction to which citizens and groups can appeal, and which is capable of assuring 
the implementation of the Charter.”51
The debate on the cultural report “unfolded in the usual confusion,” as de 
Rougement sarcastically commented. Whereas the writer Charles Morgan wanted 
to leave cultural affairs wholly in the hands of the national governments, others 
called for the immediate creation of an entity to carry the work of the Congress 
forward. A Captain Cheshire from the Movement for Moral Re-Armament wanted 
to have the return to God anchored in the document and attacked the draft as 
49 Ibid.
50 “Europe Unites,” p. 48. Cf. the contributions to the discussion in ibid., pp. 46–65 as well as 
the presentation in Loth, Sozialismus, p. 210.
51 Resolution of the Culture Committee, German translation in Europa-Archiv 3 (1948), 
pp. 1445ff.; on the origins, de Rougement, “Campaign,” pp. 339–341. Unfortunately, de Rouge-
ment does not indicate what exactly the corrections were that he had to make after a meeting on 
26 April 1948 in London.
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“anti-Christian.” Lastly, Bertrand Russell spoke emphatically for the proposed 
cultural center: It would help the people of different countries maintain close 
contact and learn to understand the viewpoints of others. His authority contrib-
uted to the unanimous passage of all the substantive proposals of the report.52
A Milestone
Some committed federalists were so disappointed at the direction the Congress 
was taking that they wanted to depart under protest shortly before it ended. 
Sandys had to bring in van Zeeland as a mediator to avoid such an open break. 
It is possible that the reading of the “Message to the Europeans” was the price 
he had to pay for it—he himself had initially wanted to strike it completely after 
objections had been raised to an endorsement of European defense.53 Marc then 
succeeded in pushing through a press declaration of the UEF in which the Con-
gress was criticized for being insufficiently representative and for “half-mea-
sures” in its decision-making.54 At the second annual conference of the UEF from 
7 to 11November 1948 in Rome, Brugmans had to accept severe criticism for his 
willingness to cooperate with the UEM.55
The disappointment of the radical federalists over the lack of a breakthrough 
to a European constituent assembly should not take away from the fact that the 
initiators of the Congress in The Hague had actually succeeded in putting Euro-
pean unification on the agenda of Western European politics. Agreement among 
more or less representative delegations from nearly all the countries of Europe 
on a common program allowed Sandys to bring together the various European 
organizations in a common “European Movement” that was officially constituted 
on 25 October 1948—with Léon Blum, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, 
and Paul-Henri Spaak as prestigious honorary presidents. At the same time, the 
high-ranking politicians who had been among the participants in the Congress 
now approached their respective heads of government in order to make it clear 
that concrete initiatives for summoning the European Assembly were expected 
52 Ibid., p. 342.
53 De Rougement is not very precise here either: He reports on a crisis session in which van Zee-
land proposed a compromise of reading the Message without the objectionable passage (ibid., 
p. 344) but does not mention the threat to leave. Sandys informed Frank Niess of that in a conver-
sation on 25 Nov. 1966; see Niess, Europäische Idee, p. 210.
54 Declaration of 20 May 1948 in Lipgens and Loth (eds.), Documents IV, p. 56.
55 Ibid., pp. 57–78.
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of them.56 Given the resonance that the Congress enjoyed in large segments of 
the European public, the governments could not off-handedly deny this request.
A few weeks after the Congress in The Hague, Winston Churchill expressed 
his confidence in its success: “This Europe Conference will be acknowledged by 
historians as a milestone in the development of our continent toward unity.”57 It 
was in fact in The Hague that the transnational societal consensus on which the 
later European Communities would rest had become palpable for the first time. 
In light of the convoluted paths to “more Europe” that would be embarked 
upon in subsequent decades, it is noteworthy that this initiative had been 
primarily organized by British politicians and that it aimed for a much greater 
Europe than the “Europe of the Six” that subsequently came into being. This 
consensus was unavoidably imprecise as regards the institutional configuration 
of a united Europe. Very clearly, however, it included acceptance of the partial 
amalgamation of national sovereign rights, the social-welfare configuration of 
the Community, and the stabilization of the democratic order in the participat-
ing countries.58 After The Hague Congress, this consensus did not simply vanish. 
Instead, it developed in critical analysis of the experience of concrete European 
politics, which in turn came to be influenced by it.
56 Niess, Europäische Idee, pp. 223–227.
57 Recorded by Sandys in a memorandum for the coordinating committee, quoted in Niess, 
ibid., p. 219.
58 The characterization of Sandys and the committee majority as “unionists,” which stems from 
the radical federalists, is misleading. 
1  Foundation Years, 1948–1957
The momentum that the European Movement had developed by the spring of 
1948 was especially welcome to the French government. The conviction that a 
Western European federation was indispensable for reconstruction and for res-
olution of the German problem had in the meantime gained significant ground 
there. Jean Monnet, as the head of the French planning commission, wrote from 
Washington on 18 April 1948 to Prime Minister Robert Schuman, “All my thoughts 
and all my observations have now led me to a conclusion that has become a deep 
conviction: The efforts of the countries of Western Europe to rise to the circum-
stances, to the danger that threatens us, and to the American drive must become a 
genuinely European effort, which only a federation of the West could accomplish. 
I understand all the difficulties that stem from such a perspective, but I am con-
vinced that we can save ourselves only by such an endeavor.”1 The creation of a 
federation seemed all the more urgent when the founding of a West German state 
was decided on by the Six-Power Conference in London on 7 June 1948, which put 
France under pressure: If Western European unification did not quickly achieve 
a supranational quality, the Germans threatened to take up their traditional 
great-power policy once again. Perhaps they would even ally themselves with the 
Soviet Union, which held the key to German unity. There was still an opportunity 
to incorporate the Germans into Europe, as Jean Laloy, political advisor to the 
French occupation commander in Germany, noted on 30 August 1948, but “One 
must grasp it quickly; in a year, it will already be too late.”2
The Struggle over the Council of Europe
At the urging of Paul Ramadier and other members of the French government, 
Foreign Minister Georges Bidault decided to advance the unification project along 
the lines sketched out by the Hague Congress. At the second session of the Con-
sultative Council of the Brussels Pact on 19 July 1948, he called for summoning a 
“European Parliamentary Assembly” for an “exchange of views” on the problems 
of European federation and for the preparation of an economic and monetary 
union of the Five. This assembly was initially to have a consultative character, 
1 FJME, AME 22/1; quoted in part in Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Paris: Fayard, 1976, p. 323.
2 Jean Laloy, note of 30 Aug. 1948, quoted from Raymond Poidevin, “Le facteur Europe dans 
la politique allemande de Robert Schuman (été 1948 – printemps 1949),” in: idem. (ed.), His-
toire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948 – printemps 1950), Brussels: Émile 
Bruylant, 1986, pp. 311–326, here p. 318.
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as was explained in an instruction from the Quai d’Orsay to the French ambassa-
dor in London; after an understanding had been reached on the Europe Project, 
however, it was soon to receive its own decision-making authority and thereby 
“constitute the core of a federative organization of Europe.”3 Bidault himself did 
not really believe that such an ambitious project could be realized; nevertheless, 
in consideration of the criticism of the London agreements on Germany that had 
been voiced by his colleagues in the Christian-democratic MRP, he felt it advis-
able to place himself at the head of the European movement.4
British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, who initially had not taken Bidault’s 
announcements seriously, was anything but enthusiastic about the French foray: 
Unlike his colleagues at the head of the Labour Party, this former leader of the 
British Transport and General Workers’ Union did envision the creation of a 
“close association between” the United Kingdom and the countries of the “Med-
iterranean and Atlantic fringes of Europe,” one that would serve the economic 
reconstruction of all participants as well as their security.5 With this perspective, 
he had promoted the formation of the Brussels Pact with France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg, which was signed on 17 March 1948 and which 
contained an automatic commitment of support in the event of an attack by a 
third power in Europe. In his view, however, the expansion of this pact into a 
“European Union” ought to remain in the hands of the Consultative Council of 
the pact members, which had been set up for that purpose. As he said of the 
idea of a parliamentary assembly, “I don’t like it. When you open that Pandora’s 
box, you will find it full of Trojan horses.”6 It threatened to produce demagogic 
demands for unification that could not win the acceptance of the British govern-
ment and would thereby endanger the incorporation of the Western Europeans 
into an order led by Britain. Beyond that, it naturally offered Winston Churchill 
an excellent forum from which he could increase his attacks on the inaction of 
the Labour government in the area of Europe policy. Angry at the extent of irre-
sponsibility displayed by Bidault, Bevin demanded, to begin with, more specific 
3 Quoted from René Massigli, Une comédie des erreurs 1943–1956, Paris: Plon, 1978, p. 157. 
4 On this and the following, Loth, Sozialismus, pp. 211–214 and 221–223; Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, 
“Le rôle de la France dans la naissance du Conseil de l’Europe,” in: Poidevin, Débuts, pp. 165–
198; Geoffrey Warner, “Die britische Labour-Party and die Einheit Westeuropas 1949–1952”, in: 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 28 (1980) pp. 310–330; Young, Britain, pp. 110–117; Antonio 
Varsori, Il Patto di Bruxelles (1948): tra integrazione europea e alleanza atlantica, Rome: Bonacci, 
1988, pp. 185–211 and 244–269.
5 Stated in this way in a discussion of principles with the diplomats of the Foreign Office on 13 
Aug. 1945, quoted from Greenwood, “Ernest Bevin, France and ‘Western Union’: August 1945 – 
February 1946,” in European History Quarterly 14 (1984), pp. 319–338, here pp. 322ff.
6 Quoted from William Strang, Home and Abroad, London: André Deutsch, 1956, p. 290.
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proposals before he agreed to a discussion of the project. Given that Bidault was 
poorly prepared, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak agreed to the call 
for adjournment: Only in this way was a failure of the unification project due to 
British opposition prevented right then.
If Bevin thought that with the adjournment the project was dead, he was 
soon to be disabused of that notion. As early as 29 July, Spaak declared in the 
Belgian parliament his willingness to advance the proposal among the allied gov-
ernments if the Coordinating Committee of the European organizations presented 
more precise suggestions about its composition and tasks. A few days later, 
Ramadier signaled to committee leaders Duncan Sandys and Józef Retinger that 
the new French government—to which he himself belonged as minister of state, 
along with Léon Blum and Pierre-Henri Teitgen as deputy prime ministers, and 
Paul Reynaud as finance minister—would likewise be ready for such a step. As 
chairman of the Institutional Committee, which the Coordinating Committee had 
set up on 29 May, he worked out a proposal together with Sandys and others that 
envisioned in short order the summoning of a preparatory conference made up 
of seventy-five representatives sent by the parliaments of the five Brussels Pact 
countries. On 19 August, the Executive Committee passed this proposal on to 
all OEEC governments; on 2 September, the French and Belgian governments 
together called for it to be studied in detail in the Permanent Commission of the 
Brussels Pact so that a determination could be made at the next session of the 
Consultative Council.
Bevin initially sought to parry this foray too with delaying tactics. He had 
a questionnaire presented to the Permanent Commission that demanded exact 
information as to the competencies of the European Assembly as well as its rela-
tionship to the national governments and other international organizations and 
overseas territories. After the French side had offered more precise details to the 
effect that the assembly should at first only develop proposals on which the gov-
ernments would then decide, Bevin presented to Schuman (who had replaced 
Bidault as foreign minister on 24 July) a counterproposal on 2 October: the idea of 
a “Council of Europe” that would gather once a year to bring home to the public 
the intensity of Western European cooperation. Given that there was no further 
convergence of standpoints, the Consultative Council was only able to decide on a 
very superficial compromise on 25 October: An eighteen-member Study Commit-
tee was created to confer on both proposals until the next session of the Council.
This Study Committee took up its work on 26 November, and the oppos-
ing standpoints once again collided. Whereas the French—in order to save at 
least something of the idea of the representative preparatory conference—sent 
high-ranking European politicians (Édouard Herriot, Paul Reynaud, François de 
Menthon, and Léon Blum, who then became ill and was replaced by SFIO General 
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Secretary Guy Mollet), the British put the firm Europe opponent Hugh Dalton at 
the head of their delegation and other than him sent only civil servants. By 16 
December, a subcommittee had finally developed a compromise proposal that 
was approved in principle by all delegations. A “Council of Europe” consisting 
of ministers and deciding unanimously, as proposed by the British delegation, 
was to be combined with a Consultative Assembly, which in accordance with 
French conceptions was to be sent from the national parliaments and in two 
fortnight-long sessions per year develop proposals for the governments. The con-
tents of the Assembly’s discussions were to be decided by a two-thirds vote of the 
Council; further-reaching proposals of the Assembly could be banned with the 
same Council majority. A permanent secretariat was to support the work of both 
bodies.
After this preliminary result, Bevin came to the view that a parliamentary 
assembly was indeed unavoidable if he did not want to risk severely endanger-
ing the stabilization of Western Europe. He insisted however that the members 
of this assembly by appointed by the governments and that they vote en bloc in 
national delegations. This was significantly too little for his Continental nego-
tiation partners, and so after furious accusations against the British side, the 
Study Committee dispersed on 20 January without having come to agreement on 
a common report. Only at the session of the Consultative Council on 27 and 28 
January 1949 did Bevin realize that he could no longer lag too far behind the com-
promise formula that had been found in December. After Schuman had conceded 
to him that each country could decide for itself on the process for choosing the 
delegates, he accepted that they would be free in their voting and could also par-
ticipate in setting the agenda. On this basis, the creation of the new organization 
was in principle decided. At the same time, there was agreement that Italy, the 
Scandinavian states, and Ireland should immediately be invited to participate in 
the project.
There were further negotiations on the details in the Permanent Commission 
of the Brussels Pact, and beginning on 28 March, representatives of the additional 
founding members that had been invited also took part. The delegates accepted 
the British suggestion that the assembly be based in Strasbourg—which to an 
extent certainly accommodated the ambitions of the French but was also meant 
to dampen the possible resonance of the new organ from the beginning. In regard 
to the meeting place of the Council of Ministers, the French sought in vain to 
have Paris chosen, whereas Bevin insisted on London. Likewise, all of Schuman’s 
efforts to have the new organization dubbed “European Union” remained fruit-
less; the name remained open right up to the last moment. At the next meeting 
of the Consultative Council on 5 May, which definitively decided on the statutes 
of the new organization, Bevin succeeded in his efforts to have the designation 
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“Council of Europe” now serving for the ensemble of organs. He hoped that over 
the long term this new organization—even though he had not wanted it—would 
serve to ensure economic cooperation after the end of assistance from the Mar-
shall Plan and to integrate Germany into the Western community.7
The modest and belated results of the negotiations, as measured against 
initial hopes, made for a certain disappointment among the Continental Europe-
ans. That could not however keep them from now concentrating all their energy 
on the rapid development of the new institution. It was especially the Continental 
Socialists, for whom Britain’s participation in the work of unification was espe-
cially close to the heart, who importuned their visibly-hesitant political coun-
terparts across the Channel not to keep their minds closed to the necessity of a 
supranational “Third Power.” The Socialist Europe Movement (MSEUE), which 
was now significantly gaining in popularity, joined the European Movement in 
November of 1948, thereby correcting the tactical error of its decision against 
the Hague Congress. Leading Socialists participated on an equal footing in the 
second congress of the European Movement from 25 to 28 February 1949 in Brus-
sels. Decisions on European economic planning and the creation of common 
institutions for European heavy industry served to push the programmatic state-
ments of the movement significantly to the left and thereby signaled to Labour 
politicians that there would certainly be a place in the future Europe for their 
socio-political beliefs. At an international socialist conference in the Dutch city of 
Baarn in May of 1949, Labour representatives agreed that all Socialist deputies in 
the future Consultative Assembly would meet with each other.8
Parallel to this, Jean Monnet and his colleagues made efforts in detailed talks 
to win over British planning experts for an Anglo-French economic union, which 
was to constitute the centerpiece of the future European community. Given that 
the British were still interested in developing cooperation with France, Chancel-
lor of Exchequer Stafford Cripps agreed to informal preliminary conversations 
on the project between Monnet and Sir Edwin Plowden, chairman of the British 
Economic Planning Board. In talks that took place in late April of 1949 in Mon-
net’s home, it was the case however that there was hardly any convergence of 
views; yet, given that Plowden had much sympathy for practical proposals such 
as exchanging British coal for French agricultural products, the French negoti-
ators came away with the impression that with further exploration of common 
7 Cf. his remarks in a conversation with Dalton on 17 Nov. 1948, reported in Young, Britain, 
p. 113.
8 Cf. Loth, Sozialismus, pp.  225–229; Lipgens and Loth, Documents IV, pp.  298–300, 379–399, 
462–469.
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and reciprocal interests, the British could be won over for common solutions in 
the end.9
When the first term of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 
began on 10 August 1949 in Strasbourg, it could indeed seem that the break-
through to a supranational Europe was not far off. The national parliaments 
had sent top-level politicians of their factions, often those who had already been 
participating in the European Parliamentary Union or the European Movement. 
Even the British government, which was the only one to make use of the opportu-
nity to appoint delegates itself, decided to send a delegation in which Churchill 
could play a prominent role. The assembly elected Spaak, who had just left the 
Belgian government, as its president and then showed sufficient self-confidence 
to expand its competencies to the greatest extent possible within the provisions 
of the statute of the Council of Europe. It created a Standing Committee (likewise 
under the chairmanship of Spaak), which ensured the presence and continuity 
of the Assembly between its brief terms and which could serve as negotiation 
leader vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers. It then endowed the six other commit-
tees (among them a general “Political Committee”) with the right to meet outside 
the designated terms. Lastly, it called for the Council of Ministers to refrain from 
exercising influence over the agenda and to create the office of a deputy general 
secretary who was to be responsible only to the Assembly.
In terms of content, the assembly cautiously moved toward supra-nationality. 
Given that Sandys, the EPU, and the MSEUE were working zealously behind the 
scenes, Churchill made use of the opportunity to inflict upon the Labour deputies 
a series of defeats in votes taken. They soon withdrew in exasperation, and hence 
the federalists succeeded in having a goodly portion of their own ideas approved. 
At the close of their talks on 5 September, the Assembly passed with the required 
two-thirds majority a declaration from Mackay specifying that “the purpose and 
goal of the Council of Europe is the creation of a European political authority with 
limited functions but genuine authority.” The Standing Committee was given the 
task of dealing in greater detail with the issue of political authority and of bring-
ing about a special session of the Assembly at the beginning of 1950 that was to 
confer on the results of the Standing Committee’s work. The Political Committee 
was also to draft a “European Pact” that was to define “the guiding principles 
of the Council of Europe in political, economic, social, and cultural areas” and 
was to be “binding for all members and associate members”; the assembly was 
9 Cf. the reports of Etienne Hirsch (in: Erling Bjøl, La France devant l’Europe. La politique eu-
ropéenne de la IVe République, Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966, p. 67), Pierre Uri (ibid., p. 381) 
and Monnet (Mémoires, pp. 329–332); Éric Roussel, Jean Monnet 1888–1979, Paris: Fayard, 1996, 
pp. 504–508.
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to decide on this draft during the next regular term. The Council of Ministers was 
called upon to make the membership of the new West German Federal Republic 
possible before the next term and to provide for the strengthening of the Euro-
pean consciousness. Beyond that, the deputies developed the draft of a European 
human rights convention; they charged the Economic Committee with the task of 
grappling with the Ruhr question and coordinating the coal and steel industries; 
and they also called for dealing with the issue of a European university during 
the next term.10
With these decisions and these demands, the assembly certainly went beyond 
Bevin’s worst fears. He was anyway in the process of correcting his European 
policy preferences and now saw himself confirmed in the suspicion that the inde-
pendent Europe that he envisioned was not to be realized with the hot-headed and 
irresponsible politicians of the Continent. He had already given up the customs 
union project in September of 1948—in part because he had grown tired of the 
continuing opposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Treasury, and the 
Commonwealth representatives and in part because the political instability and, 
as he thought, immaturity of France made an irrevocable linkage between Britain 
and the Continent seem less and less advisable. More important to him than the 
creation of a unified European economic area, which would obviously be difficult 
to harmonize with the interests of the Commonwealth, was the political stabiliza-
tion of the Western European region, which he saw as being threatened by a com-
bination of internal weaknesses and the pressure of Soviet expansion. It was first 
of all important that a stable Western German state needed to be created and that 
European reconstruction be protected by an American security guarantee (which 
engaged him to the greatest extent up to the time of the Washington agreements 
on the North Atlantic Pact and the occupation statute for the Federal Republic of 
Germany, completed on 4 and 8 April 1949, respectively). Great Britain needed 
to support European integration, but it must not engage itself to the extent that 
it would not alone remain viable in the event of a collapse of Europe, as he and 
Cripps wrote in a cabinet presentation in late January of 1949.11
Assessing Bevin’s attitude towards the Council of Europe the American 
planners around George Kennan came to the conclusion that the British would 
10 Text of the resolutions in: Europa-Archiv 4 (1949), pp. 2557–2560 and 2579–2584; on the course 
of negotiations, Édouard Bonnefous, L’idée européenne et sa réalisation, Paris: Éditions du Grand 
siècle, 1950, pp. 125–149 and 301–333; Charles Melchior de Molènes, L’Europe de Strasbourg. Une 
première expérience de parlementarisme européen, Paris: Édition Roudil, 1971, pp. 181–197; Loth, 
Sozialismus, pp. 244–247.
11 Report of 26 Jan. 1949, reported in Young, Britain, pp. 122; cf. ibid., pp. 118–123; on Bevin’s 
fear of France, also David Dilks, “Britain and Europe, 1948–1950: The Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Secretary and the Cabinet,” in: Poidevin, Débuts, pp. 391–418, here p. 407.
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never accept the level of integration regarded as indispensable for integrating 
the Germans. For Kennan, one consequence of this assessment was that in accor-
dance with their economic interests, Great Britain and the Commonwealth should 
be drawn closer to the US and Canada. On the other hand, France should be 
called upon to take on the leadership of a closer Continental unification; and as 
part of that, French fears of German superiority were to be allayed by the military 
presence of the US in Europe. This conception ran into opposition from experts 
at the State Department such as Charles Bohlen, who feared that France would 
be unwilling to enter into an association with the new Germany without Britain, 
and who therefore called for greater pressure on the British. Kennan found 
support however from the Anglophile Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and he 
was therefore able to communicate it to the British side in formal conversations 
in London during the second half of August 1949. In early September, Washington 
then accommodated the British in trilateral financial talks (with the inclusion of 
Canada): Under the influence of Acheson, the British were accorded easier impor-
tation, special rights for the sterling zone, and a special American-British-Cana-
dian financial organization in return for the devaluation of the British pound. 
All this strengthened the British resolve “not to be drawn further into Europe.”12 
Bevin now completely gave up the idea of a European “Third Power”; he was 
satisfied that the American guarantee at least ensured British independence, and 
was all the more concerned for independence vis-à-vis the Continental Europeans 
in light of his estimate that it would still take at least ten years before they would 
be in a position to resist a Soviet attack.13
Full of gratitude for the special role that the American course correction 
gave the British, the Labour government organized the devaluation of the pound 
without any consideration for its partners in the OEEC, the Brussels Pact, or 
the Council of Europe. Fundamentally, though, it was in their interest too: The 
alarmingly-increasing dollar deficit served everywhere in Europe as a barrier to 
economic integration and dimmed the prospects of a lasting recovery of the Euro-
pean economies. Given that it had to entail adjustments in other currencies, the 
partners hoped for concerted action in which the timing and the extent of the 
devaluations would be coordinated. It was a clarion call for the Continent when 
12 According to the formulation of Foreign Office official Eric Berthoud in an analysis of the 
trilateral conversations of 13 Sept. 1949, quoted from Hogan, Marshall Plan, p.  265; cf. ibid., 
pp. 238–278; Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1954–51, London: Routledge, 
1984, pp. 287–295; on the conceptional shift, also Klaus Schwabe, “Der Marshall-Plan und Euro-
pa,” in: Poidevin, Débuts, pp. 47–69, here pp. 61–67.
13 Cf. Milward, Reconstruction, pp.  308ff.; Young, Britain, pp.  127; Dilks, Britain and Europe, 
pp. 411–414.
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the British, after having long rejected calls for devaluation, now unilaterally 
announced a thirty percent devaluation of the pound on 18 September without 
any consultation and did so after a separate agreement with the US. Léon Blum 
characterized this unilateral action by the British a “scandal” that was happening 
“exactly at the moment in which one was creating Europe.”14
Still greater was the disappointment when at the Council of Ministers meeting 
of the Council of Europe from 3 to 5 November, Bevin objected to nearly all the 
demands of the Consultative Committee, doing so with American assurances of 
support. Only the call for allowing the Federal Republic to become an associ-
ate member gained his support (full membership not being possible as long as 
the new state did not possess sovereignty in foreign policy). All recommenda-
tions on economic issues were referred to the OEEC. Because the Council could 
only decide unanimously, those proposals that amounted to an expansion of 
the Council of Europe (among them the call for a special session of the assem-
bly) were rejected after Bevin’s veto.15 This meant that the path of the Council 
of Europe toward becoming a European constituent assembly was blocked even 
before it had really been embarked upon in the work of the Commissions of the 
Consultative Assembly. The federalists who had sought to persuade the British in 
Strasbourg felt themselves rebuffed; with dismay the French government saw the 
task of integrating the Germans falling to it alone.
The Emergence of the Coal and Steel Community
There was no quick way out of the blind alley in which the European unification 
movement found itself after the British veto of the decisions of the Consultative 
Assembly. It was indeed the case that conservative politicians such as de Gaulle 
and Coudenhove-Kalergi, who had always regarded the possibility of British par-
ticipation with skepticism, now energetically advocated for a Continental federa-
tion.16 The Union of European Federalists (UEF), in which the constitutional wing 
around Altiero Spinelli had in the meantime come to the fore, pushed for the 
conclusion of a federal pact that was to come into force “as soon as it is ratified by 
states with a total population of at least one hundred million”; the British and the 
Scandinavians, who would certainly not participate, were offered the prospect 
of “especially amicable organic connections” to the members of the pact in the 
14 Pierre-Olivier Lapie, De Léon Blum à de Gaulle. Le caractère et le pouvoir, Paris: Fayard, 1971, 
p. 214.
15 Text of the resolutions in: Europa-Archiv 4 (1949), pp. 2697 and 2609–2612.
16 Cf. Lipgens and Loth, Documents III, pp. 110–113; Posselt, Coudenhove-Kalergi, pp. 374ff.
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vague hope that those countries would later revise their views.17 The majority 
of the Continental forces favoring unification shrank back from a break with the 
British, however: The Benelux states once again saw French dominance in store 
for them; for their part, the French feared the dominance of the Germans; and 
the various adherents of the “Third Power” saw their final hopes for a socialistic 
Europe dwindling. French Socialist Francis Leenhardt was expressing a wide-
spread sentiment when in the National Assembly he said that a Europe without 
Great Britain would mean “the industrial dominance of Germany, France as a veg-
etable garden; it would be the realization of Hitler’s dream despite his defeat; it 
would be a German Europe.”18
Under these circumstances, it proved impossible to expand a planned Fran-
co-Italian customs union to the Benelux states. From May of 1949, talks with 
Belgium were carried on and with the Netherlands from October onward. It 
emerged that France and Italy were only willing to accept an incremental reduction 
in import restrictions and insisted on setting up coordinating organs, whereas the 
Benelux countries pushed for the quickest possible liberalization and wanted the 
Federal Republic incorporated into the union as quickly as possible. The experts 
of the Five reached agreement in principle on 9 December on the creation of a 
“Fritalux” or “Finebel” group; the participation of the Federal Republic remained 
an open question, and the antagonisms solidified over the following weeks at the 
governmental level. The British, who did not want to be excluded from a closer 
Continental market, reinforced the Dutch in their opposition to a customs union 
without the Federal Republic and at the same time warned the French so force-
fully against burdening Anglo-French cooperation that the Bidault government—
in the face of the generally pro-British opinion of the French public—no longer 
dared to continue pursuing the project against multiple group interests. When 
in late February of 1950 the British government announced a plan for a Euro-
pean customs union that meant the end of the Finebel negotiations. The treaty 
on a bilateral customs union between France and Italy, which had already been 
signed, remained in parliamentary committees and was finally laid to rest in July 
of 1951.19
17 Quotes from “Die Resolution der außerordentlichen Generalversammlung der UEF 29.–
31.10.1949 in Paris,” Lipgens and Loth, Documents IV, pp.  84–91, on the strategy of the UEF, 
Sergio Pistone, The Union of European Federalists, Milan: Giuffrè, 2008, pp. 50–57.
18 Journal Officiel de la République française, Assemblée nationale, Débats parlementaires 
2511.1949, pp. 6214–6218. Cf. Wilfried Loth, “Der Abschied vom Europarat. Europapolitische Ent-
scheidungen im Kontext des Schuman-Plans,” in: Klaus Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schu-
man-Plans 1950/51, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988, pp. 183–195.
19 Milward, Reconstruction, pp. 306–316; Richard T. Griffith and Frances M. B. Lynch, “L’échec 
de la ‘Petite Europe’: les négociations Fritalux/Finebel, 1949–1950,” in: Revue historique 109 
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Although in a “personal message” of 30 November Acheson had called upon 
Schuman to take over leadership in integrating West Germany into a suprana-
tional Europe,20 the French government remained inactive for a long while. It 
neither wanted to relieve Great Britain of responsibility for the European com-
munity nor could it allow a break with the British given French public opinion 
and the attitude of its Socialist coalition partners. There were no responses to 
the public advances by which Konrad Adenauer as chancellor of the new West 
German republic sought to set in motion the move from one-sided occupation 
restrictions to Western integration on an equal footing: On 25 August 1949, there 
was Bonn’s proposal to internationalize the Thyssen steelworks as a first step 
toward mutualizing heavy industry, then on 8 March 1950, the grandiose idea of 
a comprehensive union between France and Germany, and on 21 March the pro-
posal for a progressive economic union of the two countries.21 Instead of respond-
ing, the Bidault government enmeshed itself in unedifying controversies over dis-
mantling policy in the Federal Republic, the Ruhr statute, and the future status 
of the Saarland—controversies that burdened Franco-German relations as well as 
relations with the Allies without at the same time bringing any greater security 
against a German resurgence.
Nevertheless, Schuman and many others in authority in Paris knew that time 
was against them. The longer they waited with concrete offers of integration, the 
less the likelihood that the Germans, who in principle could demand equality 
in the Western alliance, would accept. The chance offered them by Adenauer’s 
fundamental Western orientation could not last indefinitely. To this was added 
the concern that after the end of Marshall aid, the prospects of a lasting economic 
recovery were anything but rosy. Furthermore, many experienced their own pow-
erlessness on the world stage as increasingly depressing after the detonation of 
a Soviet atomic bomb in late August of 1949 and the resultant militarization of 
American containment policy. The pressure that was then weighing on the French 
government to make a decision became all the greater when, according to a report 
of the Economic Commission for Europe of late 1949, a crisis of overproduction 
was threatening to develop in the European steel industry, which would allow the 
Germans—who alone possessed the necessary coal reserves—to gain dominance 
(1985), pp. 159–193; Pierre Guillen, “Le projet d’union économique entre la France, l’Italie et le 
Benelux,” in: Poidevin, Débuts, pp. 143–157.
20 FRUS 1949, III, pp. 624ff.
21 Cf. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg: 1876–1952, Stuttgart: DVA, 1986, pp. 684 and 
701ff.; on Adenauer’s conception of Europe, Wilfried Loth, “Konrad Adenauer und die europäi-
sche Einigung,” in: Mareike König and Matthias Schulz (eds.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
und die europäische Einigung 1949–2000, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004, pp. 81–105.
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in heavy industry again. Moreover, with the end of the American monopoly on 
nuclear weapons, a German contribution to defense became ever more unavoid-
able. It was obvious that the Germans would make use of this strategic chance to 
push through their sovereignty.
Only in late April of 1950 did Schuman decide to act when it became known 
that Acheson and Bevin would at the upcoming foreign ministers conference of 
the three Western allies (set for 11 to 13 May) call for lifting the limit of 11.1 million 
metric tons per year that had been imposed on West German steel production. 
A weakening of the occupation statute was also on the agenda, and after Chur-
chill on 16 March had in the House of Commons proposed the creation of a West 
German troop contingent within the framework of a European army, the possi-
bility could no longer be excluded that there would need to be negotiations over 
corresponding demands by the American and British general staffs.22 In this sit-
uation, Monnet presented—with a sure sense for the appropriate moment—the 
project for a European authority for coal and steel on 28 April. Unlike Prime Min-
ister Bidault, who hardly took notice of it, Schuman resolved after a weekend in 
his homeland of Lorraine to dare a breakthrough on supra-nationality without 
Great Britain: “It’ll be on my head,” as he said to his assistant Bernard Clappier 
as he arrived in the Gare de l’Est on Monday.23
He benefitted from the fact that the Socialist ministers had left the govern-
ment in February due to differences over social policy. In order to circumvent 
further opposition, he ensured that his decision was initially known only to a 
few confidants; he informed the Council of Ministers only superficially too. 
On 8 May, he obtained Adenauer’s approval; and on the morning of 9 May, he 
brought about a positive decision by French government—against the opposition 
of Bidault but with energetic support from René Mayer and René Pleven. On the 
evening of the same day, just before the opening of the foreign ministers confer-
ence, he announced the project in a press conference: subordination of the “total-
ity of Franco-German coal and steel production to a common Highest Supervi-
22 Cf. Norbert Wiggershaus, “Zur Frage einer militärischen Integration Westdeutschlands (bis 
Mai 1950),” in: Poidevin, Débuts, pp. 343–366.
23 Quoted from Pierre Gerbet, “La naissance du Plan Schuman,” in: Andreas Wilkens (ed.), Le 
Plan Schuman dans l’Histoire. Intérêts nationaux et projet européen, Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 
2004, pp.  13–51. On the prehistory of the Schuman Plan, cf. also Milward, Reconstruction, 
pp. 358–401; Raymond Poidevin, Robert Schuman – homme d’Etat 1886–1963, Paris: Imprimerie 
nationale, 1986, pp. 244–263; Ulrich Lappenküper, “Der Schuman-Plan. Mühsamer Durchbruch 
zur deutsch-französischen Verständigung,” in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 42 (1994), 
pp. 403–445, here pp. 405–413; Roussel, Monnet, pp. 519–529; William I. Hitchcock, France Res-
tored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954, Chapel Hill and 
London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998, pp. 116–129.
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sory Authority […] which stands open for entry by other European countries and 
whose decisions will be binding.”24
There were several reasons why Monnet and Schuman took up the project 
of a coal and steel union as a way to escape from the blind alley in European 
politics.25 Firstly, it was the given means by which the feared steel crisis could be 
dealt with and by which the necessary Ruhr coal could be secured over the long 
term for the expansion of the French steel industry. It thereby simultaneously 
rescued France’s modernization plan, which without that expansion would have 
failed and which had already come under fire in domestic politics anyway. Given 
that it exposed French steel industrialists to West German competition it even 
exercised a modernizing pressure, which the planners around Monnet had up to 
that point sorely missed. Above all, however, it offered a promising alternative 
to the vain struggle against a new German dominance, one that at the same time 
served to strengthen European self-assertion: “German resources and energies,” 
as Schuman formulated it in a personal note, “to confine ourselves to containing 
them and retarding them by means of prohibitions and hostile coalitions or to 
enhance them and make them bear fruit for the common benefit of the whole 
of unified Europe.”26 At the same time, the project of a High Authority for Coal 
and Steel was less ambitious than the customs union and less spectacular than 
a political federation; consequently, there were better prospects of success with 
those who advocated a Europe with Great Britain, a group whose parliamentary 
support was still necessary.
In fact, the Labour government, completely surprised by Schuman’s ini-
tiative, attempted to bring the Continental Socialists on board so as to take the 
supranational vanguard away from the Schuman Plan. On the one hand, the 
British definitely had an interest in integrating the Federal Republic through 
France; on the other, the prospect of Continental autonomy and possibly a Con-
tinental steel cartel caused them significant unease. In order to escape from the 
dilemma, they decided on British participation in the endeavor, though under the 
provision that it, like the Council of Europe, would be trimmed down to a “real-
istic” level that would not hinder Britain’s freedom of action. However, Monnet 
put a stop to that in conversations in London, in which he made the acceptance 
24 Text of the declaration in: Europa-Archiv 5 (1950), pp. 3091ff. 
25 Enlightening for the motive is Monnet’s exposé of 3 May 1950, published in Le Monde on 9 
May 1970. Cf. also Monnet, Mémoires, pp. 341–353.
26 Undated note in Schuman’s papers, investigated by Gilbert Trausch, “Der Schuman-Plan zwi-
schen Mythos und Realität. Der Stellenwert des Schuman-Plans,” in: Rainer Hudemann, Hart-
mut Kaelble, and Klaus Schwabe (eds.), Europa im Blick der Historiker, Munich: Oldenbourg, 
1995, pp. 105–128, here pp. 113ff.
 The Emergence of the Coal and Steel Community   33
of the supranational principle a prerequisite for the beginning of negotiations. 
For some days, Schuman thought about whether the British should be accorded a 
special status in the negotiations and in the future organization. However, when 
Monnet had shown him that such a course would stimulate the covetousness of 
the other partners for special rights, he demanded of the British on 1 June that 
they decide by the evening of the next day whether they wanted to participate 
in talks on a supranational authority or not. The answer was negative: Bevin, 
for whom such an engagement went too far, proposed instead an Anglo-French 
meeting at the ministerial level. This was in turn rejected by Schuman, and so on 
3 June, the governments of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, 
and the Federal Republic issued a joint communiqué announcing negotiations on 
a coal and steel union along the lines of the Schuman Plan.27
In the talks that began on 20 June in Paris, Monnet had to accept some modifi-
cations of his concept. Originally, he had hoped that the right of decision-making 
in the coal and steel sectors could be transferred more or less wholesale to a High 
Authority and that the treaty could over the course of the summer of 1950 be made 
ready for signing. However, the negotiation partners, particularly the Benelux 
governments, insisted on specifying the competencies of the new organization in 
detail and on precisely determining the relationship between the supranational 
realm and national decision-making areas. In the process, differing conceptions 
as to the scope of the supranational competency as well as differing economic 
interests manifested themselves. The talks thus dragged out and several times 
also wound up in dangerous waters. It was not until the middle of December that 
a draft treaty was ready, and then the resolution of contentious individual issues 
took so much time that the foreign ministers of the Six where only able to sign the 
treaty on the “European Coal and Steel Community” (ECSC) on 18 April 1951.28
Whereas Monnet had spoken only vaguely of the “possibility of appeals” 
regarding decisions of the High Authority, its competence would now be limited 
by no fewer than three organs: A Council of Ministers (which the Benelux rep-
resentatives originally even wanted to place above the High Authority) was 
27 The decision-making process is documented in: Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series 
II, Vol. I: The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, May 1950 
– December 1952, London, 1986. Cf. Monnet, Mémoires, pp. 360–372; Massigli, Comédie, pp. 185–
209, 236ff.; Young, Britain, pp. 150–157; Roger Bullen, “The British Government and the Schuman 
Plan, May 1950 – March 1951,” in: Schwabe, Anfänge, pp. 199–210; Roussel, Monnet, pp. 535–537 
and 540–550; David Gowland, Arthur Turner, and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration 
since 1945. On the Sidelines, London and New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 28–35.
28 Treaty text in: Europa. Dokumente, vol. 2, pp. 702ff. On the negotiations, the contributions 
in Schwabe, Anfänge; Lappenküper, Schuman-Plan, pp. 418–438; Roussel, Monnet, pp. 553–566 
and 602–604.
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able to issue instructions in precisely-defined crisis situations and had to give 
its approval for measures of the Authority likely to have an influence over other 
economic areas; depending on the sensitivity of the subject matter, it was spec-
ified that there be either a simple majority or a qualified majority or unanimity. 
True, the Parliamentary Assembly (which the West German delegation would 
have gladly had as the first chamber of a legislature) possessed only the right to 
demand reports and to topple the High Authority (with a two-thirds majority); 
de facto however it could be brought into play by the High Authority against the 
interests of individual governments or the Council of Ministers. There was also a 
court functioning as constitutional court, administrative court, and arbitration 
authority, to which there could be appeals not only by all organs and member 
states but also by all natural and juridical persons of the Community.
In regard to the harmonization of wages and prices (which was finally to 
bring the presumed locational advantage of the Lorraine steel industry29 to the 
fore), the French side had to cut back significantly: Only targeted wage dumping 
and discriminatory pricing were forbidden; beyond that, the High Authority 
could only have a steering effect by determining highest and (in crisis situations) 
lowest prices. Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers and the High Authority could 
in crisis situations set production quotas and allocate resources: This secured 
access to Ruhr coal for France and made it possible to dispense with the Interna-
tional Authority for the Ruhr after the common coal market had come into effect. 
The French, with American support, also succeeded in breaking the opposition 
of the Federal Republic and Belgium to a far-reaching ban on mergers. Monnet 
was able to push through a provision requiring approval of all future mergers and 
stakes and specifying that no group could have more than a twenty-percent share 
of the market in coal or steel. Together with the break-up terms for the Ruhr indus-
try, which Adenauer had to concede after extremely-crucial negotiations in Mid-
March of 1951, these regulations offered effective measures against the renewed 
dominance of German heavy industry.
The French government had thus pushed through the core of its integra-
tion conception literally at the last minute. With the unified French and Amer-
ican threat of otherwise providing for harsher deconcentration regulations, it 
was possible to hinder the Federal Republic—which had grown quiet self-con-
fident due to the Korean War—from insisting on a thoroughgoing restitution of 
its heavy industrial structure and thus bringing about the failure of the coal and 
steel union. In comparison to this success, it was of only secondary importance 
that Belgian Foreign Minister Paul van Zeeland had in the last negotiation round 
29 In fact, that was the case only for the pure production costs but was not operative for most 
consumers, who additionally had to take transport costs into account. 
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secured a practically unlimited transition period during which Belgium could 
subsidize its ailing coal industry with “compensatory payments.” And it was a 
mere blemish that the foreign ministers could not agree on the seat of the new 
organization. This issue had still not been resolved after the conclusion of the rat-
ification process, and Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Joseph Bech—at the end of 
an exhausting night session of the six foreign ministers on the morning of 24 July 
1952—suggested that one could provisionally begin in Luxembourg and then see. 
The High Authority with Monnet as first president was thereupon able to take up 
its work in the capital of the smallest member state on 10 August 1952.30
The European Payments Union (EPU) came into existence more quickly than 
the ECSC. After the liberalization of foreign trade in the OEEC had initially been 
gotten underway only extremely cautiously, the American threat not to pay the 
third and fourth annual tranches of Marshall aid led to an acceleration in late 
1949: It was first of all decided that fifty percent of the foreign trade of the OEEC 
states would be liberalized; and then the Executive Committee of the OEEC agreed 
on 18 June 1950 to the establishment of a multilateral payment system. From 1 July 
1950, the OEEC states settled their interstate trade via a common clearing house; 
accordingly, countries with debts received a loan of as much as nine percent 
of the previous year’s payments, whereas a growing portion of debts had to be 
settled immediately in gold or dollars. After the official founding of the EPU on 19 
September, the OEEC countries extended the liberalization ratio to sixty percent 
and agreed on a further increase to seventy-five percent for the coming February. 
In July of 1951, the OEEC Council approved an expansion-oriented list of goods for 
which foreign trade would be completely liberalized.31
Yet, there was no rapid progress to be seen on unification via the level of 
economic integration that had been reached up to that point. This became clear 
when in late June of 1950 Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker presented the OEEC 
Council with a plan that combined the liberalization of individual economic 
sectors with the establishment of a European modernization fund. This “sectoral 
integration” was to encompass all economic areas that three quarters of the OEEC 
members wanted to mutualize and then would be in force for those countries 
only. The British government saw in this the dangerous beginning of a suprana-
tional economic organization extending beyond the coal and steel realms and 
therefore made use of a request by the Economic Cooperation Administration for 
30 Cf. Gilbert Trausch, “Robert Schuman, le Luxembourg et l’Europe,” in: Robert Schuman. Les 
racines et l’œuvre d’un grand Européen, exhibit catalogue, Luxembourg, 1986, pp. 24–83, here 
p. 67–73.
31 Cf. Milward, Reconstruction, pp. 320–334 and 421–434; Hogan, Marshall-Plan, pp. 292, 295–
303, 320–325, 355–364.
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some specifications in order to push through the setting up of a special commit-
tee to review the plan more closely, together with proposals of Italian Finance 
Minister Giuseppe Pella for a staggered reduction of internal tariffs and the plan 
of French Finance Minister Maurice Petsch for founding a European Investment 
Bank. In this way, any momentum on the path to a common market was stopped 
for the time being.32
Further steps toward integration that would be confined to the area of the 
six ECSC members could not be so quickly accomplished either. There was an 
unsuccessful attempt by federalists from the UEF, MSEUE, and parts of the NEI to 
force the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe to embrace the project 
of a European federation pact by mobilizing public opinion. Neither signature 
campaigns nor local public opinion polls or the formation of a “Council of Vigi-
lance” that attempted to have a direct effect on the deputies in Strasbourg during 
the term of 18 to 24 November 1950 could alter the fact that the majority of those 
forces on the Continent favorably disposed toward unification shrank back from 
deepening integration without having the British onboard.33 Despite the hopes of 
such figures as Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and despite what Monnet 
had suggested, there was no direct route from the ECSC to the political federation 
of Europe.
The Drama of the EDC
The danger that Monnet and others in authority in France saw looming in the 
spring of 1950 materialized more quickly than expected: Owing to the change 
in European public sentiment in favor of a German contribution to defense—a 
change sparked by the North Korean attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950—
the Truman administration decided over the course of August to combine the 
strengthening of its military engagement in Europe with the creation of West 
German troops. On 12 September, Acheson confronted his British and French col-
leagues at a gathering in New York with the demand for the establishment of a 
West German army under the auspices of a NATO “European Defense Force.” In 
return, he offered American participation in this integrated NATO force, which 
included an increase in the number of US divisions stationed in Europe from two 
to six and the assumption of command of this force by an American general.34 The 
32 Cf. Milward, Reconstruction, pp. 446–451; Hogan, Marshall-Plan, pp. 350–353.
33 Cf. Loth, Sozialismus, pp. 274ff.
34 Cf. Norbert Wiggershaus, “Die Entscheidung für einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag 
1950,” in: Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956, vol. 1: Von der Kapitulation bis 
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Federal Republic was thereby offered possibilities for advancement even without 
supranational integration. With a linkage of interests between the US and West 
Germany, France was threatened with isolation; and in the long term there was 
also the threat of either complete American dominance over the European conti-
nent or the rise of Germany to the status of great power once again.
French authorities registered with great concern how the West German posi-
tion in the negotiations over the Schuman Plan stiffened and how Adenauer’s 
domestic political freedom of action was noticeably reduced. In this situation, 
nothing was left to them except forcing the development of a political Europe with 
a military dimension if they did not want to risk having their policy on Germany 
and Europe turned into a heap of ashes. As Monnet reported, “The circumstances 
compelled us to cut corners: The European federation was becoming a near-term 
goal.” He importuned Schuman to save the Schuman Plan by expanding it: “The 
army, weapons, and basic production would be placed under a common sover-
eignty at the same time. We could not wait, as we had envisioned, for a political 
Europe to crown a growing construction, because a common defense could only 
be conceived of under a common sovereignty right from the beginning.”35
However, it was difficult to prevail with this realization even in the French 
Council of Ministers. The Socialists, who in the meantime were in the govern-
ment once again, still shrank back from forcing the unification process without 
Great Britain; Defense Minister Jules Moch, whose son had been brutally killed 
by the Germans, and President Vincent Auriol were bitter opponents of any form 
of German rearmament. In accordance with Monnet’s elucidations, Schuman 
suggested “seeking a European solution to German rearmament” but was ini-
tially called off by the Council of Ministers. He was given a binding instruction 
to play for time at a second negotiation round in late September in New York. 
While Schuman was there, Monnet was able to convince Prime Minister René 
Pleven that agreement to West German rearmament could not be dragged out any 
further if an increase in American engagement in Europe was desired and that the 
government’s fall could only be avoided if West German forces were integrated 
into a European defense community in addition to NATO. After an abundance 
of further conversations as well as planning drafts from the Monnet group and 
sounding-out of the Americans, the government agreed on 19 October to the pro-
zum Pleven-Plan, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982, pp. 325–402; Rolf Steininger, Wiederbewaffnung. 
Die Entscheidung für einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag: Adenauer und die Westmächte 
1950, Erlangen, Bonn, and Vienna: Straube, 1989.
35 Monnet, Mémoires, pp. 401.
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posal to counter the Allied demand for the creation of West German forces with 
the project of a European army.36
In all this, however, there was not much left of the idea of expanding the coal 
and steel union into a political federation. In his government declaration of 24 
October (formulated point by point by Monnet), Pleven spoke only very vaguely 
of having this army “linked with the political institutions of a united Europe.” A 
“European defense minister” was proposed as the political steering organ of the 
integrated European army, an official who was to “fulfill” the “existing interna-
tional commitments” (that is, the provisions of NATO) “on the basis of directives 
that he would receive from the Council of Ministers.” There were no exact state-
ments as to the relationship between NATO structures and the European Army 
or statements as to the decision-making mechanisms of the Council of Ministers 
or the competencies of the Parliamentary Assembly that was likewise named as 
a control organ. Instead, it was explained that member states already in posses-
sion of an army would only submit their forces incrementally to the common 
command and would do so only insofar as those forces did not have “other needs 
to meet than those of common defense.” Also, integration of the national contin-
gents was to occur “on the basis of the smallest possible unit.”37 This amounted 
to two-fold discrimination against the Federal Republic: It was to be the only par-
ticipant that neither was a member of the Atlantic Alliance nor had forces outside 
the European Army, and that did not have its own general staff or its own defense 
minister; in the anticipated integration at the level of the battalion or in any event 
at the level of the regiment, access to higher headquarters was also more or less 
barred. Beyond that, the proposal had aspects that would clearly have a retard-
ing effect: Pleven specified that the creation of the European Army, which itself 
would take time, would occur only after the signing of the ECSC treaty.
The discriminatory and dilatory aspects of the proposal did indeed secure it a 
majority in the French National Assembly (349 to 235 votes on 25 November) and 
thereby saved Pleven’s government. Among the Allies, however, it unleashed a 
nearly-unanimous outcry. British Defense Minister Emanuel Shinwell privately 
termed it nothing less than “disgusting: military folly and political madness.”38 
Most politicians, with Acheson at the forefront, saw the proposal only as an 
attempt to sabotage the planned creation of a NATO armed force. Only the Belgian 
and Luxembourg governments, for which the creation of West German troops also 
caused major concern, could find any positive elements in the proposal. The most 
that the Allies were willing to do at the end of November was to concede a confer-
36 Ibid., pp. 425–440; Roussel, Monnet, pp. 578–589; Hitchcock, France Restored, pp. 139–144.
37 Text of the declaration in: Europa. Dokumente, vol. 2, pp. 813–815.
38 Quoted from Steininger, Wiederbewaffnung, pp. 267.
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ence on the Pleven Plan, for which France was to extend invitations. Regardless 
of the result of that gathering, the French government was to agree to the creation 
of West German “battle troops” (halfway between battalions and divisions). On 
6 December, the French Council of Ministers accepted this deal, after dramatic 
arguments within the SFIO party leadership.39
The prospects for creating the European Army had not been increased with 
this minimal compromise—which was nonetheless approved by the Atlantic 
Council in Brussels on 19 December. Adenauer was now seeking direct mem-
bership in NATO for the Federal Republic. After the Brussels decision, he no 
longer regarded the detour via the European Army as necessary and considering 
the mood of the West German public, no longer supportable either. Yet, he did 
participate in the talks on the Pleven Plan, which began in Paris on 15 Febru-
ary 1951; but he demanded military equality for the Federal Republic from the 
beginning and also concentrated on the conversations about the creation of West 
German troops that he had to have with the three High Commissioners. Beyond 
the Federal Republic, only Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy accepted the French 
invitation; the Netherlands and Britain along with the other NATO partners were 
represented only by observers. Given that the French were not prepared to give up 
the discriminatory elements of their draft, the negotiations dragged out endlessly 
without a convergence of viewpoints.40
A breakthrough in the project for a European Army began to emerge only 
in early June of 1951 when Monnet was able to persuade General Dwight Eisen-
hower, who had been named supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe, that 
the contradiction between the French need for security and German demands for 
equality could at base only be overcome with a European Army. In response, the 
general made it clear to Monnet that a European Army could not be had without 
an improvement in the status of the Germans; both men then worked to push 
through these viewpoints in their respective governments. In early July, Acheson 
made up his mind to approve the European Army in principle; Adenauer was then 
informed that the American government was now seeking this solution. Then, in 
the Paris negotiations, Schuman accepted the incorporation into the European 
Army of all units earmarked for the defense of Europe as well as the recruiting of 
39 Cf. Loth, Sozialismus, pp. 287–289.
40 On the negotiations up to the conclusion of the EDC Treaty in May of 1952, Klaus A. Maier, “Die 
internationalen Auseinandersetzungen um die Westintegration der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land und um ihre Bewaffnung im Rahmen der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft,” in: 
Anfänge westeuropäischer Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956, vol. 2: Die EVG-Phase, Munich: Olden-
bourg, 1990, pp.  1–234, here pp.  29–124; Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg, “Die Planung des Verteidi-
gungsbeitrags der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rahmen der EVG,” ibid., pp. 605–756, here 
pp. 630–670.
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German soldiers by West German authorities. Also, he no longer insisted on a veto 
over a West German defense ministry. Lastly, at a foreign ministers conference 
of the three Occupying Powers from 10 to 14 September in Washington, he also 
gave up his resistance to integration at the division level. In return, Acheson dis-
pensed with the demand that West German troops be mustered before the Euro-
pean Defense Community (EDC) had come into existence. Adenauer, who wanted 
both sovereignty and West German troops before the conclusion of the necessari-
ly-complex EDC negotiations, had to come to terms with the fact that the removal 
of the occupation statute was bound up with West German entry into the EDC.41
With this late success of the Pleven Plan, the problem of the political fed-
eration of Europe posed itself once again with great stridency: If the European 
Defense Ministry was to function, a European political authority had to be created 
to which it would be subordinated. In any event, that was the conclusion to which 
Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi came over the course of the summer of 
1951. Not only did a purely military community seem impracticable to him but 
also problematic given the low enthusiasm for defense matters among the Italian 
people. Furthermore, he feared a Franco-German hegemony within the defense 
community; and that was a sufficient reason itself for pursuing a supranational 
orientation. At the first foreign ministers conference of the six EDC negotiation 
partners on 11 December 1951 in Strasbourg, he thus argued for the beginning of 
talks on the creation of a political community.
Meanwhile, Churchill’s victory in parliamentary elections on 25 October had 
kindled new hopes of British participation in the unification project. As a con-
sequence, the Dutch and Belgian governments rejected any thought of political 
expansion of the defense community; and Schuman too held back with an eye 
toward fluctuating majorities in France. Adenauer, for whom equal status and 
quick integration into the West were more important than the further development 
of the Political Community, mediated a dilatory compromise: The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the future defense community was given the task of “concerning 
itself with the creation of a European organization of a federal or confederal 
character.” At the next gathering of the six ministers from 27 to 30 December, 
it was specified that the assembly should present proposals for preparing such 
an organization within six months after meeting; these proposals were then to 
be reviewed by a government conference. With this agreement, which was then 
incorporated as Article 38 of the EDC Treaty, the project of a Political Community 
41 Cf. the conference protocols in FRUS 1951, III, Part 1, pp. 1228ff.; the Allied memorandum for 
Adenauer, ibid., Part 2, pp. 1528ff.
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was definitively linked to the EDC, although the decision on its coming into exis-
tence was postponed for the time being.42
In further negotiations, the Benelux representatives prevailed with extensive 
cuts in the supranational character of the treaty construction. In place of a Euro-
pean defense minister, there was to be a nine-member commission whose inde-
pendent activities were limited to carrying out the current operations of arma-
ment and supply. Almost all essential decisions, from the issuing of regulations 
to the drafting of a budget, were made dependent on unanimous votes of the 
Council of Ministers. In regard to operations, the troop commands were subor-
dinated to the NATO headquarters for Europe; the supreme Allied commander 
was accorded wide-ranging inspection rights and in the event of a crisis was also 
to be entrusted with supreme command of EDC troops by the Council of Minis-
ters. Due to French resistance, Adenauer was unable to push through the Federal 
Republic’s direct membership in NATO, which would have been consistent with 
the close linkage of these two organizations; the other treaty partners and the US 
too did continue to seek it, however. For the transition period, the Federal Repub-
lic was accorded the right to demand joint sessions of the NATO Council and the 
EDC Council of Ministers if its security were threatened. In this form, which had 
been in the offing since the EDC foreign ministers meeting of 26 and 27 January 
1952 in Paris, the Treaty on the European Defense Community was signed in the 
French capital on 27 May 1952.43
The absence of any supranational integration attached to this construction 
drove the French to demand from the British and the Americans additional guar-
antees against German high-handedness. They succeeded in that the British 
government extended the pledges of assistance that it had made in the Brussels 
Pact to include the Federal Republic and Italy, and that the British and Ameri-
cans agreed to a Three-Power Declaration in which the Allies put forth their inten-
tion to maintain troops on the European continent and to regard any violation 
to the integrity of the EDC as a threat to their own security.44 Beyond this, full 
42 Protocols of the conference of 11 Dec. 1951 in Walter Lipgens, “EVG und politische Födera-
tion. Protokolle der Konferenz der Außenminister der an den Verhandlungen über eine europäi-
sche Verteidigungsgemeinschaft beteiligten Länder am 11. Dezember 1951,” in: Vierteljahrshefte 
für Zeitgeschichte 32 (1984), pp. 637–688; the communiqué of 30 Dec. 1951 in: Europa. Dokumen-
te, vol. 2, pp. 829ff. On Gasperi’s initiative, cf. Ralf Magagnoli, Italien und die Europäische Vertei-
digungsgemeinschaft. Zwischen europäischem Credo und nationaler Machtpolitik, Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 91–122; Daniela Preda, Alcide De Gasperi federalista europeo, Bolo-
gna: Il Mulino, 2004, pp. 613–639.
43 Text in: Europa. Dokumente, vol. 2, pp. 836–886; on military structure, also Meier-Dörnberg, 
“Planung,” pp. 698–714.
44 Text in: FRUS 1952–54, V, Part 1, pp. 686ff.
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sovereignty was denied the Federal Republic: In the “general treaty” replacing 
the occupation statute, which was signed in Bonn a day before the EDC Treaty, 
the Allies reserved the right to proclaim a state of emergency, the right to station 
troops, as well as all rights regarding “Germany as a whole.”45 Likewise, accord-
ing to the terms of the EDC Treaty, the Federal Republic was forbidden to produce 
ABC weapons, long-range missiles, military aircraft, and warships. With these 
terms and above all with the guarantee declaration, it was at base NATO that was 
the actual control organ of West German armament. For the time being, the EDC 
ministers could only demonstrate European independence by unanimously con-
tradicting the deployment orders of the American supreme commander.
British and American declarations of intent clearly did not suffice to elim-
inate French worries. Hence, the Pinay government procrastinated until the 
last moment in signing the treaty at all. Immediately after the signing, voices 
demanded supplements—either expansion to a Political Community or a British 
presence guarantee, perhaps British entry too. Many even wanted both at the 
same time, and many sought an escape from the unpleasant situation in which 
they found themselves (thanks to the decision for a Western military alliance), 
by once again looking at the possibilities for an arrangement with the Soviet 
Union. The Socialists began to split over the issue of agreeing to the treaty, and 
the Gaullists, who had advocated a political confederation with national contin-
gents, announced their opposition. After that, a parliamentary majority for rati-
fication of the treaty was not to be expected. The government, which was itself 
divided over the question of signing, consoled itself with the thought that it had 
at least succeeded in linking the creation of West German troops and the release 
of the Federal Republic from the occupation statute to the ratification of the EDC 
Treaty: That gave French authorities breathing room in which they could seek an 
exit from this unpleasant situation. They therefore decided to await the result of 
the ratification debate in the West German Bundestag and the outcome of the 
American presidential election in November before having parliament grapple 
with the treaty.46
In order to force an exit in the direction of Europe, De Gasperi now suggested 
that the Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC—which according to the terms of the 
45 Text in: Die Vertragswerke von Bonn und Paris. Dokumente und Berichte des Europa-Archivs, 
vol. 10, Frankfurt am Main, 1952, pp. 1ff.
46 Raymond Poidevin, “Frankreich und das Problem der EVG: Nationale und internationale 
Einflüsse (Sommer 1951 bis Sommer 1953),” in: Hans-Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler 
(eds.), Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. Stand und Probleme der Forschung, Boppard: 
Boldt, 1985, pp. 101–124, here pp. 114–118; Wilfried Loth, “Die EVG und das Projekt der Europäi-
schen Politischen Gemeinschaft,” in: Hudemann, Kaelble, and Schwabe (eds.), Europa im Blick 
der Historiker, pp. 191–201, here pp. 194–196.
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EDC Treaty was in the future also to function as the EDC Assembly with the incor-
poration of nine new deputies from among the three largest member countries—
should right then be given the task of working out a draft treaty for the founding 
of a Political Community as envisioned in Article 38. Schuman agreed and was 
then able to convince his fellow ministers of the usefulness of this attempt to take 
the wind out of the sails of the critics of the treaty. At the Paris meeting of the six 
foreign ministers from 23 to 25 July, Gasperi and Schuman together made a motion 
for early implementation of the process provided for in Article 38. They did not 
initially prevail in this because there had in the meantime been parliamentary 
elections in the Netherlands, and Stikker did not want to forestall the future gov-
ernment on this issue. At the constituent session of the ECSC Council of Ministers 
on 10 September in Luxembourg, the Benelux representatives then also agreed. 
After more than two years of vain efforts to push through the Stikker Plan within 
the framework of the OEEC, the Dutch government was now ready to concentrate 
its customs union project on the community of the Six. This contributed to the 
fact that the British-oriented Stikker lost his office and that with the appointment 
of his successor, Johan Willem Beyen, there was now someone in the post who 
saw in the planned EDC expansion a chance for advancing economic integration 
in the area of the Six. Beyen therefore parried the Franco-Italian initiative with 
a demand to investigate the possibilities for economic integration as well. There 
were no fundamental objections to that, and so the ministers gave the assembly 
an expanded assignment along those lines.47
After the nine additional deputies were brought onboard, the ECSC Parlia-
ment on 13 September declared itself an “ad hoc Assembly” and created an “ad 
hoc Commission,” which was to work out a draft of the “statue of the European 
Community.” This commission followed the draft of a hastily-established Study 
Commission of the European Movement (featuring the decisive participation of 
Spinelli) to the extent that it advocated the establishment of an Executive Council 
to be checked by a bicameral parliament made up of a directly-elected popular 
chamber and a senate elected by the national parliaments. Differing from the 
recommendation of the Study Commission, the ad hoc Commission reduced the 
competencies of the Executive Council in essence to the sum of the competencies 
of the ECSC and the EDC Commission. The scope and the financing of the budget 
of the Community were to remain dependent on unanimous votes of the Council 
47 Richard T. Griffith and Alan S. Milward, “The Beyen Plan and the European Political Com-
munity,” in: Werner Maihofer (ed.), Noi si mura, Florence: European University Institute, 1986, 
pp. 596–621; Magagnoli, Italien, pp. 135–148; Preda, De Gasperi, pp. 671–684; Anjo G. Harryvan, 
“In Pursuit of Influence. Aspects of the Netherlands’ European Policy during the Formative Years 
of the European Economic Community,” 1952–1973, Diss. EUI Florence, 2007, pp. 23–54.
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of Ministers, likewise any expansion of its competencies into the realms of foreign 
or economic policy. At the initiative of the Dutch deputies, for whom the indicated 
path to an economic community was much too indefinite, a provision was added 
to the effect that one year after the treaty came into force, the Council of Minis-
ters was to take measures to create a Common Market; and from the seventh year 
onward, decision-making was to be by majority rule. In this form, the draft was 
passed by the ad hoc assembly with fifty votes in favor and five abstentions on 10 
March 1953.48
The fact that some thirty-one delegates were absent when the vote was 
taken—half of them known to be opponents of the draft—indicated however that 
the statute draft of the ad hoc Commission would not necessarily win a consen-
sus. Beyen called an additional foreign ministers conference that took place on 
24 and 25 February 1953. There, the Dutchman in fact made it clear that without a 
binding arrangement on economic integration—he was thinking especially of the 
creation of a customs union within a period of ten years—the EPC did not have a 
chance with either the Dutch government or the Dutch parliament. For its part, 
however, the French side wanted nothing to do with such a stipulation: There 
had been price increases following upon the boom stemming from the general 
military buildup. The price increases had in turn led to a dramatic worsening of 
the French balance of payments, and the French government had been forced to 
impose import restrictions in February of 1952; after that, it was more strongly 
convinced than ever that it could involve itself only in a controlled market inte-
gration. It regarded the French economy as too weak for a further advance, if 
only one leading into economic supranationality.49 Bidault, who had replaced 
Schuman as foreign minister after the latter had come under fire due to the EDC 
Treaty,50 thus insisted to Beyen that the arrangement of economic integration 
be reserved for a special treaty. Hence, the path to adopting the statute draft was 
blocked for the time being.
Moreover, it was the case that the engagement of the new French govern-
ment on behalf of the Political Community diminished over time. The Gaullists, 
48 Text in: Lipgens, 45 Jahre, pp.  335–360; on this and the following, cf. Magagnoli, Italien, 
pp.  175–205 and 221–236; Richard Griffith, Europe’s First Constitution. The European Political 
Community (1952–1954), London: Federal Trust, 2000; Seung-Ryeol Kim, Der Fehlschlag des ers-
ten Versuchs zu einer politischen Integration Westeuropas von 1951 bis 1954, Frankfurt am Main: 
Peter Lang, 2000.
49 Cf. Gérard Bossuat, “La vraie nature de la politique européenne de la France (1950–1957),” 
in: Gilbert Trausch (ed.), Die Europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen 
von Rom. Pläne und Initiativen, Enttäuschungen und Mißerfolge, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, 
pp. 191–230.
50 Poidevin, Schuman, pp. 363–365.
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on whom the government of René Mayer depended, regarded the competencies 
given to the EPC in the draft of the ad hoc assembly as insufficient; and thus 
they tended more and more toward a complete rejection of the EDC Treaty. In a 
press conference of 25 February, Charles de Gaulle concentrated his attacks on 
the loss of sovereignty that the EDC threatened to usher in. In light of this change 
of course, it seemed to make little sense to many members of the government to 
continue insisting on the Political Community.51 Furthermore, with the death of 
Stalin on 5 March and the campaign of tension-reduction being pursued by his 
successors, hopes grew for an arrangement with the Soviet Union. There was no 
longer any question of ratifying the EDC Treaty in the eyes of a majority of depu-
ties or the government before the chances of a settlement for all of Germany had 
been tested at a new summit called for by Churchill on 11 May. In this situation, 
Bidault thought it for the best that the EPC project be shelved for the time being. 
At the Paris meeting of the foreign ministers on 12 and 13 May, he agreed to the 
Belgian and Dutch demand for establishing an expert commission to examine the 
possibility of expanding the treaty into the economic realm. In light of the Fran-
co-Dutch disagreement on the issue of the Economic Community, Adenauer—who 
had been pushing for limiting things to the sectors already agreed upon—was left 
with nothing.
After the fall of the Mayer government on 21 May, the French position hard-
ened still further. The disputes about the EDC made it more difficult to form a gov-
ernment, but one was put together after fourteen days with Gaullist participation 
(and with the conservative Joseph Laniel as prime minister). The Gaullist min-
isters insisted that there not be an amalgamation of the High Authority and the 
EDC Commission into a new executive. The French representatives then declared 
at the expert conference, which convened in Rome on 22 September after a long 
delay, that a new executive without new areas of responsibility was undesirable. 
At the same time, they were adamant in rejecting any form of automatic integra-
tion in the economic realm. Because the Dutch representatives for their part were 
not willing to give up on the package deal of the customs union and the Political 
Community, the fate of the EPC was sealed: The experts could not reach agree-
ment on the main issues and therefore gave the negotiation package back to the 
foreign ministers after fourteen days. At their meeting of 26 to 28 November in The 
Hague, the foreign ministers only appointed a new study commission that was to 
produce an audit report by 15 April 1954. Shortly before this deadline, the foreign 
ministers passed a resolution at the initiative of Bidault to the effect that further 
51 Against a widespread cliché that depicts the Gaullists as strict opponents of political supra-
nationality, it must be explicitly stated that this change of course occurred only after the passage 
of the ad hoc draft.
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handling of the EPC complex be postponed until after the ratification of the EDC. 
On 4 May 1954, they then announced that the High Authority of the ECSC and EDC 
Commission were to be subject to the oversight of an elected parliament; this was 
a minimal consensus.52
Somewhat more successful than the efforts on behalf of the Political Com-
munity was Mayer’s attempt to wrestle from the Allies “supplemental protocols” 
to the EDC Treaty that would again expand the national share of control over the 
armed forces. In the protocols signed on 24 March 1953, the treaty partners con-
ceded that France could withdraw forces from the European Army if they were 
needed to deal with a crisis situation overseas. Furthermore, the production, 
export, and import of war material for use overseas was not to be subject to any 
limitations from the EDC Commission; and the officer corps made up of national 
and European contingents was to continue to constitute a unified whole. Yet, 
neither the complete control over the armed forces nor the autonomy in arms pro-
duction that the French proposals had been aiming for was achieved. The path to 
building a national nuclear force remained barred, and there was no lever avail-
able for indefinitely extending the transition period in which the French veto in 
the Council of Ministers could block the construction of a supranational armed 
force. The chiefs of the general staff characterized the concessions as insufficient 
and then made their resistance to the EDC construction clear in public.53
Mayer’s efforts to achieve a “satisfactory” settlement of the Saar issue 
remained completely unsuccessful; this was the third precondition made by the 
Gaullists for their agreement to the EDC Treaty, after the Political Community and 
the supplementary protocol. Indeed, Adenauer was fundamentally willing to see 
an Europeanization of the Saar and with it to sacrifice the demand that the region 
be incorporated into the Federal Republic. Under pressure from nationalist 
opposition in his own ranks, however, he had to insist on quick and fundamen-
tal change in the conditions regarding the Saar, especially on permitting parties 
that would fight the Franco-Saarland economic union. Given that the Gaullists 
understood a satisfactory settlement of the Saar issue to be a codification of the 
economic union, there was no room for negotiation here; Mayer sought in vain to 
move Adenauer to take up negotiations with the Saar government. He had just as 
little success in his attempt to gain US support for French policy on the Saar: John 
Foster Dulles, who became secretary of state after Eisenhower’s election victory 
52 Cf. Europa. Dokumente, vol. 1, pp. 604.
53 Pierre Guillen, “Die französische Generalität, die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik und die 
EVG 1950–1954,” in: Hans-Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler (eds.), Die Europäische Vertei-
digungsgemeinschaft. Stand und Probleme der Forschung, Boppard: Boldt, 1985, pp. 125–157, here 
pp. 155ff.; Poidevin, “Frankreich”, pp. 119–124.
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in November of 1952, believed—in a striking misjudgment of the French psyche—
that he could move the French to ratify the treaty through pressure rather than 
through accommodation.54
Nor was there any success in efforts to move the British and American allies 
to make more hard-and-fast guarantees. Churchill and Eden did indeed pledge 
the close military cooperation of British European units with the EDC and also 
consultations before the withdrawal of British troops from the European conti-
nent. They were not however willing to make binding statements on the strength 
of British contingents or even allow the EDC a veto over withdrawals, as Bidault 
was demanding. Eisenhower and Dulles rejected an increase of the term of the 
Atlantic Alliance from the agreed-upon twenty years to the fifty of the EDC and 
neither could a substantial increase in American financial assistance for French 
defense be won from them. It was not only the British vote against supra-nation-
ality and the well-known restrictive attitude of the American Congress but also 
financial bottlenecks that stood in the way of increased British and American 
engagement. Eden was greatly worried over whether British engagement on the 
Continent could be maintained in its existing scope; Eisenhower was even firmly 
resolved to cut the American presence in Europe drastically if the EDC and along 
with it a German contribution to defense were realized.55
Instead of making approval of the EDC easier, the “New Look” in the Amer-
ican conception of defense, which was being discussed more and more openly 
in the autumn of 1953, increased aversion to the Europeanization of the French 
defense contribution in a double way: Firstly, the apparent inclination of the US 
to reduce its presence in Europe made Paris shrink back from having the cre-
ation of the European Army give impetus to that feared disengagement. Secondly 
and above all, the increased American recourse to nuclear weapons awakened 
the need for France itself to become a nuclear power: That promised not only to 
compensate for the distressing inadequacy of its armaments (which could not 
be eliminated due to constraints on financial resources) but also under closer 
consideration was the sole means of avoiding complete dependence on the US 
in terms of security policy. Given that no one could seriously imagine sharing 
responsibility for nuclear weapons with the Germans, these reflections inevita-
54 Cf. Wilfried Loth, “Die Saarfrage und die deutsch-französische Verständigung. Versuch 
einer Bilanz,” in: Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Saargegend 34/35 (1986–87), pp. 276–291, here 
pp. 286–288; Martin Kerkhoff, Großbritannien, die Vereinigten Staaten und die Saarfrage 1945 bis 
1954, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner: 1996, pp. 188–202.
55 Cf. Maier, Internationale Auseinandersetzungen, pp. 125–190; Stephen F. Ambrose, “Die Ei-
senhower-Administration und die europäische Sicherheit 1953–1956,” in: Bruno Thoss and Hans-
Erich Volkmann (eds.), Zwischen Kaltem Krieg und Entspannung. Sicherheits- und Deutschlandpo-
litik der Bundesrepublik im Mächtesystem der Jahre 1953–1956, Boppard: Boldt, 1988, pp. 25–34.
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bly led to the desire for a national nuclear force. From this perspective, the EDC 
seemed to be nothing less than an instrument of American hegemony.56
The stubbornness with which Dulles demanded the ratification of the EDC 
Treaty—most spectacularly with the threat of an “agonizing reappraisal” of the 
totality of America’s European policy in the event that the EDC failed, a threat made 
during a press conference in Paris on 13 December 1953—served to strengthen 
this suspicion further and frequently also allowed it to arise where there was not 
yet any awareness of the strategic contexts. Together with the robust Cold War 
rhetoric of the Eisenhower administration and its refusal to support France mil-
itarily in the Indochina war or to help bring about negotiations, it produced an 
instinctive resistance to American impertinence, which often rose to the level of 
an intense anti-Americanism and which regarded the battle against the EDC as its 
most pressing goal. Specifically, it was the proponents of a “Third Power,” who 
had long hesitated after the British rejection and the decision for West German 
rearmament, who now developed into the most determined opponents of an EDC 
during the winter of 1953–54. They saw in it an instrument of an aggressive Amer-
ican power politics that all in all threatened to bring about exactly the opposite 
of what had been fought for: Independence, détente, and incorporation of the 
Germans.
Resistance to ratification of the treaty therefore did not diminish after the 
Berlin foreign ministers conference of the four victorious powers from 25 January 
to 18 February 1954 had demonstrated the vanity of hopes for a Four-Power settle-
ment of the German question. The realization grew that the arming of the Federal 
Republic within the framework of the Western security system was unavoidable, 
even if the Germans could negotiate an extensive removal of occupation restric-
tions in return. At the same time, there was less willingness to give up one’s 
own freedom of action to a community that neither offered sufficient protection 
against the German danger nor was particularly plausible as an instrument of 
European self-assertion. A growing minority of the political public now, like the 
military, was coming to regard direct integration of the Federal Republic into 
NATO as the lesser evil. It seemed all the more acceptable when the prospect of a 
say in nuclear matters within the leadership ranks of the Western Alliance prom-
ised to guarantee a security advantage over the Federal Republic that had been 
vainly hoped for from the EDC.
56 Cf. Bidault’s anxious statements at the Bermuda Conference of 4 to 8 Dec. 1953, FRUS 1952–54, 
V, Part 2, pp. 1799ff.; Guillen, «Französische Generalität,» pp. 155ff.; Aline Coutrot, “La politique 
atomique sous le gouvernement de Mendès France,” in: François Bédarida and Jean-Pierre Rioux 
(eds.), Pierre Mendès France et le Mendésisme, Paris: Fayard, 1985, pp. 309–316.
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Decisive for the failure of the EDC after the long deadlock was the spectacular 
defeat of French troops at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. France’s American allies 
had refused to provide massive air support to help the French forces besieged 
by the Vietnamese. This drove the animus against the US to its zenith and at the 
same time made autonomous national armed forces, which apparently could 
alone be relied upon, seen more necessary than ever. The military weakness of 
France, which had now become clear in such a humiliating fashion, accentuated 
fears of the dynamism of the Germans. In French public opinion polls, the ranks 
of those opposing the treaty grew faster than those of its supporters (from twen-
ty-one percent in May of 1953 to thirty-one percent in July of 1954, versus thirty 
and thirty-six percent for the supporters, with thirty-three percent undecided).57 
The foreign affairs committee of the National Assembly, to which the treaty had 
finally been presented, gave a negative recommendation by a vote of twenty-four 
to eighteen on 9 June. In the defense committee, voting on 18 June, the negative 
majority was even greater: twenty-nine to thirteen.
Pierre Mendès France, prime minister since that same 18 June (Laniel and 
Bidault had been toppled due to their hesitancy to pull French troops out of Indo-
china), nevertheless undertook a last effort to save the EDC. As he explained to 
Spaak and Dulles, in order to win over “sixty to eighty deputies” for the EDC from 
among the advocates of arming the Federal Republic at the national level,58 he 
presented the EDC partners on 14 August with an “implementation protocol” 
approved by the Council of Ministers that amounted to a significant thinning of 
the EDC. According to this proposal, the principle of unanimity was to apply for 
the first eight years in the Council of Ministers as well as the Commission; NATO 
decisions affecting Europe were always to be made in joint sessions with the EDC 
Council of Ministers; the terms for which NATO and the EDC were in effect were 
to be harmonized; and the consequences of Article 38 were to fall by the wayside. 
Additionally, integration was to be limited to West German armed forces and 
Allied forces stationed in the Federal Republic, including British and American 
units. Also, the production of nuclear fuel for areas outside the “strategic exposed 
zone” would no longer be subject to required approval by the Commission.59
57 Quoted in Jean-Pierre Rioux, “Französische öffentliche Meinung und EVG: Parteienstreit 
oder Schlacht der Erinnerungen?” in: Volkmann and Schwengler (eds.), Europäische Verteidi-
gungsgemeinschaft, pp. 159–176, here pp. 168ff.
58 Quoted from Maier, Internationale Auseinandersetzungen, pp. 190. On the decision-making 
process of the summer of 1954, ibid., pp.  190–230; Georges-Henri Soutou, “La France, l’Alle-
magne et les accords de Paris,” in: Relations internationales, No. 52, 1987, pp. 451–470.
59 Text in: Europa-Archiv 9 (1954), pp. 6869ff.
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These amendment proposals went too far for many EDC advocates, however. 
They correctly argued that the European finality of the treaty would thereby be 
totally lost. In order to prevent that, Schuman, Mollet, and others encouraged 
Adenauer to oppose the French proposals more or less openly; West German 
Special Minister Franz Josef Strauss even brought news back from Paris that a 
parliamentary majority could still be counted on for the EDC in its original form. 
More important for Adenauer than these assurances was the impression, factu-
ally incorrect, that Mendès France was aiming for an arrangement with the Soviet 
Union. In order to forestall that, the chancellor was only too glad to help work for 
the fall of the new prime minister. He could not completely exclude the danger of 
a failure of the treaty despite the confident reports from Paris, but the goal seemed 
worth the effort. Moreover, he knew that the US was on his side to such an extent 
that he trusted he would not fall any too hard if the French National Assembly 
rejected the treaty. The other treaty partners were just as unwilling to make con-
cessions: The Dutch government wanted to remain open to the chances for an 
economic community via Article 38, and Spaak had once again assumed leader-
ship of foreign affairs in the Belgian government. At the Brussels meeting of the 
foreign ministers from 19 to 22 August, Mendès France thus found himself faced 
with an almost solid front rejecting his proposals. The conference was broken off 
with the Six having established nothing beyond their lack of agreement.
After this rebuff, Mendès France urgently wanted to ensure that with a failure 
of the EDC, France would not, as Dulles had threatened, be excluded from an 
“Atlantic” regulation of West German rearmament. He thus called for a confer-
ence of three with the British and Americans. Immediately after the Brussels 
conference, he sought out Churchill in order to win the Briton for an association 
of the UK with the six EDC countries in a “modified structure within the frame-
work of NATO.” Churchill once again urged that the EDC be ratified and in other 
respects played things more or less close to the vest; Mendès France took from 
his statements the idea that the British were not to be had for a solution without 
France. Reassured in this way, he now believed he could risk the failure of the 
EDC. Nevertheless, he did support the motion of the EDC advocates to postpone 
the ratification debate in the National Assembly so as to be able to negotiate at 
a conference with the British and Americans once again over the French amend-
ment proposals. However, he offered no further resistance when, against this last 
attempt to save the project, EDC opponents brought a motion to remove the treaty 
completely from the agenda. That motion was then adopted on 30 August by a 
vote of 319 to 264.
This ignominious burial demonstrated that Mendès France had correctly 
read the majority situation within parliament. Many EDC opponents had voted 
against the removal motion only in order to be able to present their reasons for 
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rejecting it. Consequently, the oppositional majority was even larger than the 
vote had indicated; and an engaged advocacy of the treaty, as Schuman and Ade-
nauer had wanted, would no longer have saved the Defense Community. Overall, 
however, it was by no means the case that the maneuvering room of the political 
class was limited by the pressure of entrenched public opinion: Only in the very 
week of the parliamentary vote were there more French people voicing opposition 
to the treaty than support for it (thirty-six versus thirty-one percent); there had 
clearly been influence from the mobilization of national resentment on the part 
of EDC opponents. A week later, the percentage of supporters was once again 
larger (thirty-four to thirty-three percent)—just as it had been during the whole 
period of public dispute over the treaty! The fundamental majority for a united 
Europe, which had amounted to some seventy percent in May of 1953, still oscil-
lated between fifty-five and sixty-four percent in the spring of 1955.60
To that extent, it is correct that the flight forward into security-policy 
supra-nationality had failed not least of all because of the lack of consistency and 
decisiveness on the part of the actors involved.61 It must also be added that the 
project was doubly impeded: firstly, by emotional barriers that stood in the way 
of rearming the Germans and, secondly, by the development of the bipolar deter-
rence system, which no longer admitted of an autonomous European defense. 
Given this combination of hindrances, it is not at all surprising that the interest in 
European autonomy lost out. Rather, what gives one pause is that a large portion 
of the political forces in France too clung so long to the project of a European 
defense community: This indicates that the willingness to work on the Europe of 
the Six had in the meantime grown—even if it did not meet with the ideal concep-
tions of many who envisioned a united Europe.
For this reason, the damage that the failure of the EDC had caused was not as 
severe as distraught EDC advocates such as the very embittered Adenauer thought 
in their initial consternation. To be sure, the military protection of the Germans 
would now certainly be definitively assumed by NATO. The bundling of Western 
European security-policy interests became even more difficult than it already had 
been. And it was not only in France that the tendency grew to strive for national 
ways of securing independence. Yet, the feeling for the unsatisfactory nature of 
such solutions remained rather vivid, likewise the mutual understanding among 
60 Rioux, Französische öffentliche Meinung, pp. 168–170. Rioux’s thesis that the EDC “was con-
ceived without taking the popular mood into account” and had to fail because it revived German 
trauma (pp. 175ff.) is not supported at all by the adduced data!
61 According to Walter Lipgens, “Die Bedeutung des EVG-Projekts für die politische Eini-
gungsbewegung,” in: Volkmann and Schwengler (eds.), Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, 
pp. 9–30.
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the European partners, which had grown on all sides over the course of the pro-
tracted EDC negotiations. Above all, however, the consolidation of the Western 
alliance that stemmed from the overcoming of the EDC crisis would provide a 
solid foundation on which the project of European unification could be contin-
ued.
With the danger of a collapse of the Western security community confronting 
them, all the negotiation partners now found themselves willing to make conces-
sions that they had always previously avoided. Mendès France accepted the direct 
entry of the Federal Republic into NATO and the elimination of the Allies’ reserved 
rights regarding a state of emergency in a revised general treaty. Adenauer con-
ceded Mendès France a Saar statute stipulating monetary and economic ties to 
France until definitive settlement in a peace treaty, thereby linking an Europe-
anization of the Saar to progress on the economic integration of Europe. Eden 
granted the right to the Brussels Pact—now expanded into the Western European 
Union (WEU) with the entry of the Federal Republic and Italy—to determine the 
scope of the British troop presence on the European continent via majority vote. 
And Dulles, who in the event of a failure of the supranational defense organiza-
tion had already been looking to return to a “peripheral” defense conception, 
made up his mind to transfer to the WEU the guarantee of the presence of Ameri-
can troops that had been made to the EDC. All these concessions came about after 
dramatic disputes,62 but given that all participants understood that they were 
condemned to success, they succeeded in agreeing on a compromise package 
in relatively short order. The “Treaties of Paris” were thus signed on 23 October 
1954.63
After some delay, attributable not least of all to the demand by Mendès 
France that a supranational armaments agency of the WEU remain an open issue, 
the French National Assembly ratified this compromise on 30 December 1954 by 
the relative majority of 287 to 260, with seventy abstentions. On 27 February 1955, 
the Bundestag also agreed to it—likewise after intense disputes among the West 
German public that once again endangered the compromise. Yet, exactly because 
success had been so difficult to achieve, it was the case that after the ratification 
processes, no one dared call into question the structure of internal Western rela-
tions established by the Treaties of Paris.
62 Cf. Paul Noack, Das Scheitern der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. Entscheidungs-
prozesse vor und nach dem 30. August 1954, Düsseldorf: Droste, 1977, pp. 93–138 and 151–163; and 
Rolf Steininger, “Das Scheitern der EVG und der Beitritt der Bundesrepublik zur NATO,” in: Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 17, 1985, pp. 3–18.
63 Texts in: Europa. Dokumente, vol. 1, pp. 354ff.; vol. 2, pp. 988ff.
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The Difficult “Relance”
With the failure of the EDC in August of 1954, the project of a political Europe 
receded into the distance for the time being. Essential security functions were 
now to be carried out by NATO. In an upsurge of emotion, a group decisive for 
making a majority in France had turned against the supranational principle; and 
in the remaining countries of the Community of the Six, the French rejection had 
had a demoralizing effect. Yet, the problem clearly still remained of the indepen-
dence of the Europeans vis-à-vis the US as the leading power, though under the 
changed circumstances of inclusion in the nuclear security community. Also, the 
problem of incorporating the Germans, which was ever more clearly a problem 
of incorporating German economic strength, had not yet been satisfactorily 
resolved. The problem of economic unification became more urgent, not only 
because the sectoral integration of coal and steel was oriented toward expansion 
but also because there was a growing number of firms and branches urging the 
elimination of hindrances to trade. In this situation, what mattered more than 
ever was skillful crisis management: Only if the remaining interests in unification 
were successfully bundled was there a prospect of overcoming the hurdles stem-
ming from the consolidation of nation-state structures that had in the meantime 
been achieved.
In the search for unification projects that could be implemented without 
major resistance and were therefore suitable for overcoming the paralysis of 
the integration process resulting from the EDC shock, the High Authority of the 
ECSC firstly aimed for the extension of the union to other energy branches and 
to transport policy. This seemed logical because coal was in many ways linked 
to other promising sources of energy and because the pricing of coal and steel 
was to a great extent dependent on arrangements involving transport costs. The 
German vice president of the High Authority, Franz Etzel, who had floated the 
idea of extension, therefore hoped that it would not be any too difficult to find the 
necessary majorities for it in the parliaments of the Six. On 2 December 1954, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC voiced its approval for an extension of ECSC 
competencies into the realms of gas, electricity, nuclear energy, and transport.64
Jean Monnet placed his hopes especially on the integration of nuclear 
energy. It seemed urgent to him for no fewer than three reasons: firstly, to meet 
the growing energy demand of France and the other European countries cheaply 
and at the same make them independent of oil imports that gobbled up foreign 
64 Cf. Pierre Gerbet, “La ‘relance’ européenne jusqu’à la conférence de Messine,” in: Enrico 
Serra (ed.), Il rilancio dell’Europa e i Trattati di Roma, Milan: Émile Bruylant, 1989, pp. 61–91; 
also on the following. 
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currency; secondly, in order to develop nuclear weapons independent of the US; 
and thirdly, to keep the civilian use of nuclear energy by the Federal Republic 
under supervision (after the elimination of the occupation statute, such use was 
no longer forbidden). Given that there were not yet any established national 
nuclear industries and the lobbyists of the French nuclear energy commission 
realized that they could not accomplish their ambitious plans unilaterally there 
was no appreciable opposition in sight. Instead, concentration on this energy 
sector promised to unleash new enthusiasm for Europe; it was quite clear that the 
future belonged to this sector and that this new initiative could bring it a signifi-
cant step forward after so few successful efforts aimed at securing independence 
up to that point. After Louis Armand of the French atomic energy commission 
convinced him that the creation of a European atomic energy pool was indispens-
able if France and the other Europeans wanted to keep pace in the third industrial 
revolution, Monnet decided to seek the creation of Europe’s own atomic authority 
alongside and before the expansion of the ECSC.
Unlike in 1950, Monnet could not mobilize the French government to get this 
project underway. After the fall of Robert Schuman in late 1952, Monnet no longer 
had direct access to the leaders responsible for French foreign policy. Pierre 
Mendès France, French prime minister in the crisis year 1954, even sought to have 
him replaced as head of the High Authority at the end of his first term. In order to 
forestall such a loss of confidence, Monnet declared on 9 November 1954 that he 
would not be available for a second term so as to be able to devote himself wholly 
to the struggle for the development of the Community without being bound by 
government directives. He offered the new unification initiative to Spaak, who 
agreed to it—though in fact only after Mendès France had fallen from power and 
after the Council of the Republic (as the second house of parliament) had con-
firmed the vote of the National Assembly for the Treaties of Paris. On 2 April 1955, 
he sent identically-worded letters to Konrad Adenauer, Italian Foreign Minister 
Gaetano Martino, and Antoine Pinay, who had assumed the post of foreign min-
ister in the French government of Edgar Faure that had been formed in February. 
In this communication, Spaak proposed that a delegate conference of the Six be 
summoned to discuss the expansion of economic integration. As goals, he cited 
the expansion of ECSC responsibilities over the other energy sectors as well as 
transport, along with the establishment of a special organization of the ECSC for 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The reaction to this initiative was not particularly encouraging. Dutch 
Foreign Minister Jan Willem Beyen saw in the expansion of sectoral integration 
new hindrances to the Common Market that the Dutch government was seeking; 
therefore, he immediately developed a counterproposal. In a memorandum sub-
mitted to Spaak on 4 April, the Dutchman condemned sectoral integration as an 
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integration hostile to consumers at the cost of non-integrated economic sectors, 
which would more likely lead to new cartels than to increases in overall economic 
productivity. Instead, he wanted to suggest to the foreign ministers of the Six the 
establishment of a “supranational community” that “via the path of a customs 
union was to progress to the realization of an economic union.” More clearly than 
during the talks on the European Political Community in 1952–53, Beyen was now 
aware that a supranational orientation of the Economic Community was neces-
sary from the beginning, not only in order to cushion economic modernization 
but also to develop a feeling of responsibility for the Europeans’ common future. 
Given that in the meantime the engagement of the Dutch public for European 
unification had intensified, he was largely able to prevail with this position in the 
cabinet vis-à-vis the still-reserved Prime Minister Willem Drees.65
Conversely, French opposition to the Common Market had increased even 
further: Added to the fear of the sell-off of economic sectors that were not yet 
competitive there was now also the widespread aversion to supra-nationality. 
With the danger of another parliamentary rejection in mind, the Faure govern-
ment was wary of embracing a project that threatened to draw the unanimous 
protest of all trade and workers’ organizations. The sole portion that the govern-
ment did endorse, after some hesitation, was the plan for a community for civil-
ian use of nuclear energy, which was promoted by both the planning commis-
sion and the nuclear energy commission. The stipulation that nuclear weapons 
were to remain the responsibility of individual countries was retained; an isotope 
separation facility to be erected jointly would only secure the supply of enriched 
uranium necessary for nuclear arms.66 Faure only spoke vaguely about the col-
lectivization of the other energy sectors and transportation.
The West German government was not enthusiastic about either the Common 
Market or the Atomic Community. Economy Minister Ludwig Erhard saw in the 
customs union of the Six only a statist impediment to a worldwide system of 
free trade that suited the export interests of the West German economy. Special 
Minister Franz Josef Strauss (who was entrusted with responsibility for nuclear 
issues in October of 1955) preferred cooperation with the far more technically-ad-
vanced British and Americans to an atomic community that clearly would be of 
primary benefit to France. Chancellor Adenauer, who viewed the integration of 
the Federal Republic into the West as still much too uncertain, was keenly in favor 
of continuing political integration so as to secure West German integration over 
65 Anjo G. Harryvan and Albert E. Kersten, “The Netherlands, Benelux and the relance eu-
ropéenne 1954–1955,” ibid., pp. 125–157. 
66 Pierre Guillen, “La France et la négociation du Traité d´Euratom,” in: Relations internatio-
nales 44, 1985, pp. 391–412.
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the long term. However, he feared that economic integration would not be of any 
help in reaching that goal: In light of divergent economic interests, efforts toward 
convergence in this area threatened to strengthen resistance to integration in 
both France and the Federal Republic.67 He prevailed with his ECSC partners in 
postponing the foreign ministers conference (which was to discuss the Belgian 
initiative) until the Treaties of Paris had come into force; and he let Spaak and 
Monnet know that he considered their initiative “premature.”68
Given the multifarious opposition, Monnet once again decided to take the 
bull by the horns. A conversation with Carl Friedrich Ophüls, leader of the Europe 
division of the Foreign Office in Bonn, had made clear to him that the consent of 
the West German government to an economic community would indeed be easier 
to achieve than to an atomic community. Monnet then sought to win over Spaak 
and Beyen for combining the proposals for expanding the sectoral integration 
and the plans for a Common Market. The prospect of a Common Market was to 
move the Dutch and the Germans to participate in sectoral integration as well; at 
the same time, realization of the Atomic Community was intended to ease French 
opposition to the Economic Community. In a draft of a common declaration of the 
Six that his assistant Pierre Uri revised for him on 13 April, he specified that the 
delegate conference proposed by Spaak for expanding the tasks of the Commu-
nity should work out treaty texts “in the areas of transport, energy, and nuclear 
energy” and “in a second step the program and the terms for a general integra-
tion of the economy” should be determined. With an eye to French resistance, 
he hastened to add that there of course must be transition regulations regarding 
the Economic Community, and that there must be a social fund along with an 
investment fund in order to shape the unification in a socially-bearable way. He 
recommended himself for the chairmanship of the conference; he also offered to 
67 In his memoirs, he gives as the reason for his reluctance only the fear that economic in-
tegration could distract from political integration: Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1955–1959, 
Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967, p. 27. That he had in mind opposition in France and the 
Federal Republic is seen in his behavior during the EPC negotiations. 
68 Cf. Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Adenauers Europapolitik in der Gründungsphase der Europäi-
schen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,” in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 31 (1983), pp. 646–673; 
Wilfried Loth, “Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen in der Gründungsphase der EWG,” in: Serra 
(ed.), Rilancio, pp. 585–602; Wilfried Loth, “Deutsche und französische Interessen auf dem Weg 
zu EWG und Euratom,” in: Andreas Wilkens (ed.), Deutsch-französische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
1945–1960, Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke, 1997, pp. 171–187; Mathieu L. L. Segers, Deutschlands 
Ringen mit der Relance. Die Europapolitik der BRD während der Beratungen und Verhandlungen 
über die Römischen Verträge, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008, pp. 96–99 and 113–116.
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remain in office as president of the High Authority if the governments embraced 
this “relance.”69
In terms of his own person, he had gone too far here. Beyen, who discussed 
the draft on 23 April together with Spaak, struck the name Monnet from the sub-
mission out of consideration for the French government; the French then decided 
to nominate René Mayer for the office of president. Beyen also insisted on striking 
the reference to the ECSC and the mention of an adaptation fund. In principle, 
however, he accepted the compromise suggested by Spaak and then won over his 
cabinet. It was then possible to communicate the revised Uri memorandum to the 
other ECSC partners on 18 May as a joint proposal of the Benelux governments. 
Parallel to this, Faure signaled that his government could also support the com-
promise: On the fringes of the Atlantic Council meeting of 9 to 11 May, he assured 
his ECSC colleagues that the Common Market would not fail because of France. 
After the Benelux proposal was already on the table, the West German govern-
ment fundamentally accepted the idea of a Common Market: In its answer of 27 
May, it spoke in favor of a progressive liberalization of trade and capital move-
ment among the Six, linked with the free movement of labor, the establishment 
of rules for competition, and the creation of an investment fund.70
Yet, that was not sufficient for the success of the undertaking. Bonn’s mem-
orandum said nothing about the institutions that were to regulate sectoral or 
horizontal integration; in concrete terms, it only proposed the establishment of 
a consultative organ within the ECSC that was to present the Council of Minis-
ters with proposals for the configuration of “economic cooperation.” The French 
government did not present a memorandum at all and thus left more open as to 
the framework and the time frame in which it would accept the continuation of 
economic integration. In order to avoid the danger of a failure of the initiative, 
Beyen helped push a proposal to hold an expert conference first, which, indepen-
dent of government instructions, would review all the possibilities for economic 
integration; the report of this commission would then serve as the basis for the 
treaty negotiations. Spaak added to this proposal by suggesting that an estab-
lished “political personality” function as general secretary of the expert group so 
69 Text excerpts in Gerbet, La “relance,” pp. 79ff. Cf. also the report by Pierre Uri in Serra (ed.), 
Rilancio, pp. 166ff.
70 Text of the Benelux Memorandum as well as the Italian and West German replies in L´An-
née politique 1955, pp. 714–718, on the French reaction, Edgar Faure, Mémoires II, Paris: Plon, 
1984, p. 211; on the origins of the West German memorandum, Hanns Jürgen Küsters, Die Gründ-
ung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1982, pp. 112–119; Segers, 
Deutschlands Ringen, pp. 117–127. 
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that it did not end up suffering the same unfruitful confrontation of irreconcilable 
viewpoints that had been the case with the EPC expert rounds.71
In fact, at the Conference of Messina where the six foreign ministers met from 
1 to 3 June 1955, agreement was reached only on this minimal step. After Pinay had 
rejected a binding commitment to the Common Market and after Walter Hallstein, 
who had to represent Adenauer, had rejected the creation of new institutions, the 
accompanying officials were compelled to declare on the evening of the second 
day of negotiations that there had been no agreement at all. In great haste, in a 
night session following dinner and a ballet, a declaration was passed that listed 
the integration goals of the Benelux memorandum and of the West German mem-
orandum as subjects for study and commissioned a group of experts under the 
leadership of a “political personality” to examine them. As Beyen had suggested, 
the British government was to be invited to participate in the conversations of the 
experts; representatives of existing European institutions would also be brought 
in as needed.72 That did not seem to be much. When the ministers left the session 
at four in the morning, officials and journalists present had “the impression that 
they were interested in the sunrise over Mount Etna rather than full of admiration 
for their work.”73 In any event, the decisions put the governments under a certain 
pressure to act, pressure that they could not so easily avoid if the committee were 
once to reach common viewpoints.
The pressure coming from the decision at Messina became all the greater 
when as a follow-up to the conference, the governments reached agreement by 
diplomatic means that Spaak should be appointed chairman of the committee of 
experts. The man himself had not sought this position because he saw difficul-
ties in reconciling it with the office of Belgian foreign minister. After the job had 
become his, however, his firm and independent leadership of the talks ensured 
that the delegates, some of whom he knew from the ECSC work, grew to become a 
genuine expert group. Right at the beginning of the talks in early July in Brussels, 
he got approval for having the representatives of the High Authority continuously 
participate with an advisory voice in the work of the steering committee, while 
the representatives of the OEEC, the Council of Europe, and the European Confer-
ence of Transport Ministers would be brought in only as needed.
71 On this and the following, Harryvan and Kersten, The Netherlands, pp.  153–156; Segers, 
Deutschlands Ringen, pp. 127–135.
72 Text of the declaration in: Europa. Dokumente, vol. 3, pp.  1240–1242; on the course of the 
conference, also the reports of Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers, Max Kohnstamm, and Chris-
tian Calmes in Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp. 168ff. and 175–178, as well as Brigitta Thomas, Die Euro-
pa-Politik Italiens. Der Beitrag Italiens zur europäischen Einigung zwischen EVG und EG, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2005, pp. 71–81.
73 According to the report by Christian Calmes, Rilancio, p. 178.
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After the four technical committees and four subcommittees had left a whole 
series of substantial questions open at the planned deadline, Spaak concentrated 
his work from November onward with the national delegation leaders. Also, with 
Pierre Uri and Hans von der Groeben, he brought in two more conceptually-gifted 
experts.74 He indicated to the leader of the British delegation, which had up to 
that time participated as observers, that in future conversations only the unam-
biguous supporters of a customs union could take part. The British cabinet then 
made the decision on 11 November not to participate in the planned Common 
Market.75
In the smaller circle, there soon emerged a recommendation for a Common 
Market with external tariffs, rules of competition, and promotion of moderniza-
tion; it was to be realized in three steps of four years each. This Common Market 
was to be directed by a Council of Ministers initially making decisions unani-
mously and by a Commission appointed by the Council of Ministers; the Commis-
sion was autonomously to oversee adherence to agreed-upon regulations. Both 
a mere free-trade zone and an expansion of the ECSC were rejected as unachiev-
able and to an extent undesirable too. For its part, the French delegation under 
the leadership of Félix Gaillard opposed setting a binding timetable. Instead, the 
French sought flexible responses to developing economic conditions, harmoniza-
tion of social costs, and a common investment fund to make it easier for under-
developed branches of the economy and regions to catch up. Even when the rep-
resentatives of the Federal Republic agreed in principle to the idea of promoting 
modernization, the French stuck by their opposition to a binding commitment to 
the integration program. Conversely, the Germans under the leadership of State 
Secretary Walter Hallstein showed little inclination to warm to the Atomic Com-
munity, which was being vigorously promoted by Gaillard. In late November, the 
negotiations thus ended in an impasse for which no quick solution was to be 
found. After Faure’s government fell on 29 November, Spaak interrupted the work 
and then made efforts to move the British government to alter its decision; he 
74 On the conception of von der Groeben, having an instutitionally-regulated internal market 
in mind, see Jürgen Elvert, “Weichenstellungen für die Römischen Verträge – Akteure und Über-
legungen der Bundesregierung 1955,” in: Integration 30 (2007), pp. 301–312.
75 Cf. the negotiation reports (though incomplete) in Küsters, Gründung, pp. 135–218, 232–251, 
and Michel Dumoulin, “Les travaux du Comité Spaak (juillet 1955 – avril 1956),” in: Serra (ed.), 
Rilancio, pp. 195–210; also the reports of Hans von der Groeben and Baron Snoy, ibid., pp. 294–
300; on the British stance, also Roger Bullen, “Britain and ‘Europe’ 1950–1957,” ibid., pp. 315–
338, here p. 333–337.
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believed that only in this way could French opposition to the Common Market be 
broken in the end.76
Clearly, Spaak’s emphatic warnings that the Western Alliance would fall 
apart after Adenauer were only successful in making the Eden government refrain 
from attacking a customs union of the Six. A breakthrough in the negotiations of 
the Spaak Committee only came after Adenauer—with reference to his guideline 
competence as chancellor—had instructed his ministers on 19 January 1956 not 
to allow the talks to fail and after French President René Coty had on 31 January 
appointed in Guy Mollet as Faure’s successor a figure who was likewise urgently 
interested in the success of the Messina project.77 At a hastily-called foreign min-
isters conference of the Six on 11 and 12 February in Brussels, Spaak was now able 
to convince West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano to agree to the 
preparation of a recommendation for the Atomic Community. At the same time, 
the Belgian was able to win from French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau the 
concession that a recommendation for the Common Market would be prepared 
as well. Hence, the path was now clear for the vote on the fundamentals of both 
projects, and things progressed to such an extent by 9 March that Spaak was able 
to give Uri and von der Groeben the task of editing a summary report based on 
the prepared working papers. The result, which was ready four weeks later,78 did 
run into opposition on both the German and the French sides once again; but the 
national delegation leaders then adopted the report on 20 March without major 
changes.79
Along with the basic principles of a Common Market, the proposal for an 
atomic community was thus now on the table, though the French delegates did 
have to accept some deletions to their conception. Euratom, as the new organiza-
tion was to be named at the suggestion of Armand, was only to have control over 
the trade monopoly for nuclear fuel; the call for ownership rights to be trans-
ferred to the Community was not incorporated into the report. Research was only 
76 On this action, Paul-Henri Spaak, Memoiren eines Europäers, Hamburg: Hoffmann und 
Campe, 1969, pp. 309–314.
77 On Adenauer, cf. his Erinnerungen 1955–1959, pp. 253–255; the letter to the ministers in Kon-
rad Adenauer, Briefe 1955–1957, Berlin: Siedler, 1998, pp. 139–141; on Guy Mollet, the report of his 
Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp. 281–286; as well as François Lafon, 
Guy Mollet. Itinéraire d’un socialiste controversé (1905–1975), Paris: Fayard, 2006, pp. 491–497.
78 Uri and von der Groeben worked (while being shielded) at Cape Ferrat on the French Medi-
terranean coast, supported by Spaak’s colleague Albert Hupperts and the committee secretariat 
official Giulio Guazzugli; cf. the report of Pierre Uri in Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp. 305–307.
79 The report was published in all the languages of the Community on 21 April 1956 by the 
secretariat of the Spaak Committee; a brief except from the German version is in Lipgens, 45 
Jahre, pp. 390–395.
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to a lesser extent to be organized by the Community itself. Also, in the industrial 
application of the results of research, enterprises owned by the Community were 
only to play a subordinate role; instead of an atomic fund directing the buildup 
of industrial capacities, there would only be support for public and private enter-
prises via resources from the general investment fund of the Common Market.80 
In all its sections, the Spaak Report thus bore signs of the compromise between 
differing conceptions of economic policy and integration policy. One could see 
how difficult it had been to bring it about at all.81
The production of the Spaak Report did not however mean that the two new 
integration projects had turned the corner. Guy Mollet was indeed resolved to 
push through not only the Atomic Community but also the Economic Commu-
nity so as to bind the Federal Republic to the West over the long term and help 
provide the Europeans with more autonomy from the leading power the US. 
He was the head of only a minority government, however, which also included 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, a representative of the Gaullists; Mollet could not be 
any more certain of a parliamentary majority for the Common Market than his 
predecessor. Together with Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and Maurice Faure 
(general secretary of the Radical Party who had been appointed state secretary 
for European questions), Mollet thus sought to win over partner governments for 
passing the Euratom Treaty first and then, based on this success, hope to be able 
to bring about a change in public opinion in France to the benefit of the Common 
Market. “We had to create a kind of smokescreen,” as Pineau later explained. “For 
us, Euratom was the smokescreen behind which the Common Market had hidden 
itself.”82
The negotiation partners evinced little understanding for the mobilization 
strategy of the Mollet government. The West German government in particu-
80 On this negotiation thread, Peter Weilemann, Die Anfänge der Europäischen Atomgemein-
schaft. Zur Gründungsgeschichte von Euratom 1955–1957, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983, pp. 31–47, 
76–86.
81 Due to the many contradictions and open questions, one should certainly not characterize it 
as an “intrinsically closed concept for economic and atomic integration,” in the words of Küsters, 
Gründung, p. 239. 
82 Report at the colloquium in Rome, 25 to 28 March 1987, in: Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp. 281–286, 
the quote pp. 282ff. Cf. also the account of Maurice Faure, esp. pp. 286–290; Pierre Guillen, 
“L’ Europe remède à l’impuissance française? Le gouvernement Guy Mollet et la Négociation des 
traités de Rome (1955–1957),” in: Revue d’histoire diplomatique 102 (1988), pp. 319–335; idem., “La 
France et la négociation des traités de Rome: L’ Euratom,” in: Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp. 513–524; 
Wilfried Loth, “Guy Mollet und die Entstehung der Römischen Verträge 1956–57,” in: Integration 
30 (2007), pp. 313–319; Maria Grazia Melchionni/Roberto Ducci, La Genèse des traités de Rome, 
Paris: Economica 2007 ; on Maurice Faure, also Bruno Riondel, “Itinéraire d’un fédéraliste: Mau-
rice Faure,” in: Journal of European Integration History 2 (1997), pp. 69–82.
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lar was only willing to agree to the Atomic Community if the Common Market 
were realized at the same time. Faced with Erhard’s opposition to the Economic 
Community and Strauss’s opposition to the Atomic Community, Adenauer had 
already presented a package deal on the two entities in the cabinet meeting of 
10 February; and he now was holding firm to it. He was too unfamiliar with his 
new French colleagues and was also too irritated by support for the demand for 
a package deal by West German industry to be able to push through the requisite 
flexibility in carrying out negotiations from the beginning. He feared that once 
the French had gotten the Atomic Community, they would reject the Economic 
Community once and for all; even greater opposition to the Messina initiative was 
then to be expected than was already visible.83
The Negotiations on Euratom and the European Economic 
Community
At the foreign ministers conference of the Six in Venice on 29 and 30 May, 
Pineau—with a heavy heart and without prior backup from his Council of Min-
isters—agreed to the beginning of talks on not only the Atomic Community but 
also the Economic Community, doing so because of Bonn’s package deal.84 Yet, 
he continued to seek to bring the Atomic Community to fruition before the Eco-
nomic Community and specified three conditions that his government wanted for 
the passage of a treaty on the Common Market: Firstly, overseas territories were 
to be incorporated into the Common Market as a way of sharing the cost of their 
modernization rather than accelerating their break with the motherland by the 
erection of a tariff wall; this condition had especially been pushed by Socialist 
Oversees Minister Gaston Defferre. Secondly—and what Mollet’s Socialist Party 
put the most emphasis on overall—social benefits and taxes in the Community 
were to be largely harmonized by the end of the first integration phase in order to 
avoid distortions of competition and prevent the undermining of social-welfare 
achievements by a market focused on promoting competition. Thirdly, the tran-
sition from the first phase to the second was not to occur automatically; instead, 
the governments were to determine the regulations for further phases only after 
83 Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung 1956, vol. 9, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998, p. 191. 
Cf. Segers. Deutschlands Ringen, pp. 180–183; on the domestic political opposition, Loth, “Deut-
sche Europa-Konzeptionen,” pp. 591–595.
84 Cf. Segers, Deutschlands Ringen, pp. 208–211. “We had the impression, Maurice Faure and 
I, of letting ourselves in for a competition,” according to Pineau in Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp. 283. 
“What we had to avoid at all events was [another] non-ratification of a treaty.” 
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the conclusion of the first phase. Over against the liberal integration concept of 
the free-market economists that would naturally be of benefit primarily to the 
Federal Republic, which was then experiencing a full-fledged boom, the French 
side thereby once more put up a political concept of steering that was to diminish 
the risks entailed by the opening of markets.85
In order to generate the necessary support in parliament for the project, the 
Mollet government organized a parliamentary debate on the Atomic Community 
in early July. It specified that France expressly held open the possibility of devel-
oping its own nuclear weapons; opponents of nuclear weapons and the West 
Germans, who did not want to promote the special position of the French any 
further with their resources, were only offered a (rather theoretical) moratorium 
of four or five years in which there were to be no French nuclear tests. Beyond 
that, the French insisted that their country would represent itself to the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (and not by the Atomic Community). Also, different 
from what was provided for in the Spaak Report, there were not to be any joint 
organs of the Atomic Community and the ECSC. With these concessions to the 
champions of a “national” policy of independence and with a markedly-techni-
cal presentation of the project, the government secured a broad majority (332 to 
181) for continuing the negotiations on the Atomic Community. With this success 
under its belt, the Mollet government then pushed for a rapid conclusion of both 
treaties while taking into account the French conditions; talks had begun on 26 
June in the Chateau de Val Duchesse near Brussels and were once again under the 
chairmanship of Spaak.86
However, the partners had no intentions to cater to the French demands. 
German advocates of the free market regarded the call for harmonizing social 
benefits as downright absurd and also showed little inclination to concede France 
a special role as a nuclear military power or colonial power. Erhard focused his 
hopes on a free-trade zone among the OEEC countries, which OEEC General Sec-
retary René Sergent presented to the OEEC Council of Ministers meeting of 17 to 19 
85 The details of the French conceptions were contained in a memorandum that the govern-
ment delivered to the five negotiation partners. Excerpts from it are in Robert Marjolin, Le travail 
d´une vie. Mémoires 1911–1986, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1986, pp.  283–286. As Pineau’s cabinet 
chief, Marjolin had a major role in working out the French negotiating position.
86 Cf. Küsters, Gründung, pp. 294–298, und Weilemann, Anfänge, pp. 103–109. The correspond-
ing intervention by Maurice Faure in the session of 26 July 1956 (ibid., p. 109) shows that the 
Mollet government actually did not wait until the Suez Crisis before accepting a simultaneous 
signing of both treaties and thereby confirms the criticism of Pineau and Emile Noël (Rilancio, 
pp. 525–527) of the presentation by Guillen (ibid., p. 519). In any event, it still regarded the post-
ponement of the treaty on the Economic Community as a way out if the partners did not agree 
on its terms.
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July in Paris after discussions on the issue with the British government.87 Erhard 
accordingly encouraged the West German delegation in Brussels in its reticence. 
Consequently, nothing more than an exchange of differing viewpoints could be 
achieved; and so on 24 July, the delegation leaders decided to take a summer 
break.
After the resumption of talks on 6 September, the French government modi-
fied its position a bit: It no longer insisted on leaving the continuation of market 
integration open after the end of the first phase but now maintained that the tran-
sition to the second phase would occur only if the governments had agreed that 
the goals of the first phase had been achieved. In return, however, the French 
demanded that it be possible to retain the system of export assistance and import 
duties until the French trade deficit had been eliminated and in the event of 
renewed balance-of-payment difficulties to be able to return to such protective 
measures. Furthermore, the French wanted to retain the right to postpone the 
coming into effect of the treaty on the Common Market if the Algerian War con-
tinued to generate the exorbitant costs that was the case at that time.88 This was 
indeed acceptable to the others. On the questions of social benefits and of incor-
porating overseas territories, however, the differences continued to be unbridge-
able. Mollet therefore once again aimed for a chronological separation of the two 
treaties; and Jean Monnet, who anyway promised himself a much greater mobi-
lization push for the Atomic Community, urged Adenauer to bring forward the 
completion of the Euratom Treaty. The chancellor initially agreed but then, after 
having been persuaded otherwise by Etzel and Hallstein, held fast to the package 
deal.89
In October, the treaty negotiations thus came to a dead end, like those of 
the Spaak Committee hardly a year before. At a new foreign ministers meeting, 
called for 20 and 21 October in Paris, there was convergence on the question of 
transition regulations. The partners in principle granted France the possibility of 
taking special protective measures during difficulties over balance of payments; 
in return, Pineau conceded—after consultation with Mollet—that after six years, a 
87 On the origins of the proposal, cf. Wolfram Kaiser, Großbritannien und die Europäische Wirt-
schaftsgemeinschaft 1955–1961. Von Messina nach Canossa, Berlin: Akademie, 1996, pp. 71–84; 
Alan S. Milward, The United Kingdom and the European Community, Vol. 1: The Rise and Fall of 
a National Strategy 1945–1963, London: Whitehall History: Frank Cass cop. 2002, pp. 236–247; 
Dieter Krüger, Sicherheit durch Integration? Die wirtschaftliche und politische Zusammenarbeit 
Westeuropas 1947 bis 1957/58, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003, pp. 417ff.
88 The position was determined at an inter-ministerial session on 4 Sept.; cf. Guillen, L’Europe 
remède, pp. 330, and Marjolin, Le travail, pp. 301ff. 
89 Küsters, Gründung, pp. 310ff. Etzel had been mobilized by von der Groeben who feared for 
the passage of economic “total integration.”
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qualified majority would suffice for deciding on the transition to the second inte-
gration phase. Yet, when the West German delegation, to which both Erhard and 
Strauss belonged, categorically refused to agree to reducing the workweek from 
forty-eight to forty hours over the course of the first treaty phase, Pineau retracted 
his concession on the transition issue; after a further round of talks had brought 
no results, he declared the conference a failure.90
This setback was all the more dangerous to the project as on 3 October the 
British government officially embraced the proposal for a free-trade zone, though 
with the exclusion of agricultural products (for which the Commonwealth system 
of preferences was to continue). Erhard, who with his demonstratively-pro-
pounded liberal credo had contributed not a little to the failure of the Paris con-
ference, then immediately urged that the negotiations in Brussels be broken off 
and instead that there be talks with the British on what he regarded as the “most 
decisive political and economic initiative for the integration of Europe in years.” 
It was in this way that he hoped to eliminate once and for all the danger of a 
protectionist and dirigiste customs union of the Six and at the same time take a 
significant step toward a general liberalization of trade. In this, he knew that he 
had on his side the West German industrial organizations and chambers of com-
merce along with broad circles of exporting chemical and processing industries, 
which likewise placed great hope in the British initiative.91 In light of all this, 
Paul-Henri Spaak and many other advocates of the Messina project believed that 
its failure was almost certain.
Adenauer clearly did not allow himself to be impressed by Erhard’s economic 
argumentation. As much as he had treated the project of the Economic Commu-
nity standoffishly at the beginning because he saw no significant chance that it 
could win approval in France,92 he was also resolved that it not be allowed to 
fail now owing to differences between the Federal Republic and France. After the 
Radford Plan for reducing the American troop presence in Europe had presented 
90 On this and the following, ibid., pp. 313–320; Segers, Deutschlands Ringen, pp. 257–262; as 
well as the account of Karl Carstens, “Das Eingreifen Adenauers in den Europa-Verhandlungen 
im November 1956”; in: Dieter Blumenwitz, et al. (eds.), Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit. Poli-
tik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers. Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen, Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976, pp.  591–602. Carstens led the inter-ministerial working group 
that had been created for coordinating the German departmental standpoints in the negotia-
tions. 
91 Cf. Loth, “Europa-Konzeptionen,” p. 595; the quote from Erhard’s declaration to the OEEC 
Council of Ministers on 12 Feb. 1957, Europa-Archiv 12 (1957), p. 9651.
92 Not because the resolution of the Saar question and the arming of the Federal Republic had 
been more important to him than European integration, according to the exaggerated thesis of 
Segers, Deutschlands Ringen, p. 315.
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to him in the summer of 1956 the danger of a Soviet-US understanding at the cost 
of the Europeans, his interest in Western European security-policy cooperation 
had even grown. Initial arrangements for activating the Western European Union, 
which he had agreed on with Mollet during his visit to Bonn on 29 September 
“owing to concern over developments in America”93 were not to be called into 
question once again by the failure of the Brussels negotiations.
On 3 November, Adenauer thus agreed to the proposal made by representa-
tives of the Foreign Office to seek an escape from the negotiation crisis via bilat-
eral Franco-German conversations and announced that he himself would go to 
Paris in order to talk to Mollet. He held fast to his travel plans even when two days 
later the Mollet government came under heavy fire due to the military attack on 
Egypt that it was then undertaking alongside the British so as to force a reversal 
of the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser.
It was not completely without significance for overcoming the negotiation 
crisis—which was causing Spaak and many others to fear that the Messina project 
would fail—that the Franco-German talks on the future of the Saar were success-
fully completed at just this time. On 23 October 1955, the statute worked out in the 
Treaties of Paris, contrary to expectations, had been rejected by the population 
of the Saar by a large majority; the Faure government had then taken up negoti-
ations with Bonn with the goal of winning some economic compensation in the 
now clearly-inevitable incorporation of the Saarland into the Federal Republic. 
Ever since the meeting between Adenauer and Mollet on 4 and 5 June 1956 in Lux-
embourg, a compromise had been in the offing. This amounted to having Bonn 
honor a shortening of the transition period to at most three years, with partial 
financing of the canalization of the Mosel and further exploitation of a portion 
of Saar coal deposits from French soil. After a series of difficult questions over 
details had been resolved, it was possible to sign the Treaties of Luxembourg 
on 27 October, allowing the entry of the Saarland into the Federal Republic on 1 
January 1957.94 Naturally, the fact that this compromise succeeded contributed to 
an improvement in the basic sentiment between France and the Federal Republic 
and above all brought negotiation partners such as Faure and Hallstein as well as 
Pineau and von Brentano closer to each another.95
93 Ibid., pp. 244–249; the quote from the negotiation transcript from Karl Carstens, PAAA.
94 Cf. Ulrich Lappenküper, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1949–1963. Von der “Erb-
feindschaft” zur “entente élémentaire,” vol. 2: 1958–1963, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001, pp. 1094–
1138; Segers, Deutschlands Ringen, pp. 212–215. 
95 Faure reports having become a friend of Hallstein through the negotiations on the Saar: 
Rilancio, pp. 287ff.
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In any event, what was more important was that the unified pressure of the 
US and the Soviet Union—which together had forced the governments of Mollet 
and Eden to break off their Suez undertaking in the night of 6 to 7 November—
lastingly increased the feeling in France for the necessity of European unifica-
tion. Mollet immediately made use of this improvement in the climate to acceler-
ate the treaty negotiations via greater willingness to make concessions. As early 
as Adenauer’s visit on 6 November, he instructed his officials at all events to find 
a compromise on the contentious issue of harmonization. A group of experts, 
led on the French side by Robert Marjolin and on the West German side by Karl 
Carstens, then negotiated a compromise formula that transformed a commitment 
to upward harmonization of social benefits into a vague declaration of intent: 
National legislation and the effects of the Common Market itself would by the end 
of the first phase make possible a harmonization of the workweek along French 
lines; if that was not achieved, then the Commission of the Community would 
be entitled to add protective clauses to the benefit of disadvantaged industries. 
On the basis of this agreement, the group once again confirmed the compro-
mises on the issue of compensatory payments and the modalities of transition 
to the second phase, which had already been discussed at the foreign ministers 
meeting. When the compromise package was presented to both heads of govern-
ment, Mollet had just learned in a telephone conversation with Eden that the 
British government had already agreed to the American demand for an immedi-
ate armistice in the Suez. Adenauer acknowledged the news with the injunction 
“And now we must create Europe!” Both leaders then agreed to the results of the 
negotiations without further discussion and thereby cleared the path for the talks 
to continue at an accelerated pace.96
Mollet prevailed in the cabinet—which was very impressed by the solidarity 
shown by Adenauer during the Suez Crisis—with a resolution to have the treaty on 
the Economic Community completed as quickly as possible and for this purpose 
to be content with laying down “rather general principles” on other disputed 
issues too, which were then to be fleshed out by the “supranational authority” of 
the Community.97 At the same time, he began to prepare the parliament as well as 
the public systematically as to the necessity of both treaties by presenting them 
96 Cf. Carstens, “Eingreifen,” pp.  599ff.; Küsters, Gründung, pp.  327–330; Guillen, L’ Europe 
remède, pp. 331; Krüger, Sicherheit, pp. 440–442; Segers, Deutschlands Ringen, pp. 280ff. The 
quote from the report by Pineau in Christian Pineau and Christiane Rimbaud, Le Grand Pari. 
L’ouverture du traité de Rome, Paris: Fayard, 1991, p. 223.
97 According to the communication by Marjolin in a session of the inter-ministerial committee 
for preparing the Common Market, quoted from Guillen, L’Europe remède, p. 332. Guillen’s pre-
sentation does not however disinguish clearly enough between Mollet’s views and the campaign 
of persuasion. 
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as means through which such humiliations for France could be avoided in the 
future—humiliations as Nasser’s expropriation maneuver and the superpowers’ 
intervention in the Suez Crisis. In light of the distressing dependency on Arab 
oil and the clear distancing of Adenauer from the leading power the US, Europe 
seemed to be the stronghold of independence for the first time since the intensi-
fication of the EDC crisis: This impression was increased by Mollet’s propaganda 
offensive and so prepared the soil for a weakening of the protectionist opposition 
to the Common Market.
With the background of the success on the Saar issue, the solidarity in the 
Suez Crisis, and the growing maneuvering room in talks shown by the French 
delegation, nothing less than a cordial negotiating climate developed in Brussels, 
one that made it possible for remaining differences to be moved out of the way 
step by step, with much appreciation of the domestic political difficulties of the 
partners and with some creativity too. Pierre Uri once again played a role in this; 
he had been brought into the negotiations by Spaak as a personal advisor and 
was now leading the talks out of bottlenecks by means of compromise formula-
tions that he drafted on an ad hoc basis. Spaak himself repeatedly gave Hans von 
der Groeben, whom he had named as chairman of the committee for the Common 
Market, sufficient backup to defend the line on economic integration found in the 
Spaak Report against divergent forays from national bureaucracies.98
In the process, it proved possible to come to grips with as a delicate a problem 
as the incorporation of agriculture into the Common Market. Negotiations on this 
had been going on since September of 1950 when then French Agriculture Minis-
ter Pierre Pflimlin presented a plan for the sectoral integration of European agri-
culture; the various rounds of talks had always failed however due to unbridge-
able opposing interests. The experience that an agreement within the framework 
of the OEEC was not possible owing to the great a diversity of interests as well as 
a systematic export offensive by American grain producers since the middle of 
1950 led the French to attempt to use the Common Market as an export market 
for its agricultural products, which offered protection from the competition of the 
global market via price subsidies and external tariffs.99 With this, they admit-
tedly ran into opposition from West German agricultural representatives, who 
98 Cf. the accounts by Faure und Uri, in: Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp.  288ff. and 307ff. as well 
as the account by von der Groeben in Küsters, Gründung, p. 335. On the negotiations, Segers, 
Deutschlands Ringen, pp. 286–290, 300–305, 307–309.
99 Cf. Gilbert Noel, Du Pool vert à la politique agricole commune. Les tentatives de Communauté 
agricole européenne entre 1945 et 1955, Paris, 1989; Ulrich Kluge, “Du Pool noir au Pool vert,” 
in: Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp.  239–280; Guido Thiemeyer, Vom “Pool Vert” zur Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Europäische Integration, Kalter Krieg und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen 
Europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950–1957, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999, pp. 243–260.
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feared intra-European competition, and from the Dutch too, for whom the pro-
posed subsidies were conversely much too high.
The result of this tug-of-war was the decision to seek a European market for 
agriculture but to leave the task of working it out to a government conference to 
meet immediately after the treaty had come into effect. The French representa-
tives were not given any guarantee that the future protection of agriculture would 
not be less than the existing protection via national markets; German negotiators 
had to give up special regulations for the reduction of intra-Community tariffs; 
and the Dutch had to accept that the governments would retain the right to set 
minimum prices for certain products. Furthermore, the dismantling of discrimi-
nation was made dependent on incremental convergence on subsidized domestic 
prices; and the Community was saddled with subsidizing raw materials whose 
processed products were destined for export to third countries.100 This meant that 
a European agricultural protectionism of a middling sort was in the offing, linked 
with a promotion of modernization that was curbed by regional considerations. 
Clearly, there would still need to be negotiations over the methods of subsidy; 
here, the agreements hid many sources of conflict.
Regarding the Atomic Community, Adenauer conceded in principle to Mollet 
during the November meeting that Euratom would not exercise any kind of 
control functions in the military realm. In return, the Frenchman accepted that 
the community’s supply monopoly could be broken if it could not deliver fission-
able material in sufficient quantities or did so only under “improper” conditions. 
With special regulations that guaranteed priority supply to reactors already com-
pleted and to isotope separation facilities to be established over the next seven 
years, both sides moved further from the idea of operator functions for the com-
munity itself. In the question of ownership of fissionable material, the French 
side was able to gain a victory at the last moment: Monnet, who was now involved 
only indirectly in negotiations via an expert committee of “Three Wise Men,” was 
able to make it clear to Adenauer that only in this way was it possible to gain 
the support of the US for the development of European nuclear energy. Yet, the 
community’s right of ownership was limited to “especially fissionable materials,” 
and the users could utilize the community’s property without constraint as long 
as they adhered to safety regulations. In contrast, French efforts for the construc-
tion of a common European isotope separation facility remained wholly without 
success: Here, the disinclination of the partners was reinforced by pressure from 
the US, which under all circumstances wanted to prevent the development of 
an independent French nuclear weapons force. The project thereby lost much 
100 Details from the negotiation papers in Küsters, Gründung, pp. 347–359.
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meaning in both military and civilian regards, and in France too it now retreated 
into the background compared to the Common Market.101
On the issue of institutions, there was a collision of differing conceptions 
leading to a compromise that was both complicated and capable of being devel-
oped in different directions. The French government advocated a strong posi-
tion for the Council of Ministers, which was as a rule to decide by majority, 
but opposed substantial participation by the European Parliament due to the 
anti-European mood in French public opinion. The Dutch government, whose 
conceptions here were substantially influenced by Sicco Mansholt, envisioned 
a strong Commission that, as a non-partisan body of experts, as it were, would 
pursue “objective politics.” It was to have the sole right to make proposals to the 
Council of Ministers, which was to decide on them by majority rule. Participation 
by a parliament was not provided for in this construction. With this and with the 
binding commitment of the Council of Ministers to the proposals of the Commis-
sion, the expansion of the Community beyond the creation of a Common Market 
was to be prevented. Over against this, the Italian and West German governments 
insisted on a strong position for the European Parliament, which was to decide on 
the Community budget and participate in legislative acts of the Commission and 
the Council of Ministers. Yet, Adenauer impressed upon his country’s delegation 
the need to show a willingness to compromise when in doubt so that the project 
as a whole would not fail due to institutional questions.102
A compromise on these divergent conceptions was found only at the last 
minute at the conference of the foreign ministers of the Six from 26 to 28 January 
1957. It essentially amounted to this: The competencies of the Council and of the 
Commission would be limited because the rights of the European Parliament 
remained limited. Regarding the budget, Parliament received only the right to 
make amendment proposals to the Council, which was to decide on them by qual-
ified majority. Other than that, Parliament could force the Commission to resign 
by a two-thirds majority but was given no influence over the composition of a 
new Commission. Direct election of Parliament was made dependent on a future 
101 The presentation in Weilemann, Anfänge, pp. 122–143 and 171–179, is rather unclear. Import-
ant additions in Richard T. Griffith and Wendy Asbeek Brusse, “The Dutch Cabinet and the Rome 
Treaties,” in Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp. 461–493, here pp. 482–491, und Guillen, La France, ibid., 
pp. 523ff.
102 Cf. Guido Thiemeyer, “Die Ursachen des ‘Demokratiedefizits’ der Europäischen Union aus 
geschichtswissenschaftlicher Perspektive,” in: Wilfried Loth (ed.), Das europäische Projekt zu 
Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2001, pp. 27–47; Jean-Marie Palayret, 
“Les décideurs français et allemands face aux questions institutionnelles dans la négociation 
des traités de Rome,” in: Marie-Thérèse Bitsch (ed.), Le couple France-Allemagne et les institu-
tions européennes, Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 2001, pp. 105–150.
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unanimous vote of the Council. In return, the Council was established as the sole 
lawmaker of the Community. However, decisions in the Council could initially be 
made by qualified majority only in a few areas (whereby a recommendation along 
those lines by the Commission was adopted as a requirement in order to prevent 
small member states from being outvoted). Central issues such as the naming of 
Commission members, the shaping of common agricultural policy, and the devel-
opment of common social policy were to remain dependent on unanimous votes 
even after the expiration of the transition period.103
After this, greater difficulties were once again caused by the French demand 
that overseas territories be included. As deputy delegation leader Marjolin speci-
fied on 19 November, the French government understood by this the incremental 
opening of overseas markets to the Community countries, the commitment to accept 
overseas products, and the financing of a comprehensive investment fund by the 
Community. This was supported by the Belgian government, which saw the same 
problems in the Congo, but was treated with great distance by the West German 
government—it was indeed agreeable to the opening of markets on the basis of reci-
procity, but on the issue of financing, it initially agreed to nothing more than a non-
binding declaration of intent. In contrast to the situation with social burdens, Paris 
was not satisfied with that: On the one hand, the government was fascinated by 
the vision of a “Eurafrica” that would be independent in world politics; and on the 
other, this vision played a central role in mobilizing the French public, which was 
then primarily occupied with the drama in Algeria. Once the National Assembly 
had approved the continuation of negotiations on 22 January 1957 with the proviso 
that the association of overseas territories would be regulated “on the basis of the 
principles proposed by the government,” Adenauer could not avoid giving in at the 
closing meeting of the heads of government on 19 and 20 February in Paris. After 
a private conversation between him and his French counterpart, the creation of an 
investment fund in the amount of 581 million US dollars for the first five years was 
agreed upon; its continuation beyond that period was made dependent on a unan-
imous vote of the Council of Ministers. This was less than half the sum originally 
regarded as necessary by the French side, and it completely left out the demand for 
sales guarantees. Nevertheless, it naturally served as a signal for ratification in the 
eyes of the French public.104
103 Cf. the overview of the EEC procedural regulations in Hans R. Krämer, Die Europäische Wirt-
schaftsgemeinschaft, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin: Metzner, 1965, pp. 26–40.
104 Küsters, Gründung, pp.  333ff. and 379–392; René Girault, “La France entre l’Europe et 
l’Afrique,” in: Serra (ed.), Rilancio, pp. 351–378; on the debate in the French National Assembly, 
also Gerhard Kiersch, “Parlament und Parlamentarier in der Außenpolitik der IV. Republik,” 
Diss. Berlin, 1971, pp. 287–315.
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The treaties on the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) were signed on 25 March 
1957 in Rome by two representatives of each of the six founding states, mostly the 
heads of government and their foreign ministers. The ceremony took place in the 
Hall of the Horatii and Curiatii in the Palazzo dei Conservatori on the Capitoline 
Hill; the rain that continually fell on that raw Monday in Rome marred the festive 
mood a bit.105 This fit with the course of the ratification debates in the coming 
weeks and months: Nowhere did the Treaties of Rome spark great enthusiasm, 
but after the careful preparation neither did they meet with stubborn resistance.
In contrast to the situation with the EDC, Mollet immediately presented the 
treaties to the National Assembly so as not to permit the formation of an opposi-
tional movement. Jean Monnet, who after leaving the presidency of the ECSC had 
assembled an “Action Committee for the United States of Europe” consisting of 
about a hundred political personalities,106 then made efforts to have the Bund-
estag ratify the treaties quickly so as to bring hesitant French deputies to agree-
ment too. In the process, he had some difficulties with the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), which did not necessarily want to grant Adenauer another foreign-policy 
success in light of the parliamentary elections set for the coming autumn. After 
a conversation with Erich Ollenhauer and Herbert Wehner, Monnet was able to 
prevail, however. It was due to his influence and the efforts of Maurice Faure that 
progress continued on preparing for ratification in France despite the fall of the 
Mollet government on 21 May.107 On 6 July, the Bundestag approved the treaties 
with the votes of the SPD, which for the first time had thereby backed away from 
its fundamental opposition to integration into the West. Only a minority of sev-
enteen SPD deputies, among them Helmut Schmidt, voted against the treaties, 
doing so because of the absence of Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. 
Likewise, the opposition parties FDP and BHE voted against the treaties, though 
they had earlier, as part of the government, supported Adenauer’s course on 
integration into the West.108 Three days later, the French National Assembly also 
105 Cf. Franz Knipping, Rom, 25. März 1957. Die Einigung Europas, Munich: Deutscher Taschen-
buch-Verlag, 2004, pp. 9–13. The treaty texts in: Europa. Dokumente, vol. 3, pp. 1153–1219 (Eura-
tom) and 1248–1327 (EEC).
106 Cf. Antonio Varsori, “Jean Monnet e il Comitato d’Azione per gli Stati Uniti d’Europa fra MEC 
ed Euratom (1955–1957),” in: Sergio Pistone (ed.), I movimenti per l’unità europea 1954–1969, 
Pavia: Giuffrè, 1996, pp. 349–371.
107 Cf. Monnet, Mémoires, pp.  480–499; Roussel, Monnet, pp.  715ff.; Martial Libera, “Jean 
Monnet et les personnalités allemandes du Comité d’action pour les États-Unis d’Europe (1995–
1975),” in: Une dynamique européenne. Le Comité d’action pour les États-Unis d’Europe, Paris: 
Economica, 2011, pp. 37–56.
108 Cf. Loth, “Europa-Konzeptionen,” pp. 592–594 and 597ff.
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approved the treaties—with the surprising majority of 342 to 239. Mollet’s mobili-
zation strategy had now paid off, likewise the concessions and gestures that Ade-
nauer had been willing to make in the interest of stabilizing the Franco-German 
core of the Community.
After the breakthrough in the French National Assembly, the ratification of 
the treaties was no longer in danger in the remaining parliaments. On 30 July, 
the Italian parliament approved them; on 4 October the Second Chamber of the 
Dutch States-General followed suit; the Belgian Chamber of Representatives and 
the Luxembourg parliament did likewise on 19 and 26 November, respectively. 
Both treaties then came into effect on 1 January 1958.109
The appointments to the top offices of the new institutions were decided only 
at the last minute in bilateral contacts at the turn of the year 1957–58. Jean Monnet 
pulled a few strings to secure the presidency of the Euratom authority for Louis 
Armand; he wanted the office of the president of the EEC Commission to go to 
Sicco Mansholt, the spry agriculture minister of the Netherlands who was disap-
pointed at not having become foreign minister in the most recent government in 
The Hague. For Adenauer, however, it was unacceptable to have two Socialists in 
the new top offices; and so agreement was reached that Armand would receive 
the Euratom post and that Jean Rey, the liberal economy minister of Belgium, 
would become president of the EEC Commission. As to the latter, Adenauer would 
only consent if the Belgian capital were not at the same time the seat of the Com-
mission. When Brussels refused to give up on that, he then insisted that the presi-
dency of the EEC Commission be held by a German and presented State Secretary 
Walter Hallstein as his choice. Hallstein’s candidacy was met with rapid agree-
ment in the other capitals, not least because people had learned to value him as 
a competent and engaging West German delegation head in the talks on the ECSC 
as well as those on the Treaties of Rome.110
The approval of the Treaties of Rome demonstrated that the European unifica-
tion movement was indeed stronger than it might have appeared at the time of the 
failure of the EDC. The success in creating an organizational core for “Europe”—
which even with all the modesty of its functions was nevertheless capable of 
being developed—made possible a continuation of this movement. Problematic 
was only the fact that there had been very little in the way of an understanding 
on the political finality of this Community, nor was this arrangement concen-
109 On the ratification processes, see Küsters, Gründung, pp. 441–483.
110 Michel Dumoulin, “The Interim Committee (April 1957 to January 1958),” in: The European 
Commission, 1958–72. History and Memories, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 2007, pp. 37–49; on Hallstein as a person, Wilfried Loth, “Walter Hall-
stein, a committed European,” ibid., pp. 79–90.
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trated on executive and bureaucratic elites well suited to making up for that in 
the near future—and this in a Community that, despite its economic functions, 
was still more strongly motivated by politics than by economics. Thus, in terms of 
the further course of integration history, an ambivalent result had been achieved 
with the Treaties of Rome: They could serve as the basis for further develop-
ment, which however would again and again require unambiguously-convergent 
interests and an unambiguous political creative will. At the same time, they also 
embodied within them the risk of lapsing into mere administration of the crisis of 
Community development. The European Communities thus offered a challenge 
that could prove the creativity and courage of the Europeans.
2  Formative Years, 1958–1963
The European Commission
Representatives of the governments of the six member states met in Paris to name 
the members of the first Commission of the European Economic Community 
on 5 and 6 January 1958. As agreed, the president of the Commission was to be 
the German Walter Hallstein. Vice presidents were to be the Frenchman Robert 
Marjolin, the Italian Piero Malvestiti, and the Dutchman Sicco Mansholt. Other 
members of the Commission were the Belgian Jean Rey, the Luxembourger Michel 
Rasquin, the German Hans von der Groeben, the Frenchman Robert Lemaignen, 
and the Italian Guiseppe Petrilli. The three Benelux states would thus be repre-
sented by one member each on the Commission, while the larger states would 
have two each.
It was initially unclear what role this Commission would play. According to 
the treaty, the Commission was to “ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and 
the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied” and “exer-
cise the powers conferred by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid 
down by the latter.”1 The Commission also held the sole right of initiative over 
the budget of the Community and over key politico-economic areas such as the 
realization of the customs union, the rules of competition, the standardization 
of law, trade policy, and the design of the agricultural system: In these areas, the 
Council of Ministers could make regulations only on the basis of a proposal from 
the Commission. The Council could alter such proposals only by unanimous vote. 
In those cases in which a majority decision of the Council was specified, it could 
only adopt the Commission’s proposal unaltered or reject it in its entirety.
Beyond this, there were some areas in which the governments had retained 
the sole authority to make decisions: Changes in the common tariff rates, propos-
als for the design of a common agricultural policy, common transport policy, the 
granting of government aid, the passage of trade agreements with third parties 
during the first two phases of the Economic Community, the transfer of respon-
sibilities in the area of social security to the Commission, new tasks of the Euro-
pean Social Fund, decisions about the continuation of association agreements 
with overseas territories, the naming of members of the Commission and of the 
Economic and Social Committee, as well as the acceptance of new members and 
the association of new states. In all these cases, agreement among all member 
states was necessary, but the Council was not bound by proposals of the Commis-
1 Article 155 EEC Treaty. 
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sion. The Council could solicit the position of the Commission on an issue, and 
for its part, the Commission could make recommendations and take positions at 
any time, although the Council was not bound by them.
Lastly, the Commission could in some cases make decisions in the form of 
decrees, rulings, and guidelines independent of the Council. These included the 
dismantling of tariffs, the granting of tariff quotas, import quotas, common agri-
cultural policy, the free movement of labor, rules of competition, government aid, 
cooperation in the realm of trade policy, as well as the right to file a case in the 
European Court against the Council or the European Investment Bank.
Decisions within the Commission were to be made by a majority of the nine 
members. In the Council of Ministers, majority voting was specified in only a few 
cases—for example, in the standardization of tariff rates or the conclusion of trade 
treaties with third parties. At the beginning of the second phase of the Common 
Market (after four years or six at the most), quantitative limitations as well as 
measures for implementing freedom of establishment and free trade in services 
were to be decided with a qualified majority. In the third phase (planned to begin 
after eight years), a majority would decide in a large number of additional areas, 
from tariff reductions and common agricultural policy to common trade policy 
with third parties. After the end of the transition period (lasting from twelve years 
to fifteen at the most), decisions on courses of action in international organiza-
tions would be made by qualified majority. Unanimity would then be required 
for only a few central issues such as the naming of Commission members, the 
transfer of new responsibilities to the Commission, the acceptance of additional 
members, and the conclusion of association agreements.
The qualified-majority provision in the Council meant that member states 
would be accorded different numbers of votes roughly proportional to population 
and that for a majority, close to two thirds of the total votes would be necessary. 
France, the Federal Republic, and Italy were each given four votes, while Belgium 
and the Netherlands were given two and Luxembourg one. This made seventeen 
votes altogether, and twelve were required for a majority decision. If the deci-
sion stemmed from a recommendation of the Commission, then the votes of the 
three large states would suffice for a majority. If the Council was addressing an 
issue outside the realm in which the Commission had initiative, then a majority of 
four states was required. This eliminated the possibility that the three large states 
could simply outvote the Benelux countries.
Initially, the Community did not have any income of its own but was instead 
financed by contributions from the member states. Based on a proposal from the 
Commission, the Council decided on the annual budget by qualified majority. 
The Parliamentary Assembly could propose changes in the draft budget, but 
the Council was not bound to heed them. Members of the Commission served 
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four-year terms and the president a two-year term. Unanimity was required for 
appointments. Members were allowed to serve more than one term. They were not 
dependent on instructions from their governments and were only responsible to 
the Parliamentary Assembly. In the event of a vote of no confidence by the Assem-
bly, the Commission members were required to resign as a group; the Assembly 
did not however have any influence over the composition of a new Commission.
The Commission thus oscillated between serving as an institution carrying 
out the will of the Council of Ministers and one constituting the executive of the 
Community. It had to share the executive function with the Council and remained 
dependent on the vote of the Council in all substantive questions. In the event 
of conflict with a national government, the Commission would have no support 
from a parliamentary majority; it could only resort to the more difficult task of 
finding allies among the national governments and the public. On the other 
hand, its sole right of initiative gave it an excellent means by which to shape the 
policy of the Community. From a combination of the right of initiative and the 
system of majority decision-making by the Council, there emerged the prospect 
of strengthening executive competencies and expanding supranational govern-
ment. This was also the case with the broadening of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly’s right of participation, even though that body’s powers were very limited at 
first, and also for the transition to a system of income specifically intended for 
the Community, an issue closely linked to the rights of Parliament. In principle, 
both were possible according to the terms of the treaty but remained dependent 
on unanimous decisions of the Council of Ministers. Initially, the members of the 
Parliamentary Assembly were to be sent from the national parliaments. Repre-
sentation in the body was weighted in a manner similar to that of the majority 
votes on the Council (thirty-six seats each for France, the Federal Republic, and 
Italy; fourteen each for Belgium and the Netherlands; six for Luxembourg).
The ambivalent character of the Commission corresponded to the relative 
open-endedness of the substantive provisions of the treaty. What was clearly 
agreed upon however was the gradual elimination of hindrances to trade in 
all industrial products and services, the establishment of the free movement of 
labor and of capital, as well as the creation of common tariff rates and a common 
trade policy for the Community. Likewise, it was agreed that there should be 
common rules of competition. Regarding the design of a common agricultural 
policy, however, the treaty contained only discretionary provisions. The content 
of common transport policy remained undetermined. A European social fund 
for improving employment opportunities was to exist only during the transition 
period. Likewise open was the retention of an investment fund for overseas terri-
tories after a period of five years; there was only very vague talk about “coordina-
tion” of economic and currency policy thereafter. The nature of “cooperation in 
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social questions” also remained unspecified: The Council could transfer respon-
sibilities to the Commission but was not required to do so.
The treaty thus had the character of a framework agreement. The customs 
union was to be realized gradually, and it remained an open question as to the 
extent that harmonization of economic policy was to go beyond the creation of 
that customs union. There certainly were no arrangements regarding the transi-
tion from an economic community to the integration of further policy areas. The 
fathers of the treaty had indeed declared their intention of “creating the bases for 
an ever closer union of the European peoples” by means of an economic commu-
nity,2 but they refrained from offering a more detailed description of the path to 
such a union.
Walter Hallstein regarded it as his task to promote the potential for devel-
opment contained within the treaty to the greatest extent possible. As a close 
associate of Konrad Adenauer, he saw the creation of a European Union primarily 
as a political necessity. In order to secure the peace among its members and to 
combine their forces, it must have a compulsory character. Given that the inte-
gration of democratically-constituted states was only acceptable on the basis of 
equality, supranational structures had to be created that would bind all member 
states to the same degree. Hallstein was thus determined to interpret the com-
petencies of the Commission as broadly as possible and with its help promote 
the “Community in the making” as much as possible. For him, the Commission 
was not only the guardian of the treaty and the embodiment of “pure Community 
interests.”3 Its task was also to initiate Community policy and to promote the 
process of European unification. It was therefore incumbent upon the Commis-
sion to expand its area of influence continually and to strengthen its responsibili-
ties at the expense of the national governments and of the Council of Ministers.4
The members of the first Commission shared this view of their tasks more or 
less explicitly. Sicco Mansholt, who had previously served as agriculture minis-
ter in the Netherlands, had in the treaty negotiations fought for a Commission 
that would be as strong and independent as possible from the Council of Min-
isters. Jean Rey, previously Belgian economy minister, belonged to the ranks of 
dedicated European federalists. Robert Marjolin, a colleague of Jean Monnet, had 
served from 1947 to 1953 as general secretary of the Organization for European 
Economic Co-Operation (OEEC) and thereafter as professor of political economy 
2 Preamble of the EEC Treaty.
3 Walter Hallstein, Der unvollendete Bundesstaat. Europäische Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse, 
Düsseldorf and Vienna: Econ, 1969, p. 56.
4 On this and the following see Wilfried Loth/Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, “The Hallstein Commission 
1958–67,” in: The European Commission 1958–72, pp. 51–78.
 The European Commission   79
at the University of Nancy; he regarded the potential of the Commission much 
more skeptically, not least of all in light of the views of Charles de Gaulle, who 
came to power in Paris in June of 1958. Fundamentally, however, the direction in 
which Hallstein sought to move was in sync with Marjolin’s own views: “I leaned, 
to a certain extent instinctively, toward the idea of a European federation but felt 
no less instinctively that it did not as yet exist.”5 This was also more or less the 
case with Hans von der Groeben, the second German member of the Commis-
sion; he had previously been head of the European department within the West 
German economy ministry and had played a major role in the development of the 
Spaak Report.6 For the moment, however, all commissioners were in agreement 
with Hallstein that “what was most important was allowing the Treaties of Rome 
become a reality.”7
Standing in the way of that process were not only minimalist interpretations 
of the treaty but also the difficulties stemming from competition with national 
institutions. When the Commission began its work, no decision had yet been 
made as to its seat. Until May of 1958, meetings of the Commission alternated 
among Luxembourg (where it could be supported by the administration of the 
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community), Strasbourg (at the 
Maison de l’Europe), and Brussels (where the secretariat of the “Interim Commit-
tee” for preparation of the EEC and Euratom had been located). The administra-
tive office of the Commission was provisionally headquartered in Brussels. Office 
space provided by the Belgian government in the rue Belliard and the château 
Val Duchesse quickly proved much too small. As early as May of 1958, the Com-
mission rented an additional office complex in the city center on rue de Marais. 
In July of that year, the members of the Commission and their staffs moved into 
a building on avenue la Joyeuse Entrée. In December, this headquarters was 
enlarged by the addition of the Dépendence “Cortenberg.” In April of 1959, two 
directorates-general—that for competition and that for agriculture—were moved 
into a new building on avenue de Brocqueville. This spatial separation was not 
exactly beneficial for the integration of the rapidly expanding administration.
Although the Commission had thereby de facto installed itself in Brussels, 
the governments of France and Luxembourg in July of 1958 rejected a Belgian pro-
posal to designate the city as the sole seat of the Communities. Only in February 
of the following year did the foreign ministers of the six member states determine 
that Brussels would be the provisional seat of the Economic Community—and 
only for the subsequent three years; before the end of that period, a definitive 
5 Robert Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie. Mémoires 1911–1986, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1986, p. 312.
6 Interview with Hans von der Groeben, 16 December 2003.
7 Marjolin, p. 312.
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decision was to be made. That did not occur, however, and in February of 1962, 
Brussels was again declared the provisional seat. As a result, the Commission 
was not in a position to purchase its own real estate; and the Belgian government 
remained hesitant to invest in construction for the future seat of the Community.
Likewise, the various national financial authorities dragged their feet when 
it came to financing the Community. In order to begin its work at all, the Commis-
sion had to resort to a monetary advance from the High Authority of the ECSC. 
Repeated urgent calls to individual finance ministers were necessary in order to 
ensure that salaries could be paid at the last moment.8 Moreover, in doing the 
work assigned it by the treaty, the Commission regularly ran into resistance from 
national bureaucracies that were not in agreement with it. Even in the recruiting 
of personnel for the new administration, national authorities proved anything 
but helpful—there were serious disputes about the filling of individual positions.
The Commission sought to overcome these difficulties with spirit and vigor. 
It made use of the general disinterest in European issues in the crisis-filled final 
months of the Fourth French Republic as well as the difficulties in the administra-
tive structuring of the Council of Ministers in order to establish its own authority 
as the first effectively functioning institution of the new Community. Right at the 
beginning of the Commission’s work, the issue of division of labor among the 
commissioners was taken up and was definitively resolved after ten weeks. Three 
weeks later, the Commission’s first organizational chart was adopted. With clear 
directives from the president, the commissioners immediately chose their direc-
tors-general, who in turn—still during the spring of 1958—picked their depart-
ment heads. By the autumn, most of the higher-level administrative officials 
and the vast majority of the lower-level personnel had been recruited. When the 
Budget Committee of the Council of Ministers took up its work, most hiring had 
already been done and the personnel ranks were practically full. The Commis-
sion had approximately one thousand people on its staff by the end of 1958. The 
national governments saw themselves confronted with a fait accompli.
In light of the large number of responsibilities potentially accruing to the Com-
mission according to a literal interpretation of the treaty, Hallstein’s aim from the 
beginning was to create a “grand administration” whose character would extend 
far beyond that of the High Authority of the ECSC. As a precaution, an administra-
tive structure was created for those areas in which the governments had not as yet 
settled on a concrete program. Altogether, eight administrative units were estab-
lished, so-called “Directorates-General,” at whose head sat a “Director-General”: 
External Relations, Economic and Financial Affairs, Internal Market (customs, 
8 Robert Lemaignen, L’Europe au Berceau. Souvenirs d’un technocrate, Paris: Plon, 1964, 
pp. 36ff.; Interview with Karl-Heinz Narjes, 24 May 2004.
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quotas, services), Competition and Standardization of Law, Social Affairs, Agri-
culture, Transport, as well as Overseas Countries and Territories.
Adhering to the principle of collegiality, the High Authority organized the 
Commission into work groups: For each of the eight areas, three to five commis-
sioners constituted a work group that would prepare the decisions to be reached 
in the plenum of the Commission. The chairman of the work group also bore 
responsibility for the directorate-general of the area in question. He thereby func-
tioned de facto as a minister, and the areas, which had been structured along 
the lines of West German administration, perforce developed separately from one 
another. Following the practice in Latin countries, each commissioner had a few 
private staff—a cabinet. Along with this cabinet, the president had a secretariat, 
but this body had no authority over the administrative structure. Hallstein, who 
had administrative experience in the formation of the West German Rector’s Con-
ference and the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic, did not want to permit the 
rise of any strong administrative heads independent of the political leadership of 
the Commission.9
The division of responsibilities was decided by collegial agreement. It was 
clear from the outset that Mansholt would take agriculture; he immediately 
plunged into that work with extraordinary energy. Marjolin, who was the second 
political heavyweight alongside Mansholt, initially claimed foreign affairs for 
himself. Hallstein did not however want to give it to him, presumably because 
he himself wanted to take on the representation of the Community to the outside 
world. Marjolin was compensated with comprehensive authority over econom-
ics and finance.10 By means of his tactical restraint, von der Groeben gained for 
himself what was especially important to him as the father of competition policy: 
Responsibility for cartels and monopolies, subsidies, as well as the standardiza-
tion of law and of taxes.11 External relations were entrusted to Jean Rey, a skilful 
negotiator who was to become one of the heavyweights of the Commission fol-
lowing the negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).12 
Piero Malvestiti was given charge of the internal market. Overseas areas, in whose 
integration France took an especially strong interest, were assigned to the second 
French commissioner, Robert Lemaignen. The initially less important realm of 
social policy was given to the second Italian commissioner, Guiseppe Petrilli. 
Transportation policy, which was likewise of lower priority at the time, became 
9 Interview with Fernand Braun, 8 December 2003.
10 Interview with Karl-Heinz Narjes, 24 May 2004.
11 Interview with Hans von der Groeben, 16 December 2003.
12 Interview with Fernand Braun, 8 December 2003.
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the responsibility of the commissioner from the smallest member state, Michel 
Rasquin.
Care was taken to ensure that the directors-general were not of the same 
nationality as the commissioners who oversaw them. In late March of 1958, Emile 
Noël was appointed secretary of the Commission with the title “executive sec-
retary” so as to set the position apart; he had been a longtime associate of the 
former French Prime Minister Guy Mollet and had played an important role as 
early as the passage of the Treaties of Rome. Party-political considerations did not 
come into consideration in the appointments at all; Hallstein strongly believed 
that national governments should have no influence over the filling of positions 
in the administrative structure. For him, the primary issue was the qualifica-
tions of the applicant; this often led him to advocate for younger applicants who 
combined outstanding expertise with an ability to learn. To a certain extent in 
conflict with that approach were his efforts to seek out officials who had already 
attained positions of great authority within national bureaucracies and who had 
a correspondingly-persuasive presence. In the filling of higher positions, there 
was a certain concern, though a flexible one, to achieve a balance of nationali-
ties: A quarter of the officials were to come from each of the three larger member 
states and the remaining quarter from the Benelux countries. This last group was 
thereby somewhat overrepresented, but at the same time, any kind of hegemony 
by a particular member state was avoided.
Hallstein directed the formation and the work of the Commission with an 
authority stemming from a masterful command of the dossier, combined with 
extraordinary analytical intelligence and straightforward humanitarianism. He 
allowed the commissioners great latitude in the shaping of their work, respect-
ing their areas of authority but also demanding much of them. He took personal 
charge of strategically important concerns such as the choice of leading officials, 
key conversations with national governments, and the matter of representing the 
Commission in public. In preparing his public appearances, he had only a small 
staff of competent colleagues upon whom to rely. He entrusted Noël with the issue 
of communication among the departments. Owing to Noël’s rare combination of 
absolute loyalty and precise expertise, he proved an indispensable guarantor of 
quick information-flow through the hierarchy as well as flexible responses.
It was not only through the quality of its work that Hallstein sought to con-
vince the governments and the public of the Commission’s necessity. He also put 
much value in the formal and symbolic demonstration of its autonomy. When the 
governments went beyond the provisions of the treaty by establishing a Commit-
tee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) at the headquarters of the Commis-
sion, he refused to send commissioners to attend the meetings of the new entity. 
The task of preparatory exchanges with the standing representatives was instead 
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normally undertaken by the directors-general, who were accorded a status equiv-
alent to ambassadors in COREPER. The commissioners themselves were normally 
to have ministers as their interlocutors, not only in workaday contacts in Brus-
sels but also during visits to the capitals of the member states. Efforts were made 
to ensure that in visits to non-member states, commissioners were received by 
the appropriate ministers. The Commission president was to meet officially with 
heads of state and of government.
In dealings with non-member states, the Community’s claim to sovereignty 
as a whole was to be demonstrated. Hallstein thus introduced the practice of 
officially receiving the credentials of ambassadors of countries outside the Com-
munity in a formal ceremony. Further opportunities to highlight the sovereignty 
of the Community and the authority of its executive organ were the reception of 
“state guests” and the Commission’s annual New Year’s reception. All these occa-
sions were characterized by strict adherence to diplomatic protocol. Hallstein 
made certain to stand on a red carpet during such events. Television cameras 
provided images for the public and ensured that the claims of the Commission 
were perceived in member states as well as in many countries outside the Com-
munity. As Commission president, Hallstein consciously paid frequent visits to 
the US, where he quickly became known as “Mr. Europe.”
The Struggle over the Free-Trade Area
Hallstein and his colleagues expended such energy in quickly building up a pow-
erful Commission not least of all because implementation of the treaty terms was 
being called into question in numerous respects. Since October of 1957, repre-
sentatives of the seventeen OEEC states had been negotiating on a European free 
trade area in a committee led by the British special minister Reginald Maudling. 
It was especially the British government that was pushing for such negotiations 
after having decided on 11 November 1955 not to participate in a European Eco-
nomic Community, just as had been the case with the European Coal and Steel 
Community. In July of 1956, the general secretary of the OEEC had proposed the 
creation of a free trade area, and the British government had officially adopted 
the idea on 3 October.13
In economic terms, the British decision against participation in an economic 
community was by no means compelling: Although in the mid-1950s approxi-
13 Jim Burgess and Geoffrey Edwards, “The Six plus One: British Policy Making and the Ques-
tion of European Economic Integration, 1955,” in International Affairs 64 (1988), pp. 393–413; 
Milward, The Rise and Fall, pp. 190–216, 229–276.
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mately fifty percent of British foreign trade was still with the Commonwealth and 
a customs union with lower external tariffs threatened greater competition from 
American and West German industrial products, there was on the other hand the 
attraction of increased rationalization through a common market; it was also 
foreseeable that trade with Western Europe would greatly expand in the coming 
years. Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada were keenly inter-
ested in building up their own industries and diversifying their foreign trade. 
Decisive for the British rejection of the EEC was the insistence on a special role 
vis-à-vis the Continent, one rooted in a belief in the superiority of British civi-
lization and greatly strengthened by the experience of the Second World War. 
The British establishment stubbornly clung to the illusion of a special role even 
though the economic and geopolitical bases for it were rapidly being lost.14
In creating a free trade area that would gradually eliminate industrial tariffs 
among the OEEC states but not affect tariff barriers with non-member states, the 
government of Harold Macmillan demonstrated that it was prepared to alter the 
very protectionist trade policy that the UK had been pursuing for the previous 
twenty-five years. At the same time, Britain was hoping to be able to prevent the 
formation of an economic community of the six ECSC states. Lastly, the project 
of a common market was opposed on many sides—on the one hand because it 
implied too much protectionism and on the other because it offered too little pro-
tection from foreign competition. It was especially Ludwig Erhard, the popular 
father of the West German “economic miracle,” who demonstratively pushed for 
the British initiative. He hoped it would be a significant step toward a general 
liberalization of trade, which was in the interest of strongly export-oriented West 
German industry. In 1956, some twenty-one percent of imports into the Federal 
Republic came from EEC countries and some twenty-eight percent of exports 
went to them. If the eleven OEEC states were added, the import tally was for-
ty-three percent and the export tally no less than fifty-nine percent.15 When a 
crisis developed in the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome in October of 1956, 
Erhard spoke within the West German government in favor of breaking off talks 
for an economic community and instead advocated an accord with the British, as 
14 Cf. Wolfram Kaiser, “Not present at the creation. Großbritannien und die Gründung der 
EWG,” in Michael Gehler (ed.), Vom gemeinsamen Markt zur europäischen Unionsbildung. 50 
Jahre Römische Verträge 1957–2007, Vienna: Böhlau, 2009, pp. 225–242.
15 Note for Erhard 29 October 1957, provided by Gabriele Brenke, “Europakonzeptionen im Wi-
derstreit. Die Freihandelszonen-Verhandlungen 1956–1958,” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschich-
te 42 (1994), pp. 595–633, here p. 602.
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he said, on “what has for years been the decisive political and economic initiative 
for the integration of Europe.”16
After the crisis in negotiations among the Six had been overcome, Macmillan’s 
government concentrated its efforts to use a free trade area including the EEC to 
hinder and if possible thwart the construction of the Common Market in accordance 
with the treaty terms. In any event, access to the markets of the Six was to be secured 
and the political self-isolation of Britain avoided. The prime minister also hoped that 
British engagement in the free trade area would prevent the Federal Republic, at the 
time growing noticeably stronger economically, from dominating the Community of 
the Six; his motive was concern over what he regarded as an ominous German ten-
dency toward authoritarian power politics. Instead of Germany, it would be Britain 
that would maintain or regain its leading role in Europe.
Realization of the British plans for a free trade area would have meant that 
the UK and the smaller states could gain for their industrial products all the 
advantages of the Common Market without at the same time having to accept the 
obligations to which members of the Economic Community had agreed: the cre-
ation of a common foreign tariff, the development of a common trade and agricul-
tural policy, as well as the standardization of certain aspects of social, economic, 
and monetary policy. It was very doubtful that member states such as the Federal 
Republic or Belgium would adhere to those obligations if the Common Market 
for industrial products, which was what interested them the most, could be had 
without the other terms from which Britain and its partners would be freed. Thus, 
those portions of the Community treaty might well remain a dead letter.
Aside from that, a free trade area of all OEEC countries threatened to make 
the common foreign tariffs of the Six obsolete. Countries with lower foreign tariffs 
than the common rate could import goods from other countries more cheaply and 
then sell them in the countries of the Community, whether or not those goods had 
been further processed. It was especially the case that Britain, which was also a 
member of the Commonwealth preference area, could hope for unilateral advan-
tages: Inexpensive raw materials and foodstuffs imported from the Commonwealth 
would give British industry cost advantages and would draw American investment 
into the country. Here too it was doubtful as to how long competitive industry in the 
Community of Six would participate under such circumstances; their governments 
would be subject to pressure to adjust their tariffs to British levels.
Economic mechanisms and political pressure thus threatened to collaborate 
in sooner or later bringing about the dissolution of the EEC “like a lump of sugar 
16 Wilfried Loth, Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939–1957, 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, p. 125; the quote from Erhard’s declaration before the 
OEEC Council of Ministers on 12 February 1957 is in Europa-Archiv 12 (1957), p. 9651.
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in a cup of English tea,” as opponents of the British initiative remarked with a 
note of bitterness.17 For those hostile to EEC protectionism, such as Erhard and 
the free-trader circles of German industry, that was a welcome prospect and one 
that paradoxically also helped overcome initial opposition to conclusion and rat-
ification of the Treaties of Rome: If an expansive free trade area followed in their 
wake, then they could do little harm. For the adherents of a socially acceptable 
modernization (especially in France and Italy) as well as for those seeking a polit-
ical Europe, the British initiative constituted a tremendous challenge, however. 
Hard-won unity on an approach to modernization featuring social solidarity 
would be threatened with collapse; the prospect of attaining a Political Commu-
nity via common economic development would vanish entirely.
Further questions were raised when Charles de Gaulle came to power in 
France on 1 June 1958. Gaullist deputies had rejected both the ECSC and the Euro-
pean Defense Community (EDC) and then had gone on to vote against the Treaties 
of Rome. De Gaulle himself had told the press that the treaties meant for a “muti-
lated Europe” in which France was threatened with the status of “servant” to a 
dynamic Germany.18 He was supposed to have said to his like-minded colleague 
Michel Debré, “What are these treaties good for? When we come to power, we’ll 
tear all of them up.”19 The fathers of the Treaties of Rome and the members of 
the European Commission had to reckon with the likelihood that the new French 
prime minister and future president of the Fifth Republic would carry out those 
intentions. There was thus a real danger that the rug would be pulled out from 
under the Commission before its work had really gotten going.
It was the case however that de Gaulle’s criticism had always been aimed 
at the alleged mediocrity of the politicians of the Fourth Republic—people who 
needed to be gotten rid of—and not at the principle of European unity itself. 
Establishing a Europe that was a power-political collective enabling Europeans 
to play an autonomous role between the superpowers of the Cold War and “could 
open a career for the capacities of the German people without endangering its 
neighbors”20—all this was also an important goal for de Gaulle. He had always 
emphasized that such a Europe would only be possible if the participating states 
17 Pierre Gerbet, La construction de l’Europe, 4th edition, Paris: Armand Colin, 2007, p. 166.
18 Paris-Presse-l’Intransigeant, 13 February 1957, quoted in William B. Cohen, “De Gaulle et l’Eu-
rope d’avant 1958,” in De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. V: L’Europe, Paris: Plon, 1992, pp. 53–65, here 
p. 62.
19 Quoted in Edmond Jouve, Le Général de Gaulle et la construction de l’Europe (1940–1966), 
Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1967, p. 253.
20 As formulated in a communication to the founder of the Pan-European Movement, Richard 
Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi, 30 December 1948, Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, Notes et Carnets, Mai 
1945 – Juin 1950, Paris: Plon, 1984, pp. 330ff.
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would “cede sovereignty in the spheres of economics and defense.”21 He had 
thus been criticizing not an excess of supranational elements in the concrete 
European treaties but rather a scarcity of them.
It was therefore by no means only opportunism that led de Gaulle to assure 
the worried Guy Mollet during conversations on the formation of his government: 
“The Common Market is an excellent thing, but I find it, shall we say, a bit nar-
row.”22 On 10 June 1958 in his first foreign policy meeting after taking office, 
he expressed himself somewhat more clearly: “The main issue is the Common 
Market—which in and of itself is not a bad thing—and above all the political and 
cultural organization of Europe.”23 De Gaulle was enough of a realist not to try to 
begin from scratch with European integration; he instead accepted the existing 
organizations as starting points for his farther-reaching plans. The worth of the 
Common Market itself for the modernization of France and for the power-polit-
ical self-assertion of Europe became clearer to him in the following weeks via 
Jacques Rueff. Since late September, this finance specialist had headed a council 
of experts working on a plan to bolster the French currency. If France wanted to 
keep its place in Europe and in the world, it needed to become economically com-
petitive once again; and that was only possible via a politically regulated modern-
ization in agreement with its European partners.24
Thus, the change of government in France did not mean any change in the 
French view of the project for a free trade area. Paris saw to it that the EEC Com-
mission as well as the High Authority of the ECSC participated in the negotiations 
of the Maudling Committee, and then in February of 1958, it presented a free trade 
plan that amounted to the creation of an economic union among the seventeen 
OEEC states. The liberalization of intra-European trade was to be negotiated sep-
arately for each economic category; agriculture was to be included, and every 
step toward liberalization was to be linked to progress in the harmonization of 
conditions of production, trade in goods, and social policy. In order to secure the 
advantages that the EEC treaty offered France, it was also to be the case that rules 
at the OEEC level would take effect “only some years” after the consolidation of 
21 Statement of 17 July 1950, Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 2, Paris: Plon, 1970, 
pp. 379–383, here p. 381. On this and the following, Wilfried Loth, “De Gaulle und Europa. Eine 
Revision,” in Historische Zeitschrift 253 (1991), pp. 629–660.
22 Quoted in Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, vol. II: Le politique, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985, p. 491.
23 Notes of Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, quoted in Gérard Bossuat, “Face à l’histoire? 
Les décideurs politiques français et la naissance des traités de Rome,” in Michael Gehler (ed.), 
Vom gemeinsamen Markt zur europäischen Unionsbildung, pp. 147–168, here p. 167.
24 Cf. Laurent Warlouzet, Le choix de la CEE par la France. L’Europe économique en débat de 
Mendès-France à de Gaulle (1955–1969), Paris: Comité pour l’Histoire économique et financière, 
2011, pp. 172–185.
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the EEC. The dismantling of tariffs would then follow the terms of the EEC treaty, 
but three years later in each case.25
De Gaulle was essentially committed to the free trade area but also had the 
French negotiators insist on some fundamentals that were unacceptable to the 
British government: Compensatory taxes for products whose raw materials had 
been imported at tariff rates more than three or four percent below those of the 
EEC; autonomous decisions by the member states regarding implementation of 
protective clauses; unanimity in the decision to move to each new phase; and a 
three-year period between the EEC’s tariff reduction and the launching of the free 
trade area. After the EEC Commission had striven to convince the governments 
of the member states not to allow themselves to be drawn away from Commu-
nity agreements by British proposals, de Gaulle worked hand in hand with the 
Commission: Hallstein’s deputy Marjolin went to Paris almost every weekend to 
consult with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville.26
Adenauer was much relieved when in his first meeting with de Gaulle on 
14 September in Colombey-les-deux-Églises, the Frenchman assured him that 
he would continue supporting the Treaties of Rome and moreover was seeking 
“organized” cooperation in Europe.27 At the same time, the West German leader 
was subject to strong pressure regarding the free trade area. The French condi-
tions were opposed not only by his economy ministry, which was charged with 
leading the negotiations. The business wing of the CDU and the FDP opposition 
as well as large segments of export-oriented industry declared their enduring 
opposition to the implementation of EEC regulations if the free trade area did 
not come into existence. On 2 October, the Bundestag passed a resolution calling 
upon the government to do everything possible to expand upon the EEC via a 
free trade area. Beyond that, Macmillan was threatening consequences if negoti-
ations failed: difficulties in talks on the compatibility of EEC provisions with the 
GATT Treaty, the withdrawal of British troops from the Continent, and potentially 
even Britain’s departure from NATO.28
Consequently, Bonn sought to mediate between the French and British 
positions in the negotiations of the Maudling Committee. In the process, Ade-
nauer made certain that the priority of the Common Market was maintained. At 
a meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers in Brussels on 18 September, Couve de 
Murville did succeed in getting his partners to commit themselves to autonomous 
25 Memorandum of 24 February 1956, Archiv der Gegenwart 24 February 1956, A 6911.
26 Interview with Karl-Heinz Narjes, 24 May 2004.
27 Notes on the conversation of 14 September 1958, quoted in Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: 
Der Staatsmann 1952–1967, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991, p. 456.
28 Cf. Brenke, “Europakonzeptionen,” pp. 625–627.
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protective measures, unanimity in the organs, and a three-year buffer between 
EEC and OEEC tariff reductions. The only item left unresolved was the stance 
on the French demand for compensatory taxes, which amounted to retention of 
internal tariffs. At the next gathering of the committee, from 23 to 30 October, it 
seemed that the participants were on a path to abandoning negotiations. Only 
with difficulty did Erhard’s state secretary, Alfred Müller-Armack, succeed in 
bringing the parties back to the negotiation table by means of bilateral discus-
sions. On the issue of provisions against distortions of competitiveness due to 
differing external tariff rates, the negotiators agreed to follow an EEC Commission 
proposal calling for the various economic sectors to be discussed separately.
At this juncture, Erhard appealed to Adenauer to convince the French to make 
greater concessions. In order to leave nothing untried in preventing the collapse 
of negotiations, Erhard sought to participate personally in the next gathering 
of the Maudling Committee on 13 and 14 November in Paris. For his part, Ade-
nauer thought that the risk of damaging Franco-German relations was too great. 
He summarily made use of his guideline competence as chancellor to declare 
that the negotiations on the free trade area had priority. Erhard had to remain in 
Bonn. After French Minister of Information Jacques Soustelle told the press on 
the evening of the second day of negotiations that France rejected a free trade 
area constituted along the lines proposed by Britain, the West German chancel-
lor acknowledged in a second meeting with de Gaulle on 26 November in Bad 
Kreuznach that the Maudling Committee should meet again only after the six EEC 
states had agreed upon a unified position. Compromise formulations written into 
the draft of the official communiqué of this meeting were deleted by de Gaulle 
himself, and Adenauer gave his consent.29
In agreeing on the priority of a unified position among the Six, Adenauer had 
de facto opted for termination of negotiations. The British government sought 
once again to mobilize a majority of OEEC members in the OEEC Council of Min-
isters on 15 December, ultimately demanding that the remaining OEEC members 
guarantee the same tariff reductions, not just in general but in every respect, as 
those agreed to among the EEC partners for 1 January 1959. Five of the six EEC 
states regarded that as by no means unreasonable, and Adenauer himself offered 
to mediate. De Gaulle however remained adamant, and the other five no longer 
dared outvote him.30
29 Daniel Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt. Erhard und Adenauer, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1987, pp. 213–215; Frances Lynch, “De Gaulle’s First Veto. Fance, the Rueff Plan and the 
Free Trade Area,” in Contemporary European History 9 (2000), pp. 111–135; DDF 1958 II, p. 370.
30 De Gaulle to Adenauer, 22 December 1958, in Poidevin, “De Gaulle et l’Europe,” p. 87.
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Britain’s final weapon was to force the plan to revert to the convertibility of 
the British pound. Macmillan was convinced that the French—with their overval-
ued currency—could not follow suit; and thus the realization of the first phase 
of the Common Market would need to be postponed. De Gaulle met this British 
move with a major feat: On 27 December, the French franc was devalued by 17.5 
percent and simultaneously declared convertible. Further, strict measures for 
improving the budget situation were adopted in accordance with recommenda-
tions from the Rueff Commission; and limits on trade with OEEC states, which 
France had adopted during its financial crisis, were reduced by ninety percent.31 
In this way, the effort by Macmillan to maintain a leadership role in Europe was 
defeated. British threats had in the end functioned counterproductively, serving 
to strengthen the solidarity of the Six. After all the EEC members and seven addi-
tional OEEC states had been able to follow the British move by making their cur-
rencies convertible, the European Payments Union was dissolved on 29 December 
and the European Monetary Agreement (EMA) was put into effect. The first phase 
of the Common Market could begin punctually on 1 January 1959. De Gaulle now 
had a clear path for implementing the modernization of France within the frame-
work of the EEC.
The Construction of the Common Market
After de Gaulle had committed himself to a rapid realization of the Common 
Market and after this decision had been rewarded by noticeable economic growth, 
the timetable for the creation of the customs union—which the negotiators had 
written into the treaty with an eye toward French reservations—proved too slow. 
The ten percent reduction in tariffs on 1 January 1959 and the simultaneous 
dismantling of limitations on trade through the expansion of import quotas by 
twenty percent led to an approximately twenty-percent increase of trade among 
the six states of the Community within one year. In response, the Commission 
proposed in February of 1960 that the tempo of tariff reductions be accelerated. 
France supported this but at the same time wanted more rapid imposition of the 
common external tariff, which was supposed to come into force only after the 
completion of the first phase of the Common Market. That demand was opposed 
by the Federal Republic and Benelux states: They wanted not only to delay the 
transition to higher tariff rates as long as possible but also to prevent the forma-
31 Sylvie M. Schwaag, “Currency Convertibility and European Integration: France, Germany 
and Britain,” in Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward (eds.), Widening, Deepening and Acceler-
ation: The European Economic Community 1957–1963, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999, pp. 89–106.
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tion of a preference area within the OEEC or GATT. On 12 May 1960, the Council 
of Ministers agreed to reduce internal tariffs on 1 January 1961 by thirty percent 
of the initial level (instead of twenty percent on 1 July 1960) and on 1 January 
1962 by forty percent (instead of thirty). Quantitative limits on imports were to 
be abolished completely at that time. Likewise, the first phase in adjusting to a 
common external tariff was brought forward by one year: The reduction of the dif-
ference between national tariff levels and the anticipated common external tariff 
by thirty percent was to occur on 1 January 1961. In order to take into account the 
reservations of the low-tariff states, a deduction of twenty percent was to be taken 
from the mean of the four tariff regions, that is, France, the Federal Republic, 
Italy, and the Benelux states.32
After the completion of the first phase, that is, three years after the first tariff 
reduction, a doubling of trade within the Community had occurred. The Council 
therefore decided not only on a punctual transition to the second phase, but on 
15 May 1962, it agreed to a further acceleration of tariff reductions: The next drop 
of ten percent stipulated in the treaty was moved up by one year to 1 July 1962. A 
halving of the tariff rates within the Community had thereby been attained some 
two and a half years earlier than the date set forth in the treaty (1 January 1965). 
Likewise, the next phase in the adjustment of the common external tariff, reduc-
ing the difference with national tariff rates by a further thirty percent, was also 
brought forward by two and a half years, from 1 January 1966 to 1 July 1963.33 
Given that individual states also carried out unilateral tariff reductions—France in 
1961, Italy in 1962, and the Federal Republic in 1964—the actual tariff level within 
the Community sank even more quickly. At the beginning of the third phase of the 
construction of the Community on 1 January 1966, official tariffs for internal trade 
were at twenty percent of their initial levels; in most cases, that meant a burden 
of less than five percent. On 1 July 1968, internal tariffs were completely elimi-
nated. That was eighteen months earlier than specified in the treaty, and when 
including potential extensions of the first and second phases that could have 
been implemented, it was some three and a half years shorter than the maximum 
allowable transition deadline.
What the Commission did not succeed in doing however was abolishing the 
non-tariff limitations on trade by 1 January 1970, the specified end of the transi-
tion period. In order to achieve full free traffic of goods within the tariff union 
and to ensure free competition, there needed to be a standardization of national 
legal provisions, technical norms, state monopolies or regulations and practices 
32 Hans von der Groeben, Aufbaujahre der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Das Ringen um den Ge-
meinsamen Markt und die Politische Union (1958–1966), Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1982, pp. 143ff.
33 Ibid., p. 211.
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in public procurement to the extent that they no longer constituted actual trade 
barriers or instances of discrimination. At the beginning of 1965, the Director-
ates-General for the Internal Market and for Competition presented a compre-
hensive program of measures aimed at eliminating these hindrances but also 
made the observation that given the amount of necessary changes in national 
provisions and practices, it would not be possible to meet the deadline with the 
resources available.34 The standardization of national regulations did in fact 
prove to be a difficult task. Opposition from affected interest groups hardened 
in inverse proportion to the step-by-step elimination of tariffs and import quotas 
that had served as protective measures.
In the same way, the efforts to implement free movement of labor and free 
trade in services ran headlong into national regulations for certain medical, 
technical, and legal professions, for banking, and for certain professions such as 
pharmacy. Under these conditions, no common European capital market came 
into being either. It was only the case that capital flows of a personal character 
were completely liberalized: direct investment, business with on-board securi-
ties, real estate investments, and trade credits (Directives of 11 May 1960 and 18 
December 1962). Free movement of labor was realized in two steps: Obligatory 
preferential treatment of workers from one’s own country in hiring was abolished 
in April of 1964. Largely equal treatment of workers from other member states 
then came into force. In July of 1968, workers from all member states were given 
full equal rights; work permits for citizens of member states were abolished.
In light of the opposition to eliminating non-tariff limits on trade, it was all 
the more important for the success of the Economic Community that the commis-
sioner responsible for the rules of competition, Hans von der Groeben, under-
stood the mandate embodied in the ban on anti-commercial agreements and 
cartels (Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty) broadly and that he knew how to 
implement his interpretation. Von der Groeben, who as leader of the European 
department of the West German economy ministry had already participated in the 
development of the Treaties of Rome, was an adherent of the German ordo-lib-
eral “Freiburg School” of economics, for which the guarantee of absolutely free 
competition was key not only to increasing productivity and prosperity but also 
protection of the consumer. Supported by a relatively young cohort of officials 
with missionary zeal as well as much scholarly and practical expertise, von der 
Groeben fought for the application of the provisions of the ban, which were not 
34 Eric Bussière, “Not quite a common market yet,” in The European Commission 1958–72, 
pp. 289–301, here p. 295.
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clearly specified in the treaty, as well as for their extension into a comprehensive 
code of competition.35
In the draft of regulations for complying with the terms on competition, 
which were to be met no later than three years after implementation of the treaty, 
von der Groeben and his colleagues included a general obligation that cartels 
and other combinations of firms be registered with the Commission, which would 
then determine if such entities were compatible with the requirements of free 
competition. Beyond this, the Commission was to have authority on its own or 
on the basis of complaints from third parties to initiate proceedings against firms 
and also the power to conduct investigations when cartel formation or misuse of 
a dominant position in the market was suspected. This draft, presented to the 
Council on 31 October 1960, generated a storm of protest from representatives 
of industry in France, Belgium, and the Federal Republic; the proposed powers 
of the Commission went much too far for the French government as well. Von 
der Groeben was however able to achieve much in persuading representatives of 
government, parliamentary deputies, and administration experts. Supported by 
a positive report from the Committee on Internal Market of the European Parlia-
ment as well as a parliamentary vote, he succeeded in getting the draft through 
the Council. With minor modifications, it was approved on 5 February 1962 as 
“Directive No. 17.”36
The bans and regulations issued by the Commission after it had received 
this authority were often challenged in the European Court. The rulings almost 
always upheld the decisions of the Commission—for the first time, in the case of a 
market-partitioning deal between the West German firm Grundig and the French 
firm Consten in September of 1964. A European code of competition was thereby 
created step by step, one that applied the fundamental principles of German 
ordo-liberalism. Its application also gained approval because the Commission’s 
decisions took into account the interest in competitiveness on the world market, 
especially with the US, and also acknowledged the needs of small and medi-
um-sized firms to cooperate in the face of large competitors.
35 Katja Seidel, “DG IV and the origins of a supranational competition policy. Establishing an 
economic constitution for Europe,” in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen 
(eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72, 
New York and London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 129–147.
36 Sibylle Hambloch, “Die Entstehung der Verordnung 17 von 1962 im Rahmen der EWG-Wett-
bewerbsordnung,” in Europarecht 17/6 (2002), pp.  877–897; Laurent Warlouzet, “La France et 
la mise en place de la politique de la concurrence communautaire (1957–64),” in Éric Bussiere, 
Michel Dumoulin, Sylvain Schirmann (eds.), Europe organisée, Europe du libre-échange. Fin XIXe 
siècle – Années 1960, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2006, pp. 175–201.
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Von der Groeben and his colleagues were very successful in eliminating or 
modifying state aid that infringed upon or distorted competition within the Com-
munity. Opposition from governments and interest groups was very strong in this 
area too. Nevertheless, by 1965, some thirteen of the approximately 450 subsi-
dies had been eliminated as impermissible and another sixty had been altered. 
Where subsidies were permissible as support for suffering regions or branches of 
industry or were in the common European interest, the Commission made efforts 
toward standardizing the various national regulations and toward limiting the 
duration of the aid.
On the issue of standardizing taxes, the Commission ran headlong into 
stubborn resistance from France, which sought to protect its sovereignty in that 
area and also retain the existing system of compensatory levies at the borders. 
For his part, von der Groeben argued that the exact level of tax actually paid in 
the various systems of multiple taxation in the individual states was difficult to 
determine and that compensatory levies or rebates in the change-over from one 
tax system to another strongly invited manipulation and thus distortions of com-
petition. He therefore advocated the elimination of sales tax systems in favor of 
uniform value-added taxes imposed in the land of origin of the product or service. 
He also urged the elimination of tax boundaries and, lastly, an extensive stan-
dardization of tax rates so as to banish the threat of a ruinous tax war.
Although von der Groeben’s program enjoyed support from the West German 
government, he was initially only able to obtain a moratorium from the finance 
ministers in June of 1960 by which they committed themselves to alter com-
pensatory levies at the borders for only purely technical reasons. This would 
serve as a means of preventing attempts to compensate for sinking tariff levels 
through higher tax protectionism. A draft directive of November 1962 envision-
ing the introduction of value-added taxes in connection with the elimination of 
tax boundaries was rejected by the French government. Only on 9 February 1967 
did the Council agree on the introduction of a common system of value-added 
taxes at the end of the transition period, that is, on 1 January 1970. This did not 
however include any agreement on a uniform level for the value-added tax. It 
also lacked any degree of standardization for consumption taxes (on products 
such as alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline), business taxes, or capital gains taxes. In 
a program for standardizing direct taxes that the Commission presented in Sep-
tember of 1967, it was correctly argued that these adjustments too were necessary 
in order to create an internal European market.37
37 “Programm zur Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern,” Bulletin der EWG, September–October 
1967; cf. overall Éric Bussière, “Competition,” in The European Commission 1958–72, pp. 303–316.
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The interest of the low-tariff states in sinking common tariff levels was sup-
ported by the GATT regulations, which allowed the creation of customs unions 
but only if the joint tariff were lower than the previous tariffs of the member 
states. Given that some sixty percent of the imports entering the Community went 
to the low-tariff states (the Federal Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Lux-
embourg), the overall tariff level was strictly speaking not the arithmetic mean 
among the four tariff zones.38 In order to prevent possible action by GATT against 
the customs union of the Six, the Council of Ministers had, at the suggestion of 
the Commission, granted the other OEEC states the same ten percent tariff reduc-
tion and twenty percent increase in import quotas that were in effect for EEC 
states. What was not granted was the increase in quotas applied to every single 
product category down to at least three percent of national production; that was 
the point de Gaulle in the end did not concede. In negotiations carried on by Jean 
Rey as commissioner for external trade from September of 1960 to May of 1961 in 
the GATT Committee, compensatory payments were agreed upon for individual 
states in response to the increase in import duties of the Federal Republic and the 
Benelux countries. Beyond this, the EEC was willing to make small reductions 
in the common tariff levels for some two hundred products and also expressed a 
willingness to negotiate on further tariff reductions.
In the so-called “Dillon Round” of the GATT negotiations (named after the 
American delegation leader Douglas Dillon, who had pushed for the round) 
that began on 29 May 1961 in Geneva and extended until 16 July 1962, the EEC 
and the US, its most important trading partner, agreed on mutual tariff reduc-
tions of twenty percent on 560 respectively 575 commercial products. Britain and 
other willing states joined in. Altogether, however, this meant for a reduction of 
the common external tariff of the Community by only about seven percent, the 
average level sinking from 12.5 to 11.7 percent. This was by no means the great 
breakthrough on all-round trade liberalization that the Commission had been 
seeking.39
That was not to come very quickly. The American government quickly sought 
another round of negotiations under the auspices of the Trade Expansion Act 
of January 1962, which authorized President Kennedy to eliminate tariffs com-
pletely in product areas in which the US and the European Community together 
accounted for eighty percent or more of trade; tariffs on all other products could 
be halved. Such far-reaching liberalization, which was also to include agricultural 
38 Ruggero Ranieri, “The Origins and Achievements of the EEC Customs Union (1958–1968),” 
in Antonio Varsori (ed.), Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in the European 
Integration 1957–1962, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006, pp. 257–281, here p. 266.
39 Ibid., pp. 268ff.
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products, was not acceptable to France, however. De Gaulle therefore argued that 
new negotiations only take place after completion of the Common Market. Erhard 
and the representatives of the Benelux states sought in vain to take up the offer 
Kennedy had made.40
De Gaulle viewed the American offensive all the more critically because it 
was exactly in the realm of agricultural production that France did not want to 
dispense with tariff protection through the European Community. For France, 
the transfer of existing national subsidy systems and external tariffs for agricul-
ture onto the European level presented an opportune means of eliminating the 
structural crisis in which French farmers found themselves: Through the opening 
of a larger market but one still protected from world competition, agricultural 
production could be increased; at the same time, the cost of subsidies would be 
shared among more parties. It would in this way be easier to tolerate agricultural 
subsidies that actually did not fit the strategy of accelerated modernization of 
France but that were indispensable for political reasons. In the treaty negotia-
tions, French representatives thus insisted that beyond inclusion of agriculture in 
the Common Market, a “common agricultural policy” be developed by the end of 
the transition period.41
France’s efforts to create a system of regulation for European agriculture 
were supported especially by the Netherlands, for which the transfer of agricul-
tural protectionism from the national to the European level was also among the 
essential goals of European unification policy. The Dutch case was however more 
strongly driven by economics than politics, and the pressure was correspondingly 
greater: Whereas France would first become a net exporter of agricultural prod-
ucts in 1968, the share of Dutch exports made up of agricultural products was 
no less than forty percent in the later 1940s. Additionally, Mansholt, who had 
become an important political figure in his homeland by designing Dutch agricul-
tural policy, put much more emphasis on modernizing the sector rather than on 
subsidizing it. Whereas subsidies threatened to perpetuate the structural crisis 
of agriculture at the cost of consumers and taxpayers, modernization offered the 
opportunity for lasting improvement of the situation. Specialized products for 
larger markets were intended to make agricultural concerns competitive, and the 
resulting profits would facilitate further modernization.42
40 Lucia Coppolaro, “The European Economic Commission in the GATT Negotiations of the 
Kennedy Round (1961–1967): Global and Regional Trade,” in Varsori (ed.), Inside, pp. 347–366, 
here, pp. 351–358.
41 Thiemeyer, “Pool Vert.”
42 Guido Thiemeyer, “Sicco Mansholt and European Supranationalism,” in Wilfried Loth (ed.), 
La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne, Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 2005, 
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Mansholt’s transfer to Brussels signaled how important this approach was 
for the Netherlands. As commissioner for agriculture, he sought to implement it 
as comprehensively as possible. He worked in a way similar to von der Groeben by 
incorporating representatives of national governments, experts, and lobbyists. In 
the process, he also sought to transfer as much authority as possible to the supra-
national level. He was convinced that only in this way could a coherent European 
agricultural policy be relatively safe from the pressures of particularistic interests 
or blockades by strategically well-positioned lobbyists. He quickly let agricultural 
interest groups know that he preferred to deal with entities at the European level 
rather than with national groups. This soon led to the formation of transnational 
coalitions and in September of 1958, to the creation of a permanent Committee of 
Profession Agricultural Organizations (COPA, Comité des organisations profes-
sionelles agricoles de la Communauté européenne).43 In this way, the necessary 
compromise of interests among agriculturalists would be promoted at the interest 
group level; the Commission simultaneously gained influence as a supranational 
actor in common agricultural policy.
The treaty specified that as soon as it went into effect, a conference was to 
be called in order to compare national agricultural policies and make an assess-
ment of demand. In planning for this event, Mansholt decided to invite not only 
agricultural ministers as spokesmen of the governments but also the standing 
representatives of the member states to the Commission, the top officials of agri-
culture ministries, as well as representatives of agricultural producers, proces-
sers, and trade in agricultural products. He thereby activated an international 
milieu of agricultural experts and representatives of interests that had already 
participated in the tedious and unsuccessful negotiations on the creation of a 
“Green Pool” within the framework of the OEEC; and he drew this milieu into the 
planning for the common agricultural policy.44 In Stresa, where the agriculture 
conference of 3 to 12 July 1958 took place, the different concepts and interests 
naturally emerged in sharp relief. However, with a speech intended as an answer 
to the presentations of the agriculture ministers, Mansholt succeed in creating a 
kind of spirit of optimism that resulted in a vague consensus on goal-setting in 
agricultural policy. The conference issued a resolution calling for the dismantling 
pp. 39–53.
43 Jan van der Harst, “The common agricultural policy: a leading field of action,” in The Euro-
pean Commission 1958–72, pp. 317–337, here pp. 321ff.
44 Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, “Politische Unternehmer in transnationalen Politiknetzwerken. 
Die Ursprünge der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik,” in Michael Gehler, Wolfram Kaiser, and Brigitte 
Leucht (eds.), Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, Vien-
na: Böhlau, 2009, pp. 105–120.
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of trade limits to go hand in hand with the standardization of law and the deter-
mination of uniform prices. This was not to be allowed to lead to overproduc-
tion, however, and measures to protect against “distortions of competition from 
outside” were not to be allowed to burden relations with third parties. Addition-
ally, joint “efforts for increasing productivity” were to be undertaken, especially 
measures to “improve the structure of agriculture.”45
In developing the Commission proposal for the common agricultural poli-
cy—a process occurring in informal agreement with the agriculture ministers and 
the representatives of COPA—Mansholt also had to give greater consideration 
to the French interest in subsidies and protection. Commissioner Marjolin and 
Director-General Louis Rabot made him aware that he could not succeed in the 
Council of Ministers in any other way. The proposal submitted by the Commis-
sion on 7 November 1959 stipulated that uniform benchmark prices would be 
determined for almost ninety percent of agricultural products. If prices fell below 
the level of the somewhat lower fixed-intervention prices, the Community would 
buy products at those lower prices. There would also be export assistance for 
products that could no longer command the stipulated price levels on the world 
market, and importers would pay levies compensating for the difference between 
the lower world prices and Community prices. This proposal included structural 
reform only to the extent that one third of the money from import levies would be 
devoted to measures aimed at improving competitiveness. The other two thirds 
of those funds were to be used for intervention purchases of Community prod-
ucts and for export assistance. The only measure aimed at warding off the danger 
of overproduction—which could potentially arise under this system—was the 
decision that authority for setting prices should lie with the Commission. The 
national governments, which were more vulnerable to pressure from the agricul-
tural lobby, would only establish general criteria for price setting.
Criticism of this proposal focused on the near total absence of anything about 
the transition from the existing agricultural system to the proposed common 
system. The Commission made efforts to address this concern and on 30 June 
1960 presented a significantly more comprehensive draft proposal. The orienta-
tion was unchanged, but the instrument of the import levies was now seen as 
balancing out the price differentials within the Community during the transition 
phase. Introduction of minimum prices and compensatory levies, as envisioned 
45 Michael Tracy, “The Spirit of Stresa,” in European Review of Agricultural Economics 21 (1994) 
pp. 357–374; van der Harst, “Common agricultural policy, pp. 321–327; Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, 
Farmers on Welfare. The Making of Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy,” Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity, 2009, pp. 96–98; Kiran Klaus Patel, Europäisierung wider Willen. Die Bundesrepublik in der 
Agrarintegration der EWG 1955–1973, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009, pp. 101–109.
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in the treaty, were not taken up nor was the conclusion of long-term agreements. 
The transition period was to be shortened by two and a half years, ending on 
30 June 1967. The route to the common agricultural market was thereby becom-
ing clearer; pressure to implement it was at the same time also growing more 
intense.46
In this form, the Commission proposal contradicted West German ideas in 
a double sense: It contained too much protectionism in the eyes of the economy 
ministry and a large segment of the West German public, and the German Farmers 
Association (Deutscher Bauernverband) balked at the accelerated dismantling 
of special protection from European competition and at the anticipated drop in 
grain prices, which were markedly higher in the Federal Republic than in any 
other member state. With an eye to the importance of farmers at the ballot box, 
Adenauer decided that the agricultural market project would need to be tabled 
until the next Bundestag election, that is, until the autumn of 1961. At the next 
meeting of the Council of Ministers on 19 and 20 July 1960, Agriculture Minister 
Werner Schwarz, himself a representative of the interests of the Farmers’ Associ-
ation, made it unmistakably clear that the Federal Republic could not accept a 
shortening of the transition period and that his country’s grain prices could not 
be lowered.47
In light of the West German chancellor’s position, the French and Dutch gov-
ernments agreed to delay regulation of price levels. Conversely, at the Council of 
Ministers meeting on 19 and 20 December 1960, they were able to push through 
an accelerated reduction in agricultural tariffs by five percent for 1 January 1961 
against the wishes of the West German delegation, which had not proven very 
persuasive. Likewise, the system of internal import levies was introduced for at 
least a third of the agricultural products (among them grain and pork).48 These 
measures meant that a significant step toward the planned market had been 
achieved even though it remained an open question as to when further steps 
would follow, if ever.
German obstruction continued after the Free Democratic Party (FDP) was 
able to lure away votes from the CDU with populist agrarian slogans in the Bund-
estag election of 17 September 1961. De Gaulle’s patience had reached an end, 
however. Under additional pressure from French farmers suffering from an acute 
profit crisis, he issued an ultimatum demanding agreement on the fundamentals 
and regulations of the common agricultural policy, including acceleration by two 
46 Von der Groeben, Aufbaujahre, pp. 105–110; van der Harst, “Common agricultural policy,” 
pp.327ff.; Knudsen, Farmers, pp. 148–185.
47 Patel, Europäisierung, pp. 113–136.
48 Knudsen, Farmers, pp. 185–195; Patel, Europäisierung, pp. 166–175.
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and a half years as proposed by the Commission. He instructed Foreign Minis-
ter Couve de Murville to declare in a session of the Council of Ministers meeting 
on 19 and 20 December 1961 that without an agreement on agriculture, France 
would not support the transition to the second phase of the Common Market on 
1 January 1962.
This threat had an effect. It led to that memorable marathon session of the 
Council, which was to become the archetype of crisis management in the collec-
tive memory of Europeans. Under French pressure, Adenauer and Erhard now 
decided that a solution had to be found somehow. The government representa-
tives negotiated over the Christmas holiday and into January of 1962. When no 
agreement had been reached on 31 December, the clocks were officially stopped—
in the end, all the participants still aspired to reach the transition to the second 
phase in accordance with the treaty. As Hallstein summed it up (not without 
sarcasm), there were altogether “forty-five separate meetings, 7 of them at night; 
a total of 137 hours of discussion, with 214 hours in subcommittee; 582,000 pages 
of documents; 3 heart attacks.”49 The final hurdles were cleared on the night of 13 
January 1962 after many compromise proposals from Mansholt, who was able to 
make full use of his professional competence as well as his political skill.
In the end, it was agreed that the originally envisioned transition period 
through 31 December 1969 would be adhered to; after that, however, the system 
of benchmark prices and import levies would be in effect, as the Commission had 
proposed. Into 1965, agricultural expenditures were to be financed primarily out 
of member contributions in accordance with the budget ratios (which would be 
much less expensive for the Federal Republic than financing via the levies); by 30 
June 1965, a settlement was to be found for the remainder of the transition period. 
During the transition period, member states would still be allowed to impose 
import quotas should it be necessary; these could however be lifted by the Com-
mission and by the Council of Ministers. Regarding the price level for grain, there 
was agreement on an upper and lower price for one year; these corresponded to 
the German and French prices respectively. There would need to be new negotia-
tions on an arrangement beyond that.
In essence, the West Germans had accepted a settlement that was financially 
unfavorable to them and that additionally pruned away some support for their 
farmers. The price they paid for accelerating the movement toward the inter-
nal market and for the politically-desirable deepening of integration had been 
reduced only to the extent that this settlement would come into complete effect 
49 Walter Hallstein, United Europe. Challenge and Opportunity, Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962, p. 55. On this and on the following, cf. Knudsen, Farmers, pp. 195–206; 
Patel, Europäisierung, pp. 196–212.
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after the planned end of the transition period. In the process, it was not merely 
Mansholt’s envisioned structural reform that had fallen by the wayside; the 
danger of overproduction had also been increased because the Commission had 
had to leave authority to set detailed price levels to the Council of Ministers.
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According to de Gaulle, the Common Market that had emerged here was to con-
stitute the starting point for a more comprehensive “political, economic, and cul-
tural reality.”50 Such a Europe had in the meantime come to seem even more 
urgent in his eyes, given that he viewed the existing dependence of the Euro-
pean allies on American nuclear deterrence as dishonorable and to an increasing 
extent also insecure: dishonorable in regard to the autonomy of the European 
nations, which as a consequence were permanently under threat of American 
coercion and which had no alternative in the case of military conflict; and highly 
uncertain given that the production of long-range Soviet bombers capable of 
reaching American territory with nuclear weapons had made the US guarantee 
extremely questionable. De Gaulle did not doubt that this guarantee would lose 
further value as the Soviet arsenal was perfected and that the transition to the 
strategy of “flexible response” only exposed Europe to the risk of a privileged 
destruction.51
According to his understanding, the core of political Europe was autonomy in 
defense policy; this presupposed that the European partners had agreed on the 
goal of real independence from the leading Western power—that is, they would 
certainly remain allies of the US but sovereign in the decision on the use of own 
their weapons. As he wrote in July of 1961, “There can be no European unity if 
Europe does not constitute a political entity distinct from other entities. A person-
ality. But there can be no European personality if Europe does not have control 
over the defense of its personality. Defense is always the basis of politics.” That 
“Europe must have its personality in its own defense,” was for him “all the more 
advisable as Europe becomes a strategic whole. It constitutes a marshalling area 
for one single and simultaneous battle. America can lose Europe in the battle 
without disappearing. Europe cannot.”52
50 Notes of his diplomatic advisor Jean-Marc Bœgner, 13 July 1958; Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, 
Notes et Carnets, Juin 1958 – Décembre 1960, Paris: Plon, 1985, p. 73.
51 Loth, “De Gaulle und Europa,” pp. 649–651.
52 Note of 17 July 1961; Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, Notes et Carnets, Janvier 1961 – Décembre 1963, 
Paris: Plon, 1986, pp. 107ff. Cf. Wilfried Loth, “Franco-German Relations and European Security, 
102   Formative Years, 1958–1963
According to de Gaulle, the path to such a “European Europe, independent, 
mighty, and influential within the framework of the free world,”53 was to be 
found in regular consultations of the interested governments. As he suggested 
as early as August of 1958, these consultations should “in a certain sense take 
on an organic character to the extent that they develop.”54 In the long term, this 
ought to lead to the creation of a “confederation” in which majority rule should 
certainly be in effect: “We must begin with unanimity, and then we shall see.”55 
In the short term, however, de Gaulle also sought to have the existing European 
organs subordinated to the authority of the council of governments. The tendency 
of the Commission to develop into a European government, which had its roots 
in the treaty itself, was a thorn in his side: “There is nothing above the nations, if 
their states do not jointly decide! The aspirations of the Brussels commissioners 
to give orders to the governments are risible! Risible!”56
A first effort toward realizing this institutionalized cooperation especially in 
the realms of foreign and defense policy was undertaken by de Gaulle in June of 
1959, when he suggested to Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani that there be 
regular meetings of the foreign ministers of France, the Federal Republic, and 
Italy, gatherings to be prepared by a small joint secretariat. Fanfani agreed to this 
proposal, though with the condition that the governments of Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, and Luxembourg also participate. This highlighted the impediments to 
de Gaulle’s plans: Whereas Adenauer strongly agreed with French efforts toward 
European autonomy and also hoped to make use of de Gaulle’s ambitions to 
achieve equality for the Federal Republic within the Atlantic alliance, the Belgian 
government and even more so the Dutch government were concerned about pre-
venting French hegemony or a Franco-German condominium within the Euro-
pean Community. Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns and his Belgian coun-
terpart Pierre Wigny therefore proposed that Britain participate in this foreign 
ministers’ conference and that the EEC Commission also be brought in. Neither 
was acceptable to de Gaulle, and so negotiations on his initiative led only to a 
modest result: On 23 November 1959, the foreign ministers of the Six resolved to 
gather thrice yearly in the future. Their talks were not however to “harm consulta-
1957–1963,” in Deighton and Milward (eds.), Widening, Deepening and Acceleration, pp. 41–53.
53 Quoted in Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle. Vol. 3: Le souverain 1959–1970, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 
1986, p. 313.
54 Note by Bœgner 13 August 1958.
55 Comment in a conversation with Alain Peyrefitte on 24 April 1963; Alain Peyrefitte, C’était de 
Gaulle. vol.1, Paris: Gallimard, 1994, p. 430.
56 Comment to Alain Peyrefitte on 13 July 1960, ibid., pp.  66–69. The widespread character-
ization of de Gaulle as a stubborn opponent of European integration stems from equating his 
short-term view with his long-term perspective.
 Fouchet Plans and British Membership Application   103
tion in NATO and WEU,” and if they were to extend to the field of the Community 
treaties, it should be possible to bring in the appropriate commissioners. A stand-
ing secretariat, as de Gaulle had proposed, was not envisioned.57
When the failure of the planned Paris summit among Eisenhower, Mac-
millan, de Gaulle, and Khrushchev (set for May of 1960) made the problem of 
European self-assertion more urgent, the French president took up a proposal 
from Jean Monnet that would help overcome the resistance of the Benelux gov-
ernments: At a meeting with Adenauer at the château de Rambouillet on 29 and 
30 July 1960, de Gaulle proposed the creation of a kind of Franco-German confed-
eration with joint citizenship as a strategic step toward creating political Europe. 
“Three departments, foreign policy, defense, and finance would be shared by the 
two countries”; this far-reaching fusion was to be legitimized by a referendum in 
both countries. “No one in the Community of the Six,” according to de Gaulle, 
“would be able to resist the pull of the new political formation, if Germany and 
France led the way.”58 In order to make the necessary break with NATO integra-
tion palatable to Adenauer, he even alluded to the possibility of participating in 
a European nuclear weapons program: “Later, when we are really unified, there 
will perforce be changes, a certain division. And you too will without a doubt one 
day have nuclear weapons, above all in the event our two countries—and perhaps 
others as well—can unite on a European level.”59
For his part, Adenauer wanted nothing to do with a plan that meant France 
and the Federal Republic would go it alone.60 After criticism to that effect from 
his colleagues, he withdrew his consent to the reform of NATO and of the Treaties 
of Rome. After the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Lauris Norstad, 
held out the prospect of a NATO multilateral nuclear force for Europe and after 
President Eisenhower had on 6 October threatened the withdrawal of all Ameri-
can forces in the event NATO integration were abolished, Adenauer voiced a clear 
rejection of any special military force of the Six. For the time being, he wanted 
political cooperation to be limited to the consultations of the foreign ministers; 
57 Gerbet, Construction, pp. 195ff.
58 As witnessed by Adenauer’s advisor Franz Josef Bach, quoted in Schwarz, Adenauer, Stutt-
gart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991, pp. 567ff. On Monnet’s authorship, see Wilfried Loth, “Jean 
Monnet, Charles de Gaulle und das Projekt der Politischen Union (1958–1963),” in Andreas Wil-
kens (ed.), Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Bonn: Bouvier, 1999, pp. 253–267.
59 As witnessed by de Gaulle’s colleague Pierre Maillard, in De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 5: L’Eu-
rope, Paris: Plon, 1992, p. 417.
60 He even had the corresponding passages removed from the draft protocol of the conversa-
tions at the château de Rambouillet.
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he also made an appeal to have Britain brought into Europe.61 De Gaulle sought in 
vain to mobilize public opinion for his project by advocating at a press conference 
on 5 September “a regularly organized concert of the governments involved.”62
Two circumstances ensured that this second attempt at initiating a political 
union did not end up stalled like the first: On the one hand, Monnet made Ade-
nauer and the members of his Action Committee in the various member states 
forcefully aware of the potential for promoting European unity that was embod-
ied in de Gaulle’s proposals.63 On the other hand, de Gaulle declared that for a 
first time he was willing to do without any discussion of defense issues in the 
new council of the heads of government. Furthermore, in using the term “orga-
nized cooperation,” he avoided any hint of an attack on the existing Community 
organs. On 9 February 1961, Adenauer and de Gaulle were able to agree on this 
formula; and at a summit of the Six on 10 and 11 February, the representatives 
of Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg consented as well. Dutch Foreign Minister 
Luns blocked a resolution on it, however. He would involve himself in organized 
political cooperation only if Britain participated too. The meeting ended with the 
establishment of a “study Commission” that was to work out concrete proposals 
for organized political cooperation by the time of the next summit in May.64
In the Commission, chaired by French delegation leader Christian Fouchet, 
a report was worked out by 24 April that envisioned regular meetings of heads 
of state and of government (every three to four months) without limitations on 
the content of discussion, meaning that there was a possibility that issues of 
defense and economic integration could be raised. As soon as topics in the area 
of authority of existing European organizations were treated, representatives of 
these organizations were to be brought in. Additional proposals included a fusion 
of the executives of the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM; the transition to direct elec-
tions of the European Parliament; and the founding of a European university in 
Florence.65 Yet, the Dutch delegates did not support the possible inclusion of 
themes touching on NATO or the EEC, and so the meeting of heads of state and of 
government was deferred for the time being.
61 In a communication to de Gaulle of 8 October 1960, provided in Schwarz, Adenauer, pp. 587. 
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62 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 3, Paris: Plon, 1970, pp. 244–246.
63 Loth, “Jean Monnet,” pp. 260–262.
64 Esther Kramer, Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa? Kontinuität und Wandel in den Ver-
handlungen über eine politische Union 1958–1970, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003, pp. 67–69.
65 Draft report in Heinrich Siegler (ed.), Europäische politische Einigung. Dokumentation von 
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Only after Adenauer and de Gaulle had come to an agreement to negotiate if 
necessary without Dutch participation did the six governments reach a compro-
mise, one mediated by Spaak and Fanfani at a summit in Bonn on 18 July 1961: 
Luns accepted regular meetings of heads of state and of government with the goal 
of “common policy,” whereas de Gaulle accepted the formulation that “political 
cooperation” was also to lead to “strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance” and 
“carrying forward the work begun with the European Communities.” The presi-
dent also approved reform of the existing Communities “in the interest of greater 
effectiveness” as well as an expansion of the areas to be dealt with by the Euro-
pean Parliament. Only the issues of direct elections and of the European univer-
sity had been taken off the table.66 The study Commission was then charged with 
preparing a suitable draft treaty.
The consensus reached in Bonn was soon called into question when Harold 
Macmillan, alarmed not least of all by the danger of an autonomous foreign and 
defense policy organization of the Six, announced in the House of Commons 
on 31 July that he would seek to negotiate Britain’s entry into the EEC. After the 
failure of its offensive for a free trade area, the British government had, without 
any great enthusiasm, contemplated the creation of a “small” free trade area with 
other OEEC states. Six had already been prepared to join in for various reasons: 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, and, after negotiations had 
already begun, Portugal, which was ruled by a dictatorship at the time. In accor-
dance with the Stockholm Convention of 4 January 1960, they constituted a Euro-
pean Free Trade Association (EFTA), whose members would abolish tariffs on 
commercial goods imported from other members. In a treaty of 27 March 1961, 
Finland was added as an associate member.67
EFTA did not however resolve the problems for Britain that had been caused by 
the founding of the EEC. British trade with the EEC states was not only much more 
significant than that with the EFTA states, but it was also increasing much more 
quickly. At the same time, trade with Commonwealth states was falling rapidly, 
American investors preferred the EEC states, and British industry was losing com-
petitiveness vis-à-vis firms operating within the larger Common Market. When the 
66 Heinrich Siegler (ed.), Dokumentation der europäischen Integration, vol. 2: 1961–1963, Bonn, 
Vienna, and Zurich: Siegler, 1964, pp. 10ff.
67 Mikael af Malmborg and Johnny Laursen, “The Creation of EFTA,” in Torsten B. Olesen 
(ed.), Interdependence versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945–
1960, Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 1995, pp.  197–212; Mikael af Malmborg, 
Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten. Sverige och den västeruopeiska integrationen 1945–1959, Lund: 
Lund University, 1994, pp. 342–386; Wolfram Kaiser, “Challenge to the Community: The Creation, 
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an Integration History 3 (1997), pp. 7–33.
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US government dashed all hopes of support for a bilateral agreement between the 
EEC and EFTA, opinion in British industry, in the population, and among experts 
increasingly came to back the UK’s rapid entry into the EEC or at least a status 
close to full entry. Macmillan opted for full membership because only in this way 
would there be a possibility “of controlling and dominating Europe, economically 
and politically.” For him, Britain’s entry was also a matter of preserving the coun-
try’s leading role, doubly threatened at the time by the economic success and 
possible political autonomy of the Six. The political goal of entry was “to balance 
de Gaulle now and Germany later,” he explained in a cabinet meeting on 20 April 
1961. The resultant strengthening of the British economy would also benefit the 
UK’s political position.68
After the British government had actually submitted its application for mem-
bership on 9 August, Luns once again wanted to push through Britain’s partic-
ipation in the political union. In this demand he was supported—in contrast to 
his previous attempt—by his Belgian colleague Paul-Henri Spaak. The Italians, 
Luxembourgers, and West Germans as well pushed in the Commission for a more 
strongly supranational orientation of the new organization than had been prom-
ised in Bonn. For France, Christian Fouchet presented a draft treaty (the so-called 
“Fouchet Plan I”) on 19 October that stated the goals of “common foreign policy” 
and “common defense policy” for the “European Union” that was to be founded. 
The Union Council was to make decisions unanimously; a European Political 
Commission (with its seat in Paris) was to be subordinate to it; and the European 
Parliament was to have only an advisory function. Decisions of the Council were 
to be binding only for those states taking part in the voting. Three years after the 
treaty came into effect, it was to be revised with the goal of a step-by-step harmo-
nization of foreign and defense policy as well as a centralization of the existing 
Communities.69
The French foreign ministry felt it could accede to the demands of its part-
ners to the extent that a revised version (approved on 15 January 1962 by Couve 
de Murville) incorporated the Bonn formulation whereby common foreign and 
defense policy was to serve the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. On the 
issue of revision after three years, a commitment was made that the European 
Parliament would be “more strongly incorporated” into the development and 
implementation of common policies. Beyond that, the envisioned reform of the 
existing institutions was to occur “with regard for the structures” defined in the 
68 Milward, Rise and Fall, p. 310–351, the quotes from p. 330 (Cabinet Secretary Bishop) and 
p. 344; Wolfram Kaiser, Großbritannien und die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1955–1961, 
Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1996, pp. 104–177.
69 Siegler, Einigung, pp. 114–117.
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treaties of Paris and of Rome.70 De Gaulle persisted in his view however, that 
avowals of strengthening the alliance and the existing treaties be left out and that 
the economy be explicitly included among the areas of cooperation, which had 
not been the case before. Presented on 18 January 1962, the second French draft 
(“Fouchet Plan II”) thus contained to a greater extent than the previous version 
the danger of curtailing the possibilities for supranational development of the 
existing Communities.71
Faced with general opposition to unity on this basis, de Gaulle was willing 
to make greater concessions: At a meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Antonio 
Segni on 4 April 1962 in Turin, he once again accepted the declaration of strength-
ening the alliance and stated more precisely that the realm of economics should 
be dealt with “by implementing the Treaties of Paris and Rome.” A new Article 
3 even contained an explicit guarantee of the treaties.72 At a meeting of foreign 
ministers in Paris on 17 April, Couve also made the revision clause more precise 
by returning to the second French draft.
These concessions were insufficient, however. In negotiations on 17 April on 
the revision, Segni, Luns, and Spaak called for specifying the transition to direct 
election of the European Parliament and the strengthening of its authority as 
well as the gradual transition to majority decision-making in the Council. When 
Couve did not go along with this, Spaak declared that Belgium would sign the 
treaty on the creation of the European Union only after Britain’s entry into the 
EEC had been signed. Luns supported him in this view. Thus, the second attempt 
to develop an autonomous European foreign and defense policy had failed. The 
foreign ministers parted without setting a date for a new meeting or giving the 
Commission anything further to clarify.73
Afterwards, Adenauer primarily blamed Luns for the failure of the project. 
Two years later he was still complaining about the “tall guy,” characterizing him 
as “stubborn like only a Dutchman can be.” In the spring of 1962, the chancellor 
70 Text of the draft in Kramer, Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa, pp. 293–297.
71 Text of the draft in Europa-Archiv 19 (1964), pp. D 467–485.
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fumed that “I could wring his neck.”74 In fact, however, it was primarily Spaak 
who had brought de Gaulle’s plans to a stop. The French president could have 
broken the resistance of one of the smaller member states: As it had been demon-
strated in the summer of 1961 Luns was convinced the Netherlands could not 
maintain an isolated position against a political union of the other five members. 
Two states and certainly three could however resist the pressure emanating from 
Paris and Bonn. If the Federal Republic and France were in agreement, the Neth-
erlands and Belgium had no need to follow along as automatically as de Gaulle 
had assumed. The difficulties in implementing the Bonn Resolutions of July 1961 
consequently stemmed from a course change by Spaak, one that was aided by 
the British application for membership.  Spaak had perceived that Macmillan’s 
dramatic step had put the Belgians in a position to secure better protection from 
French or Franco-German hegemony, either through Britain’s membership or 
through a supranational orientation of foreign and defense policy. “If you want 
more integration,” he told Couve de Murville at the Paris foreign ministers confer-
ence, “we are in agreement that the English aren’t included. But if you don’t want 
an integrated Europe, then you must accept England.”75
However, de Gaulle would not accept a supranational orientation in foreign 
and defense policy if he could not be sure that his partners shared his under-
standing of self-assertion within the Atlantic Alliance. “In three years, we will see 
what we can do to strengthen our ties,” he emphasized repeatedly. “In any case, 
we will have accustomed ourselves to living and acting together.”76 He did not 
understand that he needed to be bolder here in order to achieve success.
Accession Negotiations and Franco-German Treaty
Macmillan’s announcement of 31 July 1961 about accession negotiations was 
followed by other candidacies. Ireland submitted its formal application on the 
very same day as Britain. Given that over seventy percent of Irish exports went 
74 Conversation with the Swiss historian Jean Rudolf von Salis on 5 August 1964, quoted in 
Schwarz, Adenauer, p. 737.
75 Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats inachevés, vol. 2: De l’espoir à la déception, Paris: Fayard, 1969, 
pp. 262ff.; his explanation was similar at a press conference of 20 April 1962, Siegler, Integration, 
pp. 91–93. Spaak’s statements in the winter of 1961–62 do not support the assumption that an 
earlier presentation of the concessions made by de Gaulle in April of 1962 would have sufficed 
to gain his agreement. To that extent, the significance given by French diplomats (and following 
them, by Soutou as well) to de Gaulle’s corrections in the draft treaty of 15 January 1962 seem 
exaggerated.
76 Press conference of 15 May 1962, de Gaulle, Discours, vol. 3, pp. 401–416, here p. 406.
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to the UK, the Irish were practically compelled to take this step, even though it 
was hardly reconcilable with their position of making a political front against 
the British or the neutrality stemming from that stance. “It would be economic 
disaster for us to be outside the Community if Britain is in it,” declared Secretary 
of Finance Kenneth Whitaker to his superiors.77 Denmark followed on 10 August, 
one day after the official application of the British. In this case, however, the Con-
tinental market was of more concern than the British export market: Denmark 
was desperately dependent on the continued export of agricultural products to 
the Federal Republic. The Danish government thus wanted to be quickly brought 
into the ongoing talks on regulation of the Community’s agricultural market. 
Lastly, the government of Norway also submitted an application, though not until 
30 April 1962. Economic interests were very compelling in this case too: Britain 
was the largest market for Norwegian goods, and an EEC that included Britain, 
Ireland, and Denmark would be receiving approximately seventy percent of total 
Norwegian exports. Yet, Norwegian insistence on what was still a young national 
sovereignty was very strong; anti-German and anti-Western emotions manifested 
themselves too. For those reasons, it was significantly more difficult for Oslo to 
come to a decision on the application.78 There were also applications for asso-
ciation from Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden (all made on 15 December 1961) 
as well as Portugal (on 18 May 1962). All in all, there was thus the prospect of a 
substantial expansion of the economic community.
Britain’s application for membership came with reservations. In order to 
take the concerns of the conservative establishment into account, the cabinet 
had resolved to make the final decision on entry only after membership nego-
tiations had been completed. The British were especially concerned to secure 
the unhindered import of foodstuffs from Commonwealth countries, along with 
special regulations for British agriculture and “satisfactory arrangements” with 
the remaining EFTA states. These conditions were explicitly included in the 3 
August resolution of the House of Commons that backed Macmillan’s initiative; it 
was also stated that “no agreement affecting these special interests or involving 
77 Note of 5 January 1962, quoted in Dermot Keogh, “Irish Neutrality and the First Application 
for Membership of the EEC, 1961–1963,” in Deighton and Milward (eds.), Widening, Deepening 
and Acceleration, pp. 287–298, here p. 293. See also Michael J. Geary, An Inconveniant Wait. Ire-
land’s Quest for Membership of the EEC 1957–73, Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2009, 
pp. 9–25.
78 Johnny Laursen, “Next in line: Denmark and the EEC Challenge,” in Richard Griffith and 
Stuart Ward (eds.), Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the European Com-
munity 1961–1963, London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1996, p. 211–227; Mikael af Malmborg, “Di-
vergent Scandinavian Responses to the Proposed First Enlargement of the EEC,” in Deighton / 
Milward, Widening, pp. 299–315.
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British sovereignty will be entered into until it has been approved by this House 
after full consultation with other Commonwealth countries.”79
Hence the British negotiating delegation led by Special Minister Edward 
Heath brought with it a program consisting of maximal exceptional regulations: 
The transition period for full application of the common tariffs should last twelve 
to fifteen years; even after that, Commonwealth countries were to be given tar-
iff-free sales at the same level that had been allowed in the British market up 
to that point; there were to be guaranteed prices for pork, eggs, and dairy prod-
ucts; British farmers were to receive compensatory payments from the structure 
fund; financing of the Community and of the common agricultural market was to 
be related to the relative level of national income. Essentially nothing from this 
list was accepted: The French government was not willing to negotiate with the 
British on issues of agricultural market regulation as long as the fundamentals 
had not been decided on. After that had been achieved on 14 January 1962, the 
French, supported by the Commission, diligently guarded the “acquis commu-
nautaire”—the sum of already agreed-upon Community regulations—from being 
called into question by the British. Thus, the transition phase was to end on 1 
January 1970 for Britain too; Commonwealth countries were only to be allowed 
certain kinds of relief during the transition period; prices for agricultural prod-
ucts and the income of agriculturalists were to be “reviewed” at regular intervals, 
as was the practice in the British system of subsidies.80
No more concessions were to be had. Macmillan then attempted to obtain a 
deal from de Gaulle by means of personal diplomacy: greater concessions espe-
cially on the Commonwealth connections in exchange for British support for the 
development of the French nuclear force. During a state visit with de Gaulle in 
June of 1962, the Briton outlined a vision for European nuclear defense: “There 
might be a European organisation allied to the United States. There would be 
a plan for the defence of Europe. The nuclear power of the European coun-
tries would be held as part of this European defence.”81 He presented this to 
the deputy French ambassador “in terms which suggested that he was thinking 
mainly of joint manufacture of nuclear weapons.”82 Aside from the fact that 
Kennedy would not permit Macmillan to share information on the production of 
79 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons 645, Sp.  1481; cf. Milward, Rise and 
Fall, pp. 346 and 350.
80 N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing with Britain. The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 74–199; Milward, Rise and Fall, pp. 352–483.
81 British Protocol of 2 and 3 June 1962, quoted in Ludlow, Dealing with Britain, p. 121.
82 Conversation of 18 May 1962, quoted in Milward, Rise and Fall, p. 468. Also on this, Wolfram 
Kaiser, “The Bomb and Europe. Britain, France, and the EEC Entry Negotiations, 1961–63,” in 
Journal of European Integration History 1 (1995), pp. 65–85.
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nuclear weapons with France and that the British Ministry of Defence as well as 
the general staff were opposed to such a project, this proposal was by no means 
capable of charming de Gaulle: The French president was sure that American 
support for the development of a French nuclear force could only be had, if at all, 
at the price of subordination to American command. That was exactly what he 
wanted to prevent. In de Gaulle’s eyes, Macmillan’s more or less clear offers thus 
seemed to be so many attempts to foil his efforts for European independence.
After negotiations had been stalled since August of 1962, the British govern-
ment began discussing the question of the issue on which they should be allowed 
to fail. The inter-ministerial committee charged with the negotiations resolved to 
postpone agreement on the common foreign tariff until satisfactory regulations 
had been reached on the import of butter and lamb from New Zealand. Regard-
ing the financing of the agricultural market system by means of import levies 
(which threatened to be relatively expensive for Britain given its high level of food 
imports), there was agreement to form a committee to collect data to serve as the 
basis for acceptable regulations during the transition period.
Macmillan once again attempted to do business with de Gaulle. During 
another visit to France on 15 and 16 December, he spoke more clearly than before 
of a “really autonomous instrument of deterrence” as the goal of nuclear cooper-
ation between the two countries. Concretely, he proposed an agreement on the 
use of nuclear weapons in the event of war, especially regarding targets.83 Inde-
pendence in the decision to use nuclear weapons, which was what the issue came 
down to for de Gaulle, was not yet assured, however. Aside from that, the French 
president continued to doubt that such independence would be possible if the 
missiles to carry the nuclear warheads were to be acquired from the Americans, 
as Macmillan declared was unavoidable. Thus, de Gaulle still saw no reason to 
agree to Macmillan’s offer. Moreover, it certainly could not convince him to be 
more accommodating in the negotiations on British accession.
Shortly after Macmillan’s visit, de Gaulle instead resolved to cancel the nego-
tiations. On 19 December, he told Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte that 
he intended to announce this at his next regular press conference.84 He clearly 
feared that despite all Macmillan’s concessions and avowals, British membership 
would block his path to an independent Europe. It is possible that he was also 
plagued by concerns that as a member, Britain would force a reduction in the 
external tariffs of the customs union to an extent that would not be compatible 
83 Vaïsse, Grandeur, pp. 205ff. and 215; on de Gaulle’s attitude in general, ibid., pp. 191–224.
84 Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, p. 335.
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with optimal growth of the French economy.85 At the same time, the long dura-
tion of the talks and the stubborn insistence of the British on exceptional regula-
tion gave him a prospect of success in convincing his partners that Great Britain 
was not yet ready to play the European game.
Why de Gaulle did not simply wait until negotiations fizzled out, as Couve 
advised him to do,86 must remain an open question. Perhaps he feared that the 
British would in the end make more concessions that would undermine any jus-
tification for breaking things off in the eyes of his partners; perhaps he was also 
simply weary of the endless process and wanted to use the opportunity to educate 
the European public. Macmillan made an agreement in principle, though very 
much a non-binding one, on a multilateral nuclear strike force with the American 
president on 21 December in Nassau in exchange for the urgently needed delivery 
of Polaris missiles for British nuclear submarines. De Gaulle took this as an occa-
sion to highlight British unreliability: In a press conference of 14 January 1963, he 
justified his refusal of further negotiations with the UK by citing the agreements 
in Nassau and went on to warn of a “giant Atlantic Community, dependent on and 
led by the Americans” that would be a consequence of British entry.87
What the British decision on accession ultimately would have been—if de 
Gaulle had not taken it away from them—also remains an open question. The 
only certainty is that such a decision would have taken some time. Internal dis-
cussions of December 1962 give the impression that Macmillan’s government had 
little power to break things off, in contrast to the firm resolve it had earlier shown 
in applying for membership. Macmillan had not reduced his goals to a realistic 
level at an early enough point and had not fought hard enough in the cabinet or in 
public so as to be able to make an offer de Gaulle could not refuse. To that extent, 
Macmillan could attribute a good portion of the failure to himself.
The advocates of British entry of course sought to find a way to prevent the ter-
mination of negotiations unilaterally declared by de Gaulle. Mansholt’s agricul-
tural committee agreed in all haste during the night of 14 January on the planned 
report as to the effects of British entry on individual products. Although not yet 
complete, the document was immediately praised by Spaak and Heath as the 
basis for agreement on regulations during the transition period. Representatives 
85 Milward’s argument that the negotiations ultimately failed due to the opposition between 
the British world market strategy and de Gaulle’s European preference system (Rise and Fall, 
p.  483), neglects however to take into account the many concessions regarding the customs 
union and Community policy that the British had made during the negotiations.
86 Attested by Couve de Murville, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 4, p. 224.
87 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 4: Août 1962 – Décembre 1965, Paris: Plon, 1970, 
p. 69. Most contemporaries believed his reason, and many authors have followed them in doing 
so.
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of the five members pressed for the preparation of a provisional report refuting 
de Gaulle’s assessment of the state of negotiations and also threatened retaliatory 
measures in the implementation of the agricultural policy, for example. Given 
that Adenauer did not add his voice to those making threats, all these initiatives 
failed. When Spaak sought to take Couve de Murville to task at the next gathering 
of the Six on 28 and 29 January in Brussels, the Frenchman curtly observed that 
his government regarded the negotiations with Britain as “broken off.” After two 
days of mutual recriminations, the meeting ended without setting a date for con-
tinuing negotiations with the British delegation.88
The termination of negotiations, which for Macmillan meant “the end of a 
chapter but certainly not of the volume,”89 also meant the end of talks with the 
other applicants. Negotiations with Denmark had made much progress by July of 
1962, but even for that country, membership without Britain was not an option. 
When de Gaulle sought to encourage Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag on 
26 January to seek admission on his own, the latter cordially declined, citing 
his country’s links through EFTA.90 Talks had not even begun with Ireland or 
Norway; in neither Dublin nor Oslo were they regarded as necessary any longer.
In contrast, the alliance between de Gaulle and Adenauer, which had been 
decisive for the success of the French maneuver, was strengthened still further 
in the days thereafter. The chancellor had in the meantime made up his mind to 
support the president’s project even if the other EEC partners did not join in at 
first. In light of Kennedy’s pressure on the Federal Republic to stop holding up 
a relaxation of international tensions by persisting in its policy of not recogniz-
ing the German Democratic Republic, this course seemed to Adenauer a strategic 
necessity that now had to be pursued regardless of the less-than-clear prospects 
of success. “Depending on circumstances, we must be prepared,” he declared to 
his colleagues, “to live in tension with the Americans for a few years. We have to 
put more on the Franco-German and the European horse.”91
When during Adenauer’s extended state visit to France in early July of 1962 de 
Gaulle posed the question of whether the Federal Republic would be willing “to 
create a political union with France, which de facto and perforce is limited to two 
members,” Adenauer answered “unequivocally with ‘yes’: We would be willing 
88 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain, p. 213–226; Edgard Pisani, Le Général indivis, Paris: Albin Mi-
chel, 1974, pp. 110–113.
89 According to Italian Foreign Minister Attilio Piccioni 14 March 1963, ibid., p. 226.
90 Laursen, “Next in line,” p. 224.
91 During a vacation stay in Cadenabbia, 30 April 1962, reported by Horst Osterheld, “Ich gehe 
nicht leichten Herzens ...”. Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre – ein dokumentarischer Bericht, Mainz: 
M. Grünewald, 1986, p. 111.
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to accept this limited union, in which a place for the other members would of 
course have to remain available.”92 The two men supported Fanfani’s initiative 
for a new summit of the Six but simultaneously made preparations for a dual 
confederation in the event that the meeting failed to come off. After de Gaulle had 
already demonstratively celebrated Franco-German reconciliation during Ade-
nauer’s visit, his return visit to the Federal Republic from 4 to 9 September fea-
tured aggressive wooing of “the great German people” (as he phrased it in care-
fully accentuated German in a speech in Bonn’s Marktplatz). Before an audience 
of military officers at the Leadership Academy of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg, he 
stated openly that “the organic cooperation of our armies on a joint defense is of 
decisive importance for the union of our two countries.”93
In order to avoid resistance in his own ranks to overly close ties to France, 
Adenauer wanted the alliance initially to take the form of a convention that would 
not be made public. Quickly after returning to Paris, de Gaulle had sent him a 
draft that called for regular consultations and close cooperation in the areas of 
foreign policy, defense, education, and youth work. After the Italian initiative for 
a summit of the Six had failed (as expected), Couve de Murville and his West 
German counterpart Gerhard Schröder agreed on 16 December on a summit of 
their leaders, who would sign the Franco-German agreement. When Adenauer 
traveled to Paris on 20 January 1963, he opted for a full-fledged treaty after all, 
which would need to be ratified by both nations’ parliaments. As his assistants 
had explained to him, opponents of the project were threatening to file a com-
plaint against the signing of the convention in the West German Constitutional 
Court, and they stood a good chance of success.94
De Gaulle was naturally supportive of this upgraded status for the union 
plan. He even proposed that the treaty be put to a referendum in both countries, 
which Adenauer had to reject due to the constitutional problems such a proce-
dure would present in the Federal Republic. Given that a full-fledged treaty had 
not been envisioned, the protocol officials hastily had to acquire the custom-
ary parchment paper and Morocco-leather covers in a Paris specialty shop. The 
“Franco-German Treaty” or “Élysée Treaty” of 22 January 1963 could then be 
signed at the official residence of the French president. It stipulated regular meet-
ings of the French president and West German chancellor, at least twice annually, 
along with at least four annual meetings of the countries’ foreign and defense 
92 Conversation of 5 July 1962, French protocol, quoted in Vaïsse, Grandeur, p. 251.
93 Speeches in De Gaulle, Discours et messages 1962–1965, pp. 4–18.
94 Hans-Peter Schwarz, “Präsident de Gaulle, Bundeskanzler Adenauer und die Entstehung 
des Elysée-Vertrages,” in Wilfried Loth and Robert Picht (eds.), De Gaulle, Deutschland und Euro-
pa, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1991, pp. 169–179.
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ministers as well as monthly meetings of top officials in the foreign ministries. 
The general staffs and those in charge of education and youth affairs would also 
meet regularly; a joint fund would be established to promote youth exchanges. 
The governments pledged “to consult one another before every decision on all 
important foreign policy issues” and in the realm of defense “to bring their basic 
approaches closer together in order to arrive at joint doctrines.”95
The agreement between the two symbolic figures of Franco-German recon-
ciliation was by no means complete. De Gaulle was still promising nothing more 
than the use of French nuclear weapons for the security of the Federal Republic. 
For his part, Adenauer did not hesitate to signal to the French president that he 
found the American offer of a multilateral NATO nuclear force very attractive and 
had therefore assured Kennedy he would participate.96 Nevertheless, alarm bells 
sounded in Washington when the treaty was signed. Kennedy did not want to 
exclude the possibility that de Gaulle was, as a CIA report claimed, negotiating 
with Moscow on the neutralization of Germany and the withdrawal of the Amer-
icans from Europe. In any event, Kennedy was determined to prevent an inde-
pendent European nuclear force by any means necessary. In the run-up to the 
signing of the treaty, he had offered Adenauer equal participation in an “execu-
tive mechanism” for NATO, which the West German chancellor had declined. The 
president now threatened a US withdrawal from Europe if the Federal Republic 
did not choose Atlantic unity over France. General Lucius Clay, who had been 
sent by Kennedy to Berlin as special ambassador after the construction of the 
Berlin Wall, let the Bonn government know that ratifying the Élysée Treaty would 
mean “the end of Berlin.”97
The US National Security Council met on 5 February and agreed on the form 
of distancing that would be demanded of Bonn: The treaty should be ratified but 
with the addition of a resolution strengthening the commitment to membership 
in NATO and to British membership in the EEC. State Secretary Karl Carstens, 
whom Foreign Minister Schröder had sent to Washington to work on smoothing 
things out, quickly agreed. In the following days and weeks, Jean Monnet made 
his influence felt with his German friends in order to bring about such a solution. 
On the basis of information from French diplomats who did not concur with de 
Gaulle’s course, Monnet’s starting point was the possibility that the French pres-
95 Treaty text in Europa-Archiv 27 (1963), D 84–86.
96 Conversations of 21 and 22 January 1963, provided by Vaïsse, La grandeur, pp. 255–257.
97 Unterredung Knappstein – Clay 28.1.1963, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1963, Doc. 58; on this and the following, cf. Benedikt Schoenborn, La mésentente 
apprivoisée. De Gaulle et les Allemands, 1963–1969, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007, 
pp. 31–34, 41–49.
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ident was in the process of leading Western Europe down the path of neutraliza-
tion, which would benefit only the Soviet Union. A declaration of support for the 
Atlantic partnership by the Bundestag would prevent that.98
The parallel efforts of American diplomacy and Monnet’s network met with 
success. At the end of March, the chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag caucus, 
Heinrich von Brentano, having returned from a visit to the US, suggested to his 
fellow party members that the ratification be accompanied by commentary that 
would interpret the Franco-German Treaty “authentically.” Adenauer, who did 
not take Kennedy’s threats seriously, was compelled to agree—without such a 
declaration, the treaty threatened to go down to total defeat in parliament. During 
a visit by coalition representatives to his vacation home in Cadenabbia on Lake 
Como on 4 April, he also agreed that the declaration would be made in the form 
of a preamble to the ratification bill; he did so in order to avoid endangering his 
coalition with the FDP. The commitment to a policy of Atlantic integration was 
thus to become legally binding on the West German government.99
On 16 May, the Bundestag adopted a resolution along the proposed lines 
almost unanimously; there were only five votes against and ten abstentions. The 
ratification of the Franco-German Treaty was passed with a preamble in which 
the document was interpreted as an instrument for promoting the “great goals” 
of West German foreign policy, among them a close partnership between Europe 
and the US, a joint “defense within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance 
and the integration of the armed forces of the states brought together by that alli-
ance” as well as continued European integration “with inclusion of Great Britain 
and other states willing to join and the further strengthening of these Communi-
ties.”100
The victory of the “Atlanticists” over the “Gaullists” in the internal West 
German struggle became all the more clear when Ludwig Erhard, who had initially 
not wanted to ratify the treaty at all, won the contest to be Adenauer’s successor. 
Against the sitting chancellor’s express will, a majority of the CDU/CSU caucus on 
23 April nominated Erhard as their candidate for the next election, which was to 
take place after the agreed-upon resignation of Adenauer the following October. 
Heeding Monnet’s advice, Kennedy made a state visit to the Federal Republic two 
months later during which he celebrated the Atlantic partnership. His effusive 
98 Loth, “Monnet,” pp. 265–267.
99 Cf. Matthias Schulz, “Die politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet – Kurt Birrenbach, die Ein-
heit des Westens und die ‘Präambel’ zum Elysée-Vertrag von 1963,” in Wilkens (ed.), Interessen 
verbinden, pp. 299–327; Tim Geiger, Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten. Außenpolitischer Konflikt und in-
nerparteilicher Machtkampf in der CDU/CSU 1958–1969, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008, pp. 210–217.
100 Europa-Archiv 27 (1963), D 84.
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praise of the Germans’ desire for liberty (“Today, in the world of freedom, the 
proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’”) made his listeners forget the flattery with 
which de Gaulle had charmed them nine months earlier.101
The French president watched the Federal Republic turn away from the 
vision of an autonomous Europe with impotent anger. As he complained on 
24 April in the French Council of Ministers, “The Americans are seeking to rob 
our treaty of its content. They want to make it an empty shell. And why all this? 
Because German politicians are afraid of not being subservient enough to the 
Anglo-Saxons. They’re behaving like swine! It would serve them right if we can-
celed the treaty and reverse the alliances by reaching an understanding with the 
Russians!” He told Alain Peyrefitte on the same day that “Perhaps we’ll actually 
need to wait fifty years before we have a real political Community.” He expressed 
skepticism to French deputies on 3 July, one day before his next visit to Bonn: 
“Ah, treaties are like young girls and roses. They last as long as they last. If the 
Franco-German Treaty doesn’t actually come into force, it wouldn’t be for the first 
time in history.”102
With the preamble to the Franco-German Treaty and with the departure of 
Adenauer, the third attempt at establishing European political self-assertion 
as de Gaulle saw it had failed. Bitterness reigned on all sides. Viewpoints were 
farther apart than ever as to how the European Community should take political 
action, which states should belong to it at all, and what form the alliance with the 
Americans should take.
The Success of the Economic Community
It was all the more important that the Community had in the meantime become 
an economic reality, not only in institutional terms but in practice as well. Since 
the decisions on accelerating the dismantling of tariff barriers, economic activity 
had oriented itself more and more on the Common Market of the Six. Lobbyists of 
every description had set up shop in Brussels. Entrepreneurs and investors were 
directing their money into the facilitation of inter-European trade and giving the 
already-strong economic growth of the member states additional impetus. From 
101 Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, New York: Palgra-
ve Macmillan, 1993, p. 336; Eckart Conze, Die gaullistische Herausforderung. Die deutsch-franzö-
sischen Beziehungen in der amerikanischen Europapolitik 1958–1963, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995, 
pp. 280–282.
102 Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, vol. 2, Paris: Fayard, 1997, p. 228 ; ibid., vol. 1, p. 430 ; Lacouture, 
De Gaulle, p. 308.
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1958 to 1972, inter-Community trade as a share of the total foreign trade of the Six 
rose from thirty to fifty-two percent. The gross national product of the Community 
increased by seventy percent from 1958 to 1970; purchasing power jumped by an 
average of four to five percent per year. At the same time, the disparity between 
the Federal Republic and the other member states diminished; France and Italy 
were both able to achieve decisive productivity increases. Altogether, the indus-
try of the Six witnessed a productivity increase of sixty-six percent from 1961 
to 1971. Agriculture saw even better results, with a leap of eighty-eight percent; 
inter-Community trade in agricultural products grew sevenfold.103
The increase in affluence and quality of life resulting from all this was 
strongly associated with the European Economic Community by the majority of 
the population. Whoever wanted political success had to embrace the continua-
tion and further expansion of Europe. Step by step, vacation trips as well as the 
exchanges sponsored by the Franco-German Youth Organization contributed to 
making “Europe” a lived reality. Reconciliation with the Germans achieved pal-
pable success. A fundamental European consensus established itself piece by 
piece among the Six, a consensus that survived impassioned political disputes.
At the same time, the EEC took on a constitutional character. When a Dutch 
firm (Van Gend en Loos) importing chemical products from West Germany filed a 
complaint based on Article 12 of the EEC Treaty (banning new tariffs and levies) 
against an increase in transport tariffs, the Dutch court sought the opinion of the 
European Court as to whether the provisions of the EEC Treaty were to be applied 
directly, that is, without any further legislation on implementation being passed 
by member states or whether Dutch law, which allowed such a tariff increase, 
contravened European law. Up to that point, prevailing jurisprudence regarded 
the EEC Treaty as an international treaty, which thus had no direct effect on 
natural and legal persons in the member states. The governments of the Neth-
erlands, Belgium, and the Federal Republic supported that interpretation. In a 
meeting of 31 October 1962, however, the Commission voted in favor of Commu-
nity law having a direct effect. The European Court adhered to this view. In its 
legal opinion of February 1963, it found “that the Community represents a new 
legal order […] whose legal subjects are not only the member states but also indi-
viduals.”104 Citizens of member states were thereby allowed to go before national 
courts with claims made on the basis of Community law. The court also asserted 
that it had authority to rule on matters that dealt with European law only implic-
itly.
103 Gerbet, La construction, pp. 181–183.
104 Court of Justice of the European Union, Case 26/62. NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie 
Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR-1.
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This provided a clarification with far-reaching consequences for the appli-
cation of Community regulations and for the position of the citizen in the Com-
munity. It was made possible by a change in the composition of the European 
Court, which had led to the introduction of majority decision-making. In May of 
1962, the French government nominated Robert Lecourt for a seat on the court. He 
was a prominent Christian Democratic politician who had been chairman of the 
Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI) and who was also a member of Monnet’s 
Action Committee. Together with another recently appointed justice, Alberto 
Trabucchi, Lecourt provided a close four-to-three majority for the supranational 
interpretation of the treaty.105
The issue of the priority of Community law over national law was decided a 
year later by the European Court when an Italian citizen refused to pay an electric 
bill to a power company that had recently been nationalized. The court did find 
that the nationalization was not a violation of European law and that the citizen 
therefore did not have any right to refuse payment. Whereas the Constitutional 
Court of Italy had justified its ruling as to the legality of the nationalization on the 
principle of the priority of newer law over older (“lex posterior derogat priori”), 
the European Court in its ruling of 14 July 1964 in the case of Costa vs. ENEL also 
determined that subsequent national legislation could not nullify European regu-
lations. This meant “that law created by the treaty could not be overridden by any 
internal state legal provisions, regardless of their nature.” The grounds for this 
precedence of Community law were that the EEC Treaty had “effected a definitive 
limitation of their sovereign rights” that “cannot be reversed by subsequent uni-
lateral measures.”106 With this decision, the European Court laid the cornerstone 
for a new European legal order that bound national legal systems and gave per-
manence to decisions made on the European level.
Conversely, it was less significant that the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (Euratom) did not really get going and that the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity was diminishing in importance. In contrast to his attitude toward the Eco-
nomic Community, de Gaulle was not particularly interested in the development 
of Euratom. More important to him than any synergy from a joint nuclear program 
was the preservation of absolute independence from the American nuclear indus-
try. Thus, the nation that had most strongly advocated the nuclear community for 
political reasons and that had developed its own nuclear industry to the great-
est extent could not serve as a motor for the development of the organization. 
105 Morten Rasmussen, “The Origins of a Legal Revolution – The Early History of the European 
Court of Justice,” in Journal of European Integration History 14 (2008), pp. 77–98, here pp. 94ff.
106 Court of Justice of the European Union, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 
p. 1251.
120   Formative Years, 1958–1963
The skepticism of the other member states was strengthened, and they sought to 
use the provisions of the Euratom Treaty to develop their own national nuclear 
industries. Despite these circumstances, the Euratom Commission was able to 
complete a treaty with the American Atomic Energy Commission in November of 
1958 that envisioned the construction of five to eight nuclear power plants fueled 
by enriched uranium. France did not participate in this program however and 
instead continued to build plants that did not make use of the advanced enrich-
ment technology, in which the US enjoyed a monopoly. The development of a 
common reactor type functioning with natural uranium (ORGEL) proved to be an 
economic failure: No one wanted to operate such cost-intensive reactors. Further 
efforts to organize a Common Market for reactors were thwarted by the national 
governments.
Joint organization of nuclear research, one of the main tasks of the Atomic 
Community according to the treaty, did not advance very far either. In 1960, the 
Joint Research Center (JRC) was established, with four locations: Ispra (Italy), 
Petten (the Netherlands), Mol (Belgium), and Karlsruhe (West Germany). These 
facilities could only play a secondary role vis-à-vis the national research centers 
that continued to exist. Research programs were neither integrated nor even coor-
dinated. The Joint Research Center had to satisfy itself with lower-priority and 
especially risky research projects; altogether, there was much duplication and 
unnecessary overlap.
The Euratom Commission, led by Étienne Hirsch after the resignation of Louis 
Armand due to health reasons in 1959, sought to limit this waste of resources and 
to position itself as the strategic center of European nuclear research. This only 
served to kindle de Gaulle’s wrath. When the renewal of the commission appoint-
ments was pending in December of 1961, the French president refused to allow 
Hirsch a second term. Given that the other governments had no significant inter-
est in a strong commission and that Bonn was advocating the greatest possible 
freedom for private initiatives, the Six came to agreement on a new head for the 
organization, Pierre Chatenet, who was serving as de Gaulle’s interior minister. 
Also, Euratom’s budget would no longer be decided at the level of the Commu-
nity; the commission would have to content itself with the sum of the funding 
coming from various research projects around which different combinations of 
interested member states found themselves willing to coalesce.107
The European Coal and Steel Community was at least spared such limits on 
its freedom of action. Its High Authority was not however able to act as a crisis 
manager when strong demand for coal and steel gave way to oversupply in the 
107 Gerbet, Construction, pp. 190–192; Laurence Hubert, “La politique nucléaire de la Commu-
nauté européenne (1956–1968),” in: Journal of European Integration History 6 (2000), pp. 129–153.
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autumn of 1958. There were two structural crises in the coal industry: As an energy 
source, coal was increasingly being supplanted by oil, which was less expensive 
and easier to utilize; at the same time, high-quality but less expensive American 
coal was coming onto the European market thanks to the introduction of larger 
colliers and falling shipping rates. The High Authority, under the chairmanship of 
the Belgian trade union leader Paul Finet, sought to introduce a system of produc-
tion quotas on the basis of Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty that addressed instances 
of “clear crisis” stemming from overproduction. There were to be regulations as 
to the amount of coal produced at every single mine within a given timeframe. 
Not only was this opposed by the French government—which cited efforts toward 
modernization already undertaken there, in contrast to the situation in Belgium, 
for example. It also met with disapproval in Bonn: The West German government 
was hostile to “dirigiste” measures from the ECSC and instead wanted decisions 
on production and import limits to be made on the national level, as far as pos-
sible in agreement with the gentlemen of industry in the Ruhr. In the Council of 
Ministers meeting of 14 May 1959, only the representatives of the Benelux gov-
ernments voiced support for giving the High Authority power to impose produc-
tion quotas. The ECSC thus had to content itself with stabilizing the Belgian coal 
market in isolation and using Community funds to subsidize the sale of coal. 
Measures to assist unemployed miners and to promote modernization remained 
in the hands of national governments.108
A crisis of steel overproduction began to loom in 1963. This was the result 
of production increases in Britain, the US, Japan, and the Soviet Union, paral-
lel to the expansion of capacity in the Community. The High Authority initially 
responded by proposing a freeze on imports from East Bloc countries and was 
able to win approval for the measure in June of 1963. In October of that year, it 
appealed for a hike in import tariffs on steel products by an average of fourteen 
percent. After surveying the attitudes in the capitals of the Community, the pro-
posal was modified to the effect that the tariffs in all states would be gradually 
increased to the level of those in Italy (nine percent). This measure too was pushed 
through by the energetic new president of the High Authority, Italian Christian 
Democrat Dino Del Bo—not however as a decision of the Council (stemming from 
the fact that the governments could not agree among themselves) but rather in 
the form of a binding recommendation in accordance with Article 74 of the treaty.
The High Authority was not able to win further tariff increases or produc-
tion quotas so as to overcome the steel crisis. Out of justified fears of renewed 
108 Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, Histoire de la Haute Autorité de la Communauté 
Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier. Une expérience supranationale, Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 
1993, pp. 529–559, 651–679, 783–816.
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deadlock, it did not even dare send proposals along those lines to the Council of 
Ministers.109
In contrast to what the advocates of sector integration hoped, neither the 
European Coal and Steel Community nor the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity served as the driving force of economic and political integration. The ECSC 
remained limited to the organization of the markets for coal and steel, the ratio-
nalization of their production, and the promotion of social balance in these 
industries; at most, the Atomic Community functioned as a place holder for a 
missing common energy and technology policy. Hence, the impressive successes 
in realizing the Economic Community became all the more important for the 
advancement of the European project.
109 Ibid., pp. 702–707, 783–796.
3  Crises of the Community of the Six, 1963–1969
Erhard’s Relaunch
The transition of the West German chancellorship from Adenauer to Erhard in 
October of 1963 confirmed what had already been seen in the replacement of the 
Fourth French Republic by de Gaulle’s regime in May of 1958: European insti-
tutions imposed constraints on the participating governments that could not 
be evaded. In the beginning, Ludwig Erhard was highly skeptical of the Treaties 
of Rome as well as the European Coal and Steel Community and the project for 
a defense community. In his view, it was all a “bureaucratically manipulated 
Europe” that could not work.1 What he envisioned instead was a “functional 
integration” of the economies of all the democratic states of Europe and, beyond 
that, of the entire Western world, based on confidence-building cooperation 
among governments.2 Upon taking the office of chancellor, however, his first 
official statement included support for the construction of a “European political 
entity with parliamentary, democratic accountability.” As he stated, “Economic 
integration alone, without political ties” would fail to do justice to “the practical 
life and the political circumstances of the participating countries.”3 Behind this 
lay both a realization as to the unsatisfactory nature of his earlier conception as 
well as efforts to take into account the intra-party and domestic political pressure 
to which he was exposed.
In fact, despite all prior difficulties, Erhard quickly undertook efforts to bring 
the Political Union of the Six into existence. On the issue of the Common Agri-
cultural Market, the Federal Republic had recently stepped on the brakes once 
again: After the disappointment caused by the French veto of British entry into 
the EEC in April of 1963, Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder had introduced an 
“Action Program” for European policy. This fundamentally called into question 
1 Erhard to Etzel, 16 Nov. 1956, in BDFD II, pp. 833–836, here p. 835.
2 Erhard’s speech to the club Les Echos in Paris, 7 Dec. 1954, in Ludwig Erhard, Deutsche Wirt-
schaftspolitik. Der Weg der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Düsseldorf: Econ, 1962, pp. 253–259, here 
p. 253. Cf. Horst Wünsche, “Wirtschaftliche Interessen und Prioritäten. Die Europavorstellungen 
von Ludwig Erhard,” in Rudolf Hrbek and Volker Schwarz (eds.), 40 Jahre Römische Verträge: Der 
deutsche Beitrag, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, pp. 36–49.
3 Erhard’s government statement, 18 Oct. 1963, in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 
Stenographische Berichte, vol. 53, pp. 4192–4208, here p. 4197. Cf. Ulrich Lappenküper, “‘Ich bin 
wirklich ein guter Europäer.’ Ludwig Erhards Europapolitik 1949–1966,” in Francia 18/3 (1991), 
pp.  85–121; idem., “‘Europa aus der Lethargie herausreißen’: Ludwig Erhards Europapolitik 
1949–1966,” in Mareike König and Matthias Schulz (eds.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 
die europäische Einigung 1949–2000, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004, pp. 106–127.
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the system of market regulations and levies decided on in 1962. It also proposed 
that further steps on agricultural integration be made dependent on progress 
in political integration along with trade liberalization within the framework of 
GATT. The decision on the next step toward a common price level for grain had 
to be tabled due to West German obstruction. This was also the case with the 
decision on the market regulations for milk, other dairy products, beef, and rice.
At a session of the Council of Ministers from 9 to 23 December, Erhard—who 
was rather annoyed by the economically counterproductive “agricultural non-
sense”4—succeeded in establishing at least the three markets for milk, beef, and 
rice. This was accomplished only after clear threats by the French that they would 
cancel the transition to the second stage of the Common Market if the Germans 
did not stick to the commitments regarding the plan for achieving the agricul-
tural market. Some eighty-six percent of the agricultural production of the EEC 
was now subject to the market system. A way back from this, as Schröder had 
envisioned, was no longer possible. Only on the issue of common grain prices did 
Erhard advocate a further postponement. During his initial visit to de Gaulle on 
21 November, he had asked for understanding because it had not been possible 
to organize the parliamentary majority necessary for a change of course within a 
few weeks. He left no doubt however as to his willingness to find a compromise 
that would be acceptable to France. De Gaulle therefore had to accept that the 
decision on grain prices would be postponed until 1 April 1964.
This arrangement was made easier by French signals that they would not 
seek to block a significant reduction in external tariffs at the upcoming round 
of GATT, the so-called “Kennedy Round.” The French delegation acceded to 
the West German demand for providing the Commission with directives for this 
round. The Council of Ministers agreed to orient itself fundamentally on the 
American demand for halving tariff rates, both in the manufacturing and agri-
cultural sectors. The only thing to be excluded was the Kennedy administration’s 
demand for complete elimination of tariffs on goods traded at a level of more 
than eighty percent between the US and the EEC. Although many potential con-
flicts remained in the details, it was clear that the principle of “synchronization” 
between the realization of the agricultural market and general trade liberaliza-
tion was acknowledged by the French.5
On the basis of these understandings, Erhard saw himself in a good posi-
tion to restart negotiations on a Political Union. In a speech before the Bundestag 
4 Note of State Secretary Rudolf Hüttebräuker, quoted in Patel, Europäisierung, pp. 180ff.
5 Ibid., pp. 251–265; Knudsen, Farmers, pp. 251–261; Carine Germond, “Partenaires de raison? 
Le couple France-Allemagne et l’unification de l’Europe (1963–1969),” Thèse Strasbourg, 2009, 
pp. 383–389.
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on 9 January 1964, he emphasized his belief in the necessity of a democratical-
ly-legitimated Political Authority of the European Community and the urgency of 
a new initiative for its realization. Discreetly encouraged by de Gaulle, he then 
began sounding out his partners as to the chances for such an initiative. The West 
German Foreign Office began internal work on a “Multi-Stage Plan for European 
Unity.” This plan envisioned the completion of the agricultural market and trade 
liberalization for 1964–65 along with the merger of the executives of the three 
European Communities and a strengthening of the rights of the European Parlia-
ment. In 1966, there were to be negotiations on the creation of a Political Union in 
the areas of foreign policy, defense, and culture as well as the possible extension 
of this to the countries of EFTA. The transition to direct election of the European 
Parliament was to go hand in hand with the realization of the Political Union in 
the period 1967–69. The existing treaties would then be replaced by one on Euro-
pean federation in 1974.6
De Gaulle drew the conclusion from Erhard’s efforts toward a re-launch of 
the Political Union that prospects for an independent Europe were perhaps not 
as dismal as he had feared after the Bundestag had supported the preamble to 
the Franco-German Treaty containing a disavowal. In any event, his resolve grew 
throughout the spring of 1964 for attempting a foray in this direction once again. 
The next Franco-German summit on 3 and 4 July would provide an opportunity. 
To maximize his chances of success, he mobilized the West German “Gaullists” in 
April. The most politically influential of these, Franz-Josef Strauss, was informed 
by representatives of the French secret service that the general would “for the 
final time pose the question as to whether the Germans were prepared to work 
together with the French, including on nuclear cooperation.” In order to under-
score the urgent need for support, the emissaries added that “Franco-German 
friendship and cooperation” were “at stake.” If Bonn were to refuse, the general 
would “make a fundamental course change and go beyond Germany to seek con-
tacts with the East, above all with Poland.”7
Given the prospect of strengthening the Franco-German alliance, de Gaulle 
was not any too concerned when Bonn once again postponed a decision on grain 
prices due to fears over domestic political consequences. In the very next session 
of the Council of Ministers after the agreement of 23 December, Agriculture Min-
ister Werner Schwarz asserted that the April deadline applied only to prices for 
the year 1964–65; on 14 April, he declared that he would at present be unable 
to support a harmonization of prices without further intermediate steps, as 
the European Commission had proposed. In the face of renewed West German 
6 Multi-Stage Plan 23 Jan. 1964, AAPD 1964 I, pp. 118–120.
7 Franz-Josef Strauss, Die Erinnerungen, Berlin: Siedler, 1989, p. 432.
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obstruction, the Commission was in sheer desperation. As Hallstein’s colleague 
Klaus Meyer reported in a note to his superior, “A political duty to cooperate in the 
construction of Europe no longer exists for most of the gentlemen in the cabinet 
as a guiding principle for their political actions.”8 For their part, however, de 
Gaulle and Couve de Murville reacted with marked understanding for the diffi-
culties of their West German partners. Given that the American government had 
delayed the presentation of its proposals for agricultural trade in the GATT round 
until the autumn, they themselves now found it better to wait until that time to 
determine what tradeoffs there should be. In early June, it was decided that the 
issue of common grain prices would be resolved by 15 December.
When news reached de Gaulle of Erhard’s visit to US President Lyndon B. 
Johnson on 12 June, the Frenchman once again had severe doubts. With little 
concern for the content of a common European foreign and security policy, the 
chancellor had agreed with Johnson to strive for a treaty on a nuclear-armed Mul-
tilateral Force (MLF) by the end of the year. Beyond that, Erhard had promised 
political and financial support for American engagement in the Vietnam War, 
which de Gaulle had recently criticized sharply. Erhard had also pledged that he 
would under no circumstances follow de Gaulle’s example of extending diplo-
matic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. All this was done without 
consulting Paris beforehand. As de Gaulle complained to Peyrefitte, the West 
Germans had made the Élysée Treaty into “a bad joke.”9
Disappointment over Erhard’s lack of principles led the French president 
to confront him during the summit of 3 and 4 July. First off, he demonstratively 
let Erhard wait while he had an extended conversation with Adenauer. Then, 
de Gaulle explained to Erhard that the Federal Republic must decide whether it 
wanted to pursue “a policy of subordination to the USA” or “a European policy 
that is independent of the USA.” Now that France had its own nuclear weapons, 
the time had come for an equal partnership between the US and Europe. In de 
Gaulle’s view, the Franco-German Treaty had to “become the core, the founda-
tion, and the ferment of European unity, in economic as well as in political and 
military matters.” If that did not succeed, then the document was “empty and 
senseless.”10
De Gaulle expressed himself only vaguely regarding the path to political and 
military unity. When asked by Erhard in a private conversation whether France 
8 Meyer to Hallstein, 21 May 1964, quoted in Patel, Europäisierung, p.  269. Cf. ibid., pp.  265–
268 and Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 398–404.
9 Meeting of 23 June 1964, Peyrefitte, De Gaulle II, pp. 257–263.
10 Meeting of 3 July 1964, French protocol, quoted in Schoenborn, Mésentente, p. 70. On this 
and the following, cf. Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 275–291 and Geiger, Atlantiker, pp. 292–300.
 Erhard’s Relaunch   127
was prepared to give the Federal Republic a right of control over French nuclear 
weapons, the president stressed only the priority of political unity: “Up to the 
point at which Europe can defend itself, and up to the point at which its politi-
cal organization has thrived to the extent that a genuine European government 
would be possible, up to that time there will be the separate nuclear weapons of 
Great Britain and France.”11 Only in a conversation with Foreign Office State Sec-
retary Karl Carstens did he hint at participatory rights in the less-distant future. 
When the West German official defended participation in the MLF with the argu-
ment that Bonn hoped by that means to be able to exercise a certain influence 
over nuclear planning and the decision to use nuclear weapons, de Gaulle sug-
gested the possibility of West German influence over French planning: “Why not 
come along with us? We too have the Bomb. With us, you can have a much larger 
share (or can participate much more).”12
The categorical call to reach an understanding with France on a common 
foreign and security policy only served to elicit defensive reactions from Erhard. 
As he told de Gaulle in their second meeting, it was simply the case that the 
Federal Republic was dependent on American protection; neither Franco-Ger-
man cooperation nor the future Europe could replace that. The chancellor did 
not pose any questions as to the French president’s vision of the path to common 
defense. When Carstens reported to Erhard two days later on the content of his 
conversation with the general, it did not lead to any further sounding out. In the 
closing session of the two delegations, de Gaulle wrapped his disappointment 
over the lack of results from his initiative in a warm-hearted appeal to develop a 
“common policy.” Erhard remained silent. He saw no need to repeat what he had 
already said to his guest during bilateral meetings.13
Erhard’s behavior embittered the West German “Gaullists” around Adenauer 
and Strauss, leading them to make severe accusations.14 In a speech at the state 
party congress of the CSU on 12 July, Erhard, for his part, emphasized that as long 
he was chancellor, foreign policy would be based on a close alliance with the US. 
In turn, during a press conference on 23 July, de Gaulle replied that Bonn had up 
to that point done nothing to realize a common policy and thus the Community of 
11 Meeting of 4 July 1964, AAPD 1964 II, pp. 768–777, here p. 775.
12 Note of 6 July 1964, AAPD 1964 II, pp. 766–768. There was no interpreter present at the meet-
ing on the morning of 4 July 1964, conducted in French; the only source is a note prepared two 
days later by Carstens. Which of the two variants of the offer contained there comes closer to the 
actual words of de Gaulle is thus not known.
13 AAPD 1964 II, pp. 777–787.
14 Cf. Geiger, Atlantiker, pp.  300–331. The enduring controversy over the substance of de 
Gaulle’s offer that has stemmed from this is resolved if one takes into account the factor of com-
munication difficulties between the protagonists.
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the Six threatened to crumble. Privately, he referred to the chancellor as a “polit-
ical nitwit”: With him, “nothing could be done.”15
In light of this public estrangement, the chances sank dramatically for 
Erhard’s attempt to revive the Fouchet Plans. It was not only the case that he had 
to leave the development of the proposal to Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, 
who fundamentally did not want to allow a new approach to French concep-
tions of Europe to harm his efforts to strengthen the alliance with the US. Erhard 
himself strengthened his option for the MLF and made it clear that he absolutely 
did not want a European nuclear deterrent based on the French force de frappe. 
At a press conference in early October, he declared that if necessary, he would be 
prepared to go it alone in signing the MLF Treaty with the US if other NATO coun-
tries continued to oppose it. When after long delay by the West German Foreign 
Office the Europe Plan was presented to the EEC partners on 4 November, it con-
tained a statement of support for “strengthening the Atlantic alliance” and a pro-
posal to reach “fundamental agreement that other European states [beyond the 
Six] participate in a European political union.”16
The German draft also adopted a proposal that Paul-Henri Spaak had initially 
made in Bonn in July and had then presented to the WEU Council of Ministers on 
9 September—distinguishing between a preparatory and a definitive phase of the 
Political Union. Initially, agreement was to be reached on regular consultations and 
a date set for a definitive state treaty. If that date could not be met, then consul-
tations would continue. An advisory commission was to be established alongside 
the governments to work on proposals for the final treaty and participate in the 
meetings of the Council of Ministers. Other provisions of the plan contained pro-
posals for strengthening the existing Communities: developing a common currency 
policy, coordinating national budgets, merging treaties, as well as incrementally 
strengthening the position of the European Parliament to the point at which it 
would have full legislative and budgetary responsibility. There were also measures 
for approaching the EFTA countries and for the worldwide dismantling of trade 
barriers. The proposal contained no chronology. What remained of the original 
incremental plan was only the vague statement that the Political Union and the 
existing Communities would be united in a federative Europe at a “later stage.”17
15 Council of Ministers, 7 July 1964, Peyrefitte, De Gaulle II, p. 263.
16 Siegler, Europäische politische Einigung 1949–1968, pp. 280–287. 
17 On the Spaak Plan, Carine Germond, “Les projets d’Union politique de l’année 1964,” in 
Wilfried Loth (ed.), Crises and Compromises. The European Project 1963–1969, Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2001, pp.  109–130, here pp.  114–116; in general, Gabriele Clemens, “‘Zwischen allen 
Stühlen.’ Ludwig Erhards Europa-Initiative vom November 1964,” in Gabriele Clemens (ed.), Na-
tion und Europa. Studien zum internationalen Staatensystem im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner, 2001, pp. 171–193; Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 323–336.
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With the nonbinding combination of intergovernmental and supranational as 
well as European and Atlantic perspectives, the West German government’s Europe 
Plan offered the partners an invitation to take up negotiations on Political Union 
once again despite the well-known divergences among the parties. At the same 
time, it reflected the alienation between Paris and Bonn. Couve de Murville quickly 
made it known to Carstens that there was no sense to the initiative if one were not 
prepared to reach agreement on common goals independent of the US. In order 
to avoid the danger of an exclusive agreement between Bonn and Washington, he 
then declared that the MLF was irreconcilable with the Franco-German Treaty.18
Additionally, de Gaulle made use of the initiative as another means of press-
ing for agreement on common agricultural prices at last. In fact, Erhard had in 
the meantime been forced to state that the December deadline could not be kept 
either; sheer terror of losing their seats drove numerous Bundestag deputies 
within the government coalition to set themselves against a reduction of grain 
prices. De Gaulle was no longer willing to take that into account—not only because 
the negotiations in GATT had now become unavoidable, but also because he no 
longer believed he could do business with Erhard. Moreover, growing criticism 
from French farmers and consumers made it seem a good idea to have responsi-
bility for agricultural policy shoved off to “Brussels” as soon as possible. He thus 
had Peyrefitte threaten on 21 October that France would “no longer participate 
in the European Economic Community if the common agricultural market were 
not to come into existence as had been agreed upon.” Couve communicated to 
his German interlocutors that the agricultural market must be completed before 
there could be talk of anything further.”19
This double threat had an effect. In short order, Hallstein made two trips to 
Bonn and sought to persuade the chancellor that now—in contrast to the previ-
ous crises of the Community—it was a question of all or nothing: “This time, it’s 
a matter of deciding on the continued existence of the Community.”20 In light of 
this and also the danger of the failure of the GATT negotiations, Erhard finally 
came to the point where he would accept the domestic political risk stemming 
from a breakthrough in talks on agriculture. In order to get around continuing 
opposition in the governing coalition and the Agriculture Ministry, he took up 
direct negotiations with the President of the German Farmers Association. By the 
18 Meeting between Couve de Murville and Carstens, 25 Oct. 1964, AAPD 1964 II, pp. 1187–1193. 
Cf. Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, pp. 277–280.
19 Germond, “Partenaires,” pp.  332 and 407; Peyrefitte’s declaration in L’Année politique en 
Europe 1965, p. 104.
20 State Secretary Neef to Minister Schmücker, 2 Nov. 1964, BA, WH 1114/1. Cf. Hallstein’s report 
to the Commission, AHCE, PV 293 Commission CEE, 9 and 13 Nov. 1964; ibid., 294, 18 Nov. 1964.
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end of November, he had succeeded in reaching a deal with the group’s leader, 
Edmund Rehwinkel: The government would agree to the setting of common grain 
prices by 15 December. These would come into effect only on 1 July 1967, however. 
Starting then and running from the end of the transition phase to the completion 
of the Common Market on 1 January 1970, West German farmers would receive 
compensatory payments from both the Community and from the government. A 
future grain price of DM 440 per metric ton was agreed upon as a goal in negotia-
tions, some DM 15 more than the Commission had proposed but DM 35 less than 
farmers were then seeking.
Agreement between the chancellor and the president of the association did 
not however mean that the agricultural crisis was over. When negotiations began 
in the Council of Ministers on 12 December, France and the Netherlands (both low-
price countries) did per force accept the postponement to 1 July 1967 but rejected 
a price hike proposed by the Commission, which anyway lay above the average 
of national prices up to that point. Neither did these countries want anything to 
do with increased financing of compensatory payments by the Community. In the 
late evening of 14 December, Mansholt and his colleagues worked out a compro-
mise proposal whereby the postponement of the deadline was combined with 
the original price and the stipulation that the farmers of the high-price countries 
would receive only the level of compensatory payments proposed by the Com-
mission. As another high-price country, Italy was conceded the introduction of a 
market for fruit and vegetables. Under the threat that this was the final proposal 
the Commission would make, the exhausted ministers finally agreed to it in the 
early morning hours of 15 December.21
The German Farmers Association was not satisfied with the result, of course. 
Yet, given that there was still a possibility of winning higher compensatory pay-
ments in the national budget, they did not make any strong protests. There was 
general relief that the “long grain night” had not ended in a breakup. Erhard now 
believed that de Gaulle owed him something in regard to both the GATT negotia-
tions and the initiative for a Political Union. Furthermore, he hoped that the sac-
rifice the West German government had made for the common agricultural policy 
would dissuade the French president from continuing to oppose the Federal 
Republic’s participation in the MLF.
Any basis for Erhard’s hopes regarding MLF was taken away only two days 
after the Brussels agreement had been reached. After the elections of 15 October 
in Britain, the Labour Party took over the government and spoke out decidedly 
against an MLF with West German participation. In light of this additional oppo-
21 Germond, “Partenaires,” pp.  409–413; Patel, Europäisierung, pp.  270–279; van der Harst, 
“The common agricultural policy,” pp. 329–331.
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sition and in order not to endanger the realization of a treaty with the Soviet 
Union on nuclear nonproliferation, President Johnson stipulated on 17 December 
that representatives of the US government and of the military exercise restraint in 
negotiations over nuclear forces. This course change was not immediately com-
municated to US allies, and so Erhard initially did not want to give up his hopes 
for a common nuclear force. Owing to the clear hesitancy of the American repre-
sentative at the NATO Council meeting in the middle of December, the chancellor 
conceded to the “Gaullists” in his party leadership on 5 January 1965 that negoti-
ations on MLF would resume only after the parliamentary elections that coming 
autumn.22
Without knowing it, Erhard had thereby improved the chances of success for 
his Europe initiative. At the next Franco-German summit, held at Château Ram-
bouillet on 19 and 20 January 1965, de Gaulle characterized the plan as generally 
“sensible.” The only portion he did not want to accept was the proposal for an 
Advisory Commission, which in his eyes threatened to behave like an interna-
tional actor. He was all the more willing to lend his support vis-à-vis the other 
partners when Erhard explicitly confirmed that government negotiations would 
address not only foreign policy but also military issues. De Gaulle agreed that 
in May or June of 1965, the foreign ministers of the Six should hold talks on the 
shape of the Political Union. The heads of state and of government would then 
come together in July to approve the results of negotiations and to discuss funda-
mental problems.23
Inspired by the “spirit of Rambouillet,” the moderate-left Italian government 
under Christian Democrat Aldo Moro took charge of giving concrete form to the 
new chance for further developing the Community. At base, the Italian govern-
ment was interested in avoiding Franco-German hegemony, and its left wing 
made itself into an advocate of strengthening the European Parliament. After 
responding in late November to the West German initiative with its own Europe 
Plan—yet more clearly atlanticist and federalist in orientation—the Italian gov-
ernment sent Foreign Ministry General Secretary Attilio Cattani in mid-February 
to the European capitals to sound out the matter of how the conferences on the 
Political Union should be prepared. On 15 March, Foreign Minister Amintore 
Fanfani invited his counterparts to an informal pre-conference in Venice set for 
the middle of May.24
22 Geiger, Atlantiker, pp. 331–338.
23 AAPD 1965 I, pp. 101–120 and 140–151.
24 Kramer, Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa, pp. 174–176, 187ff.; Germond, “Partenaires,” 
pp. 344–346; Antonio Varsori, “Italy and the ‘Empty Chair’ Crisis (1965–66),” in Loth (ed.), Crises, 
pp. 215–255.
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Hallstein’s Offensive
A few days after the Italian government’s invitation, Commission President Walter 
Hallstein surprised European public opinion in a speech he gave to the European 
Parliament on 24 March 1965: He made a proposal that the transition to the Eco-
nomic Community’s having its own income—as was to follow after the decision 
of January 1962 with the implementation of common tariffs for agricultural prod-
ucts—be linked to strengthening the rights of the European Parliament.25 On 15 
December 1964, the Council of Ministers had given the Commission the task of 
coming up with proposals not only for financing the agricultural market during 
the remaining transition period from 1 July 1965 to 1 January 1970 but also, in 
accordance with Article 201 of the EEC Treaty, to examine under what conditions 
the financial contributions of member states could be replaced by revenue under 
the Community’s own control. With his self-understanding as a leader of the 
integration process, Hallstein made use of the instructions given by the Council 
in order to press for accelerating completion of the Economic Community once 
again and to generate pressure for strengthening supranational institutions at 
the same time.26
The proposals that the Commission officially gave to the Council of Ministers 
on 31 March 1965 initially envisioned that, with the establishment of common 
grain prices on 1 July 1967, guarantee prices for milk, rice, beef, and sugar would 
be introduced and that responsibility for all agricultural expenditures would 
be transferred to the Community. With this, the early completion of the agricul-
tural market—which the Commission had sought in vain in 1960—would be de 
facto achieved. Likewise, the completion of the customs union would be brought 
forward to this date, which suggested itself in light of the tariff reductions that 
had in the meantime been accomplished. The Community was to receive not only 
the levies from the import of agricultural products but also the proceeds of exter-
nal tariffs, the former immediately with the introduction of guaranteed prices and 
the latter in six stages up to 1 January 1972.
With the transition to independent sources of income, Article 203 of the EEC 
Treaty would be amended to the effect that the Council of Ministers could only 
25 Text of the speech in Die internationale Politik 1965, pp. D 300ff.
26 Cf. Wilfried Loth, “The ‘empty chair’ crisis,” in The European Commission 1958–72, pp. 91–108. 
On the following, also Jean-Marie Palayret, Hellen Wallace, Pascaline Winand (eds.), Visions, 
Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crisis and Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On, Brussels: 
Peter Lang, 2006; N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Nego-
tiating the Gaullist Challenge, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 65–124; Philip Bajon, 
Europapolitik “am Abgrund”. Die Krise des “leeren Stuhls” 1965–66, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2012.
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reject changes in the Parliament’s proposed budget if it adopted the vote of the 
Commission with a simple, non-weighted majority. The Council could only prevail 
with its own position, independent of change proposals of Parliament and of the 
vote of the Commission, if at least five of the six member states agreed. Addi-
tionally, further proposals for receiving independent income would be adopted 
if they gained a two-thirds majority in Parliament and a qualified majority in the 
Council. As soon as the direct election of members was introduced (no date was 
specified), the decision about independent income would be wholly given over to 
the Community. In concrete terms, that meant the Commission would be able to 
push through any proposal that had won either a simple majority in the Council 
of Ministers or a majority in Parliament and two member states. Parliament would 
be able to pass any measure for which two member states offered support.27
For Hallstein, the synchronization of economic integration and the efforts 
to link it with a strengthening of the rights of Parliament and the Commission 
constituted a question of logic as well political opportunity. The proposal would 
make it possible to avoid distortions of completion during the transition period, 
would reduce the complexity of the Economic Community, and would be in 
accord with the principle of parliamentary control, which was specified in the 
EEC Treaty and which fit with Europeans’ democratic self-understanding. The 
Commission would “cut a good figure” with the proposal, as Hallstein explained 
in the Commission session of 3 March; and this would ensure victory.28 Anyone 
who remained unconvinced would need to yield to the package deal. This was 
especially the case with the transition to independent sources of income: The 
governing majority in the Dutch parliament had already indicated that it would 
only allow that if the powers of the European Parliament were simultaneously 
strengthened, and the same was to be expected from the parliaments in Bonn 
and Rome. This offered the Commission an opportunity to strengthen Parliament 
and thereby also spark public discussion of European issues, an opportunity that 
would not soon come again.
The proposals would of course meet with opposition, and Hallstein himself 
was aware of this. No government would be eager to part with tariff income 
anytime soon or lose influence over the shaping of the budget. De Gaulle would 
be the least eager of all; his opposition to strengthening Parliament and the 
Commission was sufficiently well known. Yet, first of all, the impositions in the 
package were consciously limited in nature: The loss of tariff income would come 
in stages; this guaranteed that the Community would not suddenly find itself 
with more money than it could spend. In the complicated process of determining 
27 Proposals of the Commission to the Council, 31 March 1965, COM (65) 150.
28 Protocol note by Emile Noël, 3 March 1965, HAEU, EN 780.
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the budget, Parliament would by no means have the final say, and direct election 
of members was not part of the proposals. When the members of the European 
Parliament made demands on that very issue on 12 May, Hallstein declined to 
support them given the poor prospects for success. Secondly, the Commission 
president regarded the French interest in economic integration and the Common 
Agricultural Market as so strong that de Gaulle would simply be forced to pay the 
price demanded for them. As Karl-Heinz Narjes explained in an aide-memoire to 
his superior, measures to derail them would “even today be seen by the broad 
mass of French public opinion as being against the interest of France such that 
de Gaulle would not be able to take steps of that sort in an election year.”29 The 
Commission definitely had in mind the fact that before the end of the year, the 
French president would need to face the voters.
It seems that it was above all Mansholt who pushed for appealing to public 
opinion on strengthening Parliament. When the deputies in Strasbourg reported 
their agreement on grain prices, he announced that the entire agricultural market 
system should be introduced at a faster pace and that it should be combined with 
a strengthening of Parliament. After the Commission had approved the packet of 
proposals on 22 March, the contents immediately began seeping into the press; 
Hallstein presented the basics of the deal two days later in a speech before Par-
liament. De Gaulle and Couve de Murville were enraged by this, not completely 
without cause given that the Commission was supposed to present its proposals 
formally to the body that had given them the charge, that is, the Council of Min-
isters. By revealing the proposals to the public, the Commission was consciously 
putting the Council of Ministers under pressure. Privately, Hallstein repeatedly 
made clear to the president and the foreign minister “that the French would not 
avoid having to make a concession on this issue [parliamentary control of inde-
pendent sources of income].”30
Initially, De Gaulle reacted to Hallstein’s challenge by seeking to isolate 
the Commission. On 27 March, Couve de Murville had to explain to his Italian 
counterpart that the Venice Conference would have to be postponed because 
the role of the Commission had not yet been clarified. Four days later, Peyrefitte 
announced the result of a meeting of the French Council of Ministers: France 
would agree to a summit meeting of the heads of state and of government only if 
an agreement were reached by 30 June (as scheduled) about the financing of the 
29 Narjes to Hallstein, 19 May 1965, BA, WH 1119/1.
30 Report by Hallstein, 21 Oct. 1965, BA WH 1029. It may be the case that Mansholt helped 
Hallstein along a bit with putting out the news about the Commission decision. In any event, the 
Commission was not as innocent of the publication as portrayed in the subsequent explanation 
made to the French government.
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Common Agricultural Market during the transition period.31 If the Germans and 
Italians were so eager for a new summit, they should then refrain from supporting 
the demands of the Commission. On 27 April, de Gaulle held a televised speech 
in which he once again highlighted his vision of an independent Europe that 
“rejects any foreign intrusion in the domestic affairs of a state.” He made it clear 
to the adherents of a “so-called integrated Europe” that limitations on national 
sovereignty would perforce lead to the submission of Europe to the hegemony of 
the United States.32
This peremptory stance led in fact to the isolation of France. In a session of 
the Council of Ministers on 13 and 14 May, the representatives of the Netherlands 
and of the Federal Republic declared that financing during the transition period 
was linked to the principle of the transition to independent sources of income 
in the final phase of the agricultural market, and a decision therefore had to be 
made regarding the strengthening of control by the European Parliament. The 
Dutch government went so far as to criticize the Commission’s proposals as insuf-
ficient and called for complete legislative responsibility for Parliament as well 
as direct elections and the right to appoint the members of the executive organs. 
The Italian government praised the Commission’s proposal as logical and within 
the meaning of the Community. The Belgian government declared that it was in 
agreement “with almost all points.” Even the government of Luxembourg, which 
stated that it would be satisfied with a settlement regarding the transition period, 
did not raise any objections on principle to the proposals as a whole.33
De Gaulle then concentrated on his West German partners. He suggested to 
the chancellor that the date of the next Franco-German summit be moved forward 
so that the two could synchronize their positions on the issues at hand before 30 
June. Erhard, who regarded the rejection of the Venice Conference as a broken 
promise on the general’s part, agreed to this despite his disappointment. It was 
the case that he too was unwilling at this juncture to give up hope for a break-
through leading to Political Union. When the two delegations met on 11 and 12 
June in Bonn, it turned out that Erhard’s dependence on his party in parliament 
was greater than his ambition to achieve an agreement with de Gaulle on the 
issue of Political Union. After the French negotiators had made only vague inti-
mations about strengthening the right of the European Parliament to participate 
in decision-making on budgetary matters, Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder 
spoke with Erhard and succeeded in getting him to agree to accept a provisional 
regulation of agricultural financing for a year at most. This was much less than 
31 Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 346–348.
32 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. IV, pp. 354–358.
33 AHCE SEC (65) 1541, 13 May 1965.
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the chancellor had indicated in conversations with de Gaulle beforehand, and so 
the summit ended in a state of full confusion.34
Very angry that Schröder had tossed a wrench into the works,35 de Gaulle 
now found himself willing to dispense with a stepped-up completion of the 
Common Market and thus also the transfer of levies to the Community on 1 July 
1967. For the moment, the question of control over independent sources of income 
by the European Parliament did not come up in that way; however, France as a 
net exporter of agricultural products could not yet stop its participation in the 
financing of export subsidies. De Gaulle was prepared to accept any domestic 
political difficulties that might arise from that. He was now concerned only that 
the financing for the whole transition period be agreed upon, given the transition 
to majority decision-making in the Council of Ministers beginning on 1 January 
1966. Couve de Murville presented the new French position at the Council of Min-
isters meeting in Brussels on 15 June.
As had been agreed in Bonn, West German Foreign Office State Secretary Rolf 
Lahr and French Foreign Ministry Director Oliver Wormser, who was responsi-
ble for economic affairs, met on 22 June in Paris in order to take up the matter 
of coordinating their countries’ positions once again. A compromise presented 
itself: Bonn would agree to the postponement of the transition to independent 
sources of income if France would hold to the completion of the customs union 
on 1 July 1967. Furthermore, as had been discussed among the ministries in Bonn, 
Lahr went on to assure his counterpart that the West German government would 
now advocate a settlement for the whole transition period. In regard to the future 
budgetary rights of Parliament, Lahr emphasized that the Council of Ministers 
would still have the final word during at least an initial stage.
As can be seen when comparing the reports made by Lahr and by Wormser to 
their respective superiors,36 the two remained unclear as to how far French con-
cessions in the Parliament question should go and whether a definitive settlement 
for the transition period should actually be found by 30 June. Wormser gave the 
impression that the West German government had fully accepted the positions 
Couve had presented in the Council of Ministers session of 15 June. There was no 
mention of Bonn having persisted in its position that there should be two further 
stages regarding participation by Parliament. The French foreign minister was all 
the more surprised when in the Council of Ministers on 30 June, Lahr—acting on 
instructions from Erhard—maintained the position that for the time being, there 
34 Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 430–434; Bajon, Europapolitik, pp. 97ff., 120–126.
35 Peyrefitte, De Gaulle II, pp. 287.
36 Report by Lahr, 22 June 1965, BA, B136 2591 and report by Wormser, 23 June 1965, MAE, CE-
DE, 1111, respectively.
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could be negotiations only on provisional financing for the next few months. That 
same evening, Schröder presented a resolution of the Bundestag (approved that 
day) calling for the West German government to advocate a strengthening of the 
rights of Parliament in accordance with the vote taken by that body on 12 May. 
At this, Couve had reached the point where he thought negotiations should be 
broken off.37
Previously, Fanfani had categorically maintained that only short-term financ-
ing could be the subject of negotiations. As long as a market for fruit, vegetables, 
and olive oil had not been agreed upon, it was the poorest member states that 
were threatened with having to make hefty net payments. In accordance with a 
Dutch parliamentary resolution, Luns had stuck to the position that the Commis-
sion’s package could not be divided into its components. It was thus still the case 
that the financing of the agricultural market during the transition phase 1965–
1970 could not be had if the rights of the European Parliament were not strength-
ened at the same time. De Gaulle was not prepared to agree to that, however. 
While the Quai d’Orsay saw the necessity of “doing something more substantial 
regarding the parliamentary assembly,”38 the French head of state would rather 
accept a crisis in the EEC than agree to a strengthening of its institutions. As he 
had said in the Council of Ministers in April, France would still be able to enjoy a 
fine existence “if the Treaty of Rome were sent into hibernation.”39
There is no way to determine the extent to which that was meant in earnest. 
It was in any event the case that de Gaulle was not prepared to pay the price 
demanded by Hallstein for the transfer of the system of subsidies for agriculture 
to the Community. With the strengthening of the Commission that would result 
from that, along with the transition to majority voting in the Council of Minis-
ters, there was the threat that control over the development of the EEC would be 
taken from de Gaulle. He thus resorted to a measure that Couve de Murville had 
been encouraging as early as the end of May in the event that pressure on Erhard 
did not succeed: “the establishment of a kind of general boycott by France until 
things arrange themselves.”40
Couve thus rejected Hallstein’s offer to present in short order a new package of 
proposals that would take the various negotiating positions more fully into account. 
37 Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 434–438; Bajon, Europapolitik, pp. 99–106, 126–128.
38 MAE, CE-DE, 1111, Règlement financier. Situation au 24 juin 1965, without date, p. 2.
39 Council of Ministers session of 14 April 1965, Peyrefitte, De Gaulle II, p. 282.
40 According to the testimony of Couve de Murville during a hearing at the Institut Charles de 
Gaulle, 16 Dec. 1988, quoted in Maurice Vaïsse, “La politique européenne de la France en 1965: 
pourquoi ‘la chaise vide’?” in Loth, Crises, pp. 193–214. However, Couve suppresses the fact that 
before the crisis began, there had still been efforts to reach an understanding with Erhard.
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He wanted nothing to do with the suggestion from the German delegation that the 
clocks simply be stopped and that talks continue, as had been done in January of 
1962. Instead, he asserted that it was “obvious” that “some of our partners” lack the 
“will” to reach an agreement. Couve then used his position as chairman, which he 
held only through that very day, to adjourn the session. With the observation that 
there was “neither an agreement nor the possibility of an agreement,” he broke off 
the negotiations just before two o’clock in the morning.41
The next day, after a meeting of the French Council of Ministers Peyrefitte 
announced that the French government had drawn conclusions from the fact 
that the partners had not fulfilled their financial commitments: France would 
not participate in sessions of the EEC Council of Ministers in July. On 6 July, the 
Permanent Representative of France in the Commission was withdrawn. The 
French did no longer take part in sessions of the Permanent Representatives or 
the work groups that met under the chairmanship of the Commission. “Our chair 
will remain empty, and the meetings will be worthless,” commented de Gaulle in 
a conversation with Peyrefitte.42
It was clear that a certain portion of the blame for the outbreak of this crisis 
lay with Ludwig Erhard—in that he had suddenly yielded to political pressure 
from his smaller coalition partner, the FDP, by insisting that only provisional 
financing could be negotiated on 30 June. This had given Couve and de Gaulle 
the impression that the government of the FRG was among those that did not 
keep its word either. Decisive however was de Gaulle’s realization that the Par-
liament issue could not be taken off the table even with the offer of postponing 
Community financing of the agricultural market. The supposed failure to keep 
commitments regarding financing was only a pretext with which the blockade 
of Community institutions could be justified, an “unhoped-for pretext,” as de 
Gaulle said to Peyrefitte.43
The Crisis of the “Empty Chair”
With this blockade of Community institutions—something not foreseen in the 
treaty—de Gaulle wanted to bring about the emergence of differences among the 
41 Protocol of Emile Noël, 1 July 1965, FJME, ARM G (65) 329.
42 Peyrefitte, De Gaulle II, p.  291. Cf. Vaïsse, “Politique européenne,” pp.  209–213; on de 
Gaulle’s motives, also Wilfried Loth, “Français et Allemands dans la crise de la chaise vide,” in 
Marie-Thèrese Bitsch (ed.), Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes, Brussels: 
Émile Bruylant, 2001, pp. 229–243.
43 Peyrefitte, De Gaulle II, p. 288.
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partners so as to break the common front against the financing of agriculture 
without strengthening the European Parliament at the same time. It was espe-
cially the West German government that in his view was vulnerable to further 
pressure. “Because in the final instance the Germans cannot bear a situation in 
which there is no longer a Common Market,” as he said optimistically in mid-Sep-
tember, “in the end they’ll give in. […] The new chancellor will come to Paris 
soon after the election [on 19 September] in order to arrange things.” He did not 
even shy away from intensifying his Eastern policy so as to increase the pressure 
on the Germans. “They see,” as he stated after a visit by Polish Prime Minister 
Jósef Cyrankiewicz on 11 September in Paris, “that the East is coming closer to us. 
They’re encircled.”44
In order for the pressure to work, however, it had to continue for a long time. 
The partners were to be left in the dark as to French goals and were to fear that the 
Common Market would break apart. “If they aren’t afraid, we won’t achieve our 
goal,” as de Gaulle said on 13 July.45 Therefore, the French representatives could 
not simply be absent for four weeks as Peyrefitte had already announced, and so 
the president made clear during the Council of Ministers session on 7 July that he 
was not of a mind to begin any negotiations at all before the end of the year.
It was not only the definitive financing of the Common Agricultural Market 
without any strengthening of the European Parliament that he was envisioning 
as the goal of negotiations. He also wanted to change the personnel of a Com-
mission that had caused him so much trouble. He “never again wanted to have 
anything to do” with Hallstein, Marjolin, or Mansholt, as he said to Peyrefitte 
after the Council of Ministers meeting on 1 July.46 Furthermore, he was seeking 
to stop the transition to majority voting, which—as he now saw more clearly than 
before—threatened to call into question French successes in agricultural policy 
once again. “This crisis,” as he explained in the Council of Ministers on 7 July, 
“must be used to put an end to ulterior political motives. It can’t be the case that 
from 1 January 1966 our economy will be subjected to a settlement on majority 
voting by which our partners force us to accept their will. This opportunity must 
be used to revise the false concepts by which we have been subjected to the dic-
tates of others. End this nonsense!”47 In order to prevent the transition to major-
ity voting, he demanded a revision of the EEC Treaty or at least a supplemental 





48 Thus on 15 Sept. 1965, ibid., p. 299.
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considered a revision of the price system for the agricultural market that would 
banish the threat of overproduction as well as a slowdown in the dismantling of 
tariffs for the sake of French industry, but this was not essential to him.49
Initially, De Gaulle’s war of nerves did not have any effect. Hallstein remained 
convinced that France needed the EEC too, and that the president was therefore 
merely seeking to knock it into shape so that it did not limit his freedom of action. 
Hallstein let it be known that no one was “either to give in or to dramatize” the 
situation.50 Regarding the concessions that France would be expected to make 
for the completion of the agricultural market, he argued that the five partner gov-
ernments ought to agree on a common line and not to give in on the aspiration 
for democratic control of the Community budget. Hallstein was supported in this 
view by Schröder; both saw the conflict as a test of power with a man who aspired 
to French hegemony over Europe. Even if he was not as decisively supranational 
in outlook regarding objectives as was the Commission president, Schröder 
thought it was important to adhere to agreements already made, which he saw 
as the best protection against such hegemony. Given that the Franco-German dia-
logue had been broken off for the time being and Erhard’s initiative for a Political 
Union was obviously no longer on the agenda, Schröder could now have a more 
significant influence on West German European policy than before.51
In bilateral conversations with his partners, Schröder made sure that the for-
mulation of a new proposal for financing agriculture would be left to the Commis-
sion. It focused on the compromise offer that the French government had made on 
15 June: Postponing the transition to independent sources of income and thereby 
also putting off the Parliament issue. The Agricultural Market and the Customs 
Union were to be completed by 1 July 1967, as the Commission had proposed in 
March. The financing of the Agricultural Market was however to be accomplished 
by member contributions until the end of the transition period, and tariff reve-
nues were to be returned to the member states during this period. The funding 
of agricultural expenses was to occur in diminishing portions according to the 
general financial ratio of distribution and in a growing percentage according to 
the level of imports from third countries. If the market for fruit, vegetables, milk, 
and other commodities could not be passed by 1 July 1967, financing from levies 
was to be extended so that full financing from the agricultural account would 
begin only in 1970.
49 Conversation with Hervé Alphand, 9 Nov. 1965, quoted in Bajon, Europapolitik, pp. 196ff.
50 Horst Osterheld, Außenpolitik unter Ludwig Erhard 1963–1966. Ein dokumentarischer 
Bericht, Düsseldorf: Droste, 1992, p. 210.
51 Bajon, Europapolitik, pp. 149–153, 260–267.
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Controversially, the Commission discussed the question of the package deal 
together with that of parliamentary control. Mansholt initially protested this by 
stating that the Commission was carelessly dropping an essential portion of its 
proposals. Marjolin still wanted to hold explicitly to the principle of parliamen-
tary control of independent revenues, combined with the recommendation that 
the role of the body in budget talks be strengthened “even now,” while Hallstein 
finally succeeded with a formulation to the effect that the Commission could not 
once again take a position in light of the fact that the Council of Ministers had not 
yet finished discussing the matter: “It does not believe that all possibilities for 
agreement have been exhausted.” In this way, he sought to avoid the possibility 
that the Commission could be attacked from any angle and yet at the same time 
preserve the chances of influencing the necessary compromise among the gov-
ernments at any given moment along the lines of his own views.52
The memorandum of the Commission was formally passed on 22 July53 and 
was presented to the Council of Ministers on 26 and 27 July. In doing so, however, 
the foreign ministers in attendance did not go into detail; and there was most 
certainly no vote taken. The governments of the Five were not sure that they could 
make any decisions at all without French participation. Beyond this, they wanted 
to ease the French return to the table without any loss of face. It was rather clear 
even without a formal vote that the Five were willing to come to an agreement 
with France on the basis of the Commission memorandum. The French accusa-
tion of broken promises was thereby countered, and Paris was forced to show its 
hand.
There was nothing left for de Gaulle to do but go public with the demand for 
a revision of the treaty, which he had not yet presented. In a press conference of 9 
September, he declared that negotiations in Brussels had been broken off not only 
because of the “permanent resistance of most of our partners to bringing agricul-
ture into the Common Market” but also because of “certain errors in principle 
and ambiguities in the treaties on the Economic Community of the Six.” After he 
had denounced the “supranational ambitions” of the Commission and had con-
jured up the horrific image of the dominance of a “technocratic, unpatriotic, and 
unaccountable areopagus” over French democracy, he made the abandonment of 
such “pretentions” a precondition for France’s return to the negotiating table.54
52 Ibid. pp. 159–169; Commission memorandum of 22 July 1965, COM (65) 320 final.
53 Along with Rochereau, Marjolin voted against it; he specified in the protocols that he was 
opposed to leaving the Parliament question open. Amazingly, however, he completely concealed 
this view in his memoirs. See Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie, p. 348.
54 De Gaulle, Discours IV, pp. 377–381. 
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The partners’ shock at this demand was actually quite limited. They had 
long since perceived that the blockade of Community institutions by France was 
highly selective: French representatives continued to participate in numerous 
committee meetings and even in gatherings of the Council. On 21 September, 
the deputy of the permanent representative of the French government, Maurice 
Ulrich—who had remained in Brussels—bluntly informed his German colleague 
Eberhard Bömke “that very large portions of the French administration do not 
approve of the general’s policy toward the European Communities, even sharply 
reject” it and that no preparatory work was being undertaken in Paris on emenda-
tions to the EEC Treaty. Not only did Bömke inform his superiors in Bonn of this, 
he also told Hallstein.55 One could only conclude from all this that France did not 
actually want to leave the Community and especially that the intensification of 
the crisis was wholly the personal work of the general.
This meant too that de Gaulle was not in a position to push through any kind 
of treaty amendments. It was not only that the French administrative apparatus 
was hoping that its partners would maintain their hardline stance against the 
president: De Gaulle increasingly came under domestic pressure due to the wors-
ening of the crisis. After the session of the EEC Council of Ministers in late July, the 
agricultural associations asked why the government had not accepted the offers 
of the Commission; and then the employers’ organization voiced its criticism too. 
In order to arrest the growing opposition in the run-up to the presidential elec-
tion, representatives of the government as well as the Gaullist party newspaper 
La Nation felt themselves compelled to deny that the president had any intention 
of tearing up the EEC Treaty.56
The Five could thus increase their pressure on de Gaulle without any worries. 
When in the third week of September Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak 
proposed that France be invited to an extraordinary session of the Council of Min-
isters without participation of the Commission, there was quick agreement that 
there must not be any decision regarding agricultural financing on that occasion. 
The return of France to the negotiating table was not to be purchased at the price 
of weakening the position of the Commission. In the Council session of 25 and 
26 October, the five foreign ministers came to agreement that France was to be 
invited to such a special session in order to clear up institutional questions. At 
the same time, they emphasized in a declaration “that the solution to the prob-
lems facing the Communities must be found within the framework of the treaties 
and existing organs.” Among themselves, they were determined that they would 
55 Bömke to Hallstein, 21 Sept. 1965, BA, WH 1187/2.
56 Bajon, Europapolitik, pp. 214–218.
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permit neither a treaty revision nor an interpretation of the treaty that limited the 
responsibilities of the Commission or the principle of the qualified majority.57
The position of those who pushed for the president to yield due to economic 
concerns was strengthened when the Five expressed concern about the problems 
that de Gaulle had addressed in his press conference and also simultaneously 
demonstrated their resolve not to allow the supranational dimension of the treaty 
to be affected. Beyond this, the five foreign ministers composed a resolution on 
agriculture financing that made it clear that if France still wanted to have influ-
ence over the shaping of the Agricultural Market, it would do well to return to 
the table as soon as possible: Though in July the Commission had sought the 
postponement of the linked issues of independent sources of income and par-
liamentary control until 1970, the ministers now made reference to the original 
proposal from the Commission and observed regarding it “that this issue [must] 
be reviewed with the participation of all members of the Council.”58
Schröder, who had played the key role in attaining the agreement of the 
Five,59 also let Couve de Murville know what the proposed clearing up of insti-
tutional questions would amount to: agreement over how cooperation between 
governments and the Commission could possibly be “further improved” and 
how “on issues of objectively clear life-and-death interests [an outvoting by the 
majority could] be avoided.” Formal arrangements were not necessary for this, 
however—tact and good will should suffice.60 Such a gentlemen’s agreement was 
actually a concession to de Gaulle’s conceptions and thus also a disappointment 
to all those who were eager for a rapid expansion of the supranational nature of 
the EEC. Yet, this was much less than de Gaulle had demanded; it corresponded 
to what was achievable under the circumstances. Not only was Schröder’s for-
mulation approved by most of the other governments, with the exception of the 
Netherlands, but Hallstein too found it “encouraging” that there was to be discus-
sion of “a reasonable application of the majority principle.”61
57 Schröder to Erhard, 27 Oct. 1965, PAAA, B150, vol. 62, pp. 8383ff.
58 AHCE, SEC (65) 3145, 26 Oct. 1965.
59 Cf. Henning Türk, “‘To Face de Gaulle as a Community’: The Role of the Federal Republic of 
Germany during the Empty Chair Crisis,” in Palayret, Wallace, Winand (eds.), Visions, pp. 113–
127; Bajon, Europapolitik, pp. 274–286.
60 Circular decree from Schröder, 27 Sept. 1965, AAPD 1965, Doc. 369, pp. 1518–1522; Klaiber to 
AA, 12 Oct. 1965, AAPD 1965, Doc. 388, p. 1608.
61 Sigrist to Noel, 8 Oct. 1965, HAEU, EN 1588. The usual picture of an understanding of the 
governments with de Gaulle at the cost of the Commission (for example, in Ludlow, European 
Community, pp. 87ff.) springs from an exaggeration of Hallstein’s ambitions, which de Gaulle 
had successfully propagated.
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Naturally, the president was not immediately prepared to accept Schröder’s 
offer. First, he wanted to test whether the unity of the Five—which he had not at 
all anticipated—could last or whether by persisting in his demands there was the 
possibility of achieving more. Secondly and above all, giving up on the block-
ade without a supplementary agreement on institutional questions would now 
amount to a defeat; this was to be avoided if at all possible, as long as his re-elec-
tion was assured. Couve de Murville then quickly let Council President Emilio 
Colombo know that he was not prepared to take part in a meeting of the Council 
in Brussels. At the same time, he demanded abolition of the majority principle, 
the “return” of the Commission “to its rights and duties according to the treaty” 
and a “review” of its composition.62 He followed up by making efforts to break 
the unity of the Five by means of bilateral conversations.
After this had proven unsuccessful, the French Council of Ministers decided 
on 17 November that it would in principle accept an invitation to an extraordinary 
meeting of the foreign ministers. This concession was not to be revealed to the 
wider world yet, however. In order to prevent the Five from increasing the pres-
sure on de Gaulle still further, it was merely the case that the Belgian foreign min-
ister, who was still seeking to negotiate, was told on 22 November that Paris was 
prepared to accept the recent compromise proposal: a meeting in early January of 
1966 in Luxembourg.63
After de Gaulle had surprisingly failed by a significant margin to gain an 
absolute majority in the first round of the presidential elections on 5 December 
and thus had to contend with François Mitterrand in a runoff, the willingness 
to compromise was signaled still more clearly: In an encounter with Colombo 
on 8 December in Rome (on the occasion of the concluding festivities of the 
Second Vatican Council), Couve proposed leaving the issue open as to whether 
the meeting in Luxembourg would be a gathering of the Council or a summit. The 
Frenchman was also less rigid regarding a treaty stipulation on the desired turn 
away from the majority principle. After this encounter, Couve let it be known that 
“the main hindrances to resumption of European talks have been eliminated.”64
Immediately after the re-election of de Gaulle on 19 December, the French 
government approved a meeting of the six foreign ministers on 17 and 18 January 
1966 in Luxembourg. Despite recommendations to the contrary, however, de 
Gaulle was not willing to agree to the 1966 budget for the EEC or EURATOM; both 
62 Lahr’s notes, 10 Nov. 1965, AAPD 1965, Doc. 412, pp. 1689–1692. Couve gave his answer only 
orally (to the Italian ambassador) because his government disputed the legality of the Council 
session of 25 and 26 Oct. 1965.
63 Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 452ff.; Bajon, Europapolitik, p. 210ff.
64 Klaiber to AA, 15 Dec. 1965, PAAA, B20 1326, FS 1808. 
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communities thus had to operate with emergency budgets for the time being. The 
reduction of tariffs within the Community by ten percent as of 1 January 1966, 
which had been moved up by agreement, was put into effect; but tariff reduction 
within the framework of the Dillon round of GATT was postponed.
When the extraordinary Council—which was in French eyes only a summit 
of the foreign ministers—gathered on 17 January 1966 in Luxembourg, Couve in 
fact no longer called for an official revision of the Treaties of Rome. Instead, he 
presented a list of demands that amounted to a circumvention of critical treaty 
stipulations. In this “Decalogue,” there was a call for the Commission to present 
its proposals initially to the member governments before they were submitted to 
the Council of Ministers. Also, the Commission was no longer to make any public 
declarations without prior consultation with the Council of Ministers. The repre-
sentation of the Community to the outside world was to be left to the Council of 
Ministers. Majority voting in the Council was to be de facto eliminated via agree-
ment on an advance veto: “If a member state declares that a decision touches 
upon one of its vital interests, the Council cannot vote on this issue until the 
consent of the affected state has been given.”65
When it came to appointing a new Commission (whose mandate had expired 
on 9 January 1966), Couve no longer demanded a completely new slate of 
members. He did however want the introduction of a rotating presidency; every 
two years, a Commission member from a different country was to take over the 
position. After this, a second renewal of Hallstein’s mandate was no longer possi-
ble. The new regulations would come into force in conjunction with the merger of 
the executives of ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM—a move that had been decided upon 
by the Six in March of 1965 before the outbreak of the crisis.66 Couve demanded 
that the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965 be ratified without delay so that the new 
Commission could take up its work at once.
The partners showed a certain measure of willingness to take the “Decalogue” 
as the starting point for a dialogue between the Commission and the Council. 
Schröder and Luns were not however prepared to put any kind of voting-system 
modification in writing, not even in the significantly weakened forms proposed 
by Spaak and Columbo as a compromise. Likewise, they did not want to ratify the 
65 Note of 8 Jan. 1966, quoted from Gérard Bossuat, “Emile Noël dans la tourmente de la crise 
communautaire de 1965,” in Wilfried Loth (ed.), La gouvernance supranationale dans la construc-
tion européenne, Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 2005, pp. 89–113, here p. 105.
66 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, “La création de la Commission unique  : réforme technique ou affir-
mation d’une identité européenne?” in Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Wilfried Loth, Raymond Poidevin 
(eds.), Institutions européennes et identités européennes, Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 1998, pp. 327–
347.
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treaty on the merger of the executives of the three Communities until an under-
standing had been reached on the reappointment of Hallstein. An altercation 
almost broke out when on the second day of the meeting the French delegation 
put forward a timeline which did call for agreement on agricultural financing by 
the end of March but remained silent on the development of common positions 
in the Kennedy Round. After Couve had declared that a mandate for that round 
could only be decided after the settlement of the agricultural financing issue, 
Schröder and Luns rejected the French proposals lock, stock, and barrel. Luxem-
bourg head of government and Foreign Minister Pierre Werner, serving as Council 
president, had no recourse but to adjourn the session.67
Before the next gathering of the six foreign ministers on 28 January, the 
Permanent Representatives, with the discreet cooperation of the Commission, 
worked out a milder version of the “Decalogue,” now in seven points; the Com-
mission then “invited” the Council to work on harmonization. The document 
expressed the desire that the Commission consult the Council before passing 
“important” proposals. Furthermore, proposals were to be submitted to the 
Council before being made public. The letters of accreditation of ambassadors to 
the Communities were to be accepted jointly by the president of the Commission 
and the president of the Council of Ministers. The Commission and the Council 
were to share information on their contacts with third states, should consult on 
the nature of their representation in international organizations, should “cooper-
ate” in the realm of information, and coordinate with each other as to the control 
of Communities’ expenditures. In this form, the rules of conduct — no longer con-
taining any restrictions on the authority of the Commission or criticism of its prior 
actions — were now accepted by all foreign ministers.68
Regarding majority voting, Schröder made a concession to the French with 
a proposal for a declaration of intent that envisioned striving for a consensual 
solution “where very important interests of one or more partners are at stake.” 
The partners still opposed the French demand that in such a case “the discussion 
must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.” Given the danger of 
another conference failure, Couve was prepared—at 0:45 a.m. on 30 January—to 
end the blockade without having succeeded in this demand. In a joint declara-
tion, the partners stated “that there is a divergence of views on what should be 
done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.”69
67 Ludlow, European Community, pp.  97–100; Germond, “Partenaires,” pp.  454–458; Bajon, 
Europapolitik, pp. 163–165.
68 Cf. the comparison of the “Decalogue” und the “Heptalogue” in Palayret, Visions, pp. 246–
249.
69 Palayret, Wallace, Winand (eds.), Visions, pp. 325ff.
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Earlier, when establishing a written work program for the coming weeks and 
months, Couve had had to concede that parallel to a quick resolution to agricul-
tural financing, the working out of common tariffs and a common position for 
GATT negotiations had to be dealt with as well. The issue of replacing Hallstein 
was postponed: Couve had to accept that the Five declared an understanding on 
the composition of the new Commission would be a prerequisite for the merger 
treaty to take effect.70
With his seven-month absence from the Council of Ministers and the meet-
ings of the Permanent Representatives, de Gaulle had achieved nothing more 
than sowing uncertainty among his partners as to how France would react to 
the next difference of opinion that would be declared “vital”—whether the 
French government would then comply with a majority vote or would unleash 
another crisis. That might well protect one from being outvoted, but it was not 
a guarantee that the Community would develop in the direction desired by de 
Gaulle.71 That the president gave up his opposition at this juncture can only be 
explained in that he had come to the conclusion that he had played out his hand. 
In fact, the president of the Permanent Representatives, Albert Borschette, had 
on 7 January warned the French in the name of the Five that Luxembourg was 
their “last chance.” The Permanent Representatives had agreed upon a Council 
session for 31 January or 1 February at which the passage of the regular budget for 
1966 would be on the agenda.72 De Gaulle could no longer exclude the possibility 
that the integration of the Community would continue in a completely normal 
manner and that France would later have to submit to decisions that had been 
made without its input.
The Time of the Arrangements
De Gaulle sought to mask his defeat by immediately developing a new initiative for 
Political Union. After Couve returned from Luxembourg, he stated soothingly in 
the Council of Ministers on 2 February that they had after all achieved “that which 
we wanted to a significant degree,” and the president insisted that the suprana-
tional trap could only be evaded “if we achieve political cooperation among the 
70 Ludlow, European Community, pp.  100–103; Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 460–463; Bajon, 
Europapolitik, pp. 169–175.
71 There is no evidence for the oft-repeated claim that the Luxembourg “compromise” had led 
to dispensing with majority voting. See Jonathan Golub, “Did the Luxembourg Compromise Have 
Any Consequences?” in Palayret, Wallace, Winand (eds.), Visions, pp. 279–299.
72 Bajon, Europapolitik, p. 230ff.
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Six.”73 After the session, he let it be known that “organizing European political 
cooperation would greatly ease the development of economic cooperation.”74 At 
the next Franco-German summit in Paris on 7 and 8 February, he came to agree-
ment with Erhard on an appeal for political Europe, to which the chancellor was 
to respond with new efforts to bring about a meeting of the foreign ministers. 
At a press conference on 21 February, de Gaulle characterized the organizing of 
political consultations among the Six as “more urgent than ever before” and once 
again conjured up the vision of a “mighty and independent” European Union that 
would ultimately also play a decisive role in overcoming the two blocs.75
Erhard hesitated to make the case for the Political Union once again, however. 
After the brutal extortion attempt by de Gaulle, the chancellor had become more 
than skeptical that it would still be possible to reach a workable arrangement 
with him. Erhard therefore maintained the position at the Paris negotiations that 
he would become active again only after de Gaulle had publicly spoken in favor of 
a new initiative. When the agreed-upon press conference took place, he saw his 
skepticism confirmed: De Gaulle announced at the same time that France would 
withdraw from the integrated defense structure of NATO at an unspecified time 
before the expiration of the Atlantic pact on 4 April 1969. That was not anything 
fundamentally new—de Gaulle had informed the US government of his intentions 
in this regard as early as the end of November 1964 and had told Erhard of it in 
the Franco-German summit, which had been brought forward to June of 1965. 
Yet, the unilateral declaration without prior consultations served to make clear 
that de Gaulle was determined to force his conception of European security on 
his partners. This was not conducive to an understanding on the Political Union.
In the announcement of unilateral withdrawal from NATO, Erhard correctly 
regarded de Gaulle’s Europe appeal as “completely void.”76 The West German 
Foreign Office did obligatorily sound out the partners as to the chances for a 
new foreign ministers’ conference. After Luns had urgently counseled Bonn not 
to pursue a new initiative if it wanted to avoid endangering relations with the 
Netherlands, the chancellor made a public appeal only for the resumption of 
regular consultations of the foreign ministers; he did not issue an invitation to 
a new meeting. At the national party congress of the CDU from 21 to 23 March 
73 Peyrefitte, De Gaulle III, pp. 183ff.
74 Press statement of 2 Feb. 1966, quoted in Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 352ff. On the follow-
ing, ibid., pp. 352–355; Kramer, Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa, pp. 213–218.
75 De Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. V, Paris: Plon, 1970, pp. 5–23.
76 Osterheld, Außenpolitik, p. 295.
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1966 in Bonn, Schröder—the professed “Atlanticist” and victorious adversary of 
de Gaulle—received tremendous ovations.77
For his part, de Gaulle decided to carry through with the withdrawal from 
NATO integration in short order. Without prior consultation with the responsi-
ble staff of the foreign ministry, the defense ministry, or the government, he sent 
a handwritten announcement to President Johnson on 7 March indicating that 
France was pulling out of NATO’s integrated command and that it would be with-
drawing its troops from integrated military units. At the same time, he called for 
the removal of the integrated general staffs and allied forces from French terri-
tory. Two days later, letters to this effect were sent to Erhard as well as British 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Saragat. In a 
memorandum of 29 March, he specified that the withdrawal of NATO forces and 
institutions was to take place within one year, that is, by 1 April 1967.78
With de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw unilaterally from NATO military 
integration, a politically-independent Europe slid definitively beyond reach. 
This action, widely perceived as exhibiting a lack of solidarity, did finally spur 
an overdue discussion of reforming NATO. Contrary to the French president’s 
wishes, this did not however lead to an autonomous European pillar within the 
alliance but instead strengthened American leadership. On 25 September 1966, 
the fourteen remaining NATO members reached agreement on the creation of a 
nuclear planning group and the development of a joint strategy. The negotiations 
stemming from this led in December of 1967 to official adoption of the strategy 
of “flexible response” (which de Gaulle had fought as lacking in credibility) and 
to the issuing of the Harmel Report, named for Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre 
Harmel, which established defense and détente as tasks of equal priority for 
NATO. This meant for a strong impulse within the Western alliance to coordinate 
efforts toward détente with the Soviet Bloc and not, as de Gaulle had envisioned 
it, emancipation from American leadership.79
Erhard was just able to prevent Schröder from pushing through a withdrawal 
of French forces (heretofore under NATO’s supreme command for Europe) from 
the Federal Republic. Bonn initially declared itself “provisionally” in agree-
ment with having the troops remain and then got negotiations going between 
the chief of staff of the French land forces, General Charles Ailleret, and NATO 
77 Geiger, Atlantiker, p. 404.
78 Vaïsse, Maurice, La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958–1969, Paris: 
Fayard, 1998, pp. 385ff.; the letters in De Gaulle, Lettres 1964–1966, pp. 261–267.
79 Helga Haftendorn, “The Adaption of the NATO Alliance to a Period of Détente: The 1967 
Harmel Report,” in Loth (ed.), Crises, pp. 285–322; Vincent Dujardin, Pierre Harmel, Brussels: 
Éditions Le Cri, 2004, pp. 627–657.
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Supreme Commander for Europe Lyman Lemnitzer on the issue of command over 
the French forces in wartime. In an official exchange of correspondence on the 
matter with Paris on 21 December 1966, Bonn held firm in its position that French 
forces would remain as long as the West German government desired them to. 
Lastly, in an exchange of correspondence on 22 August 1967, it was agreed that in 
the event of war, French troops would fall under the command of Allied Forces 
Central Europe; the French government did however reserve the right to deter-
mine whether they would participate militarily at all.
Erhard saw no occasion or opportunity for further steps toward Franco-Ger-
man cooperation in the defense realm, as de Gaulle had offered in his explanation 
of the withdrawal from NATO integration. Instead, the chancellor let it be known 
during a trip to Norway and Sweden in early September of 1966 that the economic 
integration of the EEC and EFTA had once again taken priority in his eyes.80 For 
his part, de Gaulle responded to the lack of any agreement on a common strategy 
among the Europeans with a demonstration of the claim to complete national 
independence: In December of 1967, just before the Harmel Report was issued, 
the French president had General Ailleret publish an essay with a call for France 
to be in a position “to intervene everywhere” and to defend itself “in all direc-
tions.”81
In Luxembourg, the negotiations on issues that remained open thus took 
place in an atmosphere of growing alienation between France and its partners 
in regard to defense policy. For exactly that reason, however, there was pressure 
for talks on economic issues to succeed: No one involved believed that it would 
be possible to withstand another crisis calling into question the existence and 
further development of the Common Market. France did persist in its position 
that regulation of agriculture financing in the transition period had priority. In the 
end, however, the French government had to accept the Federal Republic’s insis-
tence that agreements made here would only take effect if accord were reached on 
establishing additional markets as well as the completion of the Customs Union 
and common positions for GATT negotiations.
In a series of Council sessions from late February to late July 1966, agreement 
was first of all reached that the transition to free traffic in agricultural products, 
which the Commission had envisioned for 1 July 1967, would instead be stretched 
out over a period of twelve months, that is, to 1 July 1968. The Customs Union 
for industrial products would also be completed by 1 July 1968 in two stages. As 
to the financing of the agricultural funds, agreement was essentially reached 
80 Geiger, Atlantiker, pp.  411–424; Kramer, Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa, pp.  220ff.; 
Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 549–563; Vaïsse, La grandeur, pp. 392–394, 580–582.
81 Ibid., p. 394.
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on a compromise proposal made by the Commission for the transition period: 
financing from member contributions and levies. The West German government 
was able to push through a provision specifying that its portion of the financing 
in the second half of the transition period, that is, from 1 July 1967, would be .8 
percent lower than that of the French (31.2 percent versus 32 percent) and that 
agricultural exports into the GDR would no longer be treated as exports into third 
countries. The percentage of the agricultural budget available for improving the 
agricultural infrastructure was limited to a set amount.
After energetic preparatory work by the Commission, the Council agreed on 
14 June 1966 on a negotiating position for the Kennedy Round of GATT. True, it 
did contain some concessions to France regarding the tariff levels to be put forth; 
but altogether it included the overwhelming portion of the foreign trade of the 
Community in worldwide tariff reductions, as both the Federal Republic and the 
Netherlands had especially desired. This agreement was made easier by the fact 
that in the meantime, French business was likewise becoming increasingly inter-
ested in a reduction of industrial tariffs. Lastly, there followed on 27 July 1966 an 
agreement on the agricultural portion of the negotiating position for the Kennedy 
Round; the Commission had done preparatory work on this too. Simultaneously, 
after long and to an extent very difficult negotiations, markets for sugar and fat 
were passed as well as important additions to those for fruit and vegetables and 
common prices for milk, beef, sugar, oil seeds, olive oil, and rice. The demands 
made on the Common Market by Italian and German producers were thus largely 
acceded to, which was disadvantageous for the budgets of not only those who up 
to that point had been net payers.82
After the Commission had received a comprehensive mandate for negotia-
tions, the Kennedy Round of GATT could finally enter its decisive phase. This led 
to the signing of a comprehensive agreement on 15 June 1967. The terms on reduc-
ing tariffs in agriculture were modest: Instead of dropping them by as much as 
fifty percent as the US had demanded, the reduction was twenty-two percent on 
average; this resulted not least of all from the fact that the US government refused 
to include export subsidies in the calculation. The high level of agricultural 
protectionism among the industrial nations thus remained essentially intact, 
which worked against the chances for modernization in the so-called developing 
nations. Conversely, there was a genuine breakthrough in the realm of industrial 
goods: For more than two thirds of the products involved in negotiations, tariff 
reductions of fifty percent were agreed upon. The average reduction on all prod-
ucts was thirty-five percent, to be introduced in stages over a period of five years 
82 Ludlow, European Community, pp.  103–109; Patel, Europäisierung, pp.  312–319, 336–340; 
Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 463–468.
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up to 1 January 1972. Thanks to its unified stance, the EEC was able to develop 
great negotiating strength. This enabled the Europeans to convince the Ameri-
cans to accept the mutual opening of industrial markets while denying the uni-
lateral opening of the agricultural market, as American farmers were forcefully 
demanding.83
Regarding the merger of the executives and the appointment of a new 
common Commission, Schröder continued his adamant resistance to French 
pressure. For him, sticking with Hallstein was an integral component of the as-yet 
unfinished test of strength with de Gaulle. For reasons having to do with party 
politics, Erhard could not tolerate a rejection of Hallstein, and in his resentment 
over the lack of solidarity from the French president, he saw no reason to risk his 
own position on account of French demands. In the Council of Ministers session 
of 5 April 1966, the West German delegation did accede to the French call for intro-
ducing a two-year rotating presidency of the common Commission. Yet, they also 
persisted in their position that would allow mandates to be extended for an addi-
tional two years and also proposed that the common Commission be entrusted to 
Hallstein for the first two years.84
A Belgian compromise proposal limiting Hallstein’s mandate to one year was 
rejected by Schröder, as was de Gaulle’s concession that after the merger Hall-
stein could remain in office for “several months,” as the president had said at 
the Franco-German summit of 21 July 1966.85 Instead, Schröder proposed that 
the current Commission, which had been so helpful in decision-making on the 
Common Agricultural Market and on GATT negotiations be allowed to remain in 
office until the Customs Union took effect on 1 July 1968. The merger of the exec-
utives was to be postponed until that time. The Federal Republic kept Hallstein 
de facto in office by refusing to agree to a date for filing ratification documents.
A resolution to the mutual blockade came only after the fall of Erhard in 
November of 1966 and after a grand coalition of the CDU and SPD had taken the 
reins in Bonn on 1 December. The new chancellor, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, was a 
CDU politician who regarded rapprochement with France as a high priority. 
Kiesinger himself was a South German member of the Bildungsbürgertum who 
valued France, its language, and its culture very highly. As longtime chairman of 
the Foreign Policy Committee of the Bundestag (before he had taken over as prime 
83 Coppolaro, The European Economic Community in the GATT Negotiations, pp.  360–366; 
Patel, Europäisierung, pp. 348–357; Henning Türk, Die Europapolitik der Großen Koalition, Mu-
nich: Oldenbourg, 2006, pp. 45–57.
84 Notes by Lahr, 6 April 1966, AAPD 1966, pp. 446–448. On this and the following, cf. Türk, Eu-
ropapolitik, pp. 35–46; Germond, “Partenaires,” pp. 677–688; Bajon, Europapolitik, pp. 317–323.
85 AAPD 1966, pp. 966–973, here p. 971.
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minister of Baden-Württemberg in late 1958), he had developed a conception of 
Europe that was significantly closer to de Gaulle’s than to those of Schröder or 
Hallstein. Without emphasizing a front against the US as strongly as the French 
president did, Kiesinger placed his hopes on a European core that was capable 
of taking action, one that possessed real weight vis-à-vis the US. With skeptical 
pragmatism, he assumed that the nation-states would remain the central actors 
in the European unification process for the foreseeable future.86
The new foreign minister, SPD chairman Willy Brandt, was also committed 
to a united Europe’s increased capacity to act. Moreover, he was under pressure 
from his party colleague Karl Schiller, who as economy minister was pushing 
for a rapid merger of the executives. Only if this were no longer blocked could a 
common energy policy be developed, a move the Federal Republic was seeking 
in light of the crisis in the coal mining industry. In order to overcome the block-
ade without doing damage to Hallstein, Brandt had State Secretary Lahr propose 
during a foreign ministers’ conference of the Six on 22 December that the Merger 
Treaty take effect on 1 July 1967 and that, as Schröder had suggested, Hallstein 
serve as president of the common Commission until completion of the Customs 
Union on 1 July 1968.
De Gaulle greeted this initiative with the demand that the proposal not be dis-
cussed in the Council of Ministers of the Six but rather at the next Franco-German 
summit on 12 and 13 January 1967 in Bonn. At that meeting, Kiesinger showed 
himself to be “somewhat more modest”87 than his foreign minister: He would 
be satisfied if Hallstein could remain as Commission president “for a period of 
time” after the merger was carried out. When de Gaulle replied that this period 
should expire before the end of the year, an agreement was reached that at the 
summit conference of the Six planned for June, the West German government 
would support the immediate merger and Hallstein would then be called upon to 
serve as president of the common Commission for half a year. Fanfani had issued 
the invitations to that summit, officially in order to celebrate the tenth anniver-
sary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome, but actually in order to take up work 
on political cooperation once again.
With pressure coming from the ranks of the CDU/CSU and opposition from 
his Foreign Office, Kiesinger then called this arrangement into question: He now 
wanted an earlier merger and also an extension of Hallstein’s term to 31 Decem-
ber 1967. De Gaulle was unwilling to accept that. After the chancellor had already 
86 Cf. Philipp Gassert, “‘Wir müssen bewahren, was wir geschaffen haben, auch über eine kriti-
sche Zeit hinweg’ – Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Frankreich und das europäische Projekt,” in König and 
Schulz (eds.), Bundesrepublik, pp. 147–166.
87 Conversation notes, 13 Jan. 1967, AAPD 1967, Doc. 17, pp. 94–102, the quote on p. 100.
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committed himself to the merger in the coming months, the French president 
saw no reason to make further concessions. On the contrary, in light of the West 
German demands to change the arrangement, the French government made clear 
that along with the appointment of Hallstein, it also wanted to determine right 
then who would follow him in the post. That threatened to diminish Hallstein’s 
influence over the shaping of the common Commission further.
Thus, the test of strength over Hallstein continued. In the end, there was 
nothing left for Bonn to do but give in if it did not want to endanger the recent 
beginnings of an understanding regarding the political Community, which 
Fanfani had initiated with his invitation to a summit in Rome. As the date for the 
gathering approached, Brandt sought to have Couve de Murville agree to extend 
Hallstein’s term to 31 March 1968. The West German foreign minister made this 
request at a dinner on the occasion of the Franco-German foreign ministers con-
ference on 27 and 28 April, however; the meal ended with reconfirmation of the 
French positions on all essential points: The merger should take place on 1 July; 
Hallstein’s term should end on 31 December 1967; along with his appointment, 
decisions were to be made as to his successor and the future composition of the 
Commission. Couve conceded only that Hallstein could remain a member of the 
Commission, perhaps in the post of vice president.
This was a solution no longer acceptable to Hallstein. He had acceded to the 
shortening of his term as president of the common Commission to a half year 
under the condition that all the governments accepted it (and in the hope that at 
least the Dutch would call for a longer term). Given that his successor was now 
to be appointed right at the beginning, he no longer saw any sense in further 
engagement. Hallstein correctly viewed that having him continue in the office of 
vice president would weaken the political weight of the Commission. He wrote to 
the chancellor on 3 May requesting that he not be re-nominated. In explaining 
his request, he argued not only that the proposed term would not be sufficient 
to move him to offer his experience for integrating the three executives but also 
asserted that an agreement between the governments and the candidate on limit-
ing the term would endanger the independence of the Commission.88
With Hallstein concerning himself so much with damage control, it seemed 
all the clearer that Kiesinger was the loser in this test of strength. The chancel-
lor’s actions became the subject of much criticism not only in the West German 
press but also among the governments of the member states. In fact, however, 
de Gaulle’s victory was not nearly as great as it seemed: Firstly, it had taken him 
almost two years to get rid of Hallstein. Secondly, the general had to accept Jean 
Rey as the next president of the Commission; and Rey had an understanding of 
88 Hallstein to Kiesinger, 3 May 1966, BA, WH 1126.
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the office that was no less political than Hallstein’s; moreover, as leader of GATT 
negotiations, Rey had already gained great prestige. Mansholt, whom de Gaulle 
had also been targeting, remained vice president. It proved possible to replace 
only Marjolin, who was succeeded by the economics professor Raymond Barre. 
Thus, de Gaulle had not succeeded in completely changing the composition of 
the Commission, as he had initially demanded, nor had he been able to weaken 
it. For their part, Kiesinger and Brandt could say that they had opened a path for 
further development of the Community. From that perspective, Schröder’s block-
ade strategy was unrewarding over the long term.
With the implementation of the Merger Treaty on 1 July 1967, the number of 
Commission members grew temporarily from nine to fourteen. The Committee of 
the Permanent Representatives, which had not even been envisioned in the Trea-
ties of Rome, was now institutionalized. Luxembourg, having now lost the High 
Authority of the ECSC, was compensated with a group of new agencies, notably 
the European Investment Bank, the Office of Official Publications of the Euro-
pean Communities, and the Statistical Office. Beyond this, it was decided that the 
Council would hold its sessions in Luxembourg for three months per year. The 
country also remained the seat of the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties and of the Secretariat of the Parliamentary Assembly. Yet, to a more signifi-
cant extent than previously, the center of gravity of Community institutions now 
lay in Brussels. This was expressed symbolically with the completion of the new 
headquarters of the Commission, the Berlaymont Building, in late 1969. After all 
the moves from Luxembourg had taken place during the summer of 1968, there 
were now some five thousand officials of the various directorates of the Commis-
sion working in Brussels.89
The Return of the British Question
The option of further developing the Community seemed all the more attractive 
because in the meantime the question of the entry of Great Britain and the neigh-
boring EFTA states was once again on the agenda. In Britain, de Gaulle’s harsh 
rejection had initially given new impetus to the opponents of entry. The parlia-
mentary elections of October 1964 had been won by the Labour Party, which had 
earlier spoken out against Macmillan’s application for membership.  In Harold 
Wilson, Britain now had a prime minister from the left wing of the party, one who 
regarded EEC membership as incompatible with a socialist planned economy 
89 Yves Conrad, “Évolution de l’organisation administrative de la Commission et de la question 
du siège. Un long chemin vers la fusion des exécutifs (1960–1967),” in Varsori, Inside, pp. 79–94.
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and who sought an independent role for Britain in world politics, supported by a 
reformed Commonwealth.
The failure of an ambitious national economic plan along with an increas-
ing independence of mind among Commonwealth countries, especially the 
painfully-felt exodus of Rhodesia in November of 1965, gradually led Wilson to 
rethink matters, however. In January of 1966, he had a cabinet committee secretly 
examine the economic implications of British accession to the EEC; in August, he 
appointed George Brown as foreign secretary, who along with Roy Jenkins and 
Michael Stewart was among the few dedicated Labourite supporters of EEC mem-
bership. On 22 October, Wilson convinced an overwhelmingly-skeptical and to an 
extent even hostile cabinet to agree to “exploration” with the governments of the 
Six as to whether British entry was possible and, if so, under what conditions. 
On 10 November, he announced this intention in the House of Commons, with a 
statement that while lacking binding force did signal resolve: “I want this House 
to know that the Government are approaching discussions with the clear inten-
tion and determination to enter the EEC if essential British and Commonwealth 
interests are safeguarded.”90
In fact, Wilson was now more or less convinced that there was no longer any 
alternative to British membership. True, it would initially lead to a rise in food 
prices and thus household expenses; but ultimately new industrial growth would 
only be possible via free access to the Common Market and participation in its 
modernization programs. Wilson advocated a “new technological Community” 
to counter the American challenge and lay the foundations for a strong position 
for Europe in the world. It is possible that he also hoped this would usher in a 
leadership role for Britain in Europe and that the Continent could serve as a new 
basis for British greatness, in place of the declining Commonwealth; it was at 
least the case that Brown repeatedly expressed these sorts of sentiments.91 One 
way or another, Wilson had Europeanized his dreams of modernization. Given 
that this wholly corresponded with the evolution of French thinking, he saw real-
istic chances of winning de Gaulle’s support—after some defensive reactions—for 
expansion of the Community.
90 House of Commons Debates, 1966–67, 10 Nov. 1966, col. 1540. See Hugo Young, This Bless-
ed Plot. Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 181–198; Anne 
Deighton, “The Second British Application for Membership of the EEC,” in Loth (ed.), Crises, 
pp. 391–405; Oliver Daddow (ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Ap-
plication to Join the EEC, London: Institute of Contemporary British History, 2003; Helen Parr, 
Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role: British Policy towards the European Community, 1964–
1967, London: Routledge, 2005.
91 George Brown, In My Way. The Political Memoirs of Lord George-Brown, London: Gollancz, 
1971, pp. 209–211.
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As his subsequent course of action made clear, Wilson pinned his hopes 
above all on the Federal Republic. With the SPD’s entry into the government, he 
saw a strengthening of pro-British elements in Bonn. In the common interest of 
the Socialists, Foreign Minister Brandt was to put pressure on the French gov-
ernment: “Willy, you must get us in, so that we can take the lead,” said Brown 
to his counterpart at a meeting of the Socialist International on 5 January 1967 in 
Rome.92 During a visit to Paris on 25 and 26 January, Wilson and Brown were not 
exactly welcomed with open arms. Yet, De Gaulle did exhibit a certain satisfaction 
that Britain “now really wished to moor itself alongside the continent,” but then 
went on to emphasize the problems that would face the Community if the country 
were to join. He suggested his guests consider alternatives to membership: asso-
ciation with the Community or “something entirely new.”93 Brown responded by 
pressing Brandt to support full membership for Britain during meetings between 
France and the Federal Republic. In the Briton’s view, if everyone were to form a 
strong front against de Gaulle, the general would ultimately acquiesce
Brandt was little affected by the informal methods that Brown employed. As 
much as he favored British membership—for political reasons as well as in the 
interest of German exports—a break with France, which Brown was suggesting as 
an alternative, was something that he could not and would not risk. Kiesinger did 
not want to put any special emphasis at all on engagement for British entry. He 
had great doubts as to whether the British were actually prepared to participate 
in building a political Europe; at a summit meeting with de Gaulle on 13 January, 
he therefore raised for the first time the idea of a separation between an expanded 
economic Community and a closer political Community of the Six. During a 
visit by the two Britons to sound things out on 15 and 16 February, the chancel-
lor opposed the strong push by Wilson to put pressure on de Gaulle. The West 
German ambassador in London, Herbert Blankenhorn, who supported British 
entry, wrote in his diary: “The most negative thing was the extremely reserved 
coolness, even the almost fearful attitude of the government, which always kept 
an ear to the ground to determine if negative voices from Paris were becoming 
perceptible.”94
92 Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen, Zurich: Ullstein, 1989, p. 453.
93 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964–70: A Personal Record, London: Weidenfeld 
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Wilson did not allow the cool reception in Bonn to dissuade him from pushing 
for British accession. As Brown noted, “gradually, our line got firmer and firmer” 
during the tour, and “by the time we finished we had virtually decided to make 
our application.”95 Wilson reported to his cabinet that he had achieved much 
during his visits to the capitals of the Six. This gave many ministers the impres-
sion that it was now necessary to consider an attempt to join under acceptable 
conditions. On 2 May, Wilson informed the House of Commons that his govern-
ment wanted to submit a new application. After a large majority of all three major 
parties had agreed to the idea on 10 May, the application was filed in Brussels the 
next day. Applications from the Irish and Danish governments went in the same 
day. For Ireland, economic necessity provided the motive for joining the British 
initiative. For Denmark it was a long-awaited opportunity. Danish Prime Minister 
Jens Otto Krag—like Brandt a Social Democrat—had done everything in his power 
to support the British application. An application from Norway followed a little 
later, on 24 July. As in 1961, Prime Minister Per Borten had needed more time to 
rally reluctant forces in the governing coalition for the initiative.96
De Gaulle hastened to make known, publicly too, that he continued to oppose 
British accession. In a press conference on 16 May, he warned that such a develop-
ment would divert the Community, steering it into becoming an Atlantic-oriented 
free-trade zone. He offered the British the alternative of either being content with 
association or waiting “until this great people has itself completed the far-reach-
ing economic and political transformation it is seeking.”97 In contrast, the gov-
ernments of the Five wanted to make use of this new chance to expand the Com-
munity. In their view, this was all the more attractive because Wilson and Brown 
had given assurances that they were now willing to accept the regulations of the 
Common Market without modifications and had voiced their commitment to a 
political Europe at the same time. Unlike in 1961, the Commission now engaged 
itself by supporting the applications. On the other hand, the governments of the 
Five were also concerned to avoid another Community crisis like the one they had 
95 Brown, In My Way, p. 206.
96 Geary, Inconvenient Wait, pp. 95–114; Johnny Laursen, “Denmark, Scandinavia and the Sec-
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just experienced. The result of the conflicting impulses was a call for the Commis-
sion to produce a report on the applications, a move that was decided in a session 
of the Council of Ministers on 26 June. Until the report had been completed, it 
was the West Germans especially who were to work to dispel de Gaulle’s doubts.
Initially, however, Kiesinger did not try to convince de Gaulle of the serious-
ness of the British change. Himself filled with concerns about watering down the 
Community, the chancellor instead sought to delay the clearly unavoidable acces-
sion of Britain as long as possible, until the political Union had assumed concrete 
form. So he only made the case with the French president “to buy time with the 
process [now] begun.” Public opinion in the Federal Republic would not forgive 
de Gaulle for the shock of a second harsh rejection.98 When on 29 September the 
Brussels Commission, as expected, made the recommendation to begin negotia-
tions with the candidates for entry, Kiesinger proposed that first of all, the diffi-
culties cited in the report be examined more closely.99
De Gaulle was not at all willing to engage in that form of foot-dragging. As 
he explained to a close circle of his ministers on 16 October, the Community “has 
some things to do: Merger of the Communities, review of the financial order, and 
God knows what other problems we’ll have. As long as those issues haven’t been 
resolved, the Community can’t negotiate. It’ll take time for England to be capable 
of joining and until the Community is in a position for it. One can say that we’ll 
take another look at all that in 1970.”100 De Gaulle was aware that his refusal to 
begin negotiations on entry now would unleash another crisis in the Commu-
nity; he was confident however that this crisis would also be of a limited nature 
because all the partners had a vital interest in a functioning Community.
On 18 November, Wilson’s government responded to the demand to elimi-
nate its budget deficit by implementing a spectacular devaluation of the British 
pound by 13.4 percent. The general countered with another press conference on 
27 November in which he characterized the reorganization of the British economy 
as a mammoth task that would excessively burden the Community and lead to 
its breakup. More clearly than on 16 May, he rejected negotiations at that point 
as a rash determination to “destroy the European edifice.”101 The only thing he 
conceded to Kiesinger was a willingness to leave the applications on the agenda 
98 Conversation between Kiesinger and de Gaulle at the Franco-German summit of 13 July 1967, 
AAPD 1967, Doc. 263, pp. 1052–1062, here p. 1058.
99 Türk, Europapolitik, p. 118; cf. ibid., pp. 111–130; Ludlow, European Community, pp. 137–145.
100 Protocol of Conseil restraint, 16 Oct. 1967, quoted from Gerhard Wille, “‘Which Europe? 
Quelle Europe? Welches Europa?’ British, French and German Conceptions of Europe and Brit-
ain’s Second Attempt to Join the EEC,” in Rücker and Warlouzet (eds.), Quelle(s) Europe(s), 
pp. 225–237, here p. 235.
101 De Gaulle, Discours, vol. V, pp. 241–245.
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of the Council. In the session of that body on 18 and 19 December, the foreign 
ministers of the Five, having agreed among themselves beforehand, urged that 
entry negotiations be started. Couve opposed it, and given that no one called for 
a vote, the question remained open.
In the following months, the Five sought repeatedly to convince the clearly 
obstinate general to give in. First off, on 19 January 1968, the governments of the 
Benelux states called for the establishment of a consultative process between the 
Community and the applicants as well as agreement on common actions by inter-
ested states in areas that had not yet been taken up by the Community, such as 
arms production and technological development. Bonn agreed to this idea for 
a linking organization but proposed in place of cooperation among interested 
states (possibly without France) the creation of a trade policy preference zone 
including applicants with the prospect of entry. In late September, after de Gaulle 
had found himself in serious trouble due to the crisis of May 1968, Brandt pre-
sented an “action program” that expanded upon the concept of a trade arrange-
ment by adding the idea of a work group of member states and applicants, a body 
that would concern itself with issues of cooperation and entry. As soon as there 
was sufficient agreement within the work group, the foreign ministers of the Six 
and of the applicants would gather at a conference.
Kiesinger was especially unwilling to support the sort of pressure that the 
Benelux representatives and the Italian government had in mind. West German 
attempts to convince the French only led to growing frustration between the two 
states. De Gaulle stuck with his “no” to any proposal that implied a transition to 
entry negotiations. Michel Debré, serving as de Gaulle’s foreign minister since the 
government shakeup in the wake of the May crisis, responded to Brandt’s “action 
program” not only with a new warning about the profound transformations the 
Community would experience if it were expanded. In a conversation with journal-
ists, he also dramatized the situation by speaking of a “last chance” for Bonn to 
embrace the French viewpoint. Otherwise—so his threat went—there could well 
be a “freezing up of the Common Market.”102
The crisis resulting from the French refusal to negotiate on the British appli-
cation took on a more dramatic intensity when first the Dutch government and 
then the governments of Belgium and Italy refused to agree to further develop-
ment of the Community in various fields if the issue of British entry were not 
decided simultaneously. The Dutch boycotted an initiative to revive plans for a 
102 Von Braun to Auswärtiges Amt, 2 Oct. 1968, quoted from Germond, “Partenaires,” p. 624. Cf. 
ibid., pp. 607–638; Türk, Europapolitik, pp. 130–144, 163–175.
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Political Union that Kiesinger, acting on a final impulse from Adenauer,103 had 
made during the anniversary summit on 29 and 30 May 1967 in Rome. The Italians 
supported it in their package deal when the West German government sought to 
initiate the merger of the three Communities in the interest of a common energy 
policy. In early 1968, the two governments blocked the issuing of a report on tech-
nological cooperation with the stipulation that the Council of Ministers must first 
decide on incorporating the applicants into the negotiations. In a memorandum 
of 23 February 1968, the Italian government demanded that nothing be under-
taken in the realms of common policy on agricultural, trade, competitiveness, 
taxes, energy, or industry that would amount to increasing the difficulty of the 
entry of the four candidates.104
The West German government embraced the package deal of the Four by 
including in its “action program” of 27 September a list of measures for the 
internal development of the Community, which involved not only those proj-
ects already under discussion but also closer coordination of economic and cur-
rency policy; moreover, emphasis was placed on “evaluating [the proposals] as a 
whole.”105 This was not only an attempt to hold together the centrifugal forces in 
the Community but also signaled to the French government that the development 
of the Community, which Paris also desired in many regards, would ultimately be 
possible only if it finally agreed to expansion.
Given the failure of Bonn’s attempt at mediation, Belgian Foreign Minister 
Harmel forced the idea of acting without France: In a speech to the Organization 
of European Journalists on 3 October, he proposed examining the possibility of 
close cooperation with Britain in the realms of foreign policy, defense, technol-
ogy, and currency. This was to occur within the framework of the WEU, whose 
members were to commit themselves to regular consultations on these areas. If 
a member were not prepared to cooperate in one area or another, that would not 
be allowed “to function as permanent brake. If one always waited until all the 
travelers were ready to leave, no train would ever depart.”106
For his part, de Gaulle knew how to demolish this bridge being constructed 
to EEC membership for Britain. When at the next Council of Ministers meeting of 
the WEU on 21 October in Rome the representatives of the Benelux states made a 
103 Adenauer to Kiesinger, 22 March 1967, quoted in Kramer, “Europäisches oder atlantisches 
Europa,” pp. 224.
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motion to create a study group on the Harmel proposals, Debré’s state secretary, 
Jean de Lipkowski, vetoed it. Renewed negotiations on Harmel’s concept at the 
WEU Council meeting of 6 and 7 February 1969 resulted in “a terrible shambles 
once again,” as Brandt had predicted in a letter to Kiesinger.107 In order to force 
the establishment of regular foreign policy consultations, the British government, 
which happened to hold the WEU Council chairmanship at the time, invited the 
other states on short notice to a special session to discuss Middle East policy. 
While the governments of the Four and of the Federal Republic too accepted the 
invitation, France stayed away from this gathering, which was held on 14 Febru-
ary. Five days later, the French government announced that it would participate 
in WEU Council sessions only if the partners returned to the rule of unanimity in 
calling meetings.
Meanwhile, public pressure on the French government was increasing. 
Demonstratively, Jean Monnet brought not only Wilson into his Action Committee 
but also Edward Heath, who had led negotiations during the first British appli-
cation and who was now leader of the Conservative opposition in the House of 
Commons. Interest groups and parliaments called for accession negotiations to 
begin soon; Commission President Rey warned publicly of a crisis threatening 
the achievements of the Community. A European Parliamentary Congress met 
on 8 and 9 November 1968 in The Hague, demanding rapid development of the 
Community, including its expansion, as an answer to the crisis of political leader-
ship revealed by May 1968 and the Europeans’ shock over the suppression of the 
Prague Spring.108
France on the Way to Turning
Two things were decisive for the end of the crisis that had developed over the 
second British application for entry into the Community: Firstly, Wilson did not 
let de Gaulle’s negative stance dissuade him from further efforts. Not only did he 
forbid any discussion of the French refusal in his cabinet, he also intensified his 
commitment to the Economic Community in its current form and to the develop-
ment toward a political Community. The necessity of a stronger role for Europe 
in world affairs, supported by the ability to compete in technological terms with 
the US, became the centerpiece of his argumentation. He thereby reduced linger-
ing doubts among the Five as to Britain’s suitability for participation in Europe 
and strengthened their engagement for British accession. He developed lively 
107 Brandt to Kiesinger, 4 Feb. 1969, quoted in Türk, Europapolitik, p. 185.
108 Europa-Archiv 23 (1968), pp. D616ff. 
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exchanges with Joseph Luns and his Italian colleague Pietro Nenni, the two 
most engaged proponents of British entry among the Five. He simultaneously 
promoted a large number of bilateral projects between Britain and continental 
countries, efforts that promised to get the technological Community underway: 
for example, the Concorde, Airbus, and the construction of a gas centrifuge for 
uranium enrichment in partnership with the Federal Republic and the Nether-
lands.
Behind Wilson’s push for quickly gaining full membership was the convic-
tion that Britain’s weight within the Community would continually dwindle the 
longer entry was dragged out. A memorandum from the Foreign Office, received 
by the cabinet on 23 February 1968, expressed this clearly:
If we can join them while we still have a substantial lead in various aspects of modern life 
and industry we should be able to play a major part in shaping the future of Europe and of 
European relations with the United States. But we have to acknowledge that time is not on 
our side. Our position in the world league is steadily slipping. The EEC is enormously much 
more powerful than we are and even the individual countries of the Six, e.g. Germany and 
France, are in some respects stronger than we are. In some aspects of the race Japan has 
already passed us. We must therefore bend every effort to join the European Communities 
at the earliest possible moment.109
Efforts to gain a leading role in the Community did not diminish Wilson’s will-
ingness to accept everything in the way of supranational elements that the con-
tinental partners saw as necessary for effectively constructing the Community. 
In early 1969, he accepted the view of Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart that 
foreign policy and conventional defence would in the end need to be subordi-
nated to “some sort of majority vote.”110 In a joint declaration of the British and 
Italian governments on 28 April 1969, both committed themselves to support the 
direct election of the European Parliament as well as a common foreign policy 
that included a common “European identity,” along with further integration in 
areas such as currency cooperation, technological cooperation, the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy, and cultural cooperation.
Secondly, in light of the continuing refusal of the Four to allow development 
of the Community without British accession, there grew within the French govern-
109 Quoted in Melissa Pine, “Perseverance in the Face of Rejection: Towards British Member-
ship of the European Communities, November 1967 – June 1970,” in Franz Knipping and Matthias 
Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969–
1984, Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2004, pp. 287–305, here p. 302. Cf. too Melissa Pine, 
Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing Britain’s Membership of the European Community, London: 
I. B. Tauris, 2008, pp. 26–105.
110 Maitland to Palliser, 1 Feb. 1969, quoted from Pine, “Perseverance,” p. 295.
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ment the realization that entry was ultimately also in the French interest or, more 
exactly, that British membership and hence the giving up of French ambitions 
to lead the Community constituted the price that had to be paid for strengthen-
ing Europe vis-á-vis the US. It seems that Michel Debré had made this realization 
after Brandt linked development and expansion in his mediation proposal of 27 
September. In any event, the counterproposals that the Frenchman gave his West 
German colleague on 24 October revealed a certain willingness to compromise: 
Paris was now proposing a trade arrangement to which all interested European 
states would have access, not only the candidates for entry to the Community. 
Debré simultaneously declared that he was very interested in the resumption of 
negotiations on technological cooperation and offered to speak about such coop-
eration with non-member states as well. Moreover, at a meeting of the Council of 
Ministers on 4 and 5 November, he urged rapid measures to develop the Economic 
Community further.111
Debré’s willingness to change course was intensified after having expe-
rienced West German toughness during the currency crisis that struck France 
in November of 1968. The social unrest of the previous May and the economic 
problems that followed upon it had unleashed a capital flight from France to the 
Federal Republic; the French budget deficit grew rapidly, and the value of the 
franc fell. In order to prevent the economic weight of the Federal Republic from 
growing disproportionately, not only the French government but also the British 
and American governments demanded that the D-mark be allowed to appreci-
ate. For its part, Bonn was not prepared to engage in such an act of solidarity. 
Economy Minister Karl Schiller and Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauss agreed 
to only temporary import relief and export duties (at a level of four percent); 
investing in the Federal Republic and taking out loans in foreign countries were 
made subject to approval. At a hastily called currency conference from 20 to 22 
November in Bonn, the two held firm against the pressure from their partners. 
The discussion therefore shifted toward the idea of devaluing the franc by around 
ten percent. To the surprise of all, this did not occur. Due to fears of more social 
unrest and more inflation, de Gaulle opted to limit himself to foreign-exchange 
controls, budget cuts, and a hike in consumption taxes on 23 November.112
For Debré, who had spoken out in favour of devaluing the franc, the West 
German stance was the expression of a new self-confidence—one that without 
hesitation sought to transform the economic muscle of the Federal Republic into 
111 Türk, Europapolitik, p.  171; Ludlow, European Community, pp.  152ff.; Germond, “Parte-
naires,” pp. 625–628.
112 Schoenborn, Mésentente, pp. 129–138; Türk, Europapolitik, pp. 194–196; Germond, “Parte-
naires,” pp. 658–663.
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political strength. British accession therefore seemed to be not only a necessary 
prerequisite for the sought-after development of the Community but also was 
needed to take steps to prevent German dominance of the Community. Thus, 
Debré developed a plan to begin private bilateral talks with the British govern-
ment so as to determine the possibilities for an entry that would take French inter-
ests sufficiently into account. “I thought this over and shared my thoughts with 
the general,” as he described the genesis of the plan in his memoirs. “I had no 
doubt that France would be subject to extortion: either accept the entry of Great 
Britain or a settlement regarding the agricultural market would be denied.”113 In 
fact, the expiration of the transition period at the end of 1969 did offer the Four a 
new lever, and in the West German government a sentiment grew against oppos-
ing its use. Debré also summoned the French ambassadors in the partner states to 
a consultation. All but the ambassador in Rome confirmed to him that a change of 
course on the British question was advisable.114
It took several weeks for de Gaulle to become convinced of the necessity of an 
approach to Britain. He accepted it only after Richard Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
the founder of the Pan-European movement, who was still active, had showed 
him a way in which the goal of an independent Europe could perhaps still be 
maintained despite the now clearly unavoidable entry of Britain. Couden-
hove-Kalergi, a close associate of State Secretary Jean de Lipkowski, had a con-
versation with the general in which he advocated a new initiative for creating the 
Political Union, this time however in the form of a political Community of the four 
“big ones”: Britain, France, the Federal Republic, and Italy. If the British govern-
ment could be won over for that, thought de Gaulle, then the potential political 
damage of expanding the EEC could be contained.115
In the second week of January, de Gaulle therefore accepted the request of 
the new British ambassador, Christopher Soames, for a private conversation. 
As a Conservative politician, the son-in-law of Winston Churchill, and someone 
who was intimately familiar with the pro-European milieu on the Continent, 
Soames wanted to sound out the possibilities for a political understanding with 
the general; he did so at the behest of Wilson. In the conversation, which had to 
be delayed until 4 February due to the ambassador’s earlier indisposition, the 
president began by raising his well-known complaint that the accession of the 
113 Michel Debré, Mémoires, Vol. IV: Gouverner autrement 1962–1970, Paris: Éditions Albin Mi-
chel, 1993, p. 266.
114 Vaïsse, Grandeur, p. 607.
115 Coudenhove-Kalergi reported for the first time about this conversation in a letter to Franz-Jo-
sef Strauss of 13 Feb. 1969, that is, before the contents of the subsequent conversation between 
de Gaulle and the British ambassador became known. Cf. Schoenborn, Mésentente, pp. 239ff.
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four applicants would profoundly change the character of the EEC. He then called 
for the British government to express itself privately on the idea of a reformula-
tion of the European Community: “It would de facto be a matter of both govern-
ments giving their views as to what a European economic entente could be if the 
Common Market would disappear in the future to give way to a new regime.” On 
the relationship between economic and political integration, he observed: “There 
should be a large European economic association, but with a small inner council 
of a European political association consisting of France and Britain, Germany 
and Italy.” Regarding the political Community, he emphasized—here too latching 
onto well-known conceptions—that it must be independent of the US. This was 
to include nuclear cooperation between France and Britain, and would, as he 
underscored, render the current NATO structure obsolete.116
De Gaulle’s offer was substantiated in a conversation that de Lipkowski—who 
had immediately been informed by Soames of the content of his talk with the 
president—had on the same day on the fringes of the WEU Council of Ministers 
meeting in Luxembourg with the British Foreign Office State Secretary Lord Chal-
font. De Lipkowski explained that it was his conviction that de Gaulle was now 
willing to accept a trade arrangement “as a form of pre-entry,” albeit under the 
condition that the British government carry out serious negotiations with France, 
especially regarding the political structure of Europe and defense. He then empha-
sized that the time was ripe for nuclear cooperation between France and Britain 
and encouraged an exchange of technical knowledge as well as the formation of 
a mixed nuclear planning group. In conclusion, de Lipkowski stressed once again 
that the general was in the process of fundamentally rethinking his foreign policy 
and also hinted that he—de Lipkowski—had great influence over him. Four days 
later, Soames was invited to a have a conversation with Debré during which the 
request for a private exchange of ideas about the economic and political structure 
of Europe was repeated. The French foreign minister explained that de Gaulle 
wanted to speak directly with Wilson or at least with Foreign Secretary Stewart.117
Once again, de Gaulle was too cautious to be successful. He did not offer the 
British entry into the EEC or even negotiations on entry as a concession for the 
commitment to the independent Europe that he was seeking; he declared that he 
was only agreeable in principle to the “economic entente” that in his mind would 
replace the Common Market in the event the Community were expanded. Soames 
116 Neither an interpreter nor a minute-taker took part in the conversation before lunch with 
the two wives. There thus exist only the two differing sets of notes made afterward, a shorter set 
by de Gaulle and a much longer one by Soames. The first quote is taken from de Gaulle’s version, 
the second from Soames’ version. Cf. Schoenborn, Mésentente, pp. 236–238.
117 Ibid., pp. 240ff.; Pine, Harold Wilson, pp. 110ff., 113.
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however understood him as wanting the transformation of the EEC “into a looser 
form of free trade association with arrangements by each country to exchange 
agricultural produce”118 and that the British government was to take a position 
on this. For Stewart, this was anything but an attractive offer; as a result, he saw 
the invitation to private conversations as only a maneuver by which Britain was 
to be isolated from the Five. A 7 February analysis by the Foreign Office reinforced 
this impression in his mind: John Robinson and Patrick Hancock of the Integra-
tion Department wrote that the Five would not permit a reconstruction of Europe 
outside the Treaties of Rome and that talks on the issue would take many years. If 
the government were to negotiate privately on it, the British application for entry 
would be completely discredited. Instead, the analysts recommended informing 
the governments of the Five about de Gaulle’s initiative.119
Wilson followed this advice. At a long-planned state visit to Bonn on 12 Feb-
ruary, he told Kiesinger that de Gaulle was likely seeking “to achieve the disso-
lution of NATO as soon as possible,” to establish “a loose organization along the 
lines of a free trade zone” in place of the EEC, and to have “the political and eco-
nomic fate of Europe” determined “by a leadership group consisting of France, 
Germany, Italy, and Great Britain.” Wilson distanced himself from all that and 
thereby achieved a strengthening of West German support for British entry, which 
was embodied in a joint declaration. The governments of the other EEC members 
and of the US were informed in a similar manner. Soames had to tell the French 
that Britain regarded it as appropriate to inform the partners of de Gaulle’s pro-
posals and that “one rejects the French conceptions of the future of NATO and 
that it continued to be the wish of the British to join the Common Market.”120
If de Gaulle had up to this point achieved exactly the opposite of what he 
intended, the public revelation of his initiative led to an outright poisoning of 
Franco-British relations. After the Foreign Office had on 14 February informed the 
ambassadors in most Commonwealth nations as well as NATO and EFTA states 
about the course of events, there appeared on 18 February a lead article in the 
French business newspaper Les Échos in which it was claimed that de Gaulle 
wanted to replace the Common Market with a larger free-trade zone to be led by 
a quadruple “directorate.” Three days later, Le Figaro accused the British gov-
ernment of having spread a “sensational version misrepresenting Mr. Soames’ 
audience”; an official announcement from the French government declared that 
the president had said nothing new in his conversation with Soames. In order to 
118 Notes by Soames, ibid., p. 107.
119 Memorandum of 7 Feb. 1969, PRO FCO 30/416, quoted in Schoenborn, Mésentente, p. 242.
120 German protocol, 16 Feb. 1969, AAPD 1969 I, Doc. 56, pp. 186–193, quotes, p. 187; cf. Pine, 
Harold Wilson, pp. 112–118. 
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counter the accusations, the British government then released the complete notes 
by Soames. They appeared in The Times on 22 February, not without the comment 
that the text had been approved by the French. That was in turn immediately 
denied by the Quai d’Orsay.121
The “Soames Affair” had thus developed out of a misunderstanding of de 
Gaulle’s message by his British addressee: Paris and London were now accusing 
one another of having lied. It must in fact remain an open question as to how 
substantial the desire for change was that Debré described to Soames on 8 Feb-
ruary and to what extent the published version incorporated these desires for 
change. It is possible that it was merely a misunderstanding at this point too.122 
This did not however prevent de Gaulle from drawing the conclusion from the 
spreading of statements that distorted his intentions that Britain had purposely 
sought to torpedo the development of an independent Europe and that he had 
been poorly advised to approach the British. As he noted in his diary, “Perhaps it 
is indeed better that all uncertainty one may have had regarding the actual inten-
tions of the British has been eliminated in this way.” He told Kiesinger during the 
chancellor’s next visit to Paris, on 13 and 14 March, “It is not possible to work 
seriously with Great Britain.”123 When on 11 April Stewart sought to initiate a con-
versation with Debré once again, the French foreign minister reacted with indig-
nation: “You have regarded a serious offer as a maneuver and acted accordingly”; 
now, “the bonds are broken” and one must let time pass before dialogue can be 
resumed.”124 For the time being, he saw no more possibilities of convincing de 
Gaulle to approach Britain.
It was advantageous for de Gaulle’s disposition that Kiesinger during his visit 
seemed more “Gaullist” than ever regarding the general’s visions of the future. 
The chancellor assured the French president “that he himself had never seen 
Europe’s salvation in a European Commission” and that “the whole policy could 
only succeed when one day NATO had become superfluous.” He did not share 
de Gaulle’s doubts about expansion regarding Britain but did so in regard to the 
applications of Ireland, Denmark, and Norway as well as further possible appli-
cations from Sweden, Spain, and Portugal. In the following weeks, he did develop 
a plan for a closer Community that would also be political, one that would be 
surrounded by a larger Community integrated solely in terms of economics. At the 
conclusion of the meeting, de Gaulle was more relaxed than he almost ever was, 
121 Ibid., pp. 72ff.; Schoenborn, Mésentente, pp. 244–246.
122 Cf. Vaïsse, Grandeur, pp. 609.
123 Notes of 26 Feb. 1969, de Gaulle, Lettres, vol. 11, pp. 297ff.; meeting between de Gaulle and 
Kiesinger, 13 March 1969, AN, 5 AG 1–164.
124 French protocol of 11 April 1969, quoted in Schoenborn, Mésentente, p. 249.
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and he was full of praise for his German guest: “The reflections on the current 
situation by the chancellor and his far-reaching vision had affected him very 
deeply.”125
The French president intentionally ignored the fact that the British applica-
tion for entry was still on the agenda. After the failure of a referendum on the 
reform of the Senate and of the regions, de Gaulle resigned from office. From that 
point on, he only engaged in Europe policy in the world of visions, no longer in 
that of actual politics. In that realm, de Gaulle’s failed attempt to turn had only 
delayed the resolution of the British issue. After his departure from the political 
stage, it became more pressing than ever.
125 Meeting between de Gaulle and Kiesinger, 13 March 1969, AAPD 1969 I, Doc. 99, pp. 367–377, 
quotes, pp.  372ff.; file memorandum by Braun, 14 March 1969, quoted in Türk, Europapolitik, 
p. 202; cf. ibid., pp. 199–204, 209–212.
4  Expansion and New Perspectives, 1969–1975
Turning Point: The Summit in The Hague
For Georges Pompidou, who won the election of 15 June 1969 to the French pres-
idency by a large majority, the entry of Great Britain into the European Commu-
nities was a strategic necessity. Having served as prime minister (from 1962 to 
1968) and worked as a banker, he was more keenly aware than his mentor Charles 
de Gaulle that France needed the EEC for its economic modernization and that 
the Communities needed to be developed further. The harmonization of tax and 
currency policy, technological cooperation, the development of a common indus-
trial policy, and, lastly, the completion of the common industrial market—all this 
was necessary in his view if France were once again to compete successfully with 
dynamic industrial nations. After the European partners had rejected all initia-
tives to develop the Community as long as the accession of Great Britain and the 
other three applicants had not been approved and after definitive financing of 
the Common Agricultural Market had become uncertain with the expiration of 
the temporary settlement of 31 December 1969, Pompidou saw it as necessary 
to concede on the issue of entry. That the prospect of a French leadership role 
threatened to vanish with British entry concerned him less than it had his pre-
decessor. At the same time, Pompidou—an advocate of the free market—at base 
welcomed the prospect of expanding the Common Market.1
Along with strategic considerations, there were tactical necessities. In order 
to ensure that he would not lose the presidential election to the pro-European 
candidate of the bourgeois middle, Senate President Alain Poher, Pompidou 
allied himself with independent republicans around Valéry Giscard d’Estaing 
and a faction of the center around Jacques Duhamel. These forces made their 
support conditional on a course change on the issue of entry, and so as early as 
the campaign itself, Pompidou characterized Britain’s speedy accession as highly 
“desirable.”2 Giscard d’Estaing—who had shortly before joined Monnet’s Action 
Committee—was able to secure the Finance Ministry once again in the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas. The new foreign minister was 
Maurice Schumann, a representative of the Christian Democrats who had quit 
Pompidou’s government in May of 1962 in protest over de Gaulle’s attack on the 
“integrated Volapük” of unpatriotic EEC Europeans.
1 Cf. Claudia Hiepel, Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou: Deutsch-französische Europapolitik 
zwischen Aufbruch und Krise, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012, pp. 25–36.
2 Speech of 2 May 1969, Le Monde, 3 May 1969.
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In Pompidou’s first meeting with Willy Brandt, who had made efforts to enter 
into contact with him as soon as possible, the new president let it be known that 
he was serious about fulfilling his campaign promises. During Brandt’s visit on 
4 July 1969, Pompidou explained that de Gaulle’s offer to the British government 
had been misunderstood and also assured his guest that France did not have a 
“fundamentally hostile view” of the entry issue. He wanted only “that the Com-
munity reach its definitive stage” and that the Six come to agreement as to “how 
affairs should be handled.” As the forum for such an understanding, he proposed 
a new summit of the heads of state of and of government.3
However, Pompidou was also plagued by worries that Britain could destroy 
the Community from within. With an eye to Gaullist traditionalists, he also had to 
avoid giving the impression that he was making an abrupt volte-face on Europe 
policy. No one could guarantee that de Gaulle would continue the self-imposed 
silence he had maintained since his resignation. Hence Pompidou’s proposal for 
a summit—whose results were by no means assured in advance—and hence too 
his insistence on a clear sequence of items for negotiation: First, agreement on 
the completion of the Common Market and especially the definitive financing 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, then agreement on further integration mea-
sures that were in his view urgent. Only thereafter could accord be reached on a 
concept and roadmap for entry negotiations. When Maurice Schumann officially 
presented the summit proposal to the Council of Ministers in Brussels on 22 July, 
he summed it up in the three steps of “deepening” and “widening” and “comple-
tion.”4
The governments of the Netherlands and Italy insisted on binding commit-
ments regarding expansion before they would consent to the definitive financ-
ing of the Agricultural Market and further agreements regarding integration and 
cooperation. In early June, Joseph Luns proposed that a declaration of intent be 
made by the Six on the issue of expansion; after failing to gain approval for this, 
he wanted at least a concrete date for the beginning of entry negotiations. His 
Italian colleague Aldo Moro joined him in this call and also reminded his coun-
terparts that the transition to revenue under Community control was not to be 
3 Discussion of 4 July 1969, AN 5AG2, 1010; AAPD 1969, Doc. 221, pp. 774–480.
4 On this and the following, Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, “Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route 
de la relance de 1969,” in: Loth, Crises, pp. 539–565; idem., “Le sommet de la Haye. L’initiative 
française, ses finalités et ses limites,” in: Journal of European Integration History 9/2 (2003), 
pp.  83–99;  Claudia Hiepel, “In Search of the Greatest Common Denominator. Germany and 
the Hague Summit Conference 1969,” ibid., pp. 63–68; Ludlow, European Community, pp.174–
191; Andreas Wilkens, “In der ‘Logik der Geschichte.’ Willy Brandt und die europäische Zäsur 
1969/1970,” in: idem. (ed.), Wir sind auf dem richtigen Weg. Willy Brandt und die europäische 
Einigung, Bonn: Dietz, 2010, pp. 241–275; Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 44–63.
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had without increasing the responsibilities of the European Parliament. Belgian 
Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel urged everyone to remember that the summit 
must not weaken the existing institutions of the Community and therefore, in 
contrast to the way Pompidou had made it sound, such gatherings should not 
become a permanent establishment.
Willy Brandt once again sought to play the intermediary but during a meeting 
of the EEC Council of Ministers on 15 September could achieve nothing more than 
a resolution that a summit should take place, that it should be in The Hague in 
mid-November, and that it should focus on deepening, widening, and comple-
tion. It was explicitly stated that this summit was not to constitute a precedent 
for further meetings and that the president of the Commission should be invited, 
although only for the second day of negotiations. Exactly what was to be decided 
at The Hague regarding expansion was left open, however; it also remained highly 
doubtful as to whether it would be possible to reach agreement on a definitive 
settlement for the Agricultural Market by the end of the year. The West German 
government sought to contain overproduction, which had grown costly, while the 
Italian government once again insisted on a fundamental course correction to 
eliminate the structural disadvantages of a country that exported wine and fruit 
but was also highly dependent on grain imports.
First of all, the attitude of the Commission was helpful in this situation. 
Having been asked by the Council of Ministers to update the position it had taken 
on the applications in September of 1967, the Commission presented a report on 
1 October 1969 strongly recommending the opening of negotiations on entry but 
also more clearly than before noting the economic and monetary difficulties that 
would be associated with any expansion. Consequently, it called for agreement 
among the Six on a precise mandate for negotiations. Beyond this, the applicant 
countries should not only wholly accept the level of integration that had already 
been achieved but also declare themselves in agreement with the principle of 
strengthening the Community.5 Jean Rey personally explained these fundamen-
tals to the Council of Ministers once again on 17 October. This went a long way 
toward alleviating Pompidou’s worries about a weakening of the Community, and 
it also strengthened his position on the development of a common negotiating 
position.
At the same time, Pompidou understood that his declaration of intent regard-
ing expansion ought not to remain completely non-binding if he wanted to avoid 
calling into question the completion of the Common Market. As he explained to 
his staff on 21 October: “If we persist in our systematic rejection, it would amount 
5 Europa-Archiv 24 (1969), pp. D508–526.
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to a kind of death for the Common Market.”6 He thus set aside his call for deep-
ening the Community as a prerequisite for the opening of entry negotiations and 
sought to make his partners understand that the rejection of a date for the begin-
ning of talks was only meant to ensure that there would actually be a common 
negotiating position. “We are condemned to success,” as he said to the newly 
named coordinator for Franco-German relations, Carlo Schmid, when the official 
was making his initial visit on 9 November. “The German government urgently 
desires that the possibility emerge for the beginning of negotiations with Great 
Britain. First of all, let me say that we won’t put any roadblocks in the way. If we 
get what we want, we won’t cause any new difficulties. You can tell the chancel-
lor: ‘We’ll be open and cooperative, but we want the completion of the Common 
Market and the financial settlement.’”7
The person to whom this assurance was directed was first of all Willy Brandt, 
who had been elected chancellor of the social-liberal coalition on 21 October and 
who was now making the success of the summit in The Hague his chief concern. 
With the establishment of the office of a Parliamentary State Secretary for Euro-
pean Affairs and the appointment of the European federalist Katharina Focke 
to the office, he signaled that he would be playing a more active role in Euro-
pean politics in the future.8 Very soon after the decision for the formation of 
the Brandt-Scheel cabinet, Pompidou sent word that he was interested in a direct 
private exchange regarding the preparations for the summit. Two days after this 
initiative to Brandt, Maurice Schumann confirmed French assurances on expan-
sion during a conversation with his new West German colleague Walter Scheel. 
Moreover, he announced that France would be prepared to cut back on agricul-
tural overproduction.9
Pompidou’s concessions and assurances led to the emergence of a mutual 
understanding at the next preparatory meeting of the foreign ministers (on 10 
November) that the completion of the Common Market should be decided at 
the summit. Changes would be possible during accession talks, but only if all 
members were in accord.10 Brandt and Scheel strengthened this tentative deci-
sion by committing their government to accepting mere declarations of intent on 
expansion and agricultural reform in return for agreement on definitive agricul-
6 AN 5AG2, 52.
7 AN 5AG2, 104.
8 Cf. Wilfried Loth, “Abschied vom Nationalstaat? Willy Brandt und die europäische Eini-
gung,” in: Bernd Rother (ed.), Willy Brandt. Neue Fragen, neue Erkenntnisse, Bonn: Dietz, 2011, 
pp. 114–134.
9 AAPD 1969 II, pp. 1103–1106 and 1237–1246.
10 AAPD 1969 II, pp. 1258–1260.
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tural financing. Moro, who had originally wanted the decision on agricultural 
financing to be reached only after the conclusion of accession talks, had great 
difficulties gaining acceptance from the Italian government for this reversal of 
order and had to request that the summit be postponed until 1 and 2 December. 
By the original date for the meeting (17 and 18 November), the Italian government 
had been brought into alignment with the West German position.11
In order to be very sure that unity on that position would be reached at the 
summit, Brandt had the member governments informed of Bonn’s negotiation 
position by diplomatic means. He spoke once again with Luns on 25 November, 
and two days later, he wrote a first private letter to Pompidou, in which he pointed 
out the urgency of agreement on the beginning of entry talks and the necessity of 
reforming agricultural policy. He also signaled that his government was prepared 
to accept the establishment of a European Reserve Fund that was to protect the 
Common Market from destabilization due to currency turbulence; here, Brandt 
was taking up a proposal from Jean Monnet.12 A clear listing of what Bonn 
thought essential, along with an additional concession on the issue of deepening 
the Community, was intended to help elicit from Pompidou the most concrete 
commitments possible on the issues of expansion and agricultural reform.
Altogether, Brandt had thus answered the request for confidence that was 
embedded in Pompidou’s initiatives and had also forced the resulting negotiating 
position on the smaller partners because it promised the only escape from the 
continuing crisis of the Community. At the beginning of talks in The Hague—after 
Pompidou had touched on the issue of expansion only in very general terms and 
with pointed reluctance—Brandt increased the pressure on his French partner: 
He called attention to the fact that the Bundestag would not ratify the system of 
agricultural financing unless assurances regarding expansion and agricultural 
reform were fulfilled. Moreover, he openly addressed the unease over the increas-
ing economic strength of the Federal Republic, which actually caused Pompidou 
himself much less concern than it did many of his compatriots; Brandt suggested 
that this issue constituted an additional argument for expansion.13 That sufficed 
to elicit from Pompidou a commitment to having talks on expansion begin “over 
the course of the next year,” which he announced at a dinner on the first day 
11 Cf. Maria Eleonora Guasconi, “Italy and the Hague Conference of December 1969,” in: Jour-
nal of European Integration History 9/2 (2003), pp. 101–116, here p. 109.
12 Hiepel, “In Search,” p.  67; on the role of Jean Monnet, also Gérard Bossuat, “Drei Wege 
nach dem Gipfel von Den Haag. Monnet, Brandt, Pompidou und das Europa der 70er Jahre,” in: 
Wilkens (ed.), Interessen verbinden, pp. 353–386.
13 Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, No. 146, 2 Dec. 1969, 
pp.  1241–1243; on the course of the summit in The Hague, especially Bitsch, “Le Sommet,” 
pp. 558–62, und Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 63–72.
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of the conference. Given the need to take the views of traditional Gaullists into 
account, this was not to be made public, however. So, on the beginning of the 
second day of negotiations, the partners contented themselves with a statement 
from Brandt that they gave credence to Pompidou’s declaration on the desirability 
of entry negotiations and to his notion of the time necessary for their preparation. 
The Dutch prime minister, as host of the meeting, was given authority to state in a 
closing declaration that all governments were of the opinion that preparations for 
entry negotiations could be completed “during the first half of 1970”; Schumann 
confirmed this once again on behalf of the French government.
Brandt thereby became the actual father of the summit’s success. In light of 
the now-binding assurance from Pompidou, the partners agreed that the transi-
tion to definitive financing of the Common Agricultural Policy could be completed 
on 1 January 1970, and as part of this, that the financial contributions of member 
states be incrementally replaced by revenue under the Community’s own control, 
as the Commission had proposed. In regard to the expansion process, Pompi-
dou likewise obtained satisfaction: In the closing communiqué, it was stipulated 
that the candidates had to accept the Community’s entire acquis communautaire 
and that negotiations would proceed on the basis of a position previously agreed 
upon by the Six. It would be possible to make adjustments to the agricultural reg-
ulations in the course of entry negotiations but only with the concurrence of all 
member governments and in such a way that the fundamentals of the regulations 
were not distorted.14
After this breakthrough on the issue of expansion, it was possible to begin 
moving on numerous deepening projects as well, ones that had previously been 
blocked by the smaller partners in the face of France’s veto. Especially notable was 
that the heads of state and of government drafted a resolution to develop “during 
the year 1970 an incremental plan for the establishment of an economic and cur-
rency union.” This was to include a “review” of Brandt’s proposal for a European 
Reserve Fund; the West German foreign minister was also able to include in the 
communiqué a call for “the development of cooperation in currency issues that 
[should] be based on the harmonization of economic policy.” Further declara-
tions of intent covered the development of Community programs to foster indus-
trial research and development, the revival of the Euratom research program, a 
reform of the Social Fund “within the framework of a far-reaching coordination 
of social policy,” and the creation of a “European university.” The West German 
desire for agricultural reform was essentially taken into account, if only with the 
general call for the Council “to continue its efforts toward better mastery of the 
14 Europa-Archiv 25 (1970), pp. D42–D44.
176   Expansion and New Perspectives, 1969–1975
market by means of an agricultural production policy that permits a containment 
of the budgetary burden.”
Conversely, little was achieved on the goal of a Political Union. During his 
last months as chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger had intended to make use of the 
perceptible flexibility of the new French president in order to achieve progress 
in this area. For Pompidou, however, the development of common foreign and 
security policy was not a short-term goal at all—firstly, because he was convinced 
that economic stabilization and development of the Community took precedence 
and, secondly, because he saw with complete realism that the smaller partners 
would be the most difficult to win over for the Political Union.15 Therefore, 
Brandt’s requisite appeal to work toward the creation of a Europe that would play 
an autonomous role in international politics led merely to a vague assignment for 
the foreign ministers to examine by the end of July 1970 “how, from the perspec-
tive of expansion, progress in the area of political unity could best be achieved.”
The summit in The Hague also brought little progress in regard to strengthen-
ing European institutions, as the Commission was especially urging.16 The Five 
did win the concession from Pompidou that with the transition to revenue under 
Community control, “the budgetary authority of the European Parliament was to 
be strengthened” as well. It remained unclear however what exactly that meant; 
and not a single word of the communiqué was devoted to the idea of simultane-
ously strengthening the position of the Commission. The issue of transitioning to 
direct election of the European Parliament was likewise deferred. The concluding 
communiqué was also silent on correcting the practice—in accordance with the 
Luxembourg “compromise”—of seeking consensus in the Council of Ministers for 
cases in which the EEC Treaty had provided for majority voting. Disappointment 
was evident among the various spokesmen of the European movement, who in 
the immediate run-up to the summit had once again sought a strong mobilization 
of public opinion.17
Yet, it was generally acknowledged that the heads of state and of govern-
ment had succeeded at The Hague in helping the European project achieve a new 
dynamic. The mutual blockade in questions of expansion and deepening had 
15 Cf. his argumentation in a conversation with Kiesinger, 8 Sept. 1969, AAPD 1969 II, pp. 962–
973, here pp. 964ff.; Türk, Europapolitik, pp. 209–222.
16 Cf. along with the position paper of 1 Oct. 1969 also a comprehensive aide-mémoire of 19 
Nov. 1969, Europa-Archiv 25 (1970), pp. D.32–D34.
17 Bitsch, “Le sommet,” pp. 552–556 and 562–564; on the discussion in the press, also Jan-Hen-
rik Meyer, “Transnational Communication in the European Public Sphere. The Summit of the 
Hague 1969,” in: Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen (eds.), The History of 
the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72, New York and London: 
Routledge, 2009, pp. 110–128.
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been overcome, and the way was now clear for an expeditious pursuit of both. 
It was clear to all that there would be collisions among the divergent interests 
that remained and that there would be tough struggles over them. In the final 
instance, however, doubts as to the partners’ desire for full implementation of the 
Treaties of Rome and for further pursuit of the European project had vanished. A 
“spirit of The Hague” was palpable at the ministers meeting held in connection 
with the summit—a new willingness to take the partners’ wishes seriously and 
to work constructively together.18 Not least of all, the mutual experience of not 
having been deceived served to provide the foundation for a trusting relationship 
between Brandt and Pompidou, which—although it admittedly remained far from 
a personal friendship—could be used to lead the Community in shaping the new 
breakthrough.
The Completion of the Common Market
It did prove difficult however to implement the decisions made at The Hague 
regarding the completion of the Common Market. On the one hand, the finan-
cial interests of France and the Netherlands in maintaining the existing agricul-
tural subsidies and the interests of the Federal Republic and Italy on the other in 
reducing the resulting burdens were too different to allow quick unanimity on 
the modalities of the transition to financing the entire agricultural policy from 
revenue under Community control. Also, French concessions were too vague on 
increasing the rights of the European Parliament, an issue that was linked to the 
revenue transition; still more vague were the concessions regarding reform of 
agricultural policy. As a precaution, the heads of state and of government there-
fore made the decision on the fringes of the summit to “stop” the clocks on 31 
December once again if no unity had been achieved on the details of agricultural 
financing. The stipulations of the treaty regarding completion of the Common 
Market would at least become valid thereafter.
In fact, however, the foreign, finance, and agricultural ministers of the Six suc-
ceeded in gaining a fundamental agreement on the financing of common agricul-
tural policy within the specified timeframe; it had required marathon negotiations 
beginning on 15 December and, after a break from the 16th to the 19th, ending in the 
early morning hours of 22 December. This agreement envisioned that for the year 
1970, agricultural expenses would once again be financed from contributions from 
member states as before, though with a slightly altered apportionment. From 1971 
18 That was the impression of the German delegation at the Council meeting of 5 to 7 Feb. 1970, 
quoted in Hiepel, “In Search,” p. 80.
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onward, levies on agricultural imports whose prices lay below Community price 
levels would flow to the Community budget; from 1971 to 1974, tariff income from 
the borders of the Community would do so incrementally as well. Whatever financ-
ing that would be needed above those levels during this “interim phase” would con-
tinue to come from member state contributions. In 1975, such contributions would 
be eliminated completely. Given that in the medium term it was to be expected that 
revenue from levies and tariffs would sink (due to sought-after reliance on domestic 
supply and further tariff reductions under the auspices of the GATT negotiations), 
it was also decided that a maximum of one percent of the income from value-added 
taxes would be directed to the Community; beyond this, it was agreed that the level 
of value-added taxes be harmonized at eleven percent. Up to the end of 1977, there 
would also be a “corrective” included that would ease Italy’s transition from depen-
dence on disproportionately-high levels of revenue from levies and also facilitate 
the transition of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic from dependence on 
disproportionately-high revenues from tariffs.
Regarding the budget process to be implemented with the complete transi-
tion to revenue under Community control, a draft decision from the Commission 
was adopted specifying that the Council of Ministers would initially decide on 
the budget draft of the Commission via qualified majority. Parliament was to be 
able to make changes in the Council’s decision by means of a simple majority. 
For cases in which such changes were not acceptable to the Council or were mod-
ified by it, Parliament would have a second reading and then decide by a three-
fifths vote whether and to what extent the Council’s changes were to be taken 
into account.19 Hence, the Commission’s influence over shaping the budget was 
not to be increased to the extent envisioned in Hallstein’s Commission proposal 
of March 1965. On the other hand, the status of Parliament was enhanced even 
further than in the 1965 proposal: It was now actually to have the final word on 
shaping the budget.
Maurice Schumann agreed to this strengthening of Parliament only with the 
stipulation that there once again be separate talks on the “modalities by which 
the European Parliament should determine the level of revenues.”20 And when 
the Brussels decisions were being discussed in Paris on 14 January 1970, Michel 
Debré, now defense minister, voiced opposition to the idea of Parliament’s having 
19 Draft of 11 Dec. 1969, COM (69) 1020 final 2; “Kommuniqué über den zweiten Teil der 95. 
Ratstagung 19.–22.12.1969,” in: Europa-Archiv 25 (1970), pp. D.50–D52; on the production of the 
Commission draft, Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, “Delegation as a Political Process. The Case of the 
Inter-Institutional Debate over the Budget Treaty,” in: Kaiser, Leucht, and Rasmussen (eds.), His-
tory, pp. 167–188, here p. 177–181; on the negotiations, Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 73–85.
20 “Kommuniqué,”  p. D52.
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the authority to increase expenditures.21 Pompidou concurred, clearly with the 
conviction that he could not win a struggle with the guardians of Gaullist tradi-
tion on the issue at that time. He presumably also feared irresponsible actions by 
members of the European Parliament, like those he had witnessed in the Fourth 
Republic. In any event, he claimed in conversation with Brandt on 31 January that 
the prospect of a legislature’s possessing power to initiate expenditures filled him 
“with horror.”22 This meant that the agreement of 22 December was fundamen-
tally called into question once again.
Brandt showed understanding for Pompidou’s concerns. In answering the 
French president, he had to confess that this discussion was “not to his taste” 
because it was “an issue that would become current no sooner than 1975, and 
before that, we have to implement the actual program of The Hague.”23 When in 
doubt, he regarded the expansion and construction of the Communities as more 
important than the strengthening of parliamentary rights. He did not want this 
obviously-continuing difference of opinion on a question of secondary impor-
tance to put at risk the great achievements of the summit in The Hague.
Brandt’s retreat on the question of parliamentary rights led, after long nego-
tiations, to a compromise that amounted to a defeat for Parliament and the Com-
mission. In the early morning hours of 7 February 1970, the foreign ministers of 
the Six reached agreement on a settlement that, while it did leave the principle 
of Parliament’s responsibility for the budget untouched, gave the decision on 
actual expenditures in large measure to the national governments: The right of 
Parliament to have the final say on changes made by the Council would now only 
be in effect for expenditures that did not “arise perforce from the Treaty or legal 
acts passed on the basis of the Treaty.” For all other expenditures—and with the 
agricultural market, this was by far the overwhelming portion of the budget, 
amounting to some 96.5 percent at the time—proposals for changes would require 
approval by a qualified majority of the Council. Additionally, the Council of Min-
isters established narrow boundaries on Parliament’s right of initiative regarding 
non-obligatory expenditures: Potential increases were not to exceed an upper 
limit calculated from the development of the gross national product, the budget 
plans, and the cost of living—unless the Council agreed to an increase over and 
above that, likewise with a qualified-majority vote.24
Talks took a bit longer on the introduction of a market for tobacco and 
wine, which Italy had made a precondition for agreeing to the entire definitive 
21 Gerbet, Construction, p. 259.
22 AN 5AG2, 104, quoted from Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, p. 81.
23 Ibid., p. 105.
24 Article 203 of the EEC Treaty, version of 22 April 1970.
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arrangement on agricultural financing. France feared competition from inexpen-
sive Italian table wine; West German vintners foresaw that the potential profits 
from their less sun-blessed products would vanish. The result was a wine market 
that on the one hand was characterized by high guaranteed prices but that also 
allowed for the possibility of improving West German wines with added sugar. 
Foreign Minister Scheel observed sarcastically to the leaders of his party that he 
had made certain that wines he himself would not want to drink could still be 
produced in Germany.25 After agreement was in principle reached during the 
third week of April, the whole system for completing the Agricultural Market was 
passed on the 22nd of the month.
There was little left of the fundamental reform of agriculture about which 
Brandt had reminded his interlocutors at the summit in The Hague. The West 
German and Italian demand for determining a general upper limit on agricultural 
expenditures ran headlong into stiff opposition from the French, as did the Dutch 
proposal for a multiyear financial preview. The only decision actually made was 
to retain a ceiling on the structural funds for agriculture. The plan for restructur-
ing European agriculture that had been proposed by Agriculture Commissioner 
Mansholt in December of 1968 was thereby essentially blocked. Linking up with 
Mansholt’s earlier reform conceptions, this plan had foreseen investment assis-
tance in place of further increases in price guarantees. It also included removing 
agricultural land from cultivation (in the range of five million out of a total of 
seventy million hectares), reducing dairy herds, as well as providing subsidies 
for agriculturalists chossing to retire early or change their profession. In this way, 
costly as well as economically-nonsensical agricultural overproduction, which 
moreover hampered the development of agricultural countries, was to be curbed. 
By means of the reorientation from price supports to structural assistance, the 
number of people employed in the agricultural sector was to drop within a decade 
from approximately ten to five million and the total amount of subsidies was to 
drop from two billion to 750 million units of account.26
Mansholt’s ambitious reform plan met with loud opposition from small and 
part-time farmers, who were faced with the prospect of losing future subsidies in 
the form of price guarantees. Agricultural interest groups carried out polemical 
25 Reported in Patel, Europäisierung, p. 424.
26 On this and the following, van der Harst, “Common agricultural policy,” pp. 333–336; Guido 
Thiemeyer, “The Mansholt Plan, the Definite Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy and 
the Enlargement of the Community, 1969–1973,” in: Jan van der Harst (ed.), Beyond the Customs 
Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975, 
Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 2007, pp.  197–222; Patel, Europäisierung, pp.  427–452; Katja Seidel, 
“Taking Farmers off Welfare. The EEC Commission’s Memorandum ‘Agriculture 1980’ of 1968,” 
in: Journal of European Integration History 16/2 (2010), pp. 83–101.
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campaigns against what was alleged to be a looming forced collectivization along 
Soviet lines. The governments did acknowledge the need for reform in principle 
but shrank back from decisive measures in the face of the protests. Under these 
circumstances, the West German and Italian interest in containing agricultural 
expenditures led to the elimination of the financial basis of the reform to a sig-
nificant extent. The Commission reacted with a more modest concretization of 
its draft: In a package of guidelines and regulations for implementing the plan 
presented on 29 April 1970, price decreases were no longer included; the criteria 
for “viable enterprises,” which would be the only ones to receive structural assis-
tance going forward, were also more loosely formulated.
Wearisome negotiations on this “Mini-Mansholt Plan” led to a modest 
success: On 14 March 1971, the Council of Ministers passed guidelines for invest-
ment assistance as well as regulations for early retirement and retraining, along 
with advising affected farmers. The financial resources already available to 
implement these measures were not increased, however. The criteria for enter-
prises worthy of support were formulated extremely vaguely and left much lati-
tude to the member states. Proposed guidelines for taking agricultural land out of 
production and premiums for slaughtering animals were completely rejected. The 
growing mountains of butter, pyramids of sugar, and oceans of wine could not be 
dealt with by such half measures.
After the Council of Ministers had increased the rights of the European Parlia-
ment by the smallest of doses and after the heads of state and of government had 
taken on ambitious projects going beyond the Treaties of Rome, the Commission 
saw the danger of its position within the structure of the Community being weak-
ened. Jean Rey and his successor Franco Maria Malfatti both sought to counter 
this development by positioning themselves as programmatic pace-setters and 
by claiming the Commission’s right as a full participant in the new areas of activ-
ity. Rey’s term ended after the Merger Treaty on 1 July 1970. The fourteen-mem-
ber transition Commission was replaced by one that once again totaled nine and 
whose head, according to the principle of rotation, was now an Italian. Mansholt 
remained in office, whereas Rey had to leave the Commission altogether due to 
the Belgian government’s preference for his colleague Alfred Coppé, who had 
come from the ECSC. Malfatti, a close confidant of Foreign Minister Aldo Moro 
and at age forty-three probably the most brilliant up-and-coming politician to 
emerge from Democrazia Cristiana, was surrounded by additional political heavy-
weights: The liberal intellectual Ralf Dahrendorf, who had significantly contrib-
uted to giving the FDP a new left-liberal profile, replaced Hans von der Groeben. 
The second Italian representative was the European federalist Altiero Spinelli, 
who after many years of fruitless efforts to persuade the citizens of the Commu-
nity to support the summoning of a constituent assembly now hoped the leading 
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role on the Commission. General Secretary Émile Noël, who had worked closely 
with Hallstein and Rey, was able to expand his influence; he would provide con-
tinuity in the leadership of the Commission until 1987.
The efforts of Rey and Malfatti to serve as pace-setters for the Commission 
ran into continued opposition from France, however. Rey was thus unable to gain 
for the Commission the leadership role in negotiations on expansion this time 
either. The Council president serving at the time became the negotiation leader; 
the Commission had to content itself with issuing position statements and devel-
oping proposals for solutions at the request of the Council. Malfatti fought in vain 
for unrestricted participation by the Commission in nascent European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). In actuality, it would only be allowed to participate if and 
insofar as issues within the Communities’ area of responsibility were being dis-
cussed. Proposals for a more efficient and more democratic form of decision-mak-
ing for the Communities, presented by the Commission at the urging of Noël in 
May of 1972, were not taken up by the heads of state and of government.
Nevertheless, the Commission succeeded in promoting to a great degree the 
convergence of differing positions and the development of a common political 
line; it achieved this by means of task-oriented work and intensive exchanges 
with the governments. This was the case not only regarding the negotiations on 
expansion, in which it successfully defended the acquis communautaire, but also 
in the talks on a currency union and the joint preparation for the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). When protectionist tendencies began 
to be noticeable in American politics during the winter of 1970–71, Malfatti con-
vinced the governments of the Six to bind themselves to a common position that 
served to counteract a deepening of the differences and also established in Wash-
ington a high-ranking diplomatic representative of the Commission.27
These successes by the Commission were somewhat overshadowed by the 
fact that after the conclusion of entry negotiations with Great Britain, Ireland, 
Denmark, and Norway in January of 1972, Malfatti chose to resign from the post 
of Commission president in order resume his national political career, participat-
ing in early elections to the Italian parliament. His successor was long-term Vice 
President Sicco Mansholt, who took office on 22 March 1972. After de Gaulle had 
sought in vain to be rid of this man during the crisis of the “empty chair,” it was 
none other than Pompidou who advocated Mansolt’s appointment now: Clearly, 
Paris was of the opinion that in the few months before the creation of a new Com-
27 Yves Conrad, “Jean Rey, moderate optimist and instinctive European,” in: The European 
Commission 1958–72, pp. 109–123; Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, “The development of the Single Com-
mission (1967–72),” ibid., pp. 125–151; Antonio Varsori, “Franco Maria Malfatti: a presidency cut 
short,” ibid., pp. 153–163.
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mission—with the participation of the new member states—Mansholt would offer 
no new challenges for French policy and thereafter would no longer be able to 
serve due to his age. In fact, Mansholt used the office of president to put his new 
issue on the agenda of international politics: the proclamation of sustainability 
and environmental protection, with which he had been engaged as a member of 
the Club of Rome. In the Commission itself, however, he was not able to prevail; 
it was especially Economic Commissioner Raymond Barre who emphasized the 
need for further economic growth over against Mansholt’s views.28
At the summit of the heads of state and of government in Paris on 19 and 20 
October 1972, Mansholt called for the “next step”: Formation of a genuine Euro-
pean government that would be responsible to a directly-elected Parliament. 
Over and above the extension of social- and economic-policy cooperation, he 
encouraged the removal of border controls, the granting of European citizenship 
rights, and cooperation in the realm of education.29 That was more than could 
be obtained given the governments’ then-current areas of interest. Yet, by his 
actions at the Paris summit, Mansholt was able to ensure that the agenda of the 
breakthrough reached in The Hague was fleshed out and expanded.
That was all the more important given that his successor, François-Xavier 
Ortoli, demonstrated little ambition to force the institutional extension of the 
Community. As someone who had personally worked with Pompidou for a long 
time and who had served as minister of economic development in the cabinets of 
Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Pierre Messmer, he was primarily concerned with 
the success of the project for a currency union. Spinelli sought unsuccessfully to 
be responsible for institutional issues in the new Commission. His proposal to 
support the call for a European government by appealing for a process to create 
a constitution was rejected as inappropriate by Ortoli, who was, according to his 
own admission, “no theologian of Europe.”30
The First Enlargement
During the preparations for entry negotiations, the well-known antagonisms 
manifested themselves again: On the one hand, there were French worries over 
a softening of the acquis communautaire that had so recently been won with so 
much effort; on the other hand, the Five feared that if the Community took too 
28 Jan van der Harst, “Sicco Mansholt: courage and conviction,” ibid., pp. 165–180.
29 Bitsch, “Single Commission,” pp. 149f.
30 Altiero Spinelli, Diario europeo 1970–1976, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991, p. 490; Ortoli in a con-
versation with Brandt, 29 March 1973, AAPD 1973 I, p. 448.
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rigid a stance, then failure would be preprogrammed into negotiations. Pompi-
dou’s conviction regarding the inevitability of British entry was as great as his 
mistrust of actual British motives, along with the ulterior motives of his partners. 
Also, he consciously wanted to seem “hard” so as to avoid giving the impression 
of having made an abrupt course change away from the stance of his predecessor. 
Thus, he insisted that the British be required to adopt all the principles of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, even if this would mean great financial burdens for 
the country given the high percentage of food it imported. For him, the willing-
ness of the British to accept those burdens was more or less a litmus test to deter-
mine the seriousness of their desire to enter.31
With commensurate tenacity, Pompidou largely succeeded in pushing through 
the French positions when the mandate for negotiations was being determined at 
a Council session on 8 and 9 June 1970. It was thus decided that candidates for 
entry were fundamentally to accept the preference of the Community, uniformity 
of prices, and solidarity in financing the agricultural market. Their problems in 
adjusting were to be addressed solely by exceptional regulations during a tran-
sition period, and this was to be kept as brief as possible. The leadership role in 
negotiations was to be given to the Council, and that meant in practice that the 
fundamental conflicts of interest between the French and British governments 
would need to be worked out in those negotiations. The Commission was given 
the task of supporting the French government in operative detail and at the same 
time watching that British opportunities would not be overplayed.
For the British government, all this amounted to a poor starting place. Harold 
Wilson had initially hoped to be able to have a say in the definitive determina-
tion of the Common Agricultural Market. After those hopes had been dashed, 
there was nothing left to do but accept the principles of the Common Agricultural 
Policy and then, pointing out the unreasonableness of the looming burdens when 
applied to Britain, negotiate for the longest possible transition period. While the 
foreign ministers in Brussels were setting the negotiation position of the Six, the 
British Official Committee on the Approach to Europe determined to call for a tran-
sition period of five or six years and then a further period of seven years during 
which the increase in the British burden would not be allowed to rise above a pre-
determined percentage. After these twelve or thirteen years, the entire system of 
31 Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp.  118ff.; on the negotiations with Great Britain, ibid., 
pp.  159–177 as well as the report of the British delegation leader Con O’Neill, Britain’s Entry 
into the European Community, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 99–167, and Michael J. Geary, “En-
largement and the European Commission: An Assessment of the British and Irish Applications 
for Membership in the EEC, 1958–73,” Diss. EUI Florence: European University Institute, 2009, 
pp. 275–315.
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revenue under Community control was to be reviewed.32 In direct conversations 
with French politicians and diplomats, the British emphasized a shared interest 
in containing the Federal Republic, which was now causing worries not only with 
its economic success but also with advances in its “New Eastern Policy.”33 The 
British approach was intended to help soften Pompidou’s noticeably hard posi-
tion.
The surprising victory of the Conservatives in parliamentary elections on 
18 June 1970 changed nothing in regard to strategy. New Prime Minister Edward 
Heath, who had led the negotiations of 1961–63 as representative of the Mac-
millan government, now went into the new talks with all the materials that had 
been prepared by Wilson’s government and also pursued the same goals. At the 
opening of entry negotiations on 30 June, Europe Minister Anthony Barber made 
it clear right away that his government would need to insist on substantially 
longer transition periods than the Community had envisioned. No British govern-
ment could accept responsibility for the burdens that an abrupt transition to the 
Community system would cause.34
After an initial sounding out and after initial talks, the Heath government in 
early December reduced its demanded transition period to five years; the follow-
ing “corrective phase” was now only to last three years. British contributions—to 
be made up of levies, tariffs, and direct payments or tax components—were to 
be only 2.6 to three percent of the Community budget, however, as new Europe 
Minister Geoffrey Rippon specified on 17 December; by the end of the transition 
period, the British share was to rise to thirteen to fifteen percent. A period of six 
years was envisioned before the complete adoption of the levy system and three 
years for the complete incorporation into the commercial system of the Com-
munity. It was believed that only by this means would it be possible to ensure 
that the anticipated impetus to British industry would not be negated by drastic 
increases in food costs. Additionally, London persisted in calling for exceptional 
regulations for the importation of Caribbean sugar and New Zealand butter: There 
were long-term agreements on these imports that were essential for the Common-
wealth countries involved.
For Pompidou, those were simply risible concessions. Given that the British 
would from the beginning profit from the advantages of the Common Market, he 
32 Negotiating Brief on Community Finance, 8 June 1970, quoted in Alan S. Milward, “The 
Hague Conference of 1969 and the United Kingdom’s Accession to the European Economic Com-
munity,” in: Journal of European Integration History 9/2 (2003), pp. 117–126, here pp. 125ff.
33 Gabriele Clemens, “Der Beitritt Großbritanniens zu den Europäischen Gemeinschaften,” in: 
Knipping and Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch, pp. 306–328.
34 Europa-Archiv 25 (1970), pp. D358–D361.
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regarded an initial proportion of twenty-two percent for the financing of the Agri-
cultural Market as appropriate.35 In his view, attempts to delay the full burden 
raised the danger that in five or seven years the British would once again seek to 
topple the entire system of financing. “One gladly concedes to the British three 
qualities,” he said of the offer during a press conference on 21 January 1971, 
“humor, tenacity, and realism. The thought occurs to me that we still find our-
selves a bit in the humor stage. I have no doubt that tenacity will follow. I hope 
too that realism will come and will triumph.”36
What clearly came next was tenacity—on both sides. Whereas the Five 
wanted to accommodate the British, France persisted in its position and was sup-
ported by the Commission. In mid-March, Paris added the demand that Britain 
give up the pound’s status as a second international reserve currency after the 
dollar; this had been urged by Economy Commissioner Barre. High foreign credits 
in sterling and the British guarantee of the Commonwealth countries’ currency 
reserves made the pound highly vulnerable to fluctuations in value that were not 
compatible with the Common Market and certainly not with the sought-after cur-
rency union. In light of the country’s chronic balance of payments deficit, the 
British were to commit themselves to a firm stability policy that would promote 
the desired uniformity among the currencies.
For a time, Heath considered the possibility of making Pompidou more willing 
to compromise by accommodating him on the issue of a joint nuclear force. No 
later than 1965, the Briton had become convinced of the necessity of an autono-
mous European defense; improvements in Soviet anti-missile capabilities, which 
were now making the development of new missile systems necessary, served to 
strengthen his conviction. Heath therefore wanted a “radical initiative” both to 
solve British security problems and to secure entry into the European Community. 
In February of 1971, interministerial committees recommended that a proposal 
be made for the creation of an “Organisation for the Co-ordination of European 
Defence” and for the joint development of a new generation of sea-based mis-
siles. However, Foreign Minister Alec Douglas Home got the impression in mid-
April that such an initiative would weigh down the entry negotiations rather than 
accelerate them; and so the idea was deferred.37
In fact, signs began to multiply in the middle of April that, even without 
British accommodation on the issue of an autonomous European nuclear force, 
35 From a conversation with Brandt, 25 Jan. 1971, AAPD 1971/I, 149–162.
36 Quoted from Pierre-Bernard Cousté and François Visine, Pompidou et l’Europe, Paris: Libra-
ries techniques, 1974, p. 117.
37 Helen Parr, “Anglo-French Nuclear Collaboration and Britain’s Policy towards Europe, 
1970–1973,” in: van der Harst (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union, pp. 35–59. 
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Pompidou would soften his rigid stance. Via Brandt, Heath had let the French 
president know at the beginning of the month that he needed a demonstrable 
success by the summer; otherwise, British opinion threatened to change dras-
tically.38 This made it clear to Pompidou that it was necessary to yield. If he 
did not, there would be fears of the failure of the expansion project and also the 
relapse of the partners into the old lethargy. Commissioner of Foreign Trade Jean-
François Deniau, who had been given the leadership of the Commission’s negoti-
ating delegation, told Pompidou that “It would be easier for England to block the 
Community if it stays out rather than if it is in. Its absence gives every member 
that doesn’t want to negotiate a constant excuse.”39
Michel Jobert, the general secretary of the French president, and British 
Ambassador Christopher Soames had been holding off-the-record conversations 
since February. In the second half of April, the two reached agreement on the 
outline of a compromise: The initial level and the increase in British contribu-
tions were to be based on objective criteria; the restriction of Caribbean sugar 
imports was to be postponed until the end of the transition period; the issue of 
New Zealand butter imports would be dealt with later. As to resolution of the cur-
rency problematic, a British declaration of intent would suffice. Additionally, a 
timetable for the detailed resolution of contentious issues would be agreed upon: 
first of all, a sign of willingness to compromise at the next meeting of the Council 
of Ministers, then an agreement on basic issues during a visit by Heath to Paris, 
and, finally, the determination of details at the Council of Ministers meetings in 
June.40
In fact, at the Council of Ministers meeting of 11 and 12 May 1971, the British 
delegation surprised most participants by agreeing to a new regulation of sugar 
imports after the expiration of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) at the 
end of 1974. In response, the French delegation accepted the principle of an incre-
mental increase in British contributions. The French also conceded in essence the 
possibility of extending the transition period beyond five years and presented a 
mathematical model for calculating the rate of increase.41 During comprehen-
sive talks between the French president and the British prime minister in Paris 
lasting altogether some twelve hours on 20 and 21 May, Heath let it be known that 
he was prepared to take the necessary measures to stabilize the British pound. 
38 Cf. Rippon to Heath, 1 April 1971, NA, PREM 15–370; Brandt to Pompidou, 6 April 1971, AN, 
5AG2, 103.
39 Jean-François Deniau, Mémoire de 7 vies. Vol. II: Croire et oser, Paris: Omnibus, 1997, p. 278.
40 Pompidou’s advisor Jean-René Bernard informed Brandt’s State Secretary Katharina Focke 
on 3 May 1971 about this agreement; see Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 131ff.
41 O’Neill, British Entry, pp. 95–98.
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He likewise made it clear that this would include giving up the pound’s link to 
the US dollar, which had been in place up to that point. Pompidou then assured 
his visitor that he would be accommodating on the issue of New Zealand butter: 
After incremental reductions of imports during the transition period, the issue 
was to be revisited in five years’ time in light of world market regulations that 
would have been determined by that point. Pompidou then declared that over 
the course of negotiations, the initial level of British contributions to the budget 
could “come in at something less than ten percent.”42
The whole thing was less a negotiation than a backup measure to overcome 
Pompidou’s mistrust. Heath willingly gave all the assurances that the French 
president sought: He would send bureaucrats to Brussels who would be in a posi-
tion to work in French; he would not demand any reduction of support for Fran-
cophone countries in Africa; and, yes, he was in “complete agreement” that when 
it came to a country’s vital interests, unanimity must reign. A protocol of these 
results prepared at Pompidou’s behest but not published held to the Luxembourg 
Agreement of 1966 “that community decision must in practice be reached by 
unanimous agreement on issues where the vital national interests of one or more 
partners are at stake.”43
Heath did not accept Pompidou’s concession on the issue of the initial con-
tribution level. He granted only that the final step at the end of the transition 
period could not be too high; he also assured his host once again that Britain was 
serious about the complete adoption of the Community system: His government 
had no intention of “fudging in one way or another.”44 The personal aides Jean-
René Bernard and Peter Thornton were given the task of continuing the talks on 
that point.
In fact, an initial contribution of “something under ten percent” was still 
an imposition on the UK. This would mean that the British would experience 
a higher cost of living immediately upon joining the Community, whereas the 
fruits of entry—increased exports and productivity—would fail to materialize for 
the time being. Those in London now had to tell themselves that not much more 
could be achieved than the reduction to eight percent that the other EEC partners 
thought appropriate. During another marathon session in Luxembourg from 21 to 
42 Protocol in AN, 5AG2, 108; different excerpts in Éric Roussel, Georges Pompidou 1911–1974, 
expanded edition, Paris: Fayard, 2004, pp.  438–446, and Kathrin Rücker, “Le triangle Par-
is-Bonn-Londres et le processus d’adhésion britannique au marché commun 1969–1973,” Diss. 
Paris, 2009, pp. 453–470.
43 PREM 15/373, quoted in Jens Kreutzfeldt, “Point of return”. Großbritannien und die Politische 
Union Europas 1969–1975, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2010, p. 239.
44 Second discussion of 20 May 1970.
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23 June, the British delegation in the end agreed to an initial level of 8.64 percent 
that would rise in the fifth and final year of the transition period to 18.92 percent. 
Additionally, caps were agreed upon for the first two years of full contributions, 
that is, 1978 and 1979. In the case of “unacceptable situations,” there were prom-
ises of “equitable solutions.” Regarding New Zealand butter, the settlement that 
Pompidou had offered was defined more precisely. The British declaration of 
intent to reduce sterling-denominated assets and to take measures for adapting 
to the planned economic and currency union had already become known at the 
Council of Ministers meeting of 7 and 8 June—much to the consternation of Barre, 
who had additionally wanted to negotiate a pledge to stabilize the pound.45
The other candidates for entry found these conditions with a five-year transi-
tion period unproblematic. Because agricultural self-sufficiency was significantly 
greater in Ireland, Denmark, and Norway than in Britain, there was no issue of 
an initial increase in the cost of living in these countries. It was even the case 
that in the second year of the transition period, Denmark was able to achieve the 
net gain that was to be expected only upon full membership. The smaller can-
didates nevertheless defended themselves against any attempt to set transition 
terms for them that were less advantageous than those granted to Britain. When 
in December of 1970 the Commission was contemplating exactly that, sharp pro-
tests came especially from the Danish government led by Prime Minister Hilmar 
Baunsgaard. Finally, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers with representatives 
of the candidates on 11 and 12 July, it was agreed that the terms accorded Britain 
would apply to the other candidates as well. They thereby received essentially the 
same terms that the Danish government itself had already proposed in October of 
1970.46
Denmark had a different problem: Freedom of establishment for enterprises 
of the member states, which was linked with entry into the Common Market. This 
threatened to lead to a sell-off of agricultural enterprises and coastal resorts in 
North Schleswig to Germans with deep pockets. Because opponents of Danish 
entry made this into a strong argument for their cause, the government called for 
retention of the ban on freedom of establishment until the end of the transition 
period. In late November of 1971, the Council of Ministers agreed this.47
45 O’Neill, Britain’s Entry, pp. 136ff. and 177ff.; Runderlass Poensgen, 23 June 1971, AAPD 1971/
II, pp. 1004ff.
46 Morten Rasmussen, “The Hesitant European—History of Denmark’s Accession to the Euro-
pean Communities 1970–73,” in: Journal of European Integration History 11/2 (2005), pp. 47–74, 
here pp. 56–58; idem., “Joining the European Communities. Denmark’s Road to EC-Membership, 
1961–1973,” Diss. EUI Florence: EUI Working Papers, 2006, pp. 366–498.
47 Rasmussen, “Hesitant European,” p. 61.
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For Ireland and Norway, the largest problem was the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) that the Council of Ministers, after wearisome negotiations, had just 
completed before the opening of entry talks in June of 1970. Like the agricultural 
policy, this envisioned the use of Community funds to finance price-stabiliz-
ing measures and structural modernization; in exchange, it also called for the 
opening of territorial waters to the fishing fleets of all member countries. During 
a transition period of five years, exceptions were to be made for coastal areas 
whose populations were heavily dependent on fishing. This was a problem for 
Ireland and Norway in that no later than the end of the transition period, the 
substantially better-equipped fishing fleets of the large members threatened to 
exhaust the supply of fish in their waters. The Norwegian government saw as a 
consequence the depopulation of already thinly-settled coastal regions in the 
northern half of the country.48
Both governments therefore demanded nothing less than retention of the 
twelve-mile zone of exclusive national fishing rights that had been guaranteed by 
the London Fisheries Convention of 1964. That was unacceptable to the Commis-
sion, as was the proposed requirement that foreign fishermen reside in Norway, 
which had been presented by the principally more Europe-friendly government 
of Social Democrat Trygve Bratteli in June of 1971. After tough negotiations begin-
ning in October, the governments of Ireland, Britain, and Denmark accepted a 
compromise proposal from the Commission on 12 December: The transition reg-
ulations for certain coastal regions and for the entire twelve-mile zone would be 
extended for ten years, and a review of fishing policy was announced for the end 
of the transition period. The Norwegian government continued to seek guaran-
tees of special treatment for an unlimited period. On 15 January, it had to content 
itself with an expansion of the Norwegian special zone significantly to the south 
(as far as Egersund) and with a special protocol that made mention of the pos-
sibility of an “extension of the existing system” after the end of the transition 
period, if the “special demographic and social structure of the country” would 
make it needful.49
The talks with Norway became all the more difficult when the Norwegian 
government began seeking unlimited exceptional regulations for its entire agri-
48 On this and the following, cf. Geary, An Inconvenient Wait, pp. 173–183; Robin M. Allers, Be-
sondere Beziehungen. Deutschland, Norwegen und Europa in der Ära Brandt (1966–1974), Bonn: 
Dietz, 2009, pp. 274–329; idem., “Attacking the Sacred Cow. The Norwegian Challenge to the EC’s 
Acquis Communautaire in the Enlargement Negotiations of 1970–72,” in: Journal of European 
Integration History 16/2 (2010), pp. 59–82.
49 Summary of the results of the entry negotiations, 19 Jan. 1972, Europa-Archiv 27 (1972), 
pp. D115–D122, here p. D121.
 The First Enlargement   191
culture sector as well. Given the difficult climatic and topographic circumstances 
of the country—with mountains and fjords and some third of its territory lying 
above the arctic circle—Norwegian farmers would be faced with more than a fifty 
percent drop in income if markets were opened, price levels reduced, and national 
support measures eliminated. From a technical standpoint, it was hardly possible 
to create larger units so as to increase productivity. The fear that entire areas of 
the country would be depopulated was thus not without justification. The Bratelli 
government proposed that farmers continue to be supported with exceptional 
regulations for individual products, especially price supports for milk and trans-
port assistance; this was to be financed from the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF),
The Commission and Council of Ministers gradually converged on this pro-
posal, not least of all because Brandt made the case for understanding the prob-
lems of his “second homeland.” They did not however completely embrace it. On 
12 December 1971, a special protocol on Norwegian agriculture was finally passed 
that, although not explicitly mentioning permanent exceptional regulations, 
did acknowledge the necessity of “specific provisions” even after the end of the 
five-year transition period.50 Among these were to be measures for guaranteeing 
milk production and transport assistance. The Commission was to examine the 
extent to which the Community could participate in providing the funds needed 
for this. This was too little for the Norwegian agricultural interest groups; for its 
part, however, the government thought that it had succeeded in gaining the core 
of its demands. After the terms of Norwegian entry into the Common Fisheries 
Policy had also been settled on 15 January, the way was clear for the signing of the 
common entry treaty for all candidates on 22 January 1972.51
In light of the many problems that had delayed the conclusion of negotia-
tions, the atmosphere in Brussels at the signing of the treaty was anything but 
enthusiastic. In fact, it would soon be seen that there was no majority in Norway 
for entry. Fishing Minister Knut Hoem resigned in protest even before the Norwe-
gian government had definitively acceded to the Fishing Protocol, due to what 
he regarded as an unsatisfactory result of negotiations. Bratelli and the other 
supporters of accession in the government, who were convinced of the need to 
join the prospering European Community, could not contain the negative trend in 
public opinion in the northern parts of the country and along its coasts. Together 
with the anti-Europeanism of the radical left and the conservatism of neo-liberal 
intellectuals, a majority of 53.3 percent spoke out against entry in a consultative 
referendum on 24 and 25 September 1972. As it had pledged to do, the Bratelli 
50 Ibid.
51 Treaty text, ibid., pp. D123–D125.
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government responded by resigning immediately. The new minority center-right 
government under Lars Korvald was under much time pressure to negotiate a 
free-trade agreement with the Community, as Sweden and the other remaining 
EFTA countries had in the meantime already done.52
In Britain, the accession treaty received the necessary majorities. After 
an intensive campaign in support of it and six days of debate in the House of 
Commons, a majority of 356 to 244 voted on 28 October 1971 in favor of entry 
under the terms that the government had negotiated. A law for entry was then 
passed on 13 July 1972 with a majority of seventeen votes. It was the case however 
that Heath presented the results of his negotiations in an extremely defensive 
manner out of fear of the opponents of entry. The political ambitions and eco-
nomic visions that underlay the application were not mentioned at all; in a white 
paper of 7 July 1971, the government even asserted that there was “no question 
of any erosion of essential national sovereignty.”53 Additionally, after Labour’s 
unexpected defeat at the polls, a tendency prevailed in the party to mobilize the 
diverse cross currents for a quick return to power; Wilson only knew how to unify 
his party and above all retain his leadership position by taking to the field with 
the slogan “No entry on Tory terms.” In the election campaign over the winter 
of 1973–74, he vowed to renegotiate those terms and to submit the results of that 
process to a referendum.54
British opponents of entry gained additional momentum when the economic 
condition of the country, which had long been problematic, became dramatically 
worse during the first year of membership. A major miners’ strike in January of 
1973 drove unemployment numbers over one million. Both inflation and the trade 
deficit increased; the quadrupling of oil prices in October of 1973 led to further 
burdens. Under these circumstances, Wilson’s spectacular and questionable 
change of course brought results: Elections in February of 1974 gave Labour more 
seats than the Conservatives. Wilson formed a minority government on 4 March 
that was then able to win a small majority in new elections in October of 1974.
In office once again, Wilson now had to make good on his promise of new 
talks. This did not however turn into the “fundamental re-negotiation” that 
Labour had announced.55 James Callaghan, Wilson’s new foreign secretary 
and a spokesman of those rejecting the accession treaty, did indeed come off as 
tough in Brussels at first. He soon had to realize however that nothing could be 
52 Hillary Allen, Norway and Europe in the 1970s, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979, pp. 128–159.
53 Quoted from Young, Britain and European Unity, p. 113.
54 Ibid., pp. 114–117; Young, Blessed Plot, pp. 270–278; Kreutzfeldt, Point of return, pp. 423–428.
55 The election manifesto of 11 Jan. 1974: “Let Us Work Together– Labour’s Way Out of the 
Crisis,” London, 1974, p. 5.
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achieved that way. In the eyes of the partners, the demand for new negotiations 
was nothing less than a threatened breach of the treaty, confirming the views of 
all who had warned against British entry. Those who continued to be interested in 
having the country participate could only shrug their shoulders in acknowledg-
ment that British politics might well be on the verge of squandering the results 
that had been so tenaciously striven for.
In the end, it was Helmut Schmidt, Brandt’s successor as chancellor since 
16 May 1974, who helped Callaghan and Wilson save face. More skeptical than 
Brandt and Scheel as to the chances of a currency union and Political Union, 
Schmidt—a self-confident native of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg—
at the same time had a special interest in seeing that the pragmatic tradition 
of British politics gained an influence in the Community. This led him to put a 
high priority on preventing British withdrawal. In a speech at the Labour Party 
congress in late November, he advocated that Britain remain in the Community, 
doing so in excellent English, which won him respect, and in a tone tailored to 
the mindset of British party comrades. This did not actually bring a majority of 
delegates to the point of changing their minds, but it did strengthen the position 
of the Europe advocates in the party. Above all, it gave Wilson and Callaghan 
courage to commit themselves to working for confirmation of the entry decision.
Schmidt then worked to persuade new French President Valéry Giscard d’Es-
taing to make concessions to the British on some lower-priority issues. While 
conferring after the speech with Wilson at Chequers, the country retreat of the 
British prime minister, Schmidt arranged a meeting between the British and 
French leaders. Wilson then assured Giscard on 3 December that, as Schmidt had 
requested, he would publicly work for Britain to remain in the Community if the 
partners would accede to the introduction of a “self-correcting mechanism” for 
avoiding excessive budget contributions. Four days later, Wilson spoke publicly 
to this effect. At the meeting of heads of state and of government in Paris on 9 and 
10 December, Giscard then made a concession along those lines. Beyond this, 
Schmidt agreed to provide sufficient financing for a European Regional Fund that 
would be of benefit to Italy as well as Britain and Ireland. At the summit in Dublin 
on 10 and 11 March 1975—the “summit of the pocket calculators”—it was decided 
that the self-correcting mechanism would take effect if the gross national product 
of a member state fell below eighty-five percent of the average, a level that Britain 
would continually be able to avoid. It was also decided that the end of favored 
importation of New Zealand butter could be extended from 1977 to 1980.
Together with the vague announcement of a “review” of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy and the signing of the Lomé Convention, which extended the favored 
194   Expansion and New Perspectives, 1969–1975
status of former colonial areas to the Commonwealth countries,56 there were 
enough concessions to gain majority support in the British cabinet for remaining 
in the Community. In the House of Commons and at a special party conference, 
a majority of Labour politicians stuck by their opposition, however. In a referen-
dum, which Wilson scheduled for 5 June 1975 and of whose outcome he was con-
fident, some sixty-seven percent of the voters agreed “that the United Kingdom 
should stay in the European Community.” The unity of the party was saved by 
this, and Wilson had succeeded after all in what he regarded as necessary for the 
interests of Great Britain.57
Yet, the referendum—which was an absolute innovation in British poli-
tics—did not constitute a conscious decision for participation in the European 
project, as Wilson and in a similar way Heath too had originally envisioned it. 
Moreover, the Labour prime minister displayed too little public engagement 
on behalf of European politics. Decisive for the positive vote—which had been 
advocated very strongly by the business community and the press as well as the 
Anglican Church—was merely the fear that a withdrawal would threaten to cause 
still greater economic problems for Britain. As one pro-European Labour deputy 
summarized this kind of support that stemmed from resignation: “You cannot 
unscramble the egg.”58
Looking at the big picture, it was the case that French approval for British 
entry had come too late to make an active and engaged member of the European 
Community out of the United Kingdom. If accession had been completed before 
the end of the postwar boom had struck Britain so very hard, another outcome of 
this first round of Community expansion could certainly have been imagined. It 
must remain an open question as to whether Wilson would have been in a posi-
tion to keep the Europe issue out of intra-party and domestic political power 
struggles. What is certain is that due to his own interest in securing his leadership 
role, he contributed over the long term to damaging the Community’s potential 
for development.
This proved all the more fatal when the leaders of the Danish Social Demo-
crats (who since October of 1971 had once again held the office of prime minis-
56 Lili Reyels, Die Entstehung des ersten Vertrags von Lomé im deutsch-französischen Span-
nungsfeld 1973–1975, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008.
57 Young, Britain and European Unity, pp. 119–129; Thomas Birkner, Comrades for Europe? Die 
“Europarede” Helmut Schmidts 1974, Bremen: Edition Temmen, 2005; Kreutzfeldt, Point of return, 
pp. 452–457, 465–470, 472–494.
58 David Ennals at the party conference of 25 April 1975, quoted from Birkner, Comrades, p. 116. 
On the referendum campaign, David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger (eds.), The 1975 Referendum, Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1976; Young, Blessed Plot, pp. 286–299; Mark Baimbridge (ed.), The 1975 Refer-
endum on Europe, 2 vols., Exeter: Macmillan, 2006–2007.
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ter) in their referendum campaign during the summer of 1972 concentrated solely 
on the economic advantages of membership and emphasized their rejection of 
supranational solutions in the realms of currency and foreign policy. They did so 
out of fear of losing the Euro-skeptic segment of their supporters to more radical 
groups; this strategy was rewarded with a positive vote of 63.3 percent in the ref-
erendum of 2 October 1972. The decision to gain approval for entry by means of a 
referendum also led to an institutional solidification of the opponents of Europe, 
a development that would place narrow limits on the freedom of action of future 
Danish governments.59 Conversely, the transitory danger of a British withdrawal 
had at least served to make the Irish Republic into a highly active member of the 
European Community.60
The Project of Monetary Union
Parallel to the first expansion, the governments of the Six took up the project of 
an economic and currency union. It had long been on the agenda of the Commu-
nity and indeed was a necessary counterpart to the completion of the Common 
Market. The policies of the Customs Union, the Common Market, and the Commu-
nity could not succeed over the long term if the currencies of the member states 
were to develop in divergent ways and if the member states sought to steer diver-
gent let alone contrary courses in economic policy. The EEC Treaty itself had thus 
foreseen coordination in economic policy with the goal of currency stability and 
convertibility, bound up with “mutual assistance” in cases of difficulties with bal-
ances of payment.61 In its action program of October 1962 for the second stage of 
the Common Market, the Hallstein Commission (with the advice of Belgian-Amer-
ican economist Robert Triffin) proposed strengthening monetary cooperation 
among the Six and creating a European Reserve Fund. No later than the end of 
the transition period, these two initiatives were to lead to a currency union.62
59 Rasmussen, “Hesitant European,” pp. 65–74.
60 Brian Girvin, “The Treaty of Rome and Ireland’s Developmental Dilemma,” in: Gehler, Vom 
gemeinsamen Markt, pp. 573–595, here pp. 591–595.
61 Articles 105 to 107 of the EEC Treaty.
62 On this and the following, Régine Perron, “Le discret projet de l’intégration monétaire eu-
ropéenne (1963–1969),” in: Loth (ed.), Crises, pp. 345–367; Guido Thiemeyer, “From Convertibil-
ity to the Werner-Plan. European Monetary Integration 1958–1959,” in: Régine Perron (ed.), The 
Stability of Europe. The Common Market: Towards European Integration of Industrial and Finan-
cial Markets? (1958–1969), Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris Sorbonne, 2004, pp. 161–178; Éric 
Bussière, “Moves towards an economic and monetary policy,” in: The European Commission 
1958–72, pp. 391–410.
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Initially, the proposal for coordination led to only modest results—firstly, 
because the governments feared the loss of decision-making on currency and 
economic policy, and secondly, because the Commission’s measures included 
medium-term economic planning of a Keynesian cast, which did not suit the 
neo-liberal forces in the governments. In May of 1964, the tasks of the Currency 
Committee of the Council of Ministers were expanded; at the same time, Commit-
tees for Budgetary Policy and Medium-Term Economic Policy as well as a Commit-
tee of Governors of the Central Banks were put in place.
The currency turbulence of 1968, which had been unleashed by the lax finan-
cial policy of the US and the resulting decrease of confidence in the dollar as the 
leading international currency, spurred the reactivation of the project of an eco-
nomic and currency union. Without greater convergence in these areas, there was 
not only the danger of perpetual hindrances to Community policies but also that 
of the disintegration of the Common Market itself, with devastating economic 
consequences. In February of 1968, the Commission, now under the leadership of 
Raymond Barre, therefore presented a new plan for creating a reserve fund and 
for introducing firm and definitive exchange rates. This did not initially spark any 
response, however. In the autumn of 1968, Bonn refused the partners’ demand 
that the mark be allowed to appreciate; and de Gaulle defiantly rejected a devalu-
ation of the franc, something that in reality was unavoidable.63
The Commission responded with an initiative that was somewhat less ambi-
tious. Its next proposal, ready in December of 1968 and officially presented on 
12 February 1969 (the so-called “Barre Plan”), initially envisioned only mutual 
agreement on every change in exchange rates as well as short-term monetary 
support actions on the basis of decisions by central banks and medium-term 
assistance by decision of the Council. At the same time, coordination of economic 
and business-cycle policy was to be intensified by adding the goal of achieving 
price stability.64 Giscard d’Estaing, who had long been urging a European solu-
tion to the problem of currency turbulence, was able to convince Pompidou to 
go in this direction; the Council of Ministers of the European Communities was 
thus able to approve the fundamentals of the Barre Plan on 17 July 1969. Brandt 
let himself be convinced by Monnet in November to aim for the creation of a Euro-
pean Reserve Fund as well. When the summit in The Hague decided to produce 
63 Cf. Andreas Wilkens, “L’Europe et sa première crise monétaire. Bonn et Paris en novembre 
1968,” in: Journal of European Integration History 18/2 (2012), pp. 221–243.
64 Europa-Archiv 24 (1969), pp. D163–D174.
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an incremental plan for establishing an economic and currency union over the 
course of 1970, Triffin was on hand in the role of an advisor to the chancellor.65
In developing the plan, however, different priorities manifested themselves. 
Whereas for the more economically weak member states the primary concern was 
support for their endangered currencies, the Bundesbank and Economy Minister 
Karl Schiller insisted on budgetary discipline and bringing about macroeconomic 
convergence as the perquisite for the introduction of a common currency. In con-
nection with this, a Belgian proposal envisioned in the first phase of the multi-
stage plan a reduction of the range of fluctuation of European currencies against 
the dollar. The West German draft called for only short-term support measures in 
this first phase and additionally emphasized the necessity of harmonizing eco-
nomic policy. On 6 and 7 March 1970, the Council of Ministers established an ad 
hoc committee chaired by Prime Minister and Finance Minister Pierre Werner of 
Luxembourg. This body ended up in a negotiation crisis due to the differences, 
and the deadlock was only resolved through discreet intervention by Brandt on 
behalf of rapid currency integration. The report approved by the committee on 
8 October 1970 (the so-called “Werner Plan”) proposed beginning in the first 
phase with efforts to reduce the range of fluctuation on a trial basis and “poten-
tially” establishing a Currency Equalization Fund. The common currency was to 
be introduced after a decade of dismantling existing imbalances, that is, in the 
year 1980. Responsibility for the common currency was to be in the hands of a 
common central bank; economic policy was to be steered by a “European Eco-
nomic Policy Decision Center” responsible to the European Parliament.66
The emphasis on the necessity of binding decisions, which Bonn had nego-
tiated as a quid pro quo for its expressions of support, seemed in Pompidou’s 
eyes an attack on his authority over promoting dynamism in the French economy. 
Additionally, he was motivated by Debré’s intense attacks on the results of nego-
tiations67 in the Council of Ministers, raging at any interference in his budget 
policy. Schumann and Giscard were directed not to support any transfer of further 
authority to the Community level. After the president had calmed down some-
what, he admitted to Brandt at the Franco-German summit of 25 and 26 January 
1971 that the monetary measures planned for the first phase should only continue 
to be in effect if, before their expiration, an agreement had been reached on the 
65 Gérard Bossuat, “Le président Georges Pompidou et les tentatives d’Union économique et 
monétaire,” in: Association Georges Pompidou (ed.), Georges Pompidou et l’Europe. Colloque 25 
et 26 novembre 1993, Brussels, 1995, pp. 405–447; Andreas Wilkens, “Der Werner-Plan. Währung, 
Politik und Europa 1968–1971,” in: Knipping and Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch, pp. 217–244.
66 Ibid., pp. 226–235; Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 93–104.
67 Of which the West German embassy in Paris learned, ibid., p. 142.
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further course of currency integration. The West Germans were satisfied that in 
regard to the final phase, there was only a general reference to a common central 
banking system and that the issues of its area of authority and its independence 
were left open. Likewise, Bonn accepted the formulation that the necessary eco-
nomic policy decisions should be made at the Community level by the organs of 
the Community.
The Federal Republic had thus received assurance that measures on currency 
and economic policy would go hand in hand and that in the end, authority would 
reside on the European level. The actual nature of the currency- and econom-
ic-policy decision-making process in the future Union was consciously left open, 
however. In this form, the plan for creating an economic and currency union was 
passed by the Council of Ministers on 9 February 1971.68 A further resolution of 
the Council of Ministers 22 March specified that the initial phase should last from 
1 July 1971 to 31 December 1973. As an initial measure, a minor reduction in the 
range of fluctuation among the European currencies was passed: from the exist-
ing .75 percent upward or downward to .6 percent, altogether from 1.5 percent to 
1.2 percent.
The compromise underlying the decisions of March 1971 did not hold up very 
long, however. Several weeks later, the Federal Republic became the object of 
speculative dollar influxes that disturbed the external economic balance and 
conjured up the danger of imported inflation. Schiller reacted with a demand for 
completely freeing up the DM exchange rate (so-called floating) and succeeded in 
pushing it through, for at least a limited period, at a meeting of the EEC finance 
ministers on 8 and 9 May 1971. In his view, the other member states simply needed 
to join in with this so as to save the project of a common currency area. In actual-
ity, a common float threatened to reduce the competitiveness of the weaker econ-
omies and to elevate the mark to the status of leading European currency; for that 
reason, it was out of the question for Pompidou. In isolation, a West German float 
would disrupt the functioning of the European Agricultural Market and render 
obsolete the decision to engage in narrowing the range of fluctuation.
Pompidou’s disappointment over the swerve by the Federal Republic was 
all the greater given that the more substantial alternative—a devaluation of the 
dollar—did not come into question at all. Instead of joining together with its 
European partners in demanding that the US government make such a move, 
Bonn helped Washington continue solving its budget problems at the cost of its 
European allies. A common European response to the American challenge did 
not materialize, not even when President Nixon eliminated the convertibility of 
68 Europa-Archiv 26 (1971), pp.  D139–D144. Cf. Wilkens, “Werner-Plan,” pp.  238–243; Hiepel, 
Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 108–118.
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the dollar into gold and thereby definitively undermined the Bretton Woods cur-
rency system on 15 August. While Schiller continued to plead for a common float, 
and the Dutch as well as the Belgians and Luxembourgers de facto freed up their 
currencies to rise, the French decided to split their currency market: For financial 
transactions, the exchange rate was freed; for trade movements, the existing par-
ities were maintained by means of interventions and capital controls.
Another intervention by Brandt was needed in order to bring the Federal 
Republic back on course with the Community. The chancellor was in his own 
estimation a layman regarding currency policy and had initially yielded to his 
economy minister, not least of all because the policy of defending the mark 
was very popular. However, when the chancellor perceived that divergence on 
the issue of how to respond to the flood of dollars was leading toward a point 
where the project of a currency union would be fundamentally endangered, he 
sent Ludwig Poullain, the head of the West German Landesbank—who was a 
critic of Schiller—to the French presidential advisor Jean-René Bernard in order 
to negotiate a compromise that would balance the interests of the two countries: 
a return to firm exchange rates with a rise in the mark, devaluation of the dollar, 
and retention of the parity of the franc. At a bilateral meeting with Nixon in the 
Azores on 14 December, Pompidou reached an agreement on the exact level of 
the dollar devaluation: 7.9 percent. On 18 December, the subsequent Smithsonian 
Agreement (named after the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, the location 
of the G-10 finance ministers meeting) called for the mark to rise by 4.6 percent, 
a little less than Pompidou had sought. With these preconditions, the European 
partners accepted an expansion of the range of the fluctuation of their currencies 
against the dollar from plus/minus .75 to 2.25 percent (altogether from 1.5 to 4.5 
percent) and overall reverted to intervention in cases of deviation from the result-
ing averages.69
In order to advance the project of a currency union again, it was also neces-
sary to reduce the range of fluctuation among the European currencies. Schiller 
bristled against a proposal to this effect made by the Commission. Brandt over-
rode this, and so on 21 March 1972 the Council of Ministers issued a call for the 
member states’ central banks to reduce the fluctuation margins among their cur-
rencies to plus/minus 2.25 percent. Within the “tunnel” of 4.5 percent vis-à-vis 
the dollar, there thus emerged a “snake” with a range of 2.25 percent. Whereas 
dollars would still be used for interventions against dollar fluctuations, interven-
tions within the snake would for the first time be carried out in currencies of the 
69 Ibid., pp. 177–205; Roussel, Pompidou, pp. 461–489; on the end of the Bretton Woods system 
and the Smithsonian Agreement, also Harold James, Rambouillet, 15. November 1975. Die Globali-
sierung der Wirtschaft, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1997, pp. 131–160.
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Community. This meant that the dependence of the weaker European currencies 
on the mark was lessened and that a core of European solidarity on intervention 
emerged. On 10 April, the heads of the central banks of the Six met in Basel and 
signed an agreement that would take effect a fortnight later. The candidates for 
entry joined in, initially only for the short term, however.
The renewed Franco-German consensus that underlay the establishment of 
the European currency snake also withstood the next round of attacks on the 
European currencies. As American dollars once again began flowing increasingly 
into Europe in June, the British government opted to abandon the snake and allow 
the pound to float. Schiller wanted to do the same and once again recommended 
a community float of the European currencies. Conversely, Brandt won over the 
cabinet on 29 June for initiating capital controls as the French and Italians were 
doing. This caused Schiller to resign from his ministerial posts. His successor was 
Helmut Schmidt, an all-round politician who concentrated on what was politi-
cally possible rather than on economic theories, which had been Schiller’s main 
focus.
Inspired by this stabilization of Franco-German solidarity, Pompidou now 
demanded that the planned currency balance fund be introduced soon and that 
it be given wide-ranging authority as well. Brandt concurred, though with an eye 
to the goal of stability for the economy of the Federal Republic, he included the 
restriction that there should be a cap on the credit facilities and monies available 
each year. With preparations made jointly by Giscard and Schmidt, the economy 
and finance ministers of the Community met on 11 and 12 September and were 
able to decide on the establishment of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund in 
the first phase of a currency union. The fund was initially to serve for the compen-
sation of the central banks in the currency snake and make balance equalization 
multilateral; for this purpose, a European unit of account was to be introduced. 
For later phases, an “incremental communitization of reserves” was announced. 
The Paris summit in October set the launch of this cooperation fund for April 
of 1973 and confirmed once again the already-determined course to a currency 
union.70
It was admittedly the case that neither the capital controls nor the expansion 
of currency cooperation offered a guarantee of a return to stable exchange rates. 
When in late January of 1973 a new torrent of dollars swept into the European cur-
rency markets and the US government allowed the dollar to float freely in March, 
Schmidt—who was serving in the second Brandt cabinet as finance minister with 
70 “Erklärungen der Konferenz der Wirtschafts- und Finanzminister der erweiterten Gemein-
schaft in Rom 11./12.9.1972,” in Europa-Archiv 27 (1972), pp. D470ff.; on the negotiations during 
1972, Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 197–207 and 209ff.
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expanded responsibilities—could advocate nothing besides a common float of 
European currencies as a means of helping out. This time, Pompidou agreed, 
despite the dangers for French competitiveness that were still bound up with 
such a move; he consented only with the precondition that the mark be allowed 
to appreciate once again, this time by three percent, and that the decision only 
be made after the end of voting for the French National Assembly on 11 March (a 
delay that cost the Bundesbank a large amount of currency reserves). He feared 
that if France did not participate, then Bonn would go it alone and would be 
followed by the other countries with hard currencies. On 12 March, the decision 
was thus made for a common float of the countries of the currency snake. The 
“tunnel” of pledges to make supportive purchases for maintaining the fluctuation 
range vis-à-vis the dollar now vanished.
The move to initiate bloc floating did not constitute a genuine step on the 
road to European currency union, however. The currency bloc that had been 
created was not large enough or strong enough for that. Britain and Italy remained 
outside, although Brandt had made both governments generous pledges of assis-
tance that ran counter to West German policy oriented on stability. According to 
Brandt, the “ifs-and-buts of the experts”71 on both sides ensured that the great 
gamble envisioned by the chancellor and also energetically advocated by Jean 
Monnet since the Paris summit had fallen by the wayside in talks among the eco-
nomic and finance ministers. Along with France, the Federal Republic, and the 
Benelux states, only Denmark participated.72
With the Heath and Andreotti governments shrinking back from involvement 
in the currency snake, Bonn lost its willingness to promote currency solidarity 
via steps to curtail its orientation on stability. Schmidt was visibly disappointed 
that Italy especially—a founding member of the Community—showed little dispo-
sition to practice budgetary discipline; he was also simultaneously faced with the 
growing danger of inflation due to the continuing flow of dollars and so hence-
forth supported strictly-parallel inflation-fighting and monetary support. Brandt 
followed him in this, not least of all due to the impression that there had been 
a change in West German public opinion, which was increasingly critical of the 
alleged profligacy of the partner countries. As the launch of the currency cooper-
ation fund (set for 1 June 1973) was being prepared, Schmidt insisted on binding 
71 Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960 bis 1975, Hamburg: Hoffmann & 
Campe, 1976, pp. 329.
72 Gérard Bossuat, “Jean Monnet et l‘identité monétaire européenne,” in: Gérard Bossuat and 
Andreas Wilkens (eds.), Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins de la Paix, Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1999, pp. 369–398; Kreutzfeldt, Point of return, pp. 341–352; Hiepel, Brandt und Pom-
pidou, pp. 217–230.
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pledges regarding budgetary discipline. When this was rejected, he balked at 
making a substantial transfer of currency reserves to the Community fund, as 
Monnet and the European Commission were demanding.
In order to overcome the stagnation in currency integration that had resulted 
from all this, Monnet once again pushed for taking the bull by the horns. In 
August, he sent another plan conceived by Triffin to Pompidou, this one calling 
for the rapid collectivization of all currency reserves, linked with the strengthen-
ing of Community authority on currency issues. The Currency Fund was to receive 
a directorate with decision-making power, and the budgetary rights of the Euro-
pean Parliament were also to be increased. It was clearly Monnet’s calculation 
that the creation of opportunities for the Community to intervene in matters of 
national budget policy would banish Bonn’s fear of a Community plagued by 
inflation. Pompidou was clearly not ready, or not yet ready, to pay the price of a 
further loss of national sovereignty that was being demanded here. On the report 
about Monnet’s request that had been prepared by Bernard, he wrote “dangerous 
or theoretical.”73
On 3 and 4 December, it nevertheless proved possible for the economy and 
finance ministers of the Community to reach agreement on a package for the tran-
sition to the second phase of currency union. They agreed on stability guidelines 
and on converging economy policy, a decision that had some credibility even in 
Bonn’s eyes. Schmidt rejected the pooling of reserves, but as a return gesture, 
he did accept an increase of short-term currency assistance. The package was 
not passed by the Council of Ministers, however. In the Council session of 17 and 
18 December 1973, the British and Italian governments insisted that decisions 
on economic and currency union could not be taken without the establishment 
of the European Regional Fund, which they were advocating for the benefit of 
their structurally-weak regions. For their part, the West Germans were not willing 
to accept that demand, given their conviction that they could not afford more 
transfer payments; the transition to the second phase thus remained without new 
instruments. This second phase was intended to serve as a consolidation of what 
had been achieved up to that point. However, the qualitative leap into currency 
integration had been de facto put off for an indefinite period.
As massive amounts of dollars flowed into Europe and particularly into the 
Federal Republic in the wake of the rise in oil prices, the possibility of such a leap 
became more remote. Pompidou felt that he needed to dip deeply into French cur-
rency reserves if he wanted to follow the renewed rise of the mark and thereby the 
snake overall, but in light of growing domestic criticism of his alleged inaction 
in the economic crisis, he did not want to risk it. Bonn offered short-term assis-
73 Bernard’s notes, 14 Aug. 1973, AN 5AG2, 1065; cf. Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, p. 250.
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tance of some three billion dollars, which Pompidou rejected, presumably due to 
fears of a further loss of prestige in the eyes of traditional Gaullists. Instead, he 
had Giscard declare on 19 January 1974 that France would temporarily leave the 
currency snake.74
For Brandt, this was a moment of deep skepticism regarding the future of the 
European Community. As he noted during a conversation in the chancellery in 
early April, the economic- and currency-policy philosophies of the French and of 
the Germans were too different, and it was “clearly not possible to make up for the 
economic crumbling of the Community with political initiatives.”75 Only a few 
days later, however, he was developing plans once again for unlimited support 
measures that would ease France’s return to the currency snake. According to 
the vision of the West German government, it would be possible even before 1980 
to begin with the construction of a European government on the basis of these 
plans, one that would even be controlled on the European level by Parliament.76 
Indeed, Brandt had many European policy initiatives in mind at the time he 
decided to resign from the chancellorship due to the espionage affair involving 
Günter Guillaume.
Brandt’s return to optimism had not been without justification. Giscard d’Es-
taing had been elected president of France on 19 May after Pompidou’s death on 
2 April from the blood disease that had afflicted him for many years. The new 
French leader took measures at once to combat inflation, measures that were to 
enable the country’s quick return to the currency snake. During his first Fran-
co-German summit as president, Giscard announced his intention to seek a “type 
of stability” comparable to that of the Federal Republic and a “genuine conver-
gence” of the policy of both countries.77 He was in fact able to bring the franc 
back into the currency snake in May of 1975, although with serious opposition 
from his finance minister. From 10 July 1975 onward, the franc was once again 
an official part of the European currency association, at the same exchange rate 
against the mark as in the spring of 1973.
It is therefore not appropriate to speak of a failure of the project for an eco-
nomic and currency union. In actuality, it was only that it had been taken up too 
late to be put into effect rapidly and consistently. The understandable nervous-
ness with which European societies reacted to the end of the period of continual 
74 Ibid., pp. 276, 280, 284f.
75 Klaus Happrecht, Im Kanzleramt. Tagebuch der Jahre mit Willy Brandt, Reinbek: Rowohlt, 
2001, p. 532.
76 Per Fischer’s notes, 23 April 1974, provided by Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 316f.
77 Protocol of the discussion, 9 July 1974, quoted from Hartmut Soell, Helmut Schmidt. Macht 
und Verantwortung, Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008, p. 364. 
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economic growth served to reduce the freedom for making efforts motivated by 
solidarity and also prevented the heads of state and of government from carrying 
through with the collectivization of the currencies as quickly as would have been 
necessary in order to deal with the currency crisis that had stemmed from the US. 
On the other hand, additional motives for holding fast to the European project 
sprang from the crisis and the resulting breakdown of the world currency system. 
Even though the European currency snake and the common float did not suffice 
for dealing with currency speculation, they greatly reduced the consequences of 
such speculation for trade within the Community. At the same time, the aware-
ness of the need for common policy grew as well.
Political Cooperation
As one would expect, differing views came up as well in discussing the issue of 
“progress in the area of political unity.” The most ambitious plan came from the 
Italian government, having been prepared under the leadership of Foreign Min-
ister Aldo Moro. His memorandum of 25 February 1970 envisioned nothing less 
than the incremental construction of a Political Community following the model 
of the Economic Community. It was explicitly to include the areas of defense and 
justice, which was new for the Italian position. In a first phase, there were to 
be at least quarterly meetings of the relevant expert ministers and the establish-
ment of a secretariat; during a second phase beginning in 1975, there was to be an 
incremental combining of responsibilities. In a third phase after 1980, the exist-
ing Communities were to fuse into a kind of federal state, with the common Com-
mission of the Political Community and the Economic Community as a federal 
government and the Council of Ministers exercising the presidential function.78
Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and his government appealed like-
wise for the inclusion of defense policy and justice, possibly also education 
and strong common structures. Harmel also proposed that the agreement to be 
worked out by July of 1970 immediately be presented to the candidate countries 
so that they could adhere to it as well. On 21 January, a memorandum from Bonn 
warned against “burdening the entry negotiations at the beginning with the con-
tentious issue of whether the final phase would have a supranational or a fed-
eralist character.” In concrete terms, this document only proposed for the time 
being annual meetings of the heads of state and of government as well as annual 
78 Provided by Kramer, Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa, p. 260; on Moro’s advocacy of 
increased political cooperation, also Antonio Varsori, La Cenerentola d’Europa? L’Italia e l’inte-
grazione europea dal 1947 al oggi, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010, pp. 235–241.
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meetings of the foreign ministers (on a different time schedule). The Commission 
and the Parliament were to be brought into the consultations. Although the paper 
did emphasize the necessity of common positions reflecting solidarity in foreign 
policy, the area of defense was not mentioned at all.
At a gathering on 6 March in Brussels, the foreign ministers ordered their 
Political Directors to sound out the possibilities of finding a common denomi-
nator on the issue of political unification. Chairman of the committee was the 
Belgian Étienne Davignon, who had previously worked out the passage on polit-
ical unity in the communiqué of The Hague summit along with Brandt’s state 
secretary, Egon Bahr. When the committee came together on 14 April, the French 
side finally presented a paper that was significantly more reserved than the West 
German one. Instead of political Community, it only discussed cooperation on 
foreign policy, and there was explicit emphasis that the realm of defense should 
remain outside. The decision-making freedom of the participating governments 
was not to be diminished, and cooperation with the institutions of the Commu-
nity was to be kept to a minimum. Pompidou was evidently not eager to take up 
the old debate about the Europeans’ relationship to the US. “I don’t believe in 
Political Europe,” he explained to his foreign office state secretary, “at least not 
at the present time. Perhaps there’ll come a day, 1980 or later. But I doubt that 
very much too.”79
The compromise on which first the Political Directors and then the foreign 
ministers agreed in several stages up to 20 July followed more or less the line 
set forth by Bonn. The pledge made by the governments was initially limited to 
efforts to seek harmonization in “all important issues of foreign policy.” This was 
to be achieved through meetings of the foreign ministers every six months and of 
the “Political Committee” four times a year, and more often at the request of the 
chairman. The chairmanship was to be held by the rotating Council chairman. 
The Commission “will be invited to make known its view,” though only if the 
work of the Ministers should “affect the activities of the European Communities.” 
The European Parliament was to participate as well, though only in the form of 
a “colloquium” with the members of its Foreign Affairs Committee, which was to 
take place twice a year. The issue of creating a secretariat remained open because 
France rejected the link with the Commission that the others wanted. At the same 
time, however, it was decided to produce in not more than two years another 
report that would contain proposals for the further development of political coop-
eration.80
79 Jean de Lipkowksi’s notes, 6 Jan. 1970, AN 5AG2, 1035.
80 Europa-Archiv 25 (1970), pp. D520–D524.
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Regarding the level and area of activity of this “European Political Cooper-
ation” (EPC), all of this was less than what had been capable of gaining a con-
sensus during the negotiations on the Fouchet Plans. Yet, it was also the begin-
ning of genuine cooperation on foreign policy. The report was officially adopted 
on 27 October 1970 after approval by the heads of state and of government. This 
beginning was open-ended. The advocates of greater integration were betting 
that progress would be possible right away on both the political realms included 
and on decision-making mechanisms. Joseph Luns commented that, given the 
meager result of all the hard work put into this initiative, “we need to get to work 
now.”81
Right away, in fact, Harmel attempted to make a common security and defense 
policy appetizing to his French colleague Schumann by citing the strengthen-
ing of the international position of the Federal Republic after the conclusion of 
the Treaty of Moscow on 12 August 1970. He also called attention to tendencies 
toward an understanding between the US and USSR on arms limitation as well 
as demands from the American public to reduce the American troop presence in 
Europe.82 The Federal Republic held the Council presidency in the second half of 
1970, and Scheel made use of the fact in order to promote rapid implementation 
of the decisions on political cooperation rapidly, to push through the regular noti-
fication of the ambassadors of member states in third countries and international 
organizations about decisions of the foreign ministers, and to institutionalize 
timely communication with candidates for entry. Right at their first gathering on 
19 November 1970, the foreign ministers agreed to work out common positions on 
the issues of a peace settlement in the Middle East and the planned Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). With reference to the increasing 
significance of EPC, Scheel requested an improvement in its structure a year later: 
more frequent meetings, greater focus on the Community, and the establishment 
of a permanent secretariat, which had not yet been done.83
Pompidou felt that he had been put on the defensive. At a press conference 
in January of 1971, he found it necessary to express support for the goal of a polit-
ical Europe and a common foreign policy, with which Europe could once again 
play an autonomous role in world affairs. In regard to institutional possibilities, 
81 Quoted from Charles Zorgbibe, Histoire de la construction européenne, Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 1993, pp. 102ff. Cf. Kramer, Europäisches oder atlantisches Europa, pp. 256–
267; Dujardin, Harmel, pp. 558–574; Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 164–171.
82 Harmel to Schumann, 23 Sept. 1970, quoted in Dujardin, Harmel, pp. 571ff.
83 Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 172ff. and 176; on the following, ibid., pp. 231–246; Maria 
Găinar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne. Les Neuf et la Coopération politique européenne 
de 1973 à 1980, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012, pp. 74–82.
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he cited the formation of a “European government.” As soon as it was consti-
tuted, the Parliamentary Assembly was to be further developed into a genuine 
European Parliament. All this was in any event clearly a vision for the “distant 
future,” as he admitted to Brandt.84 For the present, the insistence on the priority 
of national governments and the necessity of unanimity in their decision-making 
were more important. In February of 1972, Pompidou conceded the establishment 
of a “light” secretariat for EPC. With an eye toward traditional Gaullists, however, 
he insisted that this body must have its seat in Paris. Given that Brandt—sup-
ported by the smaller partners and also by Heath—persisted in the view that the 
seat must be in Brussels so as to promote the integration of political cooperation 
into the development of the Community, no agreement was reached at that time. 
In September of 1972, the issue of the EPC secretariat was once again tabled.
Likewise, Pompidou rejected attempts by the Dutch, Belgian, and Italian gov-
ernments to put the issues of strengthening Community organs and direct election 
of the European Parliament on the agenda of the upcoming Paris summit. Since 
November of 1970, Brandt had been pushing for this new summit in order to make 
substantial advances on the issue of deepening that had been earlier decided in 
The Hague. When after several delays the French president finally issued the invi-
tations in September of 1972, no wide-ranging decisions on institutional matters 
were consequently to be expected. Pompidou surprised the summit participants, 
among them for the first time representatives of the new member states, shortly 
before the opening on 19 October with a personal draft of a concluding declara-
tion in which the Nine were to proclaim their “intention to transform the totality 
of their relations into a European Union before the end of this decade.” Asked by 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister Gaston Thorn what that was to be, the French pres-
ident said that he himself did not know; the concept was however suited to bridge 
the gap between “my party colleagues” and the advocates of integration.85
That was exactly its function. Pompidou had sought to emancipate himself 
from the traditional Gaullists by means of a referendum on his European policy, 
but it had failed due to low participation: Only sixty percent of eligible voters had 
turned out for the 21 April vote. After that, he had only one possibility—to leave 
the issue of the institutional configuration of the Community open. The summit 
could thus only decide in general terms “that the decision-making process and the 
functioning of the organs must be improved in order increase their effectiveness.” 
84 Conversation between Brandt and Pompidou, 25 Jan. 1971, AN 5AG2, 105; Pompidou’s vague 
remarks on “European confederation” of 21 Jan. 1971 in Europa-Archiv 26 (1971), pp. D131–D137.
85 Reported by Thorn, 12 Feb. 2001, quoted in Dujardin, Harmel, p.  599. On the Paris sum-
mit, ibid., pp. 587–603; Kreutzfeldt, Point of return, pp. 318–332; Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, 
pp. 206–213; Găinar, Origines, pp. 82–86.
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As to the “how,” the organs of the Community were supposed to draft a report by 
the end of 1975; and a future summit would decide on it. In concrete terms, only 
the doubling of the number of foreign minister meetings within the framework of 
EPC was decided on: They were now to occur four times a year rather than two.86
Only after French parliamentary elections on 4 and 11 March 1973 did Pom-
pidou find himself ready for clearer engagement on behalf of a political Europe 
capable of taking action. The elections had inflicted significant losses on the 
Gaullists while at the same time confirming the government’s majority. This 
enabled Pompidou to dismiss Debré and to fill the government more completely 
with men in whom he had confidence—among them Jobert, who became foreign 
minister after Schumann’s failure to win re-election. Without having to worry 
about any more impediments from the traditional Gaullists, he could now yield 
to pressure from Heath for nuclear cooperation: At a new meeting with the British 
prime minister on 23 May, it was agreed that there should be expert consultations 
on the development of the next generation of medium-range missiles; as early as 
1975, this initiative was possibly to lead to “something common among Europe-
ans.”87 In a speech to the National Assembly on 19 June, Jobert challenged the 
partners to consider an autonomous European defense.
The resumption of de Gaulle’s plans for a Europe autonomous in defense 
policy was promoted by an initiative from Henry Kissinger, who was actually 
aiming at the exact opposite: In a speech before journalists in New York on 23 
April, Nixon’s national security advisor called for the development of a “new 
Atlantic Charter” by which 1973 was supposed to become the “Year of Europe”; 
Kissinger was seeking to firm up again the relations between the US and its Euro-
pean allies and also to put a stop to isolationist tendencies in American society. 
Given that he called for stronger European participation in common security mea-
sures and at the same time very maladroitly distinguished between the global 
interests of the US and the merely regional interests of Europe, the initiative was 
widely perceived on the other side of the Atlantic as an attempt to get the Euro-
peans to bear higher costs for the American security guarantee without conced-
ing them greater influence. That promoted understanding for French efforts on 
behalf of European autonomy, and this new openness to the idea promoted in 
turn the willingness of Pompidou to pay the necessary price for it.
86 “Erklärung der Konferenz der Staats- bzw. Regierungschefs in Paris 19./20.10.1972” in: Euro-
pa-Archiv 27 (1972), pp. D502–D508.
87 AN, 5AG2, 1015. On this and the following, Wilfried Loth, “European Political Co-operation 
and European Security in the Policies of Willy Brandt and Georges Pompidou,” in: van der Harst 
(ed.), Beyond the Customs Union, pp. 21–34.
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The understanding on a political Europe also capable of acting in matters 
of defense came all the easier because Heath—with his assurances to Pompidou 
about interpreting the Luxembourg Agreements along French lines—had by no 
means given up this orientation. John Hunt, head of the Europe Department, 
remembered in July of 1973 that “we joined to give our industry the stimulus and 
opportunities of a vastly greater market, to secure our security (particularly by 
anchoring Germany in the West) and to develop the Community into a political 
entity.” For all that, a “qualitative leap” would one day be necessary: “when a 
sufficient degree of sovereignty is passed over to a central authority to make it 
a point of no return.”88 Thus, much to Kissinger’s surprise, Jobert had Heath to 
a great extent on his side in his demand that American ambitions be countered.
After an EPC meeting of the foreign ministers on 5 June had not resulted in 
much, the second report on EPC was passed on 23 July. Beyond a doubling of 
the foreign minister meetings and an expansion of the gatherings of the Politi-
cal Committee, this document also contained a pledge not to decide on foreign 
policy issues touching on the interests of the Community without prior consul-
tation among the partners. Additionally, mechanisms were established for closer 
coordination of EPC activities with the Commission and the Parliament. The par-
ticipation of the ambassadors of third countries, already being done in practice, 
was institutionalized.89 At the same time, it was agreed that a common European 
standpoint would be worked out before the conversation with the Nixon adminis-
tration on a possible joint declaration. Lastly, the Nine also agreed to Heath’s pro-
posal to prepare an additional declaration of their own on “European identity.”
In preparing the common position, Jobert and Heath worked closely together. 
Efforts by Brandt to resolve the differences between the Europeans and the Amer-
icans by means of dialogue came to naught. At the next meeting (on 10 and 11 
September), the foreign ministers approved a draft declaration with which Wash-
ington was to acknowledge explicitly the political autonomy of the Europeans: 
The United States “welcome the intention of the nine that the Community estab-
lishes its position in world affairs as a distinct entity.”90 Little was said about 
contentious issues involving trade or currency policy, on which the US was then 
demanding concessions; on security issues, a separate declaration was proposed 
88 Hunt to Amstrong, 24 July 1973 and 18 June 1973, PREM 15/1520 und 2079, quoted in 
Kreutzfeldt, Point of return, pp. 347 and 17ff. On Heath’s efforts toward a common foreign and 
defense policy, also Ilaria Poggiolini, “How the Heath Government Revised the European Lesson: 
British Transition to EEC Membership (1972),” in: Varsori (ed.), Inside the European Community, 
pp. 313–346.
89 Europa-Archiv 28 (1973), pp. D515–D522.
90 Published in the New York Times, 24 Sept. 1973.
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for passage by the NATO Council. In this way, it was hoped that maintaining the 
American presence in Europe would not need to be paid for with greater conces-
sions on trade policy and other financial issues.
This was not at all what Kissinger had in mind. He reacted with a counter-
proposal stressing the necessity of close cooperation between the Community 
and the US and calling for intensive consultations on policy toward the East 
Bloc. Negotiations on the contrasting drafts were carried on between the Politi-
cal Directors of the Nine and representatives of the US State Department, but the 
distance between the viewpoints was not reduced. There was only agreement in 
a formal sense about issuing a declaration on Euro-American relations as well 
as a NATO declaration. After the Nine had come together on 6 November on a 
declaration regarding peace in the Middle East, one that differed markedly from 
the pro-Israeli attitude of the US in the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger largely lost 
interest in the declarations and in a European visit by Nixon that would have 
including the signing of the documents. In January of 1974, Kissinger admitted to 
Douglas-Home that they would not mean much.91
While the Nine were wrestling with a redefinition of relations to the US, two 
other initiatives were aiming at a rapid expansion of their political cooperation: 
First of all, Brandt took up Jobert’s call for talks on an autonomous European 
defense. In a conversation with Pompidou on 21 June, the chancellor pressed for 
concrete results as soon as possible in this area. The head of the Political Depart-
ment of the West German Foreign Office, Günther van Well, published a policy 
article in which he embraced the goal of an “autonomous role and responsibility 
for the European Union” in foreign and defense policy as well. In a conversa-
tion with Jobert, Scheel explained that this Political Union should also include 
defense components by 1980. In the longer term, Europe ought to “free itself from 
this ‘indissoluble’ dependence” on the US.92
In early September, Jean Monnet then urged Pompidou, Heath, and Brandt to 
accelerate the process of constructing the Political Union by having the heads of 
state and of government of the Nine constitute a “Provisional European Govern-
91 Claudia Hiepel, “Kissinger’s Year of Europe – A Challenge for the EC and the Franco-Ger-
man Relationship,” in: van der Harst (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union, pp. 277–296; idem., Brandt 
und Pompidou, pp. 304–325; Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War. Heath, 
Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, 
pp.  140–247; idem., “Asserting Europe’s Distinct Identity. The EC Nine and Kissinger’s Year of 
Europe,” in: Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz (eds.), The Strained Alliance. U.S.-Euro-
pean relations from Nixon to Carter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 195–220; 
Găinar, Origines, pp. 109–131; Catherine Hynes, The Year that Never Was. Heath, the Nixon Admin-
istration and the Year of Europe, Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009.
92 AN, 5AG 2, 1012.
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ment.” Going forward, they would then hold confidential consultations at least 
three times a year in order to oversee the fulfillment of the program of the Paris 
summit. “Insofar as it is necessary and after consultation with the president of 
the Council and the Commission of the European Communities,” they should 
develop “instructions for ministers” that “represent the member states in the 
Council of the European Communities.” This was meant to overcome the logjam 
in decision-making in the Council’s intergovernmental negotiations. Addition-
ally, Monnet immediately prescribed that the heads of state and of government 
should commit themselves to the creation of a “European government and a 
European assembly based on general elections.”93
The two initiatives conducted to different extents. Jobert and Pompidou 
reacted evasively to Brandt’s foray. Jobert wanted to discuss the defense policy 
problematic primarily within the framework of the WEU, to which obviously 
neither Denmark nor Ireland belonged. When West German Defense Minister 
Georg Leber—clearly not having coordinated with Brandt and Scheel in a signif-
icant way—encouraged France to join NATO’s “Eurogroup,” Pompidou decided 
to shelve the issue for the time being. The idea of a “Provisional European Gov-
ernment” was embraced by Jobert without reservation.94 Conversely, Pompidou—
to whom the broader prospect of establishing a European government with a 
Parliament had not been presented at all—initially signaled only guardedly his 
approval for “not all too frequent but regular” consultations on political cooper-
ation “in the circle of those responsible at the highest level.”95 Only after Brandt 
and Heath had assured him of their support did he officially propose to the part-
ners on 31 October that there be regular summits; at the same time, he urged that 
the first such meeting be held before year’s end.
The Dutch government as well as the European Parliament and the Commis-
sion opposed the idea of a “Supreme Council of the Community,” as Heath wanted 
to dub the new institution. They all feared that the Commission would lose its 
initiative function and that the Council would no longer make any decisions at 
all. Furthermore, given the form in which Pompidou had made the proposal, it 
was not clear whether the new entity would not once again steer things in the 
direction of a strict separation between Political Cooperation and the Commu-
nity. Thus, at the summit in Copenhagen on 14 and 15 December 1973, it was only 
decided that the heads of state and of government would in the future “meet more 
93 Text of the Memorandum in Monnet, Mémoires, pp.  591ff.; on the negotiations over this 
proposal, ibid., pp. 637–644; Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, “Jean Monnet et la création du Conseil eu-
ropéen,” in: Bossuat and Wilkens, Jean Monnet, pp. 399–410.
94 In conversation with Scheel, 7 Nov. 1973, AN, 5AG2, 1012.
95 Press conference of 27 Sept. 1973, excerpts in Europa-Archiv 29 (1974), pp. D26–D28.
212   Expansion and New Perspectives, 1969–1975
often” if the process of European unity or international crisis situations necessi-
tated it; in any event, these meetings were not to hamper the work of the Commu-
nity organs. More specifics were to be determined in the second half of 1974.96
In terms of content, the summit was only able to pass the “Document on the 
European Identity” that the foreign ministers and the EPC Political Committee 
had been working on since the summer. This declaration characterized “the prin-
ciples of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice, and of 
respect for human rights” as “fundamental elements of the European Identity.” 
It emphasized the necessity “that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with 
one voice” and affirmed the goal of a European Union “before the end of the 
present decade.” On the volatile issue of a European defense, it stated only that 
Europe must possess “adequate means of defence”; at the urging of the Federal 
Republic, the continuation of a “constructive dialogue” with the United States 
was also included.97
In essence, the Copenhagen summit therefore only repeated the vague for-
mulations on which agreement had been reached in Paris more than a year 
earlier. This result made all the less of an impression given the reaction of the 
heads of state and of government to the challenge by the OPEC cartel, one that 
painfully belied the unity that had so recently been proclaimed. Whereas the 
Federal Republic pushed for short-term measures benefitting the Netherlands 
above all, which had been affected by the oil embargo especially severely, France 
and Britain rejected common action and instead negotiated individually with 
Arab leaders. At the same time, Jobert and Pompidou once again appealed for the 
development of a Common Market for oil. Considering the newly discovered oil 
fields in the North Sea, Heath would only agree to that if the planned Regional 
Fund of the Community were given substantial resources. That was rejected by 
the Federal Republic at the Council of Ministers meeting following the summit, 
so both the funding of the Currency Reserve Fund and the project for a common 
energy policy remained in limbo.
96 “Verlautbarung,” Europa-Archiv 29 (1974), pp. D54–56. On the prehistory and development 
of the Copenhagen summit, especially Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 254–279.
97 English version in Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy. Key 
Documents, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 93–97. Cf. Ine Megens, “The December 1973 Declara-
tion on European Identity as the Result of Team Spirit among European Diplomats,” in: van der 
Harst (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union, pp. 317–338; Găinar, Origines, pp. 134–147.
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Crisis and New Beginning
Meanwhile, another initiative by Kissinger led to serious strains in Political Coop-
eration. In a speech on 12 December 1973, that is, shortly before the Copenhagen 
summit, the American official had called for the creation of an action group com-
prised of the most important industrial nations dependent on oil imports. Jobert 
and Pompidou correctly saw this as an attempt to push American hegemony in 
the Atlantic world by focusing on then-current worries of Western Europeans 
about oil supplies. At the same time, this American initiative endangered the 
French ambition to have Europe become an autonomous actor in this now-urgent 
field, an actor that could also work against polarization between industrial coun-
tries and oil-exporting countries.
In order to avoid the confrontation looming here, Heath urged that the 
summit examine the issue of cooperation among importing countries within the 
framework of the OECD. All the EC partners were able to agree on this, and in an 
attachment to the Copenhagen communiqué, such an action was characterized 
as “useful.” When on 9 January 1974 Nixon nevertheless invited the Western oil 
importers to a conference, the EC Council of Ministers did in principle agree to 
participate, but Commission President Ortoli and Council President Scheel were 
given a restrictive mandate for the gathering: They were not to agree either to the 
establishment of a permanent organization of importer nations or to any other 
decisions that could make dialogue with oil-exporting nations more difficult. 
Additionally, Pompidou made it publicly clear to the US president that France 
was accepting the invitation only “in order to allow Europe to assert a common 
position.”98
When the energy conference convened on 11 February in Washington, the 
American leadership overtly threatened the Europeans with a break. In a con-
versation beforehand, Kissinger told Scheel that the US could live without the 
Europeans but that the Europeans could hardly live without their most powerful 
ally. At the dinner table after the first day of the conference, Nixon reminded his 
guests of demands for the withdrawal of American troops that repeatedly came 
from the US Congress. Given that the West German government was represented 
by Helmut Schmidt, who regarded the chances for achieving a political Europe 
much more skeptically than did Brandt and Scheel, these threats sufficed to 
cause the collapse of the hard-wrought common front of the Nine. It was anyway 
the case that Heath and Brandt had only half-heartedly agreed to join that front, 
given their belief that they were dependent on the US for containing the explosion 
98 Pompidou to Nixon, 6 Feb. 1974, quoted in Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 295ff. On this 
and the following, cf. ibid., pp. 383–402; Möckli, European Foreign Policy, pp. 252–300.
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in oil prices and attempting to deal with their consequences. Schmidt warned of a 
collapse of the balance of power in Europe if US troops were withdrawn; this also 
convinced the smaller allies to accede to a great extent to the American demand 
for the establishment of a coordination group as well as for common preparation 
for a conference with the oil-exporting countries. On 13 February, a communi-
qué to that effect was signed by eight of the nine EPC representatives. There was 
nothing left for Jobert to do but withhold his approval of the procedural portions 
of the document. In a press conference, he complained that Schmidt had opted 
for the US and thereby against Europe.
Kissinger’s triumph was short lived, however. Three weeks later, at an EPC 
foreign ministers meeting on 4 March, the Eight decided to embrace not only 
the US plan for establishing a joint front of importing states but also the French 
concept of an Arab-European dialogue. This envisioned the formation of joint 
working groups of the Nine and of all nineteen member states of the Arab League, 
which would aim for a joint foreign ministers conference. Kissinger viewed such 
a gathering as highly damaging to his own crisis management in the Middle East; 
in the European plans, he had been taken into account only insofar as the date 
of the proposed gathering was left open and its occurrence made dependent on 
productive results from the working groups. This did not prevent Kissinger from 
asserting that “whatever was achieved in Washington is more than undone by 
this decision.”99 In a television interview on 15 March, Nixon made a public 
threat, saying that the Europeans could not have both protection and confronta-
tion at the same time.
In reality, Kissinger was not as far from success as he thought during his 
initial bout of frustration. True, American threats did not dissuade the Europeans 
from their project for a Euro-Arab dialogue. Yet, the Europeans were harboring 
increasing doubts as to whether the goal of an autonomous Europe, which had 
generated excitement in the second half of 1973, was actually achievable. In a 
session of his party caucus, Brandt came to the conclusion that he had to “go a 
bit further with America due to security” than with France; and in a conversation 
with Kissinger, Scheel explicitly distanced himself from the goal of an “indepen-
dent European security system.”100 Pompidou, who perceived this at least in the 
atmosphere, concentrated once again wholly on the national components of his 
independence policy. In a conversation with Leonid Brezhnev during a state visit 
to Moscow on 13 March, the Frenchman refused to conceal the tensions among 
99 In a conversation with Scheel on 4 March 1974, AAPD 1974 II, pp. 287–289.
100 SPD caucus session, 12 March 1974; conversation between Scheel and Kissinger, 24 March 
1974, quoted in Hiepel, Brandt und Pompidou, pp. 311 and 315, respectively.
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the Nine with “what only appears to be development of European integration” 
and declared a common defense with nuclear components to be obsolete.101
The project for a political Europe received another blow when Edward Heath 
was defeated at the polls. Whereas Harold Wilson had been wholly engaged in 
trying somehow to maintain the balance between a party majority hostile to 
Europe and British commitments stemming from treaty obligations, Foreign Min-
ister Callaghan roundly rejected the Political Union as well as the economic and 
currency union due to vague fears of foreign control from “Brussels.” After his 
initial experiences with the pragmatic coordination within EPC, he soon gave 
his approval to it; yet, regarding its further development into a common foreign 
policy, he persistently made reference to contrasting national interests and per-
ceptions. A European Union was “unrealistic” and “not desired,” as he declared 
during his first appearance in the EC Council of Ministers on 1 April 1974; and the 
project of a currency union was “dangerously overambitious.”102
Without foreign-policy experience and demonstratively turning away from 
Heath’s emphasis on European autonomy, Callaghan moreover believed that he 
could once again make the “special relationship” with the US the cornerstone 
of British foreign policy. The West German government sought to establish a 
consultation mechanism between EPC and Washington, which was intended to 
defuse the conflict that Kissinger had forced; but Callaghan for his part insisted 
on absolute freedom of action in British policy toward the US. In a crisis meeting 
at Schloss Gymnich near Bonn on 20 and 21 April, the foreign ministers were thus 
only able to approve rules for such a mechanism, ones that opened up possibil-
ities for blocking EPC. Whereas Scheel had proposed that the Council president 
could consult the American government at a member’s request after the Political 
Committee had already arrived at a common position, the adopted rules allowed 
member governments to demand a consultation “of an allied or friendly state” at 
any time.103 If the partners did not support the demand, then discussion of the 
issue at hand was in practical terms at an end.
Moreover, Callaghan’s aversion to the Political Union offered Kissinger an 
unexpected opportunity to bring the conflict over the European-American dec-
larations to an end that coincided with his own views after all. Encouraged by 
Kissinger, the British prime minister had gotten initial agreement from his EC 
partners at Gymnich for a NATO declaration on the occasion of the twenty-fifth 
101 AN, 5AG2, 1019; excerpts published in Roussel, Pompidou, pp. 617–623.
102 Bulletin of the European Communities 3 (1974), pp. 14–19.
103 Only after further negotiations was it written down in a non-paper of the West German 
Council presidency that was acknowledged by the foreign ministers on 10 June 1974, AAPD 1974 
I, p. 717.
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anniversary of the alliance, an initiative that was supposed to be independent of 
the policy statements that had not yet been made. When Callaghan presented the 
draft of such a declaration in the NATO Council on 15 June, it was so comprehen-
sive that it could de facto replace the policy statements. The Eight reacted to the 
fact that the European Union was not mentioned at all in the document. Finally, 
Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing were satisfied with a formulation stating “that 
further progress towards unity, which the member states of the European Com-
munity are determined to make, should in due course have a beneficial effect on 
the contribution to the common defense of the Alliance.” In this form, the “Atlan-
tic Declaration” was passed by the NATO foreign ministers in Ottawa on 19 June, 
together with a pledge “to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consulta-
tions.”104 Nixon attended the signing of the document in Brussels on 26 June.
The Ottawa Declaration did not constitute a pledge by the Europeans to 
stronger incorporation into the American strategy as Kissinger had envisioned. 
Still less did it speak of an autonomous role for the Europeans in international 
politics, as not only Pompidou and Jobert but also Heath and Brandt had sought. 
As was the case with the new chancellor, the new French president also viewed 
securing American cooperation in dealing with the acute economic crisis more 
important than rapid progress on the road to European autonomy. Given that the 
Ottawa Declaration included a commitment by the US to maintain troop levels 
high enough so as not to endanger the credibility of allied deterrence, the project 
for an autonomous European defense became less urgent once again.105
Moreover, Callaghan’s campaign against any further development of the Com-
munity practically brought negotiations on the institutional configuration of the 
European Union to a halt. Consumed by its own crisis, the EPC Political Commit-
tee did not produce any paper at all on this. The Permanent Representatives of the 
Ministers to the Commission and an ad hoc group of high-ranking bureaucrats, 
to whom the Council of Ministers had in February assigned the task of working 
out a proposal, delivered nothing more than a nine-page catalogue of questions 
in the last week of June. Given the impossibility of agreeing on the substance of 
the European Union, it was nothing less than a stroke of luck that the summit 
planned for the end of the West German Council presidency had to be postponed 
due to the death of Pompidou and the resignation of Brandt. In a conversation 
with Gaston Thorn on 25 June, Wilson remarked that the concept of Union should 
be dropped and replaced by “some long German word like ‘Gemütlichkeit.’”106
104 Europa-Archiv 29 (1974), pp. D339–341.
105 Möckli, European Foreign Policy, pp. 301–338.
106 Conversation between Wilson and Thorn, 25 June 1974, PRO PREM 16/11, quoted in Möckli, 
European Foreign Policy, p. 349; cf. ibid., pp. 346–350.
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In any event, the efforts by Schmidt and Giscard to ensure good relations with 
the US did not change the fact that these new leaders of the Franco-German duo 
were interested in strengthening European identity as well. The two men knew 
one another from encounters in Monnet’s Action Committee, which Schmidt had 
joined as SPD parliamentary chairman in the era of the Grand Coalition. For both 
leaders, the awareness of the necessity of economic integration was for the time 
being at the center of their engagement in European politics; this did not however 
mean that concern for Europe’s ability to take action was foreign to them. In his 
government declaration of 17 May, Schmidt characterized the “goal of a European 
Political Union” as “more urgent than ever.” At a Franco-German summit on 9 
July, Giscard declared his willingness to contribute to “a new stage in the con-
struction of Europe.”107
Both therefore responded positively when Monnet called for them to take 
“common action” in order to bring Europe out of the crisis and “inspire hope once 
again.”108 During a summer vacation, Schmidt worked out “a longish private 
paper on his conceptions of current Europe policy,” as he reported to Italian 
Prime Minister Mariano Rumor. Schmidt sent the document to Giscard with the 
request for a conversation and a proposal for “inviting the government leaders of 
the EC states to a long private dinner—without bureaucrats, only interpreters. If 
anything positive emerges from the private conversations, the foreign ministers 
and finance ministers can be asked to pursue those things further. If there is no 
agreement on this or that point and it remains unknown to the public, then no 
harm could come of it.”109
In terms of content, Schmidt wanted increased coordination of EC activities 
by the Council of Foreign Ministers and their Permanent Representatives, the tran-
sition to majority decision-making in the Council, and the incorporation of EPC 
into the Council of Ministers. In a conversation on the evening of 2 September, he 
reminded Giscard of the need to develop a common viewpoint on arms control 
negotiations and strategic questions in general. He also urged the French presi-
dent to participate in measures that the Eight and the US had embraced in con-
junction with the Washington Energy Conference. For his part, Giscard insisted 
that there first of all must be a common energy-policy program among the Nine. 
He asked that consideration of the defense problematic be deferred because there 
107 Bulletin der Bundesregierung 18.5.1974, pp. 593–604; Soell, Helmut Schmidt, p. 364. Cf. Mat-
thias Schulz, “Vom ‘Atlantiker’ zum ‘Europäer’? Helmut Schmidt, deutsche Interessen und die 
europäische Einigung,” in: König and Schulz (eds.), Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 185–220.
108 Monnet to Giscard d’Estaing, 21 June 1974, AMK 29/3/53.
109 Schmidt to Giscard, 26 Aug. 1974, AN 5AG3 AE 66; conversation between Schmidt and Rumor, 
30 Aug. 1974, provided by Soell, Helmut Schmidt, p. 371. On the following, ibid., pp. 373–380.
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was still a need for clarification about it in Paris. Regarding the incorporation 
of EPC into the work of the Foreign Ministers Council, he insisted on separate 
agendas and discussion in the absence of the Commission president. He wanted 
to concede majority decision-making in the Council of Ministers only for “indi-
vidual areas to be incrementally expanded.” On the other hand, with encourage-
ment from Monnet,110 Giscard appealed for resumption of the project of regular 
meetings of the heads of state and of government that had gotten derailed at the 
Copenhagen summit.
Schmidt and Giscard agreed that if there was a favorable response to the pro-
posals from the other leaders, then the next summit should also be allowed to 
take place during France’s Council presidency; the appropriate decisions were 
to be dealt with there. During a dinner at the Élysée Palace on 14 September 
attended by the nine heads of state and of government as well as Commission 
President Ortoli, Giscard explained that the regular meetings (at least three and 
as many as four annually) would over time make the new organ the “highest 
instance” of the Community. As the representatives of the small states’ worried 
that the Commission would be rendered impotent, he offered direct elections and 
greater authority for Parliament; it was to receive control over the budget as well 
as initiative rights that were more binding in nature. In the Council of Ministers 
three days later, Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues officially proposed the 
creation of the new organ. In so doing, he suggested that it be named “perhaps 
‘European Council.’”111
The concession on the issue of direct elections and parliamentary rights 
proved sufficient to ease the concerns of the smaller states this time. Wilson—who 
was clearly on the defensive among the heads of state and of government and 
who in the meantime had begun wholly concentrating on winning material con-
cessions that could be presented to British voters as an argument for remaining in 
the Community—raised no fundamental objections. Neither did the Commission 
voice negative views any longer; by including the Commission in his preparations 
for the decision, Giscard had taken care to ensure that it would see the new entity 
as an opportunity rather than a danger to its own place in the decision-making 
process of the Community.
110 Monnet to Sauvagnargues, 1 July 1974, FJME, AMK C/H6.
111 Hattersley to Foreign Office, 17 Sept. 1974, PRO PREM 16/75. On the dinner at the Élysée 
Palace and above all the notes by Schmidt of 16 Sept. 1974, AAPD 1974 II, pp. 1178–1185; on the 
following, also Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Filling the EEC Leadership Vacuum? The Creation of 
the European Council in 1974,” in: Cold War History 10/3 (2010), pp. 315–339; Găinar, Origines, 
pp. 315–324.
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The Paris summit of 9 and 10 December 1974 was thus able to approve the 
introduction of the European Council, albeit without officially giving it a name. 
There were to be three summits per year, and more if necessary; a further conces-
sion to the smaller states was that one of these meetings was to be held in Brus-
sels or Luxembourg, the other two in the country of the half-yearly Council presi-
dent. The Commission president was to participate and—something that Giscard 
had not originally envisioned—so too would the foreign ministers. The issue of a 
separate secretariat, which France and Britain wanted but the smaller states did 
not, was left open. The Council was to concern itself with foreign policy and all 
other questions of common interest; EPC was de facto integrated into the work of 
the Council of Ministers. Likewise, it was decided that the European Parliament 
would be directly elected starting in 1978; its areas of responsibility were to be 
expanded; and the practice of unanimous decision-making in the Council was to 
be dropped.
The British and Danish governments expressed reservations about the intro-
duction of direct elections to Parliament in 1978, and these viewpoints were 
noted in the common concluding communiqué. Regarding the goal of a Euro-
pean Union, the offer of Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans was accepted: 
to produce by the end of 1975 a “summary report” based on consultations with 
all governments, the Commission, the Parliament, as well as important political 
representatives in all member states. This spared the British government from 
having to take a position on the further development of the Communities before 
the completion of renegotiations; at the same time, this also prevented the issues 
of increased integration and unification from being shoved aside. The communi-
qué contained a commitment to a “complete conception of the European Union” 
as well as the strengthening of the goal of economic and currency union. Dates 
and deadlines earlier agreed upon were not explicitly repeated, however.112
Tindemans purposely left plenty of time for the production of the report. 
He did not visit Britain before the positive outcome of the referendum on 5 June 
1975, and his sounding out of Denmark, France, Italy, and the Federal Republic 
occurred only after he had spoken to the British government as well as represen-
tatives of influential parties and organizations in the UK in late June and early 
July. In mid-November, Helmut Schmidt sought to accelerate the decision-mak-
ing process by sending his Council colleagues and the Commission president a 
position paper that stemmed from consultations within the Bonn government. 
Schmidt hoped that the document could be discussed at the upcoming Council 
meeting in early December in Rome. After the British government had signaled its 
112 Europa-Archiv 30 (1975), pp. D41–43; on Tindemans’ initiative, Kreutzfeldt, Point of return, 
pp. 457–459 and 464ff.
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unwillingness to take a position on institutional questions so early, the chancellor 
gave up the idea of discussing it in Rome. Tindemans then presented his report on 
29 December in the form of a confidential letter to his colleagues on the Council. 
He had initially hoped that discussion of the document could be kept confidential 
until the next meeting of the Council in the spring of 1976. Then however he opted 
to present it to the public on 7 January 1976.113
Tindemans’ report hovered a little above the level that in the meantime was 
capable of a consensus between Giscard d’Estaing and the West German gov-
ernment. The document spoke out clearly for “strengthening the common insti-
tutional apparatus” to the extent necessary, even by means of “adjusting the 
treaties.” Also, the difference between the meetings of the ministers on Political 
Cooperation and the meetings of the Council ought to be eliminated altogether; 
the currency snake ought to be transformed into an EC institution that “clearly 
bears the visible character of the Community.” Majority decision-making ought 
to be “the norm” in Community affairs and also in foreign policy areas in which 
the members had committed themselves to a common policy. Parliament ought to 
receive a genuine right of initiative as well as the right to confirm the appointment 
of the president of the Commission by the European Council. That official ought 
to be able to choose his own colleagues, though in accordance with the schedule 
of national distribution; also, the Commission ought to receive more executive 
authority.114
Tindemans may have hoped to be able to get a majority of Council members 
to commit themselves more or less to this program due to the pressure of public 
opinion if nothing else. The participation of the Nine at the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe had been characterized by unity, solidarity, and 
deftness and had decisively contributed to its successful conclusion on 1 August 
1975.115 This along with France’s return to the currency snake did give encourage-
ment to go beyond consolidation of what had been achieved in the era of Brandt 
and Pompidou. Regarding possible progress on the way to an economic and cur-
rency union—seen by Tindemans as especially urgent—the report embraced the 
idea of a vanguard made up of a core group of the economically stronger member 
113 Ibid., pp. 500–517; the memorandum of the West German government of 3 Nov. 1975 in AAPD 
1975, pp. 1587–1595.
114 “Die Europäische Union. Bericht von Leo Tindemans, Premierminister von Belgien, an den 
Europäischen Rat,” Brussels, 1976; reprinted in, among others, Jürgen Schwarz (ed.), Der Aufbau 
Europas. Pläne und Dokumente 1945–80, Bonn: Osang, 1980, pp. 527–552.
115 Möckli, European Foreign Policy, pp. 99–139; Angela Romano, “The Nine and the Confer-
ence of Helsinki: A challenging game with the Soviets,” in: van der Harst (ed.), Beyond the Cus-
toms Union, pp. 83–104.
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states, as Brandt had already proposed in November of 1974.116 It was clearly an 
open question as to whether the governments supportive of integration would 
take up this tactical possibility. Just as unclear was the extent to which the British 
and the Danish governments would be prepared to follow the majority on the way 
to more efficiency and more democracy in the European construction. In a conver-
sation with Tindemans, Callaghan had indeed spoken as though he were leaning 
in that direction; however, his conceptions regarding institutional arrangements 
and the date of their introduction remained rather vague.
Jean Monnet took the establishment of the European Council and the deter-
mination that there would be direct elections to the European Parliament in the 
future as the occasion for dissolving the Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe on 9 May 1975. His advanced age—he would be celebrating his eighty-sev-
enth birthday in November of 1975—undoubtedly contributed to this decision, but 
the primary reason was undeniable: Given that the “holders of the highest deci-
sion-making power in each state” were watching over the progress of European 
integration, it seemed to him that the committee “was now less necessary and 
less in a position to carry out a task that according to all the treaties was entrusted 
to the organs of the Community, the governments, and the new institutions.”117 
He clearly was counting on the abilities of Giscard and Schmidt in the years ahead 
to fulfill the responsibilities growing out of that.
116 “Rede vor der Französischen Sektion der Europäischen Bewegung 19.11.1974,” Europa-Ar-
chiv 30 (1975), p. D36.
117 Monnet, Mémoires, p. 606.
5  Consolidation, 1976–1984
The Path to Direct Elections
Helmut Schmidt and his cabinet regarded the Tindemans Report as “realistic 
and constructive.” However, they rejected the proposal to move forward with a 
monetary union among the economically-stronger states, likewise the proposal 
for accelerating this move by making short- and medium-term currency assis-
tance automatic and transferring a large portion of foreign currency holdings 
to the monetary fund. On the other hand, they approved the proposed institu-
tional reforms without exception, even where these went beyond the 3 November 
program of the West German government—for example, in having the Commis-
sion president confirmed by the European Parliament. After a cabinet meeting on 
3 March, Schmidt wrote to Council President Gaston Thorn, who was serving in 
the first half of 1976, that it was very important for the Federal Republic to have 
the foundations of the European Union laid that year.1
In a telephone conversation with Schmidt, however, Valéry Giscard d’Es-
taing withdrew two concessions that he had made in the autumn of 1974: He 
now rejected the idea of a right of initiative for the European Parliament and also 
viewed the transition to majority decision-making in the Council as no longer 
opportune. Additionally, confirmation of the Commission president by Parlia-
ment was completely out of the question for him. Instead, he wanted the jam 
in decision-making to be resolved through the creation of a “Directorate” of the 
large member states. It was clear that the harsh criticism coming from traditional 
Gaullists around Michel Debré to the policy decision for the direct election of Par-
liament had persuaded the French president to return to de Gaulle’s positions 
regarding the authority of Parliament and the issue of majority decision-making.
Schmidt succeeded in convincing Giscard to abandon the idea of a director-
ate. It could not have won approval anyway given the justified aversion of the 
smaller member states to such a plan. Shared positions on institutional issues 
were no longer sufficient to allow a common initiative on sweeping implemen-
tation of the Tindemans Program, however. At the next meeting of the European 
Council, on 1 and 2 April 1976 in Luxembourg, Schmidt and Giscard concentrated 
1 Undated draft letter from Schmidt to Thorn and draft of a declaration by the chancellor, 
quoted in Matthias Schulz, “The Reluctant European. Helmut Schmidt, the European Com-
munity, and Transatlantic Relations,” in: Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwartz (eds.), The 
Strained Alliance. U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, pp. 279–307, here pp. 284ff. On this and the following, cf. Soell, Helmut Schmidt, 
pp. 437–440.
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on having a decision made at least on the issue of organizing direct elections. 
After a brief though not unfriendly discussion, the Tindemans Report was referred 
to the foreign ministers for further consultation. The only thing decided was that 
the review of the report was to be concluded before the end of the year.2
Thorn and Tindemans were very displeased that discussion of the report did 
not advance in the Council of Foreign Ministers either. The document was handed 
off to the Committee of Permanent Representatives, where the well-known antag-
onisms collided. New British Prime Minister James Callaghan—replacing Harold 
Wilson, who had resigned for health reasons on 16 March—did seek to shake off 
the reputation of being an impediment; he was not prepared however to support 
substantial reforms that would threaten the unity of the Labour Party, which 
had been arduously maintained after the positive outcome of the referendum.3 
The Council, meeting again on 29 and 30 November 1976 in The Hague, could 
thus take only an overall positive position, which required no commitments in 
the short term at least. The declaration stated that “The European Council indi-
cated its very great interest in the analyses and proposals put forward by Mr. 
Tindemans. It shared the views expressed by the Belgian Prime Minister on the 
need to build European Union by strengthening the practical solidarity of the 
nine Member States and their peoples, both internally and in their relations with 
the outside world, and gradually to provide the Union with the instruments and 
institutions necessary for its operation.” The Commission was given the task of 
annually preparing a report on progress toward a European Union.4
For the committed proponents of strengthening European institutions, there 
was great disappointment over the outcome of this process, which in essence had 
begun seven years earlier with the resolutions of the summit in The Hague. That 
sentiment, along with the resulting catchword “Eurosclerosis” for describing the 
second half of the 1970s, should not hide the fact that the positive position on 
the Tindemans Report did constitute a significant step toward consolidating the 
European Community: Both the British and the Danish governments, which had 
demonstratively opposed the extension of economic integration to other policy 
areas up to that point, had now explicitly acknowledged the goal of a European 
Union. In general, moreover, the consensus had grown as to what was to be 
understood by this consciously vague formulation: a coalescence of political and 
economic integration, the development of a common foreign and defense policy, 
as well as the strengthening of the institutions necessary for it. Disagreements as 
to priorities and methods might well continue, even in polemical form; and prog-
2 Bulletin of the European Communities, 1976/4, p. 83.
3 Kreutzfeldt, Point of Return, pp. 528–531.
4 Bulletin of the European Communities, 1976/11, p. 93.
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ress on the way to this Union might thereby become a protracted, often tortuous 
and wearisome process. Yet, there was no longer any doubt as to the direction of 
this progress. The danger that the Community would break apart—undeniable 
during the economic crisis of 1973–74—no longer existed.
At Rome in early December of 1975, the European Council determined that 
elections to the European Parliament would take place “at a uniform time between 
May and June 1978.”5 During discussion of the election law, however, opposition 
emerged from various directions to the proposal that Parliament had presented 
only a few weeks after the policy decision at the Paris summit of December 1974. 
France bridled at differing standards for considering the population totals of the 
large member states, which would result in a French contingent smaller than that 
of the British and, above all, of the West Germans. All the large member states 
found the disproportional consideration of the small states too high. Denmark 
continued to insist on the principle of indirect elections: This was to ensure that 
the elections to the European Parliament in the country would be linked to those 
to the Folketing and that the Danish Parliament would then send deputies from 
its own ranks to Strasbourg.
An agreement on the distribution of parliamentary mandates was reached 
only at the Council meeting in Brussels on 12 and 13 July 1976. There were to be 
410 seats, just over three times the number sent to Parliament up to that point, 
and the four “big” ones—West Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy—would 
each receive eighty-one. The “small ones” had to content themselves with fewer 
seats than had been envisioned in Parliament’s proposal: the Netherlands with 
twenty-five, Belgium with twenty-four (half for Flanders and half for Wallonia), 
Denmark with sixteen, Ireland with fifteen, and Luxembourg with six. They would 
still however be over-represented: This ensured that in the smaller member states 
too, various political groupings of any significance would have a chance. Yet, 
there was no agreement on a uniform electoral procedure, as was required by 
the Treaties of Rome; nor was a date set for abolishing the provisional system of 
using the various national election procedures. The Council had to concede to the 
Danes what was nothing but a concealed deviation from the principle of direct 
elections for at least a transition period. Only with this condition was it possible 
for the Council to pass the “Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of 
the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage” on 20 September 1976.6
5 Europa-Archiv 31 (1976), pp. D7ff.
6 See Martin Bangemann and Roland Bieber, Die Direktwahl – Chance oder Sackgasse für Eu-
ropa. Analysen und Dokumente, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1976; Gerhard Brunn, “Das Europäische 
Parlament auf dem Weg zur ersten Direktwahl 1979,” in: Knipping and Schönwald (eds.), Auf-
bruch, pp. 47–72; Thierry Chopin, “Le Parlement européen,” in: Serge Berstein and Jean-François 
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Before the measure could be implemented, there were further hurdles to be 
overcome in France and Britain. The Gaullist opposition around Michel Debré 
attacked the act during its ratification as unconstitutional, a position that notably 
put them on the same page as the Communists: The argument went that the act 
amounted to a surrender of national sovereignty not envisioned in the consti-
tution of the Fifth Republic. Giscard d’Estaing responded by presenting the bill 
to the Constitutional Council for review. In a ruling of 30 December 1976, this 
body confirmed the constitutionality of the measure but did so on grounds that 
impeded the envisioned extension of Parliament’s authority: Sovereignty could 
“only be national”; direct elections created “neither a sovereignty nor institu-
tions whose nature” would be “incompatible with observance of national sover-
eignty.”7 The government then added a stipulation to the ratification law that 
banned any expansion of the authority of Parliament not assumed to be compat-
ible with the constitution.
In Britain, the ruling Labour Party ran into trouble over the electoral proce-
dure with the Liberals, with whom they were now in coalition after having lost 
their outright majority. Whereas most Labour MPs wanted to utilize the British 
majority-vote system for elections to the European Parliament, the Liberals 
insisted on a proportional system. In February of 1977, Callaghan opted for a bill 
providing for a proportional electoral system but allowed his party as well as his 
cabinet, whose members were quite divided on the issue, freedom to vote as they 
wished. The following November, a majority of the House of Commons approved 
British participation in the elections but rejected the proportional system. Conse-
quently, a new bill had to be worked out; but it could not be passed in time for the 
agreed-upon election date of May or June 1978.8 At a Council meeting on 7 and 
8 April 1978 in Copenhagen, it was therefore decided that the elections would be 
postponed for a year; they were now set for the period of 7 to 10 June 1979.
The prospect of the first direct elections to the European Parliament led the 
great families of parties in Europe to increase their transnational cooperation. 
After a “Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community” had 
been founded in April of 1974, there followed as early as March of 1976 a “Federa-
tion of Liberal and Democratic Parties in the European Community” and in April 
of that year the “European People’s Party,” an alliance of Christian Democratic 
parties. They all built upon connections that had already been established in the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC. Given the heterogeneity of the participating 
Sirinelli (eds.), Les années Giscard. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Europe 1974–1981, Paris: Armand 
Colin, 2006, pp. 153–189.
7 Ibid., p. 173.
8 Young, Britain and European Unity, p. 132.
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parties and the often very different national contexts in which they operated, the 
common identity of these alliances remained relatively weak, at least as mea-
sured against the coherence of parties on the national level. Thus, for example, 
the Confederation of the Socialist Parties was unable to agree on a common plat-
form for the European elections and instead had to content itself with a vague 
“appeal” to the voters. For their part, Christian Democrats were able to adopt 
such a platform but then began disputing among themselves as to whether they 
should participate along with the British and other European conservatives in a 
“European Democrat Union” that had been founded in 1978.9
At the same time, the parties made use of the European election campaign 
for conducting skirmishes on the national level. To an extent, the campaign 
was exploited as a test vote and for other party-political purposes. For example, 
by means of a campaign against the alleged enslavement of France by foreign 
powers and supranational politics, Jacques Chirac positioned his Gaullist party 
vis-à-vis the successful combination of Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Inde-
pendent Republicans (the party of Giscard). In Britain, the European elections 
stood wholly in the shadow of recent parliamentary elections, which five weeks 
earlier had given the Conservatives, now under Margaret Thatcher, a clear major-
ity once again. In Italy, national parliamentary elections took place on 3 June 
1979, that is, only a few days before the European vote.
The emergence of a European public was not fostered by this kind of approach 
to the European election campaign. On the contrary, it served to increase the 
alienation between European politics and the citizens of the Community, which 
had grown anyway due to the endless quarrels over expansion and deepening 
as well as the increasing complexity of regulations on the European level. Under 
these circumstances, it was the case that voter participation rates were diverg-
ing greatly, corresponding to the situation in the national debates on European 
policy: In Britain, only 31.6 percent of voters saw fit to participate in elections to 
the European Parliament, and in Denmark, 47.1 percent. With some 57.8 percent, 
the Netherlands was more or less representative of the whole; likewise France 
(60.7 percent), Ireland (63.6 percent), and the Federal Republic (65.7 percent). 
Turnout was significantly over eighty percent in countries with mandatory voting: 
Italy (85.5 percent), Luxembourg (88.9 percent), and Belgium (91.6 percent). 
Another factor in these latter two cases was that the seat of European institu-
tions had in the meantime become a significant bond for heterogeneous people 
groups. Overall, turnout was some 62.4 percent. That was sufficient to legitimize 
9 Jürgen Mittag (ed.), Politische Parteien und europäische Integration. Entwicklung und Pers-
pektiven transnationaler Parteienkooperation in Europa, Essen: Klartext, 2006; Kaiser, Christian 
Democracy, pp. 315–317.
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the directly-elected Parliament but did not however contribute significantly to 
strengthening its position vis-à-vis the national governments.10
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing made use of the election results to profile his Euro-
pean policy more symbolically once again. After having already demonstratively 
declined in 1975 to commemorate the anniversary of the German capitulation of 
8 May 1945, he now promoted the election of Simone Veil as first president of the 
directly-elected European Parliament. He had persuaded this liberal minister, a 
Jew who as an adolescent had survived Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen, to head 
the list of candidates for the united “Union pour la Démocratie Française” (UDF). 
After this list had achieved an impressive victory over the competing Gaullists 
led by Chirac, Giscard sought to make the election of Veil palatable to Helmut 
Schmidt in terms of affirming Franco-German reconciliation. Foreign Minister 
Jean-François Poncet sought to work along the same lines with his counterparts, 
and Giscard’s friend Michel Poniatowski did so among the newly-elected dep-
uties. These efforts were successful: Simone Veil was elected president in the 
second round of voting on 17 July 1979, even though the liberals were by no means 
the largest faction in the new Parliament.11
Not only did the election of Simon Veil contribute to strengthening Giscard’s 
position vis-à-vis his declared rival Chirac and bolstering his image as a “Euro-
pean.” Veil was in fact a committed European and with her moral authority con-
tributed greatly to increasing the self-confidence of the European representatives 
and promoting coherence among them. True, their role remained vague due to 
their restricted authority, the lack of career prospects, and the large size of their 
electoral districts, which limited their function as representatives. Yet, by means 
of a host of inquiries and petitions, they were able to develop a function as peren-
nial admonishers, which went significantly beyond the possibilities available to 
preceding Parliaments with their indirectly-elected members and their sporadic 
meetings.12
10 Cf. Rudolf Hrbek, “Die EG nach den Direktwahlen: Bilanz und Perspektiven,” in: Integration 
2 (1979), pp. 95–109; Birte Wassenberg, “La campagne pour les élections européennes de 1979 
en France et en Allemagne: l’image de l’Europe,” in: Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Wilfried Loth, and 
Charles Barthel (eds.), Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne, Brus-
sels: Émile Bruylant, 2007, pp. 264–284.
11 Maurice Szafran, Simone Veil. Destin, Paris: Flammarion, 1994, pp. 328–330.
12 Cf. Emil J. Kirchner, The European Parliament. Performances and Prospects, Aldershot: 
Gower, 1984; Richard Corbett, The European Parliament’s Role in Closer EU Integration, Bas-
ingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001; Aurélie Élisa Gfeller, “Une militante du 
parlementarisme européen: Simone Veil,” in: Journal of European Integration History 17 (2011), 
pp. 61–72.
228   Consolidation, 1976–1984
The greater self-confidence of the directly-elected Parliament also led to 
greater use of its budgetary instruments. In accordance with an agreement 
between the Council and the Commission of 22 April 1975, Parliament would from 
1977 onward have the right to be heard before the Council passed new legal acts 
“that have weighty financial impacts and whose issuance is not required on the 
basis of earlier legal acts.” Thanks to a treaty amendment of 22 July 1975, Parlia-
ment could also reject the entire budget “for important reasons” by a two-thirds 
majority of votes cast; additionally, it was given authority to scrutinize the Com-
mission’s budgetary policy. In exercising this authority, it was supported by the 
newly-established European Court of Auditors (ECA).13 With its very first budget 
meeting, the new Parliament made use of its right to reject the budget in its 
entirety, so the Community had to employ an emergency budget until the middle 
of 1980. Parliament was thereby able to win an increase in expenditures for struc-
tural policy and increase the pressure for an expansion of revenue.
From that point onward, Parliament regularly wrestled with the Council over 
the division of expenditure between the Common Agricultural Policy, which con-
tinued to garner the lion’s share of the budget, and the promotion of structural 
improvements through the Regional Fund, Social Fund, industry policy, and the 
promotion of research—all of which the large majority of MPs regarded as more 
pressing concerns. Initially, there was only modest progress on this agenda. Over 
the medium term, however, Parliament succeeded in compelling a debate on 
the reform of Commission policies, one that took place on the level of both the 
Council of Ministers and the European Council.
All in all, the European Parliament gained influence over the Commission’s 
proposals and, to a lesser extent, over the decisions of the Council of Minis-
ters as well. This increase in the power of European institutions was partially 
offset however by the fact that the European Council increasingly took on deci-
sion-making on essential issues. True, the Commission participated in these deci-
sions, which still needed to be unanimous, in the role of an advisor and assistant. 
However, the European Council, as an informal organ not anchored in the trea-
ties, did not need to consult Parliament (unlike the Council of Ministers); nor 
did it need to offer justifications to Parliament. The decisions of the European 
Council were de facto made without any parliamentary participation. A chasm 
loomed between the European-policy debate in Parliament and the highest deci-
sion-making levels of the Community, something that was detrimental to the 
legitimization of European policy in the eyes of voters.
The fragility of this construction became manifest in a twofold traveling 
circus: Whereas the European Council met sequentially in the capital of the 
13 Text of the agreement and of the treaty amendment in Lipgens, 45 Jahre, pp. 604–610.
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Council president of the first half of the year, then in Brussels or Luxembourg, and 
then in the capital of the Council president of the second half of the year, the seat 
of the European Parliament remained in Strasbourg. Parliament was normally in 
session one week per month. Yet, the meetings of committees and party caucuses 
between sessions increasingly took place in Brussels due to cooperation with the 
Council of Ministers and the Commission. The Parliamentary administration con-
tinued to have its seat in Luxembourg. The increased burden that resulted from 
this situation meant that the number of European MPs who also held a seat in a 
national legislature—still almost one-third in the Parliament of 1979—decreased 
from election to election. To a corresponding degree, it became an ever-greater 
problem to connect European politics to the national parliaments.
The European Monetary System
The blocking of substantial Franco-German initiatives by Giscard d’Estaing’s 
Gaullist coalition partners created new space for an initiative by the European 
Commission. It was thus momentous that as the successor to François-Xavier 
Ortoli in the role of Commission president, the British government put forth a 
very politically astute candidate: Roy Jenkins, the spokesman of the Europe advo-
cates in the Labour Party and longtime rival of Wilson and Callaghan in the strug-
gle for party leadership. After Wilson’s resignation, Jenkins had lost the leader-
ship contest and now saw a more rewarding task in serving as the head of the 
Commission. For his part, Callaghan was rid of a troublesome critic within the 
cabinet and at the same time gained an effective representative of British interests 
in Brussels.
With the additional political heavyweights Étienne Davignon (as Commis-
sioner for Industry) and Antonio Giolitti (responsible for regional policy), the new 
Commission regarded its task as first of all the consolidation of economic integra-
tion in light of the manifold crises after the end of the era of prolonged growth. It 
was especially in the crises of the steel industry and the chemical industry that the 
Commission proved to be the guardian of a policy of competition against strong 
protectionist impulses. Jenkins repeatedly had occasion to lament the continuing 
ineffectiveness of the Council of Ministers given that separate meetings with dif-
fering compositions were held for dealing with the various areas of responsibility; 
he was also concerned about the failure to concretize the prospects for develop-
ment of the Tindemans Plan. After only six months in office, he was so frustrated 
that he seriously contemplated resigning. In the end, he opted instead to attempt 
to push forward the European integration process with an initiative of his own.
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In searching for an appropriate policy area for such an initiative, Jenkins—
like Tindemans two years earlier—hit upon the project of economic and mone-
tary union. It was here that the need for substantive progress was most urgent 
in light of general inflationary tendencies and the renewed drop of the dollar; at 
the same time, the political resistance against collectivization in this area seemed 
to him the most likely to be overcome. He therefore made use of a speech at the 
recently-opened European University Institute in Florence on 27 October 1977 to 
call for the reopening of the debate on economic and monetary union. In notice-
able contrast to the “Economists” in Germany and the Netherlands, for whom a 
monetary union was conceivable only as the result of the harmonization of eco-
nomic power and economic structure, he lauded a Community currency as an 
instrument of rationalization in the struggle against inflation and currency spec-
ulation, an instrument that would enable a return to stable growth and simul-
taneously reduce dependency on the dollar. Three weeks after the speech, the 
Commission presented a timetable for completion of the monetary union. It envi-
sioned re-establishing the necessary convergence of European economic policy 
within a period of five years. The monetary union was to be realized incremen-
tally thereafter.14
Jenkins’ initiative was aimed first of all at overcoming the skeptical atti-
tude of Helmut Schmidt. Although the chancellor did regard monetary union as 
fundamentally desirable, it seemed to him impossible to realize in the foresee-
able future due to diverging economic development, differing economic-policy 
courses, and limited West German resources. He also regarded it as less urgent 
since Richard Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford had been pursuing a very successful 
anti-inflation policy, which had led to an equalization of the balance of payments 
and a relative stabilization of the dollar’s exchange rate. More important now 
than the assertion of European autonomy in Schmidt’s view was agreement on 
economic policy among the large industrial countries. Therefore, he consented 
immediately when in July of 1975 Giscard d’Estaing proposed working toward a 
summit conference of the leading Western industrial countries. Schmidt felt sat-
isfaction that the resulting Rambouillet Meeting of 15 to 17 November 1975 tended 
toward an understanding between Ford and Giscard regarding the necessity of 
focusing on stability. The gathering included the US, the Federal Republic, Great 
Britain, France, and Japan; Italy, which happened to be exercising the presidency 
of the Council at the time, also joined in after persistent urging.15
14 Europa-Archiv 33 (1978), pp.  D1–19; on the origins of this initiative, Roy Jenkins, A Life at 
the Centre, London: Methuen Publishing, 1994, pp. 461– 470; Andrew Adonis and Keith Thomas 
(eds.), Roy Jenkins: A Retrospective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
15 Soell, Helmut Schmidt, pp. 415–433.
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As discrepancies in economic performance in early 1976 led once again to 
pressure first on the Italian lira and then on the French franc too, Schmidt was 
willing to allow a certain increase in the value of the mark, though not to the 
extent that Giscard regarded as necessary. In any event, the views of the other 
members of the currency snake diverged regarding a new setting of internal pari-
ties. The parities thus remained unchanged, and France once again left the snake 
on 15 March 1976 in order to permit a further devaluation against the dollar. The 
European currency snake was thereby reduced practically to a “mark zone” made 
up of the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, the Belgian-Luxembourg currency 
group, and Denmark. Until 1977, Sweden also belonged to it, as did Norway until 
1978; Austria and Switzerland were associates.
After France had had to leave the currency snake for a second time, Giscard 
d’Estaing increased the focus of French economic and budget policy on stability 
by appointing Raymond Barre prime minister in August of 1976 after the resigna-
tion of Jacques Chirac. However, Schmidt was still not prepared to accommodate 
countries with weaker currencies via more substantial support measures. At the 
Franco-German summit of 3 and 4 February 1977, Giscard pressed for combining 
the currency reserves; Schmidt responded by pointing out the disparity of the 
economic situation within the Community: “In light of [the] difficult economic 
situation in several EC countries, no far-reaching steps on integration [are] possi-
ble, given that they would overtax the power of our partners.”16
That Schmidt did not stick with this restrictive attitude is attributable primar-
ily to the fact that US President Jimmy Carter abandoned his predecessor’s focus 
on stability and instead sought to improve the American economy with higher 
government spending and higher levels of oil imports. The consequences were 
not only a high rate of inflation once again and a return to a balance of trade 
deficit but also a rapid drop in the dollar, which severely harmed West German 
exports. At the London world economic summit of 7 May 1977 (dubbed the “G-7 
Meeting” because Canada was now participating), Schmidt attempted to con-
vince Carter to alter course; this only resulted in the accusation that Bonn and 
Tokyo were not doing enough deficit spending. Schmidt was also irritated by the 
16 Speaking notes, 31 Jan. 1977, quoted in Guido Thiemeyer, “Helmut Schmidt und die Gründ-
ung des Europäischen Wirtschaftssystems 1973–1979,” in: Knipping and Schönwald (eds.), Auf-
bruch, pp. 245–268, here p. 248; on the following, also Peter Ludlow, The Making of the European 
Monetary System. A Case Study of the Politics of the European Community, London: Butterworth 
Scientific, 1982; Schulz, Reluctant European, pp. 293–305; Soell, Helmut Schmidt, pp. 691–708; 
Harold James, Making the European Monetary System. The Role of the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors and the Origins of the European Central Bank, Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap 
Press, 2012, pp. 146–180; Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, A Europe made of Money. The Emergence of 
the European Monetary System, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012, pp. 132–260.
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strong pressure from Carter to station the neutron bomb in Europe and drew from 
it the conclusion that reform of the international monetary system—upon which 
he had placed so much hope—could not be achieved with this US president.
Jenkins must certainly have perceived that Schmidt’s confidence in the Amer-
ican leadership was dwindling away even as the recovery in Europe was increas-
ingly being harmed by the fall of the dollar. Nevertheless, the chancellor did not 
immediately react positively to Jenkins’ 27 October appeal in Florence. When the 
Commission president visited the chancellor in Bonn on 10 November seeking 
his support for the project, Schmidt only assured him that he would not derail it. 
At a meeting of the European Council in Brussels on 5 and 6 December, Jenkins 
received unqualified support only from the leaders of the Benelux states and 
Italy. Schmidt declared that he was for a European monetary union in principle 
but also warned that it must not lead to an inflation rate of eight percent. The 
meeting resulted in giving the Commission the task of working out proposals for 
improving monetary cooperation; neither concrete measures nor chronological 
targets were decided on, however.
What exactly had induced Schmidt to become more involved in Jenkins’ 
initiative is in the final instance difficult to determine. If one accepts Raymond 
Barre’s account,17 it was the impression that the French stability course had born 
fruit: The reduction of the budget deficit, a halving of the foreign-trade deficit, 
and a drop in the inflation rate all made France once again seem a reliable partner 
in constructing a monetary union. More probable, however, is that during Febru-
ary of 1978, Schmidt became convinced that the ongoing weakness of the French 
economy also threatened its political stability and that Giscard was therefore 
in urgent need of West German help. In any event, Schmidt confided to Jenkins 
during the Briton’s visit to Bonn on 28 February that “as soon as the French elec-
tions are over—assuming the French elections go all right and that there aren’t 
any Communists in the French government—then I shall propose, in response to 
the dollar problem, a major step towards monetary union; to mobilize and put all 
our currency reserves into a common pool, […] and to form a European monetary 
bloc.”18
As justification for this step, the chancellor cited not only the dollar crisis, 
which was growing worse, but also the “confrontation between Europe and 
Japan, the practical collapse of multinational trade negotiations,” and “the great 
weakness and uncertainty in France.” What also came through to Jenkins in this 
conversation was Schmidt’s “deep hostility toward Carter, whose behaviour over 
17 Conversation with Michèle Weinachter, in: Michèle Weinachter, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et 
l’Allemagne. Le double rêve inachevé, Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 2004, pp. 134ff.
18 Roy Jenkins, European Diary 1977–1981, London: Methuen Publishing, 1989, p. 224.
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the dollar was intolerable.” When negotiations on the “major step” were already 
in progress, Schmidt justified it in a conversation with Italian Prime Minister 
Giulio Andreotti by citing the fear of “a collapse of the Common Market” and 
the potentially dangerous domestic- and foreign-policy consequences that would 
stem from it. In order to prevent such a collapse, it was necessary to “take risks.” 
The new monetary-policy arrangement was to stabilize the members’ currencies, 
protect them from speculation, and build confidence. If Europe were to succeed 
in that, it would also help “discipline the balance of payments policy of the 
United States.”19
The elections to the French National Assembly on 12 and 19 March did not 
witness the feared victory of the leftist union of Socialists and Communists; it 
was rather the case that Giscard’s political allies even gained at the expense of 
the Gaullists. Jenkins then prepared a memorandum for the next meeting of the 
European Council, set for early April in Copenhagen. He urged that work on the 
monetary project be intensified such that by the meeting after next (slated for 
Bremen in July) binding decisions could be made. Like Schmidt, he argued that 
state support for the economy had only led to higher inflation and that the Euro-
peans had to protect themselves from the irresponsible monetary policy of the 
US.20 Parallel to this, Schmidt discussed with Giscard on 2 April at Chateau Ram-
bouillet how the project could be launched at the Council meeting. Both were in 
agreement that the highest level of confidentiality was called for, not only to avoid 
speculative withholding of funds by investors but also to circumvent resistance 
from the French finance ministry and the Bundesbank. Technical preparation was 
assigned to only two men: Bernard Clappier, president of the Banque de France 
and one-time assistant to Robert Schuman in preparation of the Schuman Plan, 
and Horst Schulmann, head of the economic-policy department in the chancel-
lor’s office. The two were to prepare a plan that Schmidt would then present in the 
confidential round of the Copenhagen meeting. Giscard trusted that the chancel-
lor would be able to persuade the skeptics in the West German financial world.21
In Copenhagen, where the heads of state and of government of the Nine met 
on 7 and 8 April, Jenkins and Giscard first spoke in general terms—as had been 
agreed—about the necessity of a stable monetary order before Schmidt in a fire-
side chat after dinner unofficially made a brilliant case for a new monetary-pol-
19 Annotation on the conversations between Schmidt and Andreotti, 1 Nov. 1978, quoted in 
Schulz, Reluctant European, p. 305.
20 Memorandum Jenkins, 3 April 1978, PRO FCO 30/4004.
21 In Giscard’s recollection of this conversation, the chancellor’s earlier skepticism still played 
a role: Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la Vie, Vol. 1 : La rencontre, Paris: Compagnie 12, 
1988, pp. 142–14.
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icy arrangement through which the dollar would be replaced by a European 
currency. As for concrete measures, he cited, firstly, the creation of a European 
Monetary Fund, in which the existing institutions and resources of the Commu-
nity and the currency snake would be integrated; secondly, the pooling of fifteen 
to twenty percent of the member states’ currency reserves; thirdly, increased use 
of European currencies in place of the dollar for intervening in currency markets; 
fourthly, increasing use of the European Currency Unit in transactions between 
the central banks and later also the creation of a new form of reserve asset com-
parable to the Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Over time, according to Schmidt, the European Currency Unit—since April of 1975 
valued according to the average of the individual currencies weighted for eco-
nomic strength and foreign-trade percentages—could become a European cur-
rency.
The target of the presentation was primarily James Callaghan, whom Schmidt 
eagerly wanted to have along for this new step in the direction of a monetary union, 
even if the Labour government up to that point had always decidedly opposed the 
project. For his part, Callaghan immediately criticized the anti-American orien-
tation of the project; he was still hoping for a restructuring of the international 
monetary system in concert with the US. Only when Giscard, Schmidt, and Cal-
laghan met privately the next morning and the French leader made it unmistak-
ably plain “that if Callaghan did not come in, he would go along with Schmidt”22 
did the British premier agree to participate in the preparation of draft decisions 
for the Council meeting in Bremen. The expert group made up of Clappier and 
Schulmann was augmented by Kenneth Couzens of Her Majesty’s Treasury.
In the course of conversations after the Council meeting, Couzens was forced 
to the conclusion that his French and West German colleagues were indeed 
serious about mutualizing the currency; and so he withdrew from the talks. In 
the Treasury, there was even less willingness to give up control over one’s own 
currency than in the Bundesbank or the Directoire du Trésor. Regarding foreign 
trade with non-EC states, which was still significant, the British had a preference 
for an arrangement within the framework of the IMF. Clappier and Schulmann 
thenceforth worked alone on the concept, and on 23 June, they conferred with 
Giscard, French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud, and Schmidt at the chan-
cellor’s Hamburg home. Schmidt remembered of this meeting that “we worked 
in the dining room because of the large table. Loki served us coffee. The next 
day, she told us that every time she had entered the room, we were sitting in a 
22 Jenkins, European Diary, p. 249.
 The European Monetary System   235
more relaxed posture, initially still in our jackets, then without them and finally 
without our neckties either.”23
The result of this summertime round of work was sent by Giscard and Schmidt 
to their colleagues on the Council shortly before its next meeting on 6 and 7 July; 
Clappier and Schulmann gave presentations in the various capitals explaining it. 
The proposal from Schmidt for increased use of the European Unit of Account was 
made more precise to the effect that it was to constitute the “core” of the improved 
monetary arrangement, that is, it was not only to serve as a means to simplify pay-
ments between the central banks but also serve as the basis for the interventions 
to preserve the bandwidths. The Franco-German paper, in which the thoughts of 
Belgian central banker Jacques van Ypersele had been incorporated, therefore 
spoke of a “European Currency Unit” (ECU) and a “European Monetary System” 
(EMS) that went beyond the snake. Regarding the sought-after merging of cur-
rency reserves, it was said that “e.g. 20%” of the member states’ currency reserves 
in dollars and gold was to be placed in the European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
and, additionally, “an amount of comparable order of magnitude” in the curren-
cies of the member states. When purchasing dollars, about twenty percent was 
likewise to be placed in the common Cooperation Fund; when selling dollars, the 
central banks would receive about twenty percent in European Currency Units.
Regarding usage of EMS funds made up of deposits of member states’ cur-
rency assets, it was rather ominously the case that it “will be subject to conditions 
varying with the amount and the maturity; due account will be given to the need 
for substantial short term facilities.” Clearly, the authors envisioned an expan-
sion and simplification of credits to member states that had come under pressure 
to devalue. They had not as yet been able to come to agreement as to the exact 
extent or the conditions; the document only included the reminder that closer 
monetary-policy cooperation “will only be successful if participating countries 
will pursue policies conducive to greater stability at home and abroad.” Regard-
ing a mechanism for directing exchange rates, there was only mention that the 
new system would be “at least as strict as the ‘snake’”; and “ways to coordinate 
dollar interventions should be sought.”
In essence, the proposed system amounted to having the hard-currency 
countries (that is, primarily the Federal Republic) accommodate to an extent the 
weak-currency countries by mutualizing part of the reserves; in return, the latter 
would subordinate themselves to mechanisms binding them to the goal of sta-
bility to a greater extent than heretofore. In order to expand the circle of mone-
tary-union members as far as possible, the paper envisioned that “in the initial 
stage of its operation and for a limited period of time member countries currently 
23 Helmut Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn, Berlin: Siedler, 1990, p. 228.
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not participating in the snake may opt for somewhat wider margins.” However, it 
had not yet been worked out as to how large the concession of the hard-currency 
countries would be or how strong the obligation of the weak-currency countries. 
The authors only noted, quite ambitiously, that “two years after the introduction 
of the system at the latest, the existing agreements and structures would be con-
solidated in a European Monetary Fund (EMF).”24
In Bremen, Schmidt and Giscard first sought to organize another private 
meeting with Callaghan before the beginning of the actual Council meeting. 
When the premier declined by citing urgent matters in London, they persisted in 
seeking a separate meeting after the first afternoon session. Callaghan however 
stuck to his position of not permitting any decisions based on the Franco-German 
paper. In the evening session, he was supported by Dutch Prime Minister Andreas 
van Agt and his Italian colleague Giulio Andreotti in criticizing the preparations 
for the gathering. Andreotti and Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch signaled their 
interest in participating in the new monetary system but at the same time also 
indicated a need for greater assistance. In order to save this muddled situation, 
Giscard proposed beginning without Britain. Schmidt was not willing to do so, 
however. They finally agreed on a declaration for “a closer monetary coopera-
tion leading to a zone of monetary stability in Europe [….] The European Council 
envisages such a durable and effective scheme,” along with a directive for the 
finance ministers to present a proposal to that effect by the end of October. It was 
then supposed to be passed by the Council at its December meeting in Brussels. 
The Franco-German proposal was made public as an “appendix” to this declara-
tion without further qualification.
In discussing the closing communiqué the next morning, Giscard d’Estaing 
suggested general use of the English-language designation “European Currency 
Unit” or “ECU.” In September of 1974, Ortoli as Commission president had made 
the same suggestion with the justification that it would please not only the Anglo-
phone members but also the Francophone ones given that the écu had been a 
popular silver coin in pre-revolutionary France. For his part, Giscard naturally 
refrained from citing this second reason in the Council and gloated over the fact 
that Callaghan elatedly agreed with him. That his trick regarding the name had 
worked made him think that the success of the Bremen meeting was on the whole 
greater than it actually was.25
24 Quoted according to the rendering in the appendix to the “Conclusions” of the European 
Council in Bremen 7–9 July 1978, in: Ludlow, Monetary System, pp. 301ff.
25 On the course of the Council meeting in Bremen, Jenkins, European Diary, pp.  286–290; 
Giscard d’Estaing, Le Pouvoir, Vol. 1, pp. 148–152; and Mourlon-Druol, A Europe, pp. 186–189.
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In the negotiations of the Council of the Economic and Finance Ministers that 
had now been made necessary, the haggling continued over the extent of West 
German concessions and the binding stability commitments for weak-currency 
countries. In the subcommittee for currency issues, the French representatives 
argued that having qualified the ECU as the “core” of the new system meant it 
would be the basis as a reserve currency. Violations of the permitted band width 
of plus/minus 2.25 percent would then be measured in reference to this reserve 
currency, and the main burden of intervening would lie with the country that 
had committed the violation. The British and Italian representatives embraced 
this interpretation. In contrast, the representatives of the hard-currency coun-
tries insisted that the exchange rates should, as before, be measured only bilater-
ally between two currencies. They drew attention to the fact that the ECU basket 
of currencies would likewise lose value if individual national currencies lost 
value. Orienting oneself on it when obliged to intervene would thus mean not 
only accepting in silence a creeping inflation but even promoting it further due 
to departure from the focus on stability. This issue engaged the experts for a long 
while. In the end, a decision along the lines of the interpretation by the hard-cur-
rency countries was made at the Franco-German summit in Aachen on 14 and 
15 September. This meant that Giscard had de facto confirmed his choice for the 
West German stability model and had thereby won out over the latent opposition 
in the Directoire du Trésor. In light of the position of supplicant in which he found 
himself vis-à-vis the current members of the currency snake, no other decision 
was possible any longer—at least if one really wanted the monetary union.
In contrast, an ECU basket of currencies was used in measuring the “thresh-
old of divergence” to which governments and central banks were supposed to 
commit themselves before pre-emptive intervention; this stemmed from a Belgian 
proposal. There was stubborn resistance from the Bundesbank to the pledge to 
stability-endangering measures resulting from this; the representatives of the 
banking sector and industry repeatedly made that clear to Schmidt. The French 
side finally made a concession with the formulation that when a threshold value 
of seventy-five percent of the maximum deviation range was reached, there 
would be “a presumption that the authorities concerned will correct this situa-
tion by adequate measures.” This formally left the Bundesbank with its freedom 
of action but also set it under strong political pressure. As the text ran, “In case 
such measures on account of special circumstances, are not taken, the reasons 
for this shall be given […], especially in the concertation between the central 
banks.” Additionally, consultations at the level of the Council of Ministers were 
envisioned if individual participants regarded them as necessary. This settlement 
too was reached at the highest level, during another visit by Schmidt to the Élysée 
Palace on 2 November.
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Another new element that was meant to make it easier for under-performing 
countries to remain in the currency snake was the establishment of a “Very Short-
Term Facility” of an unlimited amount. It could be utilized for forty-five days and 
then extended for three months. The credit lines for short- and medium-term cur-
rency assistance were also significantly expanded to a total of twenty-five billion 
ecus. Furthermore, short-term credits for a maximum of nine months could be dis-
persed by the committee of the central bank governors; the Council was respon-
sible for medium-term credits of two to five years, which could be linked to eco-
nomic-policy requirements. Finally, concessions were made to the weak-currency 
countries in that the governing exchange rate of individual currencies based on 
the ECU could be altered by mutual agreement, with the requirement that the 
European Commission be involved in the decision.
Regarding the size of the currency pool, it was specified that it would consist 
of twenty percent of dollar and gold reserves; there was no more mention of a 
comparable contribution of the currencies of the member states. Likewise, under 
pressure from the Bundesbank, the binding nature of the timeline of the goals for 
further developing the agreed-upon regulations for a European Monetary Fund 
was reduced: Whereas in the Schmidt-Giscard paper it was specified for a point 
within two years, it now read only that “we remain firmly resolved to consolidate, 
not later than two years after the start of the scheme, into a final system the pro-
visions and procedures thus created.”26
While the technical negotiations were nearing an end, Helmut Schmidt 
continued hoping that it would be possible to bring the visibly-hesitant Britons 
onboard. For this purpose, he was now outwardly very friendly toward the US. At 
the world economic summit in Bonn, he made a concession to Carter by agreeing 
to contribute to strengthening international demand through tax reductions and 
investment programs in the range of one percent of GNP.  This helped forestall 
American intervention against the EMS project. Nevertheless, Callaghan could 
not win approval for British participation. Along with continuing opposition at 
the Treasury, he was now plagued by worries over vociferous protests from the 
labor unions as well as a rebellion by anti-Europeans in the cabinet. In light of 
the necessity of calling elections for the spring of 1979, those were developments 
he could no longer afford. Shortly before the Council meeting in Brussels on 4 
and 5 December 1978, he officially informed Schmidt that Great Britain would not 
participate in the EMS exchange-rate mechanism. The British government stated 
only that it was in agreement that the pound sterling be included in the currency 
basket.
26 Conclusions of the European Council in Brussels 4–5 Dec. 1978, in: Ludlow, Monetary System, 
pp. 303–308.
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Callaghan’s rejection made Ireland’s acceptance all the more noteworthy. 
To the British premier’s consternation, his Irish counterpart had at the Bremen 
Council meeting already announced that his country would participate in the 
new monetary system even if Britain did not. Jack Lynch carried through with 
this, even though it implied giving up the Irish pound’s long peg to the British 
pound and that Ireland would face the risk of significant turbulence in trade with 
its larger neighbor. Like his Italian colleague Andreotti, he insisted however that 
in the initial phase, Ireland be allowed greater possibilities for variation—and 
that there be financial support for the adaptation of the Irish economy to the 
structure of the hard-currency countries.
In the case of Italy, similar demands were made with still greater force. The 
Christian Democrat Andreotti was very interested in having his country join in, 
yet his Socialist coalition partners and the Communists, whose toleration was 
needed by the government, showed little inclination to participate in the infla-
tion-fighting necessary for this. They raised their demands for concessions higher 
and higher, and Andreotti felt it necessary to pass them along to his colleagues on 
the Council. After already insisting in Bremen that Italy be allowed to participate 
with a range of plus/minus six percent (instead of the level of plus/minus 2.25 
percent that was in force for the snake), he came to the Brussels Council meeting 
with a demand for interest subsidies in the amount of eight hundred million cur-
rency units.
In the end, Schmidt and Giscard fully agreed that the newcomers should 
be given grater maneuvering room. In the Brussels resolution, it was noted only 
that “these margins should be gradually reduced as soon as economic conditions 
permit.” Nevertheless, both leaders rejected adjustment assistance of the magni-
tude demanded by Andreotti. Schmidt believed that it might undermine the sta-
bility goal. Giscard feared that the Gaullists and the opposition would accuse him 
of having won too little for France at the bargaining table; he would not consent 
to more than 300 million units of account each for Italy and Ireland spread out 
over three years. Schmidt regarded 600 million each over three years as justifi-
able. In the end, there was agreement on a limit of one billion spread over five 
years (thus, if France did not make a claim to any of the funds and Britain did not 
join, that would mean 500 million each for Italy and Ireland).
Andreotti and Lynch did not explicitly accept this. Hence, while the Brussels 
Council meeting did end in agreement that the European Monetary System would 
come into force on 1 January 1979, it was not clear that Italy or Ireland would par-
ticipate.27 The Italian decision to join—a manifestation of the victory of the mod-
27 On the course of the Brussels meeting, Jenkins, European Diary, pp.  349–353; Mour-
lon-Druol, A Europe, pp. 250–255.
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ernizers who strove for increased cooperation with European partners—was clear 
only after a parliamentary vote on 13 December. The Communists answered the 
defeat they had thereby received by toppling Andreotti four weeks later. Lynch 
was able to announce Ireland’s participation on 15 December, after the represen-
tatives of the countries then participating in the snake had on 11 December made 
concrete commitments to the Irish government regarded financial distributions.
The EMS still could not come into force, however. Chirac made use of the 
publication of the Brussels decisions in order to announce a dramatic “no” to a 
“France that abdicates today and dissolves itself tomorrow.”28 Giscard thereupon 
drew the conclusion that more had to be done than what he had achieved in Brus-
sels regarding demands of French farmers for abolition of the Monetary Compen-
sation Amount (MCA), which they had to pay on exports to the Federal Republic 
as a consequence of the increase in value of the mark. At the Council meeting, it 
had only been decided that “The European Council stresses the importance of […] 
progressively reducing present MCAs.” Agriculture Minister Pierre Méhaignerie 
made a demand on 18 December that they be completely abolished within a year. 
When the other governments made no move to agree, the French declared on 
29 December that the European Monetary Union could not under those circum-
stances take effect on 1 January.
Regarding the border-levy problem in the Common Market, there was thus 
a need for further negotiations, both among the agriculture ministers and at the 
highest level. An agreement emerged only during a lightening visit by Prime Min-
ister Barre to Schmidt on 23 February 1979. It included the point that the MCAs 
would in fact be abolished within one year; prices were raised too, however, which 
eliminated the prospect of a sought-after increase in exports by French farmers. 
At its next meeting, on 12 and 13 March 1979 in Paris, the European Council could 
thus implement the European Monetary System immediately. The rough start pre-
vented any feelings of triumph. Added to this was the fact that public attention 
had in the meantime been almost completely drawn to the fall of the shah of Iran 
and the resulting second wave of oil price hikes. Because of this, it went unnoticed 
that with his support of Giscard, Schmidt had accomplished something enor-
mous: Against the opposition of the Bundesbank, a majority of public opinion, 
and the Christian Democratic opposition, he had eliminated the danger of the 
Common Market’s drifting apart in turbulent times for currency policy. Simulta-
neously, a core of stability had been created through which the European states 
could reduce their dependence on US monetary policy. The increased engage-
ment of the Federal Republic and the other hard-currency countries as well as the 
28 “Appel de Cochin,” 6 Dec. 1978, printed in Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la Vie, Vol. 
3: Choisir, Paris: Compagnie 12, 2006, pp. 513–518.
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pressure to make consensual changes in exchange rates helped France, Italy, and 
Ireland stay in the common currency group this time and helped dampen their 
inflationary tendencies. The strong upward pressure on the mark had simultane-
ously been removed and more uniformly distributed throughout the Community. 
Both together prevented the danger of a lasting economic crisis after the end of 
the big postwar boom. Transformation of the currency snake into the European 
Monetary System was thereby in keeping with the “material logic” of the inte-
gration process, of which Walter Hallstein had spoken in the 1960s. Without the 
political will and the extraordinary energy of Helmut Schmidt, this logic would 
not have come to fruition, at least not at this point in time.
The gradual harmonization of economic policies did not begin right away and 
was not sufficient for substantially reducing the disparities in economic structure 
and performance. As a consequence, changes in the central rate could not be 
avoided in 1981–92 following the second oil shock along with a rise in the dollar 
and in interest rates. By 1983, there had been seven rounds of central rate adjust-
ments; in the process, the value of the mark had been raised four times and that 
of the French franc reduced three times. Without any spectacular success and 
with the French presidential elections approaching in the spring of 1981, Giscard 
d’Estaing did not dare carry through with the creation of a European Monetary 
Fund as had been agreed upon in Brussels. Giscard’s successor François Mitter-
rand, in office from 10 May 1981, began his term with a program of government 
support for the economic cycle and employment, a program that went against the 
stability goal of the EMS. When in September of 1981 the Commission took up the 
initiative for the “second stage” of the monetary system, in which preventative 
interventions were to be mandatory when the “deviation threshold” was reached, 
the Bundesbank was successful in arguing that its members were still very far 
from the stability-oriented convergence.
In the spring of 1983, the European Monetary System was faced with nothing 
less than the danger of failing. In light of rising unemployment, government 
debt, and trade deficits, Mitterrand was confronted with the alternative of either 
returning to a rigorous austerity course or leaving the European Monetary System. 
Whereas strong forces among the Socialists as well as the Communist coalition 
partners voted for the second option, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and Finance 
Minister Jacques Delors advocated a change of course in economic policy. It took 
several weeks for Mitterrand to make a decision for the European solution on 
17 March: Another devaluation of the franc within the monetary system was to 
be accompanied by a whole package of measures for stabilizing the budget. The 
special socialistic path pursued by the leftist French government was thereby 
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practically at an end, and France’s focus on convergence, which Giscard had 
introduced along with Barre, was thus strengthened.29
Expansion to the South
An additional reason for the efforts to stabilize and expand the currency associ-
ation was the prospect of another expansion of the Community—the accession 
of Greece, Portugal, and Spain. One after another in quick succession during the 
middle of the 1970s, these three southern European countries experienced the 
end of dictatorial regimes that had always prevented their membership in the 
European Community. In April of 1974, officers belonging to a “Movement of the 
Armed Forces” staged a coup against the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal; 
democratic and communist forces then contended over establishing a new order 
in the country. In Greece in July of the same year, the Regime of the Colonels 
collapsed seven years after a coup had brought it to power; a provisional gov-
ernment under an earlier conservative prime minister, Constantine Karamanlis, 
worked to establish a new constitution based on the rule of law. In November of 
1975, Spain’s long-time dictator Francisco Franco died. In accordance with his 
plans, Juan Carlos I was proclaimed king; he moderated a process of liberaliza-
tion and democratization that led to the establishment of a constitutional monar-
chy by the end of 1978.
These sea changes—which from a long-term perspective were consequences 
of modernization processes laden with conflict—not only eliminated opposition 
to these countries’ membership in the EC, opposition that stemmed from the EC’s 
self-understanding as a Community of democracies. The European Commission 
had completed an association agreement with the Greek government of Karaman-
lis in July of 1961 and had subsequently “frozen” it after the colonels’ putsch. An 
application for association submitted by Spain in February of 1962 had contin-
ually been delayed by the governments of the Community. By 1970, this had led 
only to a trade treaty; negotiations on further tariff reductions had been broken 
off in October of 1975 after the execution of Basque opponents of Franco. In light 
of the difficulties in establishing new democratic regimes, the question also came 
29 Jean-Claude Asselin, “L’expérience sociale face à la contrainte extérieure,” in: Serge Berstein, 
Pierre Milza, and Jean-Louis Bianco (eds.), François Mitterrand. Les années de changement, 1981–
1984, Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin 2001, pp.  385–430; Pierre Mauroy, Mémoires. “Vous 
mettrez du bleu au ciel,” Paris: Omnibus, 2003, pp. 259–272; Jacques Attali, C’était François Mit-
terrand, Paris: Fayard, 2005, pp. 140–155.
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up as to how the countries of the Community could and should assist in the sta-
bilization of new democracies.
The Greek government was the first to answer this question with a bid for EC 
membership. Immediately after the new republican constitution came into effect 
in June of 1975, the Karamanlis government submitted the application. Along 
with hopes for support in economic modernization and access to Western Euro-
pean markets—which had also played a role in the 1959 application for associa-
tion—there were now other factors too, ones that were closely bound together: 
interest in assistance for building a modern civil society capable of supporting 
the parliamentary regime over the long term as well as emancipation from US 
hegemony. Not completely without justification, the US was held responsible for 
the longevity of the colonels’ regime. Above all, however, the US was blamed for 
having left the Greeks in the lurch after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July of 
1974. It had followed an attempted coup by Cypriot supporters of the colonels and 
had led to the establishment of a Turkish Cypriot regime in the northern part of 
the island. Following the example of France, Greece had quit the military organi-
zation of NATO in August of 1974 and needed membership in the EC as a political 
counterweight to Turkey, whose policy in the Aegean was still perceived to be 
revisionist.
The political motives for entry now led Karamanlis to insist on immediate 
full membership, in contrast to 1959. Only in this way did it seem possible to hold 
Greece on a fundamentally Western course and to forestall the exploitation of 
anti-American sentiment by the radical “Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party” (PASOK) 
of Andreas Papandreou. Karamanlis was supported in this by France, which had 
promoted his return from French exile as a contribution to democratization of the 
country and to strengthening French autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant power, the 
US. In December, Karamanlis discussed the entry project with then Prime Minis-
ter Jacques Chirac; the following February, Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues 
conveyed to him official assurance that the French government would support 
the application. Only thereafter did Karamanlis publically announce his inten-
tion, and then on 12 June 1975, one day after the new constitution of Greece had 
come into effect, he submitted the application in Brussels.
France’s enthusiasm for Karamanlis’ action was not however shared by all 
members of the Community. In London, there were reservations about challeng-
ing the American role in the eastern Mediterranean. Above all, however, there 
were concerns about problems arising in relations with Turkey, which was not 
only an important NATO ally but which since 1963 had also had an association 
agreement with the prospect of future membership in the EC. In Rome, there were 
mainly fears of future competition from cheap Greek fruit growers and vintners. 
In Bonn, there were worries about the general level of development of the Greek 
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economy, which would again make transfer payments necessary to an extent that 
would be detrimental to the stability goal of West German economic policy. The 
free movement of Greek workers in the near future was also seen as highly prob-
lematic in light of increased unemployment in all the Western industrial coun-
tries. When Giscard d’Estaing sought to persuade his friend Schmidt of the neces-
sity of Greek membership in the interest of stabilizing democracy, he was met 
with “nothing but loud sighs.”30
The European Commission shared these reservations. In its official position 
on the application, presented on 28 January 1976, it therefore recommended 
that Greece be offered only a preliminary membership of indefinite duration. A 
transition period with full membership rights would follow only when the eco-
nomic, legal, and administrative reforms deemed necessary for membership had 
been carried out. In contrast, Karamanlis insisted that the stabilization of Greek 
democracy was urgent. He also pointed out the necessity of solidarity among 
democrats in the face of new totalitarian challenges. Moreover, with tactical skill, 
he made assurances that Greece would not block the development of relations 
between the EC and Turkey.
The solidarity argument may well have played the key role in the decision 
that the EC Council of Ministers had to make on 9 February. In the meantime 
in Portugal, leftist officers of the “Movement of the Armed Forces,” with strong 
support from the Communist Party, had begun attempting to establish a socialist 
regime; in the Italian communal and regional elections in June of 1975, the Com-
munists had come very close to the level of support of the governing Christian 
Democrats. It thus seemed imperative to send a clear signal of encouragement 
to democratic forces in Southern Europe. That made sense to the Ford admin-
istration too: It supported Greek engagement with the EC—though along with 
the desire that it occur in close consultation with the US. Given that support for 
Greek democracy was also strong in the public opinion of the member states, 
the partner governments finally put aside their reservations and voted to begin 
accession negotiations.31
These negotiations officially opened on 27 July but actually began in Novem-
ber. The Greek side showed itself willing to subordinate economic interests to 
30 Giscard d’Estaing, Le Pouvoir, vol. 3, p. 251.
31 Cf. Antonio Varsori, “L’Occidente e la Grecia: dal colpo di Stato militare alla trasizione alla 
democrazia (1967–1976),” in: Mario Del Pero et al., Democrazie. L’Europa meridionale e la fine 
delle dittature, Milan: Le Monnier, 2010, pp. 5–94 ; on the negotiations, see Iakovo S. Tsalikoglou, 
Negotiating for Entry: The Accession of Greece in the European Community, Aldershot: Gower, 
1995; Kostas Ifantis, “State Interests, External Dependency Trajectories and ‘Europe’: Greece,” 
in: Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert (eds.), European Union Enlargement. A Comparative History, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 70–92.
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the goal of rapidly bringing the talks to a conclusion. When chief Greek negoti-
ator Nikolaos Kyriazidis, deputy president of the Greek Central Bank, resigned 
in protest in January of 1977 due to this negotiating position, he was replaced by 
Foreign Ministry General Secretary Vyron Theodoropoulos. That the talks dragged 
into the spring of 1979 was primarily attributable to the member states, which 
wanted to protect themselves from Greek competition for as long as possible.
The accession agreement signed in Athens on 28 May 1979 thus also included 
exceptional regulations benefitting countries that were already members. A tran-
sition period of five years was agreed upon. However, tomatoes and peaches 
would be allowed in the Community without tariffs only after seven years, and 
the free movement of labor was to come into effect only after seven years. As to 
protecting the Greek development program, the agreement contained only the 
stipulation that the Greek government could temporarily limit the freedom of 
capital movement in order to prevent the transfer of excessively large sums. Entry 
into the European Monetary System would occur only five years after the end of 
the transition period. Additionally, some assistance was envisioned for modern-
izing agricultural production, especially that of olive oil. After the agreement had 
won a majority in the Greek parliament as well as in those of the member states, 
it came into effect on 1 January 1981.
In Portugal, entry into the EC became an issue only after the decision for a 
democratic regime had been consolidated with parliamentary elections on 25 
April 1976. The governments of the Nine had worked toward this outcome by 
offering economic support for reorientation after the end of the Portuguese colo-
nial empire, but this support had explicitly been made contingent on the develop-
ment of a pluralistic democracy. They had supported the democratic forces in the 
country, had rejected Kissinger’s distancing of himself from the Socialists as the 
largest group of democratic forces, and had successfully pressured Leonid Brezh-
nev to give up his support for the Portuguese Communists. Furthermore, strong 
support for the Portuguese Socialists under Mário Soares came from European 
sister parties; Willy Brandt and the SPD had especially become engaged in terms 
of financial and moral support.32
The Socialists decided to form a government after winning 34.8 percent of 
the vote and having been confirmed as the largest party. At the same time, this 
victory also represented a decision for Europe over against the traditional Atlan-
ticist orientation of Portuguese policy and its Third World variant in the policy 
32 Mario Del Pero, “A European Solution for a European Crisis. The International Implications 
of Portugal’s Revolution,” in: Journal of European Integration History 15/1 (2009), pp. 15–34; Ana 
Monica Fonseca, “The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy 
(1974–1976),” ibid., pp. 35–56.
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of the leftist officers. This was augmented by the fact that the Christian Demo-
crats also strongly supported rapid entry into the European Community and that 
the Social Democratic Party, which represented reformist elements of the former 
Caetano regime, was also inclined in the same direction. Only the Communists 
categorically rejected membership. As with Karamanlis, membership in the Euro-
pean Community for Soares primarily represented a contribution to stabilizing 
the young democracy, which according to the constitution of 2 April 1976 still 
was under the tutelage of the Revolutionary Council. Economic experts’ doubts 
about the problems that would ensue in many branches of the poorly-developed 
Portuguese economy were dismissed by Soares with reference to the insufficient 
foundation of democracy.
The first step toward Europe made by the Soares government was entry into 
the Council of Europe in August of 1976. In doing so, it not only ensured recogni-
tion by Western democracies but also demonstratively distanced itself from the 
self-conception of the old regime, which in the years after the Second World War 
had not concerned itself at all with joining this fundamental European organiza-
tion. In September, there followed the signing of a supplementary and financial 
protocol to the trade treaty of 1972 with the EC (with which the unloved EFTA 
member Portugal had reacted to the entry of Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark 
into the EC). By means of this new addition, transitional assistance was orga-
nized, as the Commission had had in mind for Greece with the proposal for a 
preliminary membership. After a series of bilateral negotiations with the govern-
ments of the Nine, the official application for entry was submitted on 28 March 
1977.33
The Commission needed more than a year—until May of 1978—before it took 
a positive position on the application. Five more months went by before negotia-
tions began. These talks were endlessly tedious. They lasted far longer than those 
with Greece and only came to a conclusion in June of 1985. The main reason for 
this astonishingly long delay, as measured by initial hopes, lay in the fact that 
the Suárez government in Spain had submitted an application of its own on 27 
July 1977, some four months after the Portuguese; and the Commission as well 
as the Council had by mutual agreement decided to deal with both applications 
together. Soares wanted to avoid that but was unable to prevail—in contrast to 
Karamanlis, who succeeded in keeping the Greek negotiations, begun earlier, out 
of the complex of Iberian issues.
The Spanish application had resulted from constant pressure by the Euro-
pean Community on Franco’s successors as well as related efforts to support dem-
33 António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, “From Atlantic Past to European Destiny: 
Portugal,” in: Kaiser and Elvert (eds.), European Union Enlargement, pp. 112–130.
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ocratic parties. In May of 1976, Maurice Faure released a report commissioned 
by the European Parliament; not only did the document explicitly make Spain’s 
entry contingent on democratization, but it also listed in detail the steps neces-
sary for that democratization. Beginning with the appointment of Adolfo Suárez 
as prime minister in July of 1976, the regime embarked upon this process and 
thereby made EC accession into the symbolic badge of democratization. After 
the first free elections on 15 June 1977—by which Suárez’s Union of the Demo-
cratic Center became the largest party—the new government submitted its appli-
cation. It was supported by all the parties. Even the Communists threw in their 
weight; in contrast to the Leninists in Portugal, the Spanish Communists had set 
a Euro-Communist course under the leadership of Santiago Carrillo.34
With the Spanish application, the problem of Southern European competi-
tion in the fruit, vegetable, and wine industries presented itself in an entirely 
new dimension. The producers in the French southwest and Languedoc feared 
being literally overrun by competition from low-wage countries that also enjoyed 
climate advantages; both the Communists and the Gaullists became advocates of 
these concerns. The opposition in Italy was strong too, and Greek voices joined 
in from 1981 on. The solidarity among democrats demanded by Karamanlis had 
its limits, just as that of the communists did. Carrillo found himself having to 
listen to French party chief Georges Marchais arguing that Spanish entry into the 
Common Market would not contribute to solving the problems of the Spanish 
working class.
The argument based on urgency, which Karamanlis had effectively employed 
against opposition within the Community, did not lend itself to the case of Spain 
and Portugal: Firstly, there never was the danger of a “leftist” regime in Spain, 
something that frightened the conservative governments especially. Secondly, 
fears of radical upheavals or counter-revolutions dwindled to the extent that the 
processes of democratization advanced; the consolidation of political conditions 
in Italy after the shock over the murder of Aldo Moro by a terror cell of the Red 
Brigades in May of 1978 also played a role in this. Under these circumstances, 
the status of candidate for entry, negotiating with the prospect of success and 
receiving all manner of transition assistance, sufficed to strengthen the demo-
cratic order; entry became less significant in and of itself.
34 Víctor Gavín and Fernando Guirao, “La dimensione internazionale della transizione polica 
spagnola (1969–1982). Quale ruolo giocarono la Comunità europea e gli Stati Unity?” in Del Pero, 
Democrazie, pp. 173–264; Wolfram Kaiser and Christian Salm, “Transition und Europäisierung in 
Spanien und Portugal. Sozial- und christdemokratische Netzwerke im Übergang von der Diktatur 
zur parlamentarischen Demokratie,” in: Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 49 (2009), pp. 259–282.
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Despite the foreseeable implications for the Common Agricultural Policy, the 
Commission took a positive stance toward Spanish accession as well; this was 
officially issued on 29 November 1978, shortly after the new Spanish constitu-
tion had been ratified. On 19 December, the Council of Ministers gave the green 
light for the opening of negotiations. After a year and a half, in July of 1980, talks 
were de facto put on ice because Giscard d’Estaing insisted that an understanding 
on reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and an increase in the Community 
budget had to be reached first. Neither did talks make much progress after the 
French presidential elections of May 1981; at the European Council in Brussels in 
June of 1982, Giscard’s successor Mitterrand insisted once again on a comprehen-
sive solution to all questions associated with expansion. Paris regarded expan-
sion of spending on the Common Agricultural Policy to be the solution to the 
problem of Iberian competition; neither Bonn nor London was prepared to accept 
that, however. Nor did Spain’s entry into NATO on 30 May 1982 suffice to break 
the opposition.
A way out of the crisis in negotiations first manifested itself when Socialist 
Prime Minister Felipe González, victor of the Spanish parliamentary elections of 2 
December 1982, increased the moral pressure on Paris and Bonn. At the Stuttgart 
meeting of the Council on 18 and 19 June 1983, a reform of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy was approved that led to the passage of a market for fruit, vegetables, 
and olive oil. At the same time, Schmidt’s successor Helmut Kohl agreed in princi-
ple to a hike in the percentage of the value-added tax received by the Community, 
a source that in the meantime had grown to more than half of its total revenue. 
One year later, at the Council meeting in Fontainebleau on 25 and 26 June 1984, 
an increase in the value-added tax percentage from 1.0 to 1.4 percent was agreed 
upon. In return, Mitterrand gave his approval to a definitive roadmap for entry 
negotiations. Under the pressure of an ultimatum from Papandreou, who had 
become head of the Greek government in October of 1981, an “Integrated Med-
iterranean Program” of the Community was issued that envisioned nearly three 
billion ecus for promoting modernization in southern France, Italy, and Greece.
With those safeguards in place, negotiations with Portugal and Greece could 
then be carried to a conclusion at high speed. The treaties signed in Lisbon and 
Madrid on 12 June 1985 envisioned a seven-year transition period for Spain and 
ten for Portugal. For the Spanish steel industry, Spanish fruit, and olive oil, tran-
sition periods of up to seven additional years were agreed upon. Access by the 
significant Spanish fishing fleet to territorial waters of other members was even 
quantitatively limited for a period of seventy years. The escudo and peseta were 
incorporated into the basket of currencies for calculating the ECU, but partici-
pation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary Union was 
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deferred until a later date. So, on 1 January 1986, the number of member states in 
the Community rose from ten to twelve.35
Despite the long delay and the difficult compromises, the process of democ-
ratization and Europeanization succeeded in all three new member states. It was 
accelerated during the transition phases along the lines of harmonization with 
the political structures of Western Europe and catching up on economic develop-
ment. After taking power in Greece, Papandreou led the originally anti-imperial-
ist oriented PASOK to support EC membership aggressively. Not even the return 
to the military organization of NATO in October of 1980, which Karamanlis had 
pushed through due to the lack of European defense structures, was called into 
question any longer. In Portugal, the prospect of membership made the constitu-
tional reform of 1982 possible, which freed the democratic institutions from the 
tutelage of the Revolutionary Council and its socialistic program. The conviction 
that the future of the nation lay in the European Community grew stronger and 
was henceforth part of the national self-understanding. In Spain, Prime Minister 
González, supported by a comprehensive national consensus, was able to tran-
sition from the battle for entry to the battle for further developing the European 
Community. The concept of a strong Spain within a strong Europe advanced to 
a guiding principle of Spanish policy on Europe, contributing to the country’s 
identity.
At the same time, the experience of the stabilization of the southern European 
democracies strengthened the awareness that the European Community was 
more than an association devoted to economic benefit. The perception of respon-
sibility for the democratization of the Southern European states underscored 
that the integration of the Germans after the collapse of the National Socialist 
regime had not been a one-time task but rather belonged to the core function 
of creating the prerequisites for the durability of democratic orders. Given that 
the European Union was largely alone in carrying out this function now—in con-
trast to the German case—and that it was in the beginning undertaken even in 
a certain contrast to tendencies in US policy, the EC was strengthening its claim 
to be an autonomous actor in international politics. This double experience 
flowed together into the concept of the “civilian power Europe” that now became 
popular: The perception of the European Community as an international actor 
that did not wield influence due to military might but rather thanks to the com-
35 Lorena Ruano, “The Consolidation of Democracy vs. the Price of Olive Oil: The Story of why 
the CAP Delayed Spain’s Entry to the EC,” in: Journal of European Integration History 11/2 (2005), 
pp. 96–118; Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, “In Search of Lost Europe: Spain,” in: Kaiser and Elvert 
(eds.), European Union Enlargement, pp. 93–111; Matthieu Trouvé, L’Espagne et l’Europe. De la 
dictature de Franco à l’Union européenne, Brussels et al.: Peter Lang, 2008.
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bination of an attractive civilization and targeted employment of its economic 
means. The report on the significance of the southern expansion, presented by 
the Commission in 1984, tellingly was prepared by François Duchêne—a political 
scientist who had in 1973 already interpreted the EC as “a power for the interna-
tional spread of civil and democratic standards.”36
The concept of civilian power was not applied to Turkey, however. The Turkish 
government reacted to the Greek application for entry with a demand for equal 
participation in European Political Cooperation (EPC). Turkey wanted to ensure 
that at least the provisions of the supplementary protocol to the association agree-
ment, having taken effect in 1973, would be carried out in accordance with the 
Turkish interpretation: Only a gradual reduction of protective tariffs for Turkish 
industrial products over a period of twelve years and for approximately forty-five 
percent of EC exports over no less than twenty-two years; a gradual reduction of 
limits on imports of Turkish agricultural products, also over a period of twen-
ty-two years; incremental establishment of free movement for Turkish labor over 
twelve years; financial assistance, the extent of which was to be re-determined 
every five years. The Council of Ministers rejected this request as wholly inap-
propriate, however; in light of the financial burden that the southern expansion 
already entailed, no political majority could be found in any member state for the 
idea of compensating for the increased support of Greece by spending more on 
the development of Turkey. On the contrary: When for once a Turkish product—
cotton textiles—enjoyed success in the European market, Great Britain limited 
imports. The Federal Republic sought to avoid the pledge to accept more guest 
workers, and in general, the Mediterranean policy of the EC, especially the 1975 
free-trade agreement with Israel, devaluated the loosening of import limits and 
the financial assistance agreed upon in the supplementary protocol. When the 
Turkish military reacted to the increasing inability to form a stable government 
in September of 1980 by staging another coup, political contacts were suspended 
by the European Parliament and the Commission and financial assistance frozen.
This perpetuated a vicious circle that had burdened Turkey’s approach to 
the European Community since the beginning of negotiations on the association 
treaty: On the one hand, there was a lack of consensus among the governments 
36 François Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence,” 
in: Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems be-
fore the European Community, London: John Wiley & Sons, 1973, pp. 19–26, here p. 20. Cf. Thomas 
Derungs, “The Integration of a Different Europe. The European Community’s Enlargement to 
the South and the Evolving Concept of a Civilian Power,” in: Michele Affinito, Guiy Migani, and 
Christian Wenkel (eds.), Les deux Europes. Actes du IIIe colloque international RICHIE, Brussels: 
Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 311–325.
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of the Community as to what was the actual goal of the association; while on 
the other, a coherent and long-term strategy for Europeanization was lacking in 
Turkey. The conviction that “Turkey is part of Europe,”37 which to the Adenauer 
government and the Hallstein Commission, for example, had still been com-
pletely obvious, retreated wholly into the background. That this occurred pre-
cisely at the time that the European identity of the Community was gaining depth 
of focus is not without a certain tragic element. The path out of the isolation in 
which Turkey had fallen in the early 1980s would be extremely arduous.38
The Defense of Détente
Whereas the European Community was distinguishing itself as a civilian power, 
progress on Common foreign and defense policy did not materialize. Regular 
meetings of EPC and the European Council did ensure that there was an increas-
ing European socialization among the foreign-policy actors as well as the devel-
opment of common standpoints, not only in regard to southern expansion but 
also to conflicts in Africa, relations with Latin America, and the crisis in Iran 
after the fall of the shah in the winter of 1978–79. The European Council of Venice 
in June of 1980 strengthened the autonomy of European Middle East policy in 
that it recognized the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and char-
acterized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as their legitimate rep-
resentative.39 The central question of military autonomy was omitted, however. 
This was on the one hand the result of the Labour government’s rejection of a 
common foreign policy, a stance that remained unchanged after confirmation of 
the decision for entry. On the other hand, the defense expert Schmidt, social-
ized as an Atlanticist, did not regard European autonomy as a high-priority goal; 
and Giscard d’Estaing was for the time being busy dismantling the anti-American 
points of French European policy.
37 Walter Hallstein at the signing of the association agreement, quoted from Sena Ceylanoglu, 
“Von der unumstrittenen Beitrittsperspektive zu umstrittenen Beitrittsverhandlungen: Wand-
lungen des Verhältnisses der Europäischen Union zur Türkei,” in: Gabriele Clemens (ed.), Die 
Türkei und Europa, Münster: Lit-Verlag, 2007, pp. 151–169.
38 Elena Calandri, “A Special Relationship under Strain: Turkey and the EEC, 1963–1976,” in: 
Journal of European Integration History 15/1 (2009), pp. 57–75; Heinz Kramer and Maurus Rein-
kowski, Die Türkei und Europa. Eine wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
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39 Cf. Daniel Möckli, “Speaking with One Voice? The Evolution of a European Foreign Policy,” 
in: Anne Deighton and Gérard Bossuat (eds.), The EC/EU: A World Security Actor? Paris: Soleb, 
2007, pp. 132–151; Găinar, Origines, pp. 377–476.
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However, the problems resulting from the one-sided dependence of Western 
Europe and especially of the Federal Republic on the US and the inadequacy of 
a purely nationally-defined defense strategy, which de Gaulle had in the end 
retreated into, led Schmidt and Giscard to aim for a common European defense 
strategy. According to Schmidt’s testimony—not contradicted by Giscard—it was 
the French president who made the first step here in the search for a common 
foreign policy for the Nine, doing so because of discomfort over the status quo in 
French defense policy, which the self-appointed heirs of the general had elevated 
to a dogma. Schmidt responded with a series of analyses and proposals, and over 
the years, a thoroughgoing dialogue developed out of this, which was mostly 
carried on privately by the two leaders due to its delicate nature.
Schmidt summarized these conversations:
I presented to my friend primarily three security-policy aspects: Firstly, the undesirable, 
excessive dependence of the Federal Republic on the US, which was unavoidable owing 
to the refusal of French participation in a common defense organization. […] Secondly, I 
emphasized my conviction that French troops and the reserves that could be mobilized, 
combined with German troops and their reserves, would by themselves almost be sufficient 
to deter the Soviet Union from any conventional attack on Europe. In doing so, I called 
Giscard’s attention to the neglect of France’s conventional armed forces, which has been 
seen for about fifteen years in terms of weapons and equipment but also in terms of the 
psychological handling of the army. Thirdly, I pointed out the dangerousness of NATO’s 
military plans. How there was a feeling of being severely inferior to the Soviet armed forces 
in conventional terms, and in the event of a military conflict, there was a desire to answer 
very early with so-called tactical nuclear weapons; a nuclear detonation on German soil 
would however immediately shake any further German willingness to resist, regardless of 
whether it were an American, English, or French nuclear weapon. The French conception of 
a glacis east of the Rhine that the Germans would defend therefore rested on very dubious 
theoretical considerations.40
Influenced by Schmidt’s arguments, Giscard made adjustments to the French 
defense policy. In May of 1976, General Guy Méry, chief of staff of the French 
Army, publicly announced the possibility of French participation in a “forward 
defense” by NATO, that is, a combat mission on German soil and also a phase of 
conventional warfare before nuclear weapons were employed. Regarding the use 
of tactical nuclear weapons, top-secret negotiations were carried out with the US 
that resulted in an agreement in 1979. At the same time, with American support, 
strategic missiles and cruise missiles were developed that could reach Soviet ter-
ritory, in contrast to the Pluton missiles that had been ordered by Pompidou and 
deployed since 1974. In the budget planning for 1977–82, funding for conventional 
40 Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn, pp. 170ff.
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arms and especially for land forces were increased at the expense of the nuclear 
component. Lastly, a program for modernizing the French forces stationed in the 
Federal Republic was begun in 1980. At the Franco-German summit of 4 and 5 
February 1980, the construction of a joint Franco-German tank was announced.
Giscard was not prepared to do more, however, such as make a public guar-
antee of intervention in the event of an attack on the Federal Republic or embark 
upon a new initiative to develop a European defense structure. The opposition of 
the Gaullists in the military and in politics was too strong for that. Even Méry’s 
cautious distancing from the concept of a “force de frappe” that was focused 
solely on protecting national territory ended up generating such a large amount 
of polemical criticism that Prime Minister Barre felt compelled in a speech on 
military doctrine a year later to speak only very generally of “neighboring and 
allied territories” for which “the concept of deterrence was likewise [to be] 
employed.”41 There was no review of the contradiction between European-ori-
ented praxis and a still nationally-defined doctrine.
As a consequence, in resolving the most urgent security-policy task at hand, 
Schmidt and Giscard stayed with the traditional division of labor between the 
autonomy of France and the Atlantic integration of the Federal Republic. This 
consisted of finding an appropriate response to the modernization of Soviet medi-
um-range missiles targeting Europe. Schmidt feared a decoupling of Europe from 
the American security guarantee because the new Soviet weapons—designated 
SS-20 in the West—were to be deployed in the winter of 1976–77 and, in contrast 
to the previous generation of medium-range missiles (SS-4 and SS-5), would be 
capable of neutralizing nuclear weapons stationed in Europe with little warning 
time. In order to banish the danger of decoupling, he demanded—first at the 
NATO summit in May of 1977—that the next round of arms control talks include 
weapons systems below the strategic level of the intercontinental weapons with 
which the Soviet Union and US threatened one another.42
Giscard d’Estaing was initially very hesitant about this demand because the 
negotiations on the so-called “Euro-strategic” weapons threatened the expan-
sion of French medium-range systems to which he had just committed himself. 
At the Franco-German summit of 14 and 15 September 1978, he recommended to 
41 Speech of 18 June 1977, quoted from Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, p. 364. Cf. ibid., pp. 359–
365.
42 On this and the following, Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War. A History of Détente, 
1950–1991, Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 150–156; Tim Geiger, “Die Regierung 
Schmidt-Genscher und der NATO-Doppelbeschluss,” in: Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Her-
mann Wentker (eds.), Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung. Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in 
deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011, pp. 95–120.
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Schmidt the alternative of stationing American medium-range missiles in Europe 
that could reach Soviet territory. This did not please Schmidt: In his view, it would 
be problematic to contribute to the arms spiral; moreover, domestic approval for 
the proposal would be difficult to gain. Brezhnev paid a state visit to the Federal 
Republic during the first week of May and showed no openness at all to his host’s 
call to limit the arsenal of medium-range weapons. After this, Schmidt regarded 
the threat of such an American deployment as an appropriate means by which 
to compel the Soviet side to concede. He was aware that, depending on circum-
stances, that threat might actually need to be carried out. He still regarded the 
deployment as the second-best solution and, furthermore, saw good prospects 
for the threat to work.
This was the solution that would come to be known as “upgrading” and 
would go on to be passionately debated in public. It was decided in principle 
at an intimate meeting of Carter, Callaghan, Giscard, and Schmidt, which the 
chancellor had requested in early October and which—in order to take French 
sensitivities into account—took place on the French Caribbean island of Guade-
loupe from 4 to 6 January 1979. Here, Carter offered the production and deploy-
ment of Pershing II missiles, which could reach the Soviet Union at least from 
German territory and which could be ready for deployment in four years. Schmidt 
accepted this offer but, along with Callaghan, emphasized that there first had 
to be negotiations on limiting medium-range missiles. Giscard highlighted the 
fact that the West would not have a bargaining chip without the new weapon 
systems, and so he demanded a limit on the negotiation offer to the four years 
that would be needed for the Pershings to be ready for deployment. Beyond that, 
he insisted that the modernization of the French nuclear arsenal not be hindered 
by the talks.43
The emphases of Schmidt and Giscard were thus very divergent: Whereas 
for the West German chancellor it was primarily a matter of reducing Soviet 
medium-range missiles, the French president was above all concerned with the 
expansion of his nation’s own medium-range arsenal. Both goals were included 
in the “double-track decision” passed in Brussels on 12 December 1979 by the 
foreign ministers and defense ministers of NATO in support of carrying out the 
basic agreement reached on Guadeloupe: There were to be negotiations to the 
end of 1983; if no satisfactory results had been achieved by that time, then 108 
Pershing II missiles and 464 cruise missiles were to be deployed. Along with the 
Federal Republic, Italy agreed to accept the weapons; Belgium and the Nether-
43 Weinachter, Giscard d’Estaing, pp.  207–215; Soell, Helmut Schmidt, pp.  728–733; German 
conversation notes in AAPD 1979 I, pp. 5–20. 
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lands made their acceptance dependent on the results of negotiations.44 This 
was a rather unequal deal insofar as the chances of successful negotiations were 
lessened not least of all by the fact that French and British nuclear weapons were 
not to be included. In French public opinion, there predominated a feeling of 
relief that their country’s autonomy had been maintained as well as the Germans’ 
link to the West, whereas in the countries where deployments might occur—and 
especially in the Federal Republic—fear spread of a new arms race and a lowered 
threshold for nuclear war.
The divergent priorities in the double-track decision did not prevent Schmidt 
and Giscard from working closely together in defending détente policy against 
American overreactions and thereby bringing the Europeans’ autonomous role in 
the East-West conflict into sharper relief. Both had been in agreement in seeking 
to persuade Carter to give up his bold public denunciation of Soviet human rights 
violations—Giscard doing so in an attention-getting interview in the American 
magazine Newsweek in September of 1977 and Schmidt with forceful reproaches 
in private conversation. Along with their partners in EPC, both leaders also 
sought to prevent the Carter administration from having the follow-up gathering 
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (meeting from October 
1977 to March 1978 in Belgrade) devolve into nothing more than a tribunal against 
Eastern human rights violations. They were not very successful. They did however 
manage to have the Belgrade meeting end with a declaration proclaiming the 
desire to continue the dialogue of détente and to hold at least one more follow-up 
conference. The European governments could link up with that in their bilateral 
talks with the East Bloc states, and they in fact did so.45
When Carter reacted to the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan at Christ-
mas time in 1979 by suspending both the détente dialogue and ratification of the 
SALT II Treaty, Schmidt and Giscard once again made efforts toward moderation. 
In a joint declaration at the close of the Franco-German summit of 4 and 5 Febru-
ary 1980, they characterized the Soviet intervention as “unacceptable.” However, 
their warning to the Soviet side confined itself to the statement “that détente 
would not be able to survive another blow of that kind.” That was indeed an accu-
rate analysis, but it also carried the message that, unlike the American president, 
Bonn and Paris did not want to deviate from their détente course. There followed 
the barely veiled suggestion that under the current circumstances it was the Euro-
pean powers that ought to take on special responsibilities.46 On French televi-
44 Europa-Archiv 35 (1980), pp. D35ff. and D99–D110.
45 Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, pp. 149ff.; on the following, ibid., pp. 160–164 and 172–174.
46 Europa-Archiv 35 (1980), pp. D166.
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sion, Giscard characterized this declaration as the “clear date of the reappearance 
of Europe as a new center of influence and decision-making in world politics.”47
In fact, the Nine did not participate in the comprehensive trade restrictions 
that Washington imposed on Moscow as “punishment.” Only the Federal Repub-
lic responded to Carter’s call for a boycott of the Summer Olympics in Moscow, 
doing so only after strong domestic disputes and out of a concern to avoid damag-
ing the Western alliance any further. At the urging of Polish Prime Minister Edward 
Gierek, Giscard went to Warsaw on 19 May to meet with Brezhnev in order to warn 
him of the consequences of a Soviet intervention in Poland. In order to move the 
USSR to negotiate on limiting medium-range missiles, Schmidt accepted a Soviet 
invitation to visit Moscow on 30 June. Each leader’s mission was discussed with 
the other in advance,48 and both proved successful in the end: Moscow shrank 
back from the idea of military intervention against the Solidarity Movement, and 
Brezhnev proposed on 21 August that negotiations be started on medium-range 
missiles. Carter had no easy way of rejecting the offer out of concern for the cohe-
sion of the Western alliance, and so negotiations began on 16 October in Geneva 
on “Euro-strategic” weapons.
Schmidt and Giscard thus provided one another support in the détente crisis 
unleashed by the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan. Schmidt’s journey 
to Moscow protected Giscard from Mitterrand’s accusation that he was making 
himself into Brezhnev’s “errand boy,” and Giscard’s journey to Warsaw could be 
pointed out to those who saw in the chancellor’s action only another attempt to 
curry favor with Moscow for the sake of German reunification. The pressure that 
Carter exerted on both leaders fizzled absent sufficient resonance in France and 
the Federal Republic. Schmidt and Giscard had thus secured for Western Europe 
an influence over containing the “second Cold War,” an influence that neither 
the Federal Republic nor France could have gained by itself. Schmidt confirmed 
this in retrospect: “Alone, I would without a doubt have been much more circum-
spect.”49
In their joint resistance to American pressure, Schmidt and Giscard also 
found themselves stronger when working together on the issue of European 
defense. The chancellor was clearly able to convince his friend that preserving 
the French medium-range arsenal would not spare France the consequences of 
47 Declaration of 26 Feb. 1980, quoted in Weinachter, Giscard d’Estaing, p. 177.
48 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Le Pouvoir et la Vie. Vol. 2: L’affrontement, Paris: Compagnie 12, 
1991, pp. 417–419; Vol. 3, pp. 217ff. There is no basis for contemporary speculations regarding 
Giscard’s ambition to forestall Schmidt here.
49 Helmut Schmidt in conversation with Michèle Weinachter: Weinachter, Giscard d’Estaing, 
p. 182.
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a nuclear exchange on German soil and that he expected a quid pro quo for the 
exclusion of French and British nuclear weapons from the sought-after negotia-
tions. In any event, the two agreed on a Franco-German defense alliance in July 
of 1980 that in essence amounted to adding an autonomous European pillar to 
NATO. According to this agreement, the Bundeswehr was to refrain from acquir-
ing tactical nuclear weapons and instead expand its conventional capacities sig-
nificantly over five years and, along with the French armed forces, become part 
of a joint high command. In this way, a force was to develop that when mobi-
lized could within one week comprise some eighteen German and twelve French 
divisions. That would facilitate a reduction of American forces in Europe and 
offer a promising prospect of “defending the western portion of Central Europe” 
without resort to nuclear weapons. In return for the expansion of the Bundeswehr 
and the Federal Republic’s contribution to the cost of modernizing the French 
Army, Paris was to expand the mission of its nuclear force de frappe “by unilat-
eral declaration to the protection of Germany too.” The French president would 
continue to have sole decision-making power over use of the force de frappe; the 
West German chancellor was to receive a veto right over the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons, however.50
Overall, France was therefore to Europeanize its defense strategy, while the 
Federal Republic was to free itself from being merely subsumed within the Ameri-
can defense strategy. To what extent this implied a return of France to the military 
organization of NATO or a modification of the decision-making mechanisms in 
the Western alliance remained unclear and was not fully negotiated by Schmidt 
and Giscard. What was primarily important to them was that their approach 
could raise the nuclear threshold in Europe and that the West Germans would be 
offered a version of the French nuclear concept that they could back. Both may 
additionally have helped contain West German anxiety over a nuclear confron-
tation and thus preempt any tendencies toward neutralization. European auton-
omy within the Western alliance would thus gain substance, and the extension of 
this dual alliance to the other members of the Community would accordingly be 
only a matter of time.
It was the case however that significant opposition had to be overcome in 
order to push this project through. It did not fit with the dogma of the closest 
possible interweaving of American and West German security that was accepted 
50 As explained by Helmut Schmidt in the Bundestag on 28 June 1984, Verhandlungen des 
Deutschen Bundestages, pp. 5601ff.; the information on a West German veto right in a conversa-
tion between Schmidt and Hartmut Soell, reported in Michael Wirth, Die Deutsch-Französischen 
Beziehungen während der Kanzlerschaft von Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982), Berlin: Wissenschaftli-
cher Verlag Berlin, 2007, p. 104.
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by large segments of the FRG’s military establishment and that was also popular 
with the West German public—and, in the final analysis, with the French public 
too. It was also not readily compatible with the détente policy approach of Egon 
Bahr, an approach that promised possibilities for German reunification primarily 
through reducing conventional forces in Europe and that therefore had placed 
great hope in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) 
in Vienna. Above all, however, the project threatened the illusion of French inde-
pendence, to which the guardians of Gaullism in the military and politics clung, 
along with an overwhelming majority of the French populace. If the US adminis-
tration were to engage in mobilizing the various forces opposing the project, there 
was thus a good chance of derailing it.
After having successfully warded off an attack by Carter on his détente policy 
at a meeting of the G-7 in Venice on 22 and 23 June,51 Schmidt was committed 
to facing this new challenge too. He speculated that “the waywardness of two 
American presidents” would certainly contribute “to understanding in European 
public opinion for the necessary adjustments.”52 For his part, however, Giscard 
feared that the project of a Franco-German military treaty with such far-reaching 
implications might reduce his chances of re-election in the coming spring. He 
therefore asked Schmidt to postpone the working out of the treaty until after the 
vote and to do nothing beforehand to unsettle French public opinion. The treaty 
on the formation of a military alliance was then to be signed on the twentieth 
anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, that is, 22 January 1983. Schmidt perforce agreed 
to this but warned against waiting too long: “My time in office has its limits.”53
The only initiative that Giscard d’Estaing wanted to get underway before 
the French presidential elections in April and May of 1981 was the proposal for a 
“Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe.” This fit with the new European defense concept in that it was only to 
involve talks on conventional armaments. In contrast to MBFR, this new initiative 
was to include Soviet territory up to the Urals. The proposal was strongly sup-
ported by Schmidt and was put forward in November of 1980 at the beginning of 
talks at the Madrid CSCE Conference. It was finally able to win approval there. On 
17 January 1984, the negotiations for this new initiative opened in Stockholm.54
51 Soell, Helmut Schmidt, pp. 751–761.
52 Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn, p. 171.
53 Ibid., p. 284.
54 Veronika Heyde, “Nicht nur Entspannung und Menschenrechte: Die Entdeckung von Abrüs-
tung und Rüstungskontrolle durch die französische KSZE-Politik,” in: Matthias Peter and Her-
mann Wentker (eds.), Die KSZE im Ost-West-Konflikt. Internationale Politik und gesellschaftliche 
Transformation 1975–1990, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012, pp. 83–98.
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After the French presidential elections, the project of a military alliance was 
put on the back burner. New President François Mitterrand, who had little foreign 
policy profile, was initially against any privileging of his West German partner 
above his other allies. In his circle, the priority was especially on an understand-
ing with Britain, in accordance with tradition. In terms of security policy, he 
reverted to a “force de frappe” doctrine that envisioned use of French nuclear 
forces only in the event of a direct attack on French territory and that limited 
French engagement in the defense of the Federal Republic to the conventional 
realm. This was however expanded by the establishment of a “rapid deployment 
force”; at the same time, links to NATO mission planning were cut back.55
At the beginning of 1982, on the occasion of regular Franco-German consul-
tations, Mitterrand conceded to Schmidt “a thorough exchange of ideas between 
the two governments on security issues.” Since then, talks have been conducted 
between the foreign ministers and defense ministers of the two countries on a 
regular basis, as had been envisioned in the Franco-German Treaty. Furthermore, 
a Franco-German Security and Defense Commission was established, made up of 
the chiefs of the general staffs and the Political Directors of both foreign minis-
tries.56 In terms of content, however, these talks made hardly any progress. When 
the foreign ministers and defense ministers gathered for the first time in October 
of 1982, the social-liberal coalition had just broken apart, with Helmut Kohl 
having become the new chancellor. The project of a military union now lacked 
a driving force on the West German side as well: What Kohl primarily conceived 
of as Franco-German military cooperation was only the return of France to NATO 
military integration—also a wholly-traditional position. What had made the con-
cretization of plans for a European defense much easier—limiting the dialogue 
to the smallest circle around both top politicians—proved to be the decisive hin-
drance in carrying out such plans now that both leaders had lost elections.
In a spectacular way, Mitterrand advocated implementation of the decision 
for an “upgrading” of intermediate-range missiles in a speech before the Bunde-
stag in January of 1983. In doing so, he was expressing the French interest in the 
Federal Republic’s linkage to American defense strategy as clearly as his own 
persistence in the ideology of France’s independence in security policy.57 He 
was clearly unaware that neither the one nor the other could be harmonized with 
the development of a security-policy identity for Europe. In contrast to Giscard, 
he was not prepared to pay a price for preventing the feared drift of the Federal 
55 Cf. Hubert Védrine, Les mondes de François Mitterrand. À l’Élysée 1981–1995, Paris: Fayard, 
1969, p. 120; Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, pp. 373–378.
56 Joint declaration of 25 Feb. 1982, Europa-Archiv 37 (1982), p. D194.
57 Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, 30 Jan. 1983, pp. 8978–8992. 
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Republic into neutrality. When Schmidt presented the bigger picture to him at a 
private meeting in June of 1983, his reaction was cautiously positive. He could not 
however bring himself to the decisive concession: a French nuclear guarantee for 
the Federal Republic.58
Not even the decision for jointly building a battle tank was carried out. Mit-
terrand did indeed push hard for its realization, but the West German arms-indus-
try lobby as well as the budget-policy experts opposed it. In France, a new tank 
would be necessary by 1990, while that need would not arise in the Federal Repub-
lic until 1995. Additionally, there were fears in the Federal Republic of losing the 
export market for the successful “Leopard” battle tank; from the perspective of 
competition, there was also opposition to technology transfers to France. Given 
that the political justification for the project—the military union—had slipped 
from sight, German opponents of the decision of February 1980 were finally able 
to win out: The defense committee of the Bundestag halted development of the 
Franco-German tank in February of 1982.
What remained was the shared will to continue détente policy. Schmidt and 
Mitterrand were in agreement on putting up a fight against the demand by US 
President Ronald Reagan to reduce East-West trade in order to discipline the Soviet 
Union. The two leaders prevailed on the issue of constructing a natural gas pipe-
line from the USSR and also refused to expand the list of security-sensitive goods 
that could not be exported to the Eastern Bloc. When a storm of outrage erupted in 
French public opinion over the allegedly too feeble respond of the West Germans 
to the imposition of martial law in Poland in December of 1981, Mitterrand publicly 
emphasized that the views of the two governments were in accord. Both Bonn and 
Paris rejected the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union that Reagan had 
imposed in response to the ban on the Solidarity movement. When in June of 1982 
the sanctions were extended to technical equipment needed by the Europeans for 
the construction of the natural gas pipeline, the EC foreign minister condemned the 
American action as “unacceptable for the Community.”59
This solidarity continued after Helmut Schmidt had been replaced by Helmut 
Kohl. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who remained in the role of foreign minister in 
the new coalition, had Kohl’s support in advocating a declaration by the heads 
of state and of government of the Community affirming the goal of the “indepen-
dence of Europe” in world politics. The “proposal for a European Act,” for which 
they were seeking support from the partner governments, aimed “by means of a 
common foreign policy and common presence and action of the member states in 
58 Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn, pp. 286–288.
59 Government declaration by Helmut Schmidt, 25 June 1982, Europa-Archiv 37 (1982), 
pp. D347–D352, quote on p. D350. Cf. Schmidt, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn, pp. 260–266.
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the world to make it possible for Europe increasingly to take on a global political 
role in accordance with its economic and political weight.”60
Thatcher, Genscher, and Colombo
Great Britain kept back from the new discussion over “the idea of a strong Europe 
that takes on its responsibility to the full extent.”61 It was not only Callaghan who 
rejected stronger institutionalization and common foreign policy or an autono-
mous defense. Margaret Thatcher, who in 1975 had replaced Edward Heath as 
leader of the Conservatives and who had won parliamentary elections in May of 
1979, also opted in a wholly-traditional way for national independence and close 
connections with the US. The “hard” attitude toward the Soviet Union that Carter 
had taken since the beginning of 1980 fit well with her temperament. Accord-
ingly, she not only reduced diplomatic communication with Moscow but also 
publicly criticized Giscard’s insufficient support for the new American course. 
She got along famously with Carter’s successor Ronald Reagan.62
Instead of developing a common foreign policy, Thatcher concentrated at the 
beginning of her term on the problem of British net payments to the Commu-
nity, as it was presented to her by representatives of the British Treasury, which 
was critical of the EC. Thatcher was not an opponent of British membership. In 
regard to the European Community and its further development, she behaved 
like “an agnostic who continues to go to church,” as Christopher Soames once 
remarked.63 On the one hand, this led her to a series of initiatives for reconfigur-
ing the Community according to her views. On the other, she also repeatedly let 
herself be seduced into sharply anti-European rhetoric, which brought her into 
conflict with various cabinet colleagues and thwarted her initiatives.
She took up the problem of net payments because, as things turned out at the 
end of the British transition phase, it had not been resolved by the “self-correct-
ing mechanism” that Wilson had won from his partners: Thanks to North Sea oil 
reserves that had in the meantime been opened up and the resultant strength-
ening of the British pound, the UK’s gross national product per capita never 
60 German-Italian draft of 4 Nov. 1981, Europa-Archiv 37 (1982), pp. D50–D62.
61 According to Giscard d’Estaing in the French Council of Ministers on 16 July 1980, AN 5AG3 
AE 72.
62 Joe Renouard and D. Nathan Vigil, “The Quest for Leadership in a Time of Peace. Jimmy 
Carter and Western Europe, 1977–1981,” in: Schulz and Schwartz (eds.), The Strained Alliance, 
pp. 309–332, here pp. 329ff.
63 Young, Blessed Plot, p. 311.
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sank below the threshold of eighty-five percent of the average of the member 
states, which would have triggered limits on the country’s contributions to the 
Community. Because Britain continued to import more food and industrial prod-
ucts from third countries outside the Community and because its agricultural 
sector received few subsidies due to modernization and production in line with 
the market, the UK ended up paying approximately twice as much in tariffs and 
levies to the Community budget as it received from the Community. The Trea-
sury calculated the expected difference as one billion pounds for the year 1980. 
The UK was thus the largest net payer into the Community, ahead of the Federal 
Republic, even though Britain’s per capita GNP had already fallen behind those 
of countries such as France, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
Thatcher perceived that as a glaring injustice. With little sense for the eco-
nomic and political gains that her country could derive from the Community, 
she demanded nothing less than a balance between payments and benefits. Her 
mantra became “I want my money back,” which made for good publicity and 
which she repeatedly held against her partners. Schmidt and Giscard were con-
fronted with this during their first encounters with the new prime minister, the 
other leaders of the Nine having to hear it at the first Council meeting in which 
she took part. When the Commission responded at the next Council meeting, 
in November of 1979 in Dublin, by presenting a modified distribution proposal 
that amounted to a reduction of British contributions by 350 million pounds, 
she rejected it as completely unsatisfactory. The partners in turn found that 
highly inappropriate, and so the Dublin Council meeting ended in an argument. 
Schmidt and Giscard were greatly annoyed by the endless tirades from the “gro-
cer’s daughter.”64
After tempers had once again cooled, the partners made significantly greater 
concessions to British demands. Schmidt especially regarded those demands as 
partially justified. Under his influence, the British were offered a deal at the next 
Council meeting, in Copenhagen in April of 1980: The UK’s contribution for the 
years 1980 and 1981 would be capped at the average amount from 1978 and 1979. 
That meant a reduction of some 760 million pounds. To the partners, this seemed 
to be a generous offer. British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington, State Secretary 
Michael Pallister, as well as Commission President Roy Jenkins urgently advised 
Thatcher to accept it. She once again refused any compromise, however, and this 
Council meeting too ended without result. At the end of May, Carrington did agree 
to this offer at a meeting of the Council of Ministers with the provision that the 
prospect also be held out of reducing the British contribution for 1982 and that the 
64 According to the characterization by a member of Giscard’s staff; Jenkins, European Diary, 
pp. 528–531. Cf. ibid., pp. 464–466 und Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, pp. 494–500.
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Commission be given the task of developing a permanent solution. That was still 
not acceptable to Thatcher. Only after Carrington and foreign-policy parliamentary 
speaker Ian Gilmour threatened to resign did she agree to the interim solution.65
The Commission, since January of 1981 under the chairmanship of Gaston 
Thorn, made use of this opportunity to present a comprehensive reform program 
that overtly combined necessary adjustments to the Common Agricultural Policy 
with the expansion of intervention into other economic sectors. According to their 
report of 24 June 1981, agricultural expenditures were to be reduced by capping 
the subsidies when full supply was reached and then incrementally harmonized 
with world market prices. At the same time, the Regional Fund and the Social 
Fund were to be augmented. Thirdly, economic recovery was to be promoted 
through the expansion of the European Monetary System, increased investment 
in research and development, common energy-saving programs, and further har-
monization of the rules of competition. Taken together, these measures were also 
to lead to a more uniform distribution of Community financial resources. Until 
that point had been reached, Great Britain was to receive compensation based on 
its percentage share of the GDP of the Community. In order to finance all this, the 
report declared that it was indispensable to increase the Community’s share of 
the value-added tax from the then-current one percent to two percent.66
There was no agreement on this program, however. Mitterrand did support 
the increase in the portion of the value-added tax but rejected the reduction in 
guaranteed agricultural prices. It was the other way around with Thatcher, who 
was in agreement with cutting agricultural expenditures but opposed to any 
expansion of the Community budget. Schmidt joined in: Having in the meantime 
become the only net payer, he regarded the praxis of subsidy apportionment in 
the Community with great skepticism. Commission President Thorn was not in 
a position to break the two-way blockade: As a representative of the smallest 
member state and as a liberal without backing from any of the large party net-
works, he had difficulty simply bringing the Commission together on a unified 
course. He was all the less successful in getting the heads of state and of govern-
ment to commit themselves to compromises, as Ortoli and Jenkins had previously 
been able to.
Thorn was forced to look on powerlessly as Thatcher sought to compel deci-
sion-making in line with her views by having her agriculture minister, Peter Walker, 
block the routine raising of agricultural prices for the production period 1982–83 
over several months. This British extortion attempt could only be put to an end 
when France separated the Federal Republic from the bloc of those opposing 
65 Ibid., pp. 501–508; Jenkins, European Diary, pp. 604–607.
66 Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1981, pp. 484–495.
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increases. On 18 May 1982, the Council of Ministers summarily determined the agri-
cultural increases by majority vote. Claude Cheysson, Mitterrand’s foreign minis-
ter who had previously served eight years as a commissioner in Brussels, curtly 
declared that the issue of agricultural prices did not involve vital national interests; 
and so Great Britain would not be able to cite the Luxembourg Compromise.
As punishment for behavior hostile to the Community, Thatcher had to accept 
that the reduction of the difference between contributions and subsidies for 1982 
ended up somewhat lower than it had for the previous two years. In 1983, she 
had to fight hard once again in order to emerge triumphantly from the Stuttgart 
Council meeting of 18 and 19 June with the declaration “I have my check.”67 Yet 
this too was nothing more than a temporary arrangement for one year. The British 
contribution question continued to poison the atmosphere and, along with the 
difficulties in negotiating with Spain and Portugal, contributed once again to the 
impression that the Community was unable to act or reform itself.
That impression became all the more persistent when, parallel to Thatcher’s 
campaign for repayment, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
undertook an initiative to strengthen Community institutions. He was dissatisfied 
that Schmidt had so quickly accepted Giscard’s about-face on the issue of expand-
ing the rights of Parliament and that the decision of the Paris summit of December 
1974 on dispensing with unanimity in the Council had more or less been forgotten. 
The foreign minister also regarded it as necessary to make the European autonomy 
practiced by Giscard and Schmidt multilateral so as to give it a more stable basis. 
In general, Genscher was seeking to make the integration process dynamic once 
again and to work precisely against the impression of a stalemate on Europe policy, 
which had resulted from Thatcher’s campaign for repayment.
To this purpose, a plan for a “Treaty on European Union” was developed in 
the Europe Department of the West German Foreign Office during the spring of 
1980. This was to strengthen the political goal of European unity, better coor-
dinate established activities, and highlight possibilities for further development 
within a readily comprehensible framework. In other words, it was a matter of 
now making decisions on those parts of the Tindemans Report that—in contrast 
to direct elections and the monetary union—had remained in limbo up to that 
point. Genscher took up this proposal in early 1981 and did so publicly, given that 
he was chairman of the smaller coalition partner and was eager for the opportu-
nity to have the Free Democrats distinguish themselves in the area of European 
policy. In a speech at the traditional meeting of the FDP in Stuttgart on Epiphany 
(6 January 1981), he declared that it was “finally time” for such a treaty. As goals 
of the European Union, he cited “the development of a common European foreign 
67 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen, Berlin: Siedler, 1995, p. 366.
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policy, expansion of Community policy in accordance with the Treaties of Paris 
and Rome, coordination in the realm of defense policy, closer cooperation in cul-
tural matters, and the harmonization of lawmaking.”68
Genscher’s initiative was taken up at once by Italian Foreign Minister Emilio 
Colombo. This Christian Democrat, who had long been an important figure in 
Italian politics, not only saw a chance to strengthen European institutions, a goal 
toward which he had already worked as president of the European Parliament 
from 1977 to 1979. He also welcomed the prospect of breaking up the Franco-Ger-
man duopoly in formulating European foreign policy so as to have greater influ-
ence over shaping it. Two weeks after Genscher’s speech in Stuttgart, Colombo 
joined in the call for a union treaty during a speech in Florence. Thereafter, he 
met repeatedly with the West German foreign minister in order to exchange ideas 
about the contents of such a treaty.
Reactions were less enthusiastic in the other capitals. Giscard d’Estaing envi-
sioned attacks on him once again for selling out national sovereignty, attacks 
that he absolutely did not need before the presidential elections. After those elec-
tions, Mitterrand was first of all concerned with preventing his European partners 
from intervening in the socialistic economic program of the new government. A 
plan for creating a “great European social space,” presented to the public on 13 
October by French Europe Minister André Chandernagor, explicitly envisioned 
“no kind of institutional innovation” and unmistakably distanced itself from an 
“always somewhat unrealistic over-all concept.”69 Lord Carrington did signal 
interest in increasing foreign-policy cooperation, but he too was cool toward the 
notion of further institutional development.
Schmidt viewed these hesitant reactions as confirming his skepticism regard-
ing the chances of achieving this initiative—and thus also his skepticism regard-
ing its utility. When Genscher presented his draft treaty to the West German 
cabinet on 18 September, he also ran into opposition from Defense Minister Hans 
Apel, who was not pleased with the proposed expansion of foreign-policy cooper-
ation into the realm of defense policy. After thorough discussion, a majority of the 
cabinet decided that it would not be possible to win acceptance for a new treaty 
that would be binding in international law. Genscher was only given permission 
68 Europa-Archiv 36 (1981), p.  D164. Cf. Wilfried Loth, “Deutsche Europapolitik von Helmut 
Schmidt bis Helmut Kohl,” in: Knipping and Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch, pp. 474–488; Hans-
Dieter Lucas, “Politik der kleinen Schritte – Genscher und die deutsche Europapolitik 1974–
1983,” in: idem. (eds.), Genscher, Deutschland und Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002, pp. 85–
113; Ulrich Rosengarten, Die Genscher-Colombo-Initiative. Baustein für die Europäische Union, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008.
69 Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1981, pp. 505–519. 
266   Consolidation, 1976–1984
to negotiate on a “political declaration of principle” whereby the heads of state 
and of government were to implement the pledges of the 1972 Paris summit. There 
was not to be any mention of establishing a separate council for defense-policy 
issues, which Genscher had previously advocated.70
Nonetheless, in order to give the initiative as much gravity as was still possi-
ble, Genscher and Colombo decided to present it as a joint initiative of the govern-
ments of the Federal Republic and Italy and to raise the status of the sought-after 
declaration of principle rhetorically through use of the name “European Act.” On 
4 November, they presented a joint draft. This reinforced the desire for a common 
foreign and security policy, completion of the internal market, and further devel-
opment of the European Monetary System. New realms of cooperation cited in the 
document were culture, the legal system, and domestic security. In terms of insti-
tutions, it envisioned the creation of a secretariat for EPC, semiannual reports 
by the European Council to Parliament, ratification of international treaties by 
Parliament, and a commitment to restraint in using the veto right in the Council 
(those making use of the veto were to justify it in writing). Beyond this, the draft 
contained a declaration that the agreements would be reviewed after five years. 
If that review was positive, then a legally-binding treaty would be concluded.71
The European Council put off the proposal for the time being. In an ad hoc 
committee created at the Council meeting in London on 27 and 28 November, the 
various doubts were articulated about institutional augmentation and expanded 
content. When the Council of Ministers took up the matter on 20 June 1982, Gen-
scher and Colombo did not succeed in dispelling those doubts. Only after Kohl 
had become chancellor in October of 1982 and had made the “European Act” 
a core component of his European policy did the project gain momentum. As 
leader of the opposition, he had made intensive efforts to develop the transna-
tional Christian Democratic network of the “European People’s Party.” Hence, 
he eagerly made use of the opportunity right at the beginning of his chancellor-
ship to distinguish himself in European politics and so approached Mitterrand 
with this intention. “I was of the firm conviction,” he wrote in retrospect, “that 
I should dare to take the decisive step on the way to the political unification of 
Europe in this decade.”72
70 Werner Link, “Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der Ära Schmidt 1974–1982,” in: Wolfgang 
Jäger and Werner Link (eds.), Republik im Wandel 1974–1982. Die Ära Schmidt, Stuttgart and 
Mannheim: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, pp. 275–432, here p. 35; Genscher, Erinnerungen, 
p. 364.
71 Europa-Archiv 37 (1982), pp. D50–D62.
72 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990, Munich: Droemer, 2004, p.  101; on the following, 
ibid., pp.  108–111, and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie, Munich: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2012, pp. 397–407.
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He benefited from the fact that in the first half of 1983 it was the turn of the 
Federal Republic to chair the Council. In the third week of March, he made it easier 
for Mitterrand to remain in the European Monetary System by pushing through 
another increase in the value of the mark parallel to the devaluation of the franc 
and the Italian lira; Kohl did this against the advice of most of the finance ministers 
and central bank governors. Then, he made use of the trust he had thereby gained 
in Mitterrand’s eyes to convince the French president to commit to a series of weak-
ened formulations along the lines of the Genscher-Colombo program. The result 
of their agreements was the “Solemn Declaration on European Union,” which the 
European Council passed at its meeting in Stuttgart. At its core, this document was 
still only a declaration of intent regarding the deepening of existing interrelations 
and the development of new areas of cooperation. In contrast to the German-Italian 
proposal, there was mention of agricultural policy, social policy, and promotion of 
regional development; cooperation in the defense realm was limited to its “political 
and economic aspects.” In institutional terms, there was only the promise of cir-
cumspection in exercising the veto right and increased consultation of Parliament. 
In regard to treaties binding in international law, it was merely the case that official 
“positions” from Parliament would be necessary.73
The value of this weakened form of the “European Act” was further restricted 
by unilateral declarations. No fewer than five of the ten signatories issued pro-
tocols that held to the necessity of unanimity in the Council of Ministers on 
so-called vital issues: France, Ireland, Greece, Great Britain, and Denmark. The 
last two of these states did not even want a commitment to justify use of the veto 
in writing. Additionally, the Greeks declared that their right to shape their foreign 
policy according to national interests could in no way be encroached upon; for 
their part, the Danes voiced reservations about six points of the declaration alto-
gether.
Mitterrand’s approach to Kohl’s policies went beyond the basic commitment 
to a concerted expansion of the Communities and cooperation among the govern-
ments. After he had come to understand that the modernization of France could 
in the end be ensured only together with the Community and that for this reason, 
there was no alternative to close partnership with the Federal Republic, he was 
prepared in the run-up to the Stuttgart Council meeting to agree in principle to 
limiting the agricultural budget. The French government declared that it was in 
agreement with a process proposed by Bonn for reforming agricultural policy. 
This meant that, as already mentioned, a negotiation packet on reform of agricul-
tural policy, the increase in revenue, and the definitive settlement of the British 
entry issue could be gotten underway at Stuttgart.
73 Europa-Archiv 37 (1982), pp. D420–D427.
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After the Stuttgart meeting, Kohl and Mitterrand intensified their telephone 
contacts and meetings; informal conversations between the top officials of both 
governments occurred more frequently too. In the third week of September, 
staff of the chancellor’s office and of the Élysée Palace met for a Franco-Ger-
man seminar at Konrad Adenauer’s one-time vacation spot, Cadenabbia on 
Lake Como, in order to inform each other about their methods of work and their 
positions. Here, the unresolved questions of European politics were thoroughly 
reviewed “in the course of very open discussion.”74 In the process, it seems that 
Mitterrand’s understanding grew regarding the necessity of Europe for securing 
French independence. “We find ourselves between two empires that treat us like 
colonies,” he said to his advisor Jacques Attali. “What should one do to resist 
them, if not build Europe?”75 At the end of the year, Mitterrand replaced Europe 
Minister Chandernagor with his personal friend Roland Dumas, who quickly suc-
ceeded in establishing close contact with Genscher.
In this way, a whole series of points of Franco-German understanding was 
achieved. Over the winter of 1983–84, Paris and Bonn agreed on the production 
of a joint attack helicopter, several projects of technical-scientific cooperation 
within the framework of the Community’s ESPRIT research program, as well as 
a series of technical regulations for the dismantling of protectionism and imbal-
ances in Franco-German trade. In May of 1984, an agreement was concluded 
that provided for the incremental dismantling of border controls for persons and 
goods moving between France and the Federal Republic. All these measures were 
intended to serve as models for extension to other countries of the Community.
Parallel to this, the two parties coordinated their stances on the Stuttgart 
negotiation packet. The agreement on agricultural policy was concretized to the 
effect that the price guarantee for milk was to be limited quantitatively; prices for 
agricultural products were to be generally frozen. In return, Bonn agreed to the 
incremental dismantling of the so-called currency equalization payments to West 
German agriculturists who exported to other Community countries. Regarding 
the portion of the value-added tax that the Community was to receive as revenue, 
the West German government would not accept a doubling, as the Commission 
had been seeking, but nevertheless would agree to a hike from 1.0 to 1.4 percent. 
Regarding British contributions, Mitterrand accepted in the end a reduction of 
74 Report from Mitterrand‘s staffer Pierre Morel, 21 Sept. 1983, AN 5AG5 4, quoted in George 
Saunier, “Prélude à la relance de l’Europe. Le couple franco-allemand et les projets de relance 
communautaire vue de l’hexagone 1981–1985,” in: Bitsch, Le couple France-Allemagne, pp. 463–
485, here p. 479.
75 Notes, 17 Feb. 1984, Jacques Attali, Verbatim. Vol. I: Chronique des années 1981–1986, Paris: 
Fayard, 1993, p. 594.
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two-thirds of the difference between payments from the value-added tax and sub-
sidies from the Community budget.
On the basis of these agreements, a solution to the budget problems—accu-
mulating since 1979—could have been reached at the Council meeting in Brussels 
on 19 and 20 March 1984. The breakthrough that had been carefully prepared 
by Bonn and Paris did not materialize there because Margaret Thatcher was not 
content with the level of reimbursement of British payments to which Mitterrand 
had agreed. Given that receipts from tariffs and levies were no longer included in 
the calculation, the permanent settlement being offered was in fact significantly 
lower than the one-time payments of previous years. Thatcher found this all the 
less acceptable given that the portion of the value-added tax going to the Com-
munity was to rise by forty percent. Because she persisted in her demands with 
accustomed stubbornness, Kohl simply refused to negotiate further with her. The 
heads of state and of government went their separate ways without results.
Up to the time of the next Council meeting, set for 25 and 26 June in Fontaine-
bleau, Mitterrand—who was then serving as Council president—sought out all the 
governments individually in order to align them with the compromise negotiated 
between Bonn and Paris. At the same time, he let it be known in several public 
utterances, most clearly in a speech before the European Parliament in Stras-
bourg on 24 May, that he was now prepared to have the project for a European 
Union as advocated by Genscher and Colombo put into the form of a treaty. Bonn 
and Paris privately agreed on an alternate plan if Mrs. Thatcher were to stick with 
her noncompliant attitude: In that event, the treaty on the European Union was 
to be completed without Great Britain and instead only among those countries 
willing to accept it. For this purpose, the staffs of the Élysée Palace and the chan-
cellery prepared a joint memorandum to be presented at a conference to be called 
by Mitterrand outside the mechanism of the Council. The French president did 
not leave the British government in the dark about the fact that Bonn and Paris 
were seriously contemplating this alternative.76
The threat of a core Europe without Great Britain worked. It was the case that 
at the meeting in Fontainebleau, Thatcher did demonstratively show that she was 
unimpressed initially. When Mitterrand interrupted the talks on the second day 
of negotiations with the observation that he saw hardly any prospect of success, 
however, she suddenly gave in. In a conversation with the French president, she 
accepted a settlement that was only one percent higher than the position on 
which Bonn and Paris had agreed. Kohl consented to this under the condition 
that the Federal Republic, as the largest net payer, would need to shoulder only 
two-thirds of the British rebate and that the other members take on more on a per-
76 Saunier, “Prélude,” pp. 481–483.
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centage basis. Further, he insisted that the hike in the portion of the value-added 
tax be linked to the conclusion of negotiations with Spain and Portugal; it was to 
be in effect from 1 January 1986.77
After the budget problems that had been building up since 1979 had finally 
been solved in this way, the further development of the Community as discussed 
in the context of the Genscher-Colombo initiative could be taken up concretely. 
Aware of the alternate plans that Mitterrand and Kohl had prepared, Thatcher 
came to Fontainebleau with a paper entitled “Europe, the Future,” which indi-
cated where Britain saw a need for development: in cooperation on foreign and 
security policy as well as in liberalizing the Common Market.78 The partners 
eagerly took up this signal. In the closing communiqué of the Council meeting, 
the heads of state and of government announced their intention to provide a 
new and powerful impetus to economic development in Europe, which was to 
be accomplished by means of “completing the internal market” as well as devel-
oping scientific and technical potential. They then appointed two committees 
that were to work out measures for the further development of the Community: 
a “Committee for the Europe of the Citizen,” which was to develop proposals for 
mobility across borders and for citizens’ identification with the Community, as 
well as a Committee for the Further Development of European Institutions and 
Cooperation.79
In the middle of 1984, it was therefore not only the southern expansion that 
entered the home stretch. It was also the case that the course was set for the 
further development of the Community, oriented on the needs of the time: the 
increased necessity of acting autonomously in world politics and the challenge 
of competition from the up-and-coming economic powers of the Far East, espe-
cially Japan. After a moment of crisis stemming from Mitterrand’s initial unfamil-
iarity with the European policy of Giscard d’Estaing, the surprising approach of 
the Socialist president to Kohl had provided a new ability to take action. It was 
thus no coincidence that photos of a commemoration at the graves of soldiers in 
Verdun on 22 September 1984 showing Mitterrand spontaneously taking Kohl’s 
hand became the emblem of a new epoch of Franco-German leadership in Euro-
pean policy.
77 On the course of the Council meeting in Fontainebleau, Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 369ff.; 
Jacques Attali, Verbatim I, pp. 658–660; Roland Dumas, Le Fil et la Pelote. Mémoires, Paris: Om-
nibus, 1996, pp. 330ff.; Young, Blessed Plot, pp. 322–324.
78 Europa-Archiv 39 (1984), pp. D434–D440.
79 Conclusions of the chair of the European Council, 25 and 26 June 1984, ibid., pp. D440–D443.
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The Single European Act
The ad hoc Committee on Further Development of European Institutions and 
Cooperation, appointed by the European Council in Fontainebleau, took up its 
work on 28 September 1984. It consisted in equal parts of the state secretaries of 
the foreign or Europe ministries of the Ten and independent figures holding no 
governmental office at the time. Given that Ireland had in the meantime assumed 
the Council presidency, Irish Senator and former Foreign Minister James Dooge 
was chosen as chairman. In the vaguest of terms, the committee’s task was “to 
put forward proposals for the better functioning of European cooperation in 
the Community area as well as in the area of Political Cooperation and in other 
areas.” The proposals were to have a function similar to that of the Spaak Report 
for the development of the Treaties of Rome. In the appointment of this body, 
there was explicit reference to the Spaak Committee.1
In its work, the Dooge Committee could lean upon a draft “Treaty on Euro-
pean Union,” which the European Parliament had passed on 14 February 1984. 
This document traced its origins to Altiero Spinelli, who had given up his attempt 
to win more political authority for the Commission in May of 1976; now as a 
member of the European Parliament, elected on the slate of the Italian Commu-
nists, he was seeking to convince his colleagues to support a fundamental reform 
initiative from Parliament. He met with success too, given that members of Par-
liament were still dissatisfied with the relationship between the amount of effort 
they put into their positions and their actual influence over Europe policy. In July 
of 1981, there was a decision to work out a draft treaty that would replace the 
existing Community treaties. The resulting document, on which the Institutional 
Committee had labored for over a year, was approved by an overwhelming major-
ity of Parliament: 237 to 31, with 43 abstentions.
There was an awareness of Spinelli’s role in developing the draft, and so it 
later gained the reputation of paying homage to federalist maximal positions. 
In fact, it differed little from what in the Tindemans Report had already been 
regarded as capable of achieving a consensus. The draft retained the existing 
division between the Community realm and intergovernmental cooperation; 
it only envisioned that, “after consultation with the Commission and with the 
approval of Parliament,” the European Council was to have the right to transfer 
further political areas into the realm of “common action.” Decision-making in the 
1 Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1984, pp. 436ff.
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Council of Ministers was to be by qualified majority; during a transition period of 
ten years, however, member states were to have the right to demand deferral of 
a decision by reference to the “vital interest of a state”; such a motion was to be 
granted if the Commission confirmed such an interest. Parliament was to have 
equal status with the Council of Ministers in regard to participation in legisla-
tive and budgetary proceedings. The draft also gave the Commission president 
the power to put together the Commission after consultation with the Council. If 
Parliament passed a motion of no-confidence in the Commission, then the latter 
would need to resign; in that case, the European Council would then name a new 
Commission president.
The only really new feature of the draft treaty of the European Parliament 
was the process envisioned for its implementation: It was not addressed to the 
European Council or the Council of Ministers but rather directly to the national 
governments. They were to bring about its ratification after the requisite process 
in each country. As soon as the treaty had been approved “by a majority of the 
member states whose populations equal two-thirds of the total population of the 
Community,” a government conference of the involved states was to be called and 
a process and date of implementation were to be decided—and there was also to 
be a decision “on relations with the member states that had not yet ratified it.” 
This meant that efforts to block it by countries opposed to reform, such as Britain 
or Denmark, were ruled out, as was any dilution of the draft by a government 
conference that was dependent on consensus among all member states.2
For their part, the governments were clearly not prepared to give up control 
over a decision about going forward without Britain or Denmark or probably 
Greece either. Contrary to what Spinelli had hoped, they were not pressured into 
doing so by the national parliaments either. Only the Italian Chamber of Depu-
ties—by a large majority—demanded that its government embrace the draft treaty 
of the European Parliament. In the other parliaments, similar motions either 
found no majority or were not introduced at all. In a speech before the Strasbourg 
parliament on 24 May 1984, Mitterrand, who was then serving as Council presi-
dent, did speak out in principle for a new treaty and let it be known that he was 
willing to draw inspiration from Parliament’s draft. He appointed Maurice Faure 
as the French non-governmental representative on the Dooge Committee; Faure 
had played a decisive role in the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome in 1956–57 
while serving as state secretary.
2 Text in: Lipgens, 45 Jahre, pp. 711–736; preliminary drafts, ibid., pp. 654–710. Cf. Daniela Preda, 
“L’action de Spinelli au Parlement européen et le projet de Traité d’Union européenne (1979–
1984),” in: Wilfried Loth (ed.), La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne, 
Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 2005, pp. 185–203.
 The Single European Act   273
Given that preparation, the Dooge Committee also came to the conclusion 
that a new treaty should be made, one that codified the expansion of Community 
activities and provided “more effective democratic institutions.” In doing so, the 
committee was guided by a report that Faure had introduced into the delibera-
tions. As a means of achieving such a treaty, it was proposed that a government 
conference be called in accordance with Article 236 of the EEC Treaty. In terms 
of content, the basis of the negotiations was to be provided by “the acquis com-
munautaire, this report, and the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart”; it was also 
explicitly stated that “inspiration should come from the spirit and method of the 
draft treaty passed by the European Parliament.” The Dooge Committee made 
recommendations very similar to those of Parliament regarding the tasks of the 
European Union, majority voting in the Council of Ministers, co-decision-making 
by Parliament, and the strengthening of the Commission.3
Of course, these were in part the positions of the majority. Representatives of 
Britain, Denmark, and Greece made clear in annotations at various places that 
they were of a different opinion. This was especially the case regarding majori-
ty-voting by the Council of Ministers and to an extent for the rights of Parliament 
as well. The minority went on record saying that consultations among the govern-
ments should take place before a decision was made to call a government confer-
ence. Right at the beginning of the Brussels Council meeting of 29 and 30 March 
1985, the heads of state and of government then opted to postpone a decision on 
the Dooge Report until the next gathering, scheduled for late June in Milan.
The Thatcher government argued that what in its view constituted the heart 
of the matter—strengthening foreign-policy cooperation and completing the 
internal market—could be achieved without treaty amendments. At a meeting of 
the Council of Ministers on 10 June in Stresa, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe 
presented a plan for committing to a “gentlemen’s agreement” as a means of 
avoiding a logjam on the internal market. In the event of conflict, dissenting 
members ought simply to abstain. Beyond this, an agreement on Political Cooper-
ation ought to be reached. There was no mention of new institutions in this plan, 
only talk of closer cooperation under the leadership of the European Council. As 
Helmut Kohl commented, it was “an agreement not to go very far.”4
In order to avoid having their initiative for institutional reform get bogged 
down in this way, Kohl and François Mitterrand had a “Draft Treaty on Euro-
pean Union” prepared in haste a few days before the gathering in Milan. This 
document focused wholly on the expansion of foreign and defense policy. The 
3 Europa-Archiv 40 (1985), pp. D240–D253.
4 Attali, Verbatim I, p.  1241. The draft of the Agreement on Political Cooperation was again 
presented at Milan; text in: Europa-Archiv 40 (1985), pp. D 446–D449. 
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development of a common foreign policy, including the political and economic 
aspects of defense, was to be promoted by establishing a general secretariat of 
the European Council. The continued presence of the Commission at the sessions 
of the Council was to be stipulated in the treaty, likewise regular consultation of 
Parliament. The draft was announced by Kohl in the Bundestag on 27 June, one 
day before the beginning of the Milan conference. The text became available to 
participants only a few hours before the opening of the meeting.5
Nowhere in the eleven paragraphs of the draft treaty was there any mention 
of reforming the decision-making procedures within the existing Community. 
This gave rise to the suspicion, not only among the representatives of Italy and 
the Benelux states, that here was another attempt by the Franco-German duo to 
subordinate the Community to the diktat of the governments. Jacques Delors, 
who had succeeded Gaston Thorn as Commission president at the beginning of 
the year, met with Kohl and Mitterrand on the sidelines of the Council meeting 
in Fontainebleau and voiced such misgivings to both leaders. The two quickly 
realized that tactically they had gotten on the wrong track. Mitterrand suddenly 
began speaking of nothing more than a “mere work instrument.” On the second 
working day, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher presented a 
new work instrument: a paper that embraced the recommendations of the Dooge 
Committee on the whole and especially emphasized the necessity of summoning 
a government conference for reforming the Treaties of Rome. After the foreign 
ministers’ dinner, he did some thinking and dictated his ideas the next morning 
while shaving.6
As expected, Thatcher and her Greek colleague Andreas Papandreou along 
with Danish Prime Minister Poul Schlüter offered opposition to the new West 
German proposal. During a pause in the talks, the advocates of a government con-
ference discussed whether it should be called by majority decision. Italian Prime 
Minister Bettino Craxi and Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti were immediately 
in favor of such a move, as were Kohl and Genscher. For his part, Luxembourg 
Foreign Minister Jacques Poos cautioned against splitting the Community. Then, 
however, Mitterrand was persuaded by Genscher to support a majority decision. 
As could already be seen in the run-up to the Council meeting of Fontainebleau, 
5 Europa-Archiv 40 (1985), pp.  D449–D451. Cf. Ulrich Lappenküper, “Die deutsche Europa-
politik zwischen der ‘Genscher-Colombo-Initiative’ und der Verabschiedung der Einheitlichen 
Europäischen Akte (1981–1986),” in: Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen 10 (2003), pp.  275–294; 
also on the following.
6 Jacques Delors, Erinnerungen eines Europäers, Berlin: Parthas, 2004, pp. 257–261; Genscher, 
Erinnerungen, p. 373.
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the French president too believed that, if in doubt, it was more important to make 
progress on Europe policy than to have Britain come along.7
The results of the Milan Council meeting were thereby determined. When 
the plenary session resumed, Craxi—who was serving as Council president in the 
first half of 1985—put the German proposal up for a vote, which was a complete 
surprise to Thatcher. It was adopted by a margin of seven to three. This had been 
the first use of majority voting in the European Council. When the opponents of 
a government conference protested, they were told that this was only a vote on 
a procedural matter; it was thus not possible to resort to claims of vital national 
interests. By applying a procedural rule of the Council of Ministers, Craxi had in 
fact made it clear that in the end the European Community itself could decide 
whether it wanted to take up treaty revision.8
Thatcher was absolutely furious about that. With an eye toward her own 
goals regarding the internal market and foreign policy, however, she could not 
bring herself to torpedo the government conference that had now been decided 
upon. Instead, following the counsel of her staff, she quickly concentrated on 
representing her interests to the Council. By approving the “Conclusions” of the 
Council, Papandreou and Schlüter also signaled their willingness to participate 
in the government conference. By the time of the next Council meeting in Decem-
ber in Luxembourg, the conference was to present a draft treaty on common 
foreign and defense policy as well as proposals for reforming the EEC Treaty and 
regulations for the new fields of activity.
The Milan Council meeting also approved the report on the “Europe of the 
Citizens,” which had been worked out by the second ad hoc committee under the 
chairmanship of the former Italian MEP Pietro Adonnino. It contained an abun-
dance of proposals for establishing the free movement of people and goods in 
the Community, simplifying residency and employment in other member states, 
organizing economic areas that extended beyond borders, recognizing the equiv-
alency of educational degrees and certificates, promoting the establishment 
of partner cities and student exchanges, simplifying dealings with European 
authorities, introducing a European passport, and using the European flag. The 
European Council accepted all the proposals and directed the Commission and 
the member states “to take the necessary measures for implementation.”9 A 
decision by the Council of Ministers made the banner with twelve stars on a blue 
7 Ibid.
8 C. Luuk van Middelaar, Le passage à l’Europe. Histoire d’un commencement, Paris: Gallimard, 
2012, pp. 171–182.
9 “Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates von Mailand 28./29.6.1985,” Jahrbuch der Euro-
päischen Integration 1985, pp. 425–429; the Adonnino Report, ibid., pp. 423–425.
276   The Era of Development, 1984–1992
ground, originally used by the Council of Europe, the official flag of the European 
Communities on 29 May 1986.
Lastly, the Council in Milan also approved a “White Paper for Completing 
the Internal Market,” which had been commissioned from Delors and had been 
presented on 14 June. This document embraced demands that Étienne Davignon 
as commissioner for enterprise and industry and especially Karl-Heinz Narjes as 
commissioner for economic and financial affairs had made but that had always 
been defeated in the Council of Ministers during Thorn’s presidency due to oppo-
sition arising from national interests. These demands related not only to the elim-
ination of technical and legal hindrances to trade that had still not been abol-
ished with the completion of the Customs Union in 1968 but also to the many 
direct and indirect subsidies, administrative rules, and tax advantages that the 
governments had implemented in order to protect national production in the 
face of the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979. In the meantime, all this constituted a 
great danger to economic growth: Entrepreneurs and corporations viewed the 
Common Market as coming under increasing threat and consequently were hesi-
tating to continue investing in Europe. In the process, competitiveness fell vis-à-
vis the US and Japan, both of which—in contrast to the Europeans—were again 
experiencing considerable rates of growth. Year by year, the memoranda in which 
the Thorn Commission called for measures to complete the internal market had 
become more urgent; the recommendations by the European Council stemming 
from these documents remained largely without effect. At the Council meeting in 
Fontainebleau, a memorandum of 7 June 1984 that listed over one hundred dis-
tinct measures necessary for establishing complete market freedom within two 
years had not even been acknowledged due to the focus on resolving budgetary 
issues.
After thorough consultations with government heads and having been influ-
enced by demands from industry, Delors now decided to make the internal-mar-
ket project the central theme of his presidency. He gained Thatcher as an ally: 
She took seriously the elimination of hindrances to trade in the European Com-
munity as a parallel to the liberalization of the British market and was supported 
by British entrepreneurs as well as the City in her fight for genuine competition in 
the European market. Delors gave responsibility for economic affairs on the Com-
mission to Lord Francis Arthur Cockfield, a confidant of Thatcher with experience 
in politics as well as the business world; he directed the operationalization of 
the internal-market project with great professionalism. Delors then consciously 
went public with his effort, and beginning with his inaugural address before 
the European Parliament on 14 January 1985, he promoted a date for completion 
of the project—by 1992. Lastly, the Commission presented in the white paper a 
precise timeline for implementing some 282 individual steps and legal acts that 
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in the meantime were regarded as necessary for actually completing the internal 
market. By not only approving the document in principle but also its timeline, the 
European Council in Milan gave Delors a means by which to bring pressure on the 
governments.10
Roughly speaking, there were two factions in the government conference 
that began with the session of the Council of Ministers on 9 and 10 September in 
Luxembourg: those who sought to implement as much as possible of the institu-
tional reform program of Parliament and of the Dooge Committee—Italy, Ireland, 
and the Benelux states; and those who wanted to embrace as little as possible of 
that program—Britain, Denmark, and Greece. That a new logjam did not develop 
was partly thanks to the close cooperation between Genscher and French Foreign 
Minister Roland Dumas, who decisively focused the negotiations on what was 
achievable. After Claude Cheysson had rejoined the Brussels Commission at the 
beginning of the year, Dumas had returned to the foreign ministry and was now at 
pains to ensure an even closer coordination between Paris and Bonn. Moreover, 
the Commission supplied the conference with well-formulated proposed texts 
on the spot; and Delors was indefatigable in justifying them by reference to the 
requirements of the internal market. In terms of procedure, he was supported in 
this by Luxembourg Council President Jacques Santer and his foreign minister, 
Jacques Poos; the trio quickly became known in the sessions of the Council of 
Ministers as “the three Jacques.”11
Regarding the practice of majority voting, Delors succeeded in having it apply 
for all relevant areas of the internal market, though with the important excep-
tions of tax policy, free movement of persons, and employee rights. Whereas in 
accordance with the terms of the EEC Treaty more than two thirds of the measures 
proposed in the white paper would have required unanimity, it would now be 
only one quarter. Unanimity was necessary for bringing new policy areas into the 
Community realm, but as soon as they were introduced, majority voting would 
apply here as well.
Regarding the rights of Parliament, the maximalists were supported by the 
Germans and the minimalists by the French. Following a proposal from the Com-
mission, the result was a “Process of Cooperation,” which accorded Parliament 
limited right of participation in those areas in which the Council of Ministers 
decided by majority vote. Amendments made by Parliament to Council decisions, 
if approved by the Commission, could now only be rejected by unanimous vote of 
10 “Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the European Coun-
cil,” COM (85), 310 final. On Delors’ strategy, cf. Helen Drake, Jacques Delors. Perspectives on a 
European Leader, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 78–112.
11 Delors, Erinnerungen, p. 269. 
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the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, there were some areas in which this right 
of participation would not apply despite majority voting in the Council: in deter-
mining foreign-trade tariffs, in granting free movement of services and capital, 
as well as in transportation and agricultural policy. Additionally, future treaties 
for the accession of new members and association agreements were to require 
approval by an absolute majority of Parliament. Also, the status of Parliament 
was conceptually raised to a certain extent: Whereas up to this point the French 
government especially had placed emphasis on speaking only of a “Parliamen-
tary Assembly” (in accordance with the formulation in the Treaties of Rome), the 
new treaty made use of the term “European Parliament,” the name that the body 
had given itself in 1962.
The concern for efficiency in implementing the internal-market project as 
reflected in these regulations also led to an expansion of the executive responsi-
bilities of the Commission: It was empowered to issue regulations to implement 
guidelines for harmonizing legal provisions and ensuring competition. Neverthe-
less, the governments retained the right to take on implementation themselves in 
“special cases” if the Council of Ministers unanimously decided on this. Beyond 
that, “regulatory committees” were established by which the governments would 
oversee implementation. Delors failed in his attempt to have these committees 
granted merely advisory functions.
In regard to foreign and defense policy, it was essentially the case that the 
old system was retained. More precisely, the practice up to that point was now 
put into treaty form. Dumas and Genscher wanted to strengthen it by establish-
ing a general secretariat of the European Council, as had been envisioned in the 
Franco-German draft of a Union Treaty. However, this did not gain support from 
the small states, which feared that the Commission would fall under tutelage, or 
from the British, who—in contrast to the era of Edward Heath—now did not want 
any new structures for foreign or security policy. The institutional augmentation 
that the European Council received was limited to a small administrative secre-
tariat in Brussels, to which some officials of the prior, the current, and the next 
Council president would belong. Furthermore, the Communities and Political 
Cooperation were now incorporated into a common treaty text, while the Euro-
pean Council was anchored in the treaty as the overarching institution; however, 
their integration still did not go beyond the presence of the Commission at all 
gatherings of the Council, of the foreign ministers, and of their directors. Because 
neither Denmark nor Britain wanted a European Union, the term “Act of the Euro-
pean Union” could not be approved for the new treaty. As a minimal compromise, 
there remained the qualification of the act as “single,” which emphasized the link 
between the Communities and Cooperation.
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The treaty anchored and provided specifications regarding social policy, 
regional policy, research policy, and environmental policy. The program for 
a “European Social Space” was not as greatly expanded as Mitterrand had 
demanded at the beginning of his presidency and as was now also being advo-
cated by the Danish government (which, being a minority government, was 
dependent on approval from the opposition Social Democrats). Yet, directives 
for occupational safety and health protection were transferred into the realm 
of majority decision-making; and the Commission was assigned the task of pro-
moting collective treaties among the social partners on the European level. The 
Regional Fund was embedded in a program for promoting “economic and social 
cohesion,” which amounted to increased resources for the fund and introduced 
majority voting on regulations related to implementation. Regarding research 
and technology policy, the practice of the multi-year Framework Programs for 
Research that had been implemented by the Commission in 1984 was now insti-
tutionalized. At the same time, measures were taken to help these policy areas 
become more effective by means of majority voting and cooperation with national 
and international research programs. Lastly, environmental protection was 
declared to be a goal of the Community. Due to opposition from the less-devel-
oped states, this did not go beyond very general stipulations; financing remained 
the responsibility of individual member states, aside from measures with a Com-
munity character.
Despite the program’s varied offerings to less-developed and less social-
ly-progressive member states, Delors had to accept some curtailments of his 
internal-market program. Demands for retention of the veto right had originally 
extended beyond tax policy, free movement of persons, and employee rights. By 
this means, Britain and Ireland had wanted to retain oversight of health; Ireland 
had additionally wanted to retain control over insurance and banking affairs. In 
general, the free movement of persons ended up being threatened by a situation 
in which the concept of a “space without internal borders” would be replaced by 
a market concept. Delors was only able to avoid that by personally requesting 
help from Mitterrand and Kohl. At the “conclave” of the foreign ministers shortly 
before the Council meeting in Luxembourg on 2 and 3 December, Dumas and 
Genscher presented a joint draft that saved the essential provisions of the inter-
nal-market program. True, the announcement on realizing the “space without 
internal boundaries” by 31 December 1992 did not have any legally-binding char-
acter. To what extent the resistance of individual states to its achievement could 
actually be overcome was thus left open.
Delors achieved still less in regard to the completion of the monetary union. 
In his view, it was a logical counterpart to the free movement of capital and, in the 
final analysis, also an element of the unified market regulations. He thus wanted 
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to include in the act the stipulation that the European Monetary Fund that was 
envisioned in the European Monetary System could be created by unanimous 
decision of the Council. However, the British as well as the Germans and Dutch 
opposed this. For her part, Thatcher simply could not imagine giving up British 
sovereignty over the currency; and Kohl heeded warnings from the Bundesbank 
and Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg about renewed adverse effects on the 
West German stability course. At a meeting in London on 27 November, both 
leaders agreed that the project of a monetary union should not be mentioned at 
all in the treaty.
In a bilateral meeting during the Luxembourg Council, Mitterrand threatened 
Kohl by saying that if the monetary union were not included in the treaty, France 
would not approve the internal-market program; the chancellor then backed away 
from the commitment he had made in London. He accepted a formulation from 
Delors by which the signatories would in regard to economic policy cooperation 
commit themselves to “take into consideration experiences gained in cooperation 
in the framework of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the development 
of the ECU.” Acting at the urging of Stoltenberg’s State Secretary Hans Tietmeyer, 
Kohl also insisted that institutional reforms in monetary policy be regarded as 
treaty amendments and also that before any decision-making, “the Monetary 
Committee and the Committee of the Central Bank Governors” were to be con-
sulted. This was still far too much for Thatcher. Feeling betrayed once again, she 
threatened to veto these provisions. Only after her staff had made it clear to her 
that in essence what was meant was only the continuance of current practice 
regarding monetary policy cooperation did she back off.
The Single European Act (SEA), as it emerged after more than thirty hours 
of discussion in the European Council,12 was thus far from the clear structure 
that had characterized the draft treaty of the European Parliament. Spinelli, who 
as reporting secretary of the Institutional Committee had been informed of the 
course of the negotiations on an ongoing basis, spoke with deep disappointment 
of the “wretched little mouse” to which the government conference had given 
birth.13 It was clearly the case that a more coherent and far-reaching reform 
was hardly to be expected if one wanted to bring the minimalists further along 
12 Text in Europa-Archiv 41 (1986), pp. D163–D182; on the course of the government conference 
and the Luxembourg Council meeting, Jean de Ruyt, L’Acte unique européen. Commentaire, Brus-
sels: Édition de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1987; Ken Endo, The Presidency of the European Com-
mission under Jacques Delors. The Politics of Shared Leadership, London and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999, pp. 140–151; Dietrich Rometsch, Die Rolle und Funktionsweise der Europäischen 
Kommission in der Ära Delors, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999, pp. 112–130.
13 Speech before the Institutional Committee of the European Parliament on 4 Feb. 1986, Altie-
ro Spinelli, Discorsi al Parlamento europeo 1976–1986, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1987, p. 370.
 The Internal-Market Project   281
toward a European Union. However, a break with them was only a second-best 
solution in the eyes of Kohl and Mitterrand; and they were happy that Thatcher 
helped them avoid such an outcome by offering a partial accommodation.14 In 
this regard, Delors’ internal-market project proved to be functional in a double 
sense: On the one hand, it evoked memories of the most important challenge that 
had faced the Community in the middle of the 1980s and thereby made a break 
with Britain seem particularly inappropriate. On the other hand, it served to make 
Thatcher somewhat more willing to offer concessions regarding supranational 
regulations, to an extent far beyond what could be reconciled with her ideolog-
ical premises. In fact, after years of stagnation, the Single European Act was to 
make possible a far-reaching attainment of the internal market and thereby also 
unleash a new dynamic in other areas of integration. Spinelli’s harsh judgment 
was a significant exaggeration.
When on 16 and 17 December the Council of Ministers was in the final debate 
on the draft treaty, the foreign ministers of Italy and Denmark both withheld 
their final position—Andreotti doing so because the draft did not go far enough 
in acceding to the demands of the European Parliament and his Danish colleague 
doing so because the concessions to Parliament went too far. After the Single 
European Act had been rejected by the Danish Parliament on 2 January 1986, a 
referendum had to be organized in the country. This meant that at the signing of 
the act by the foreign ministers in Luxembourg on 17 February 1986, only nine 
states were represented, among them the new members Spain and Portugal, 
which even before their entry had participated in the government conference. 
The Greek government opted to await the outcome of the referendum in Denmark. 
One day after the positive outcome of the vote on 27 February (with some 56.2 
percent in favor), the foreign ministers of Denmark, Greece, and Italy signed the 
treaty. After the Supreme Court of Ireland likewise ordered a referendum, the 
treaty went into force on 1 July 1987.
The Internal-Market Project
Even before regular use of majority voting in the Council of Ministers had signifi-
cantly accelerated the elimination of non-tariff hindrances to trade, Delors took 
further steps that were to strengthen the consensus regarding the internal-market 
14 Andrew Moravscik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conven-
tional Statecraft in the European Community,” in: International Organization 45 (1991), pp. 19–
56; he presents “all three major states” (ibid., p. 49) schematically as concerned in the same way 
about the preservation of sovereignty and thereby brushes aside these fundamental facts.
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project and in the final analysis thus also promote the cohesion of the Commu-
nity. Among these were measures that he explained to the Strasbourg parliament 
on 18 February 1987: a substantial reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
better provisioning of the structural funds and of the new Community policies as 
well as another expansion of the Community budget, combined with a strength-
ening of budgetary discipline. This program stemmed from thoughts that the 
Commission had been developing since the middle of 1986. It gained momentum 
from another sounding-out that Delors had been able to undertake among all the 
heads of state and of government in early 1987, and it was presented under the 
suggestive title “Making a Success of the ‘Single European Act.’” It was quickly 
dubbed the “Delors Package” by the public.
Its passage did not happen as quickly as Delors had hoped. It was the case 
that the General Council, the Finance Ministers Council, and the Agricultural Min-
isters Council all approved the major outlines of the project. When the European 
Council was to make concrete decisions on 4 and 5 December 1987, however, the 
debate got bogged down in the various details of the program. Margaret Thatcher 
once again wanted to bring about decisions on reducing the agricultural budget, 
while rejecting the other aspects of the program. At the next Council meeting on 
11 and 12 February 1988 in Brussels, it required the energy and negotiation skill 
of Kohl—holding the new West German Council presidency—to have a decision 
reached that was only a little less than what the Commission had been seeking.15
In order to contain overproduction and the exorbitant costs of agriculture, 
it was first of all decided that expenditures over the next few years would not be 
allowed to increase at more than eighty percent of the growth in gross domestic 
product. Thus, upper limits were set on annual price adjustments and incentives 
created to produce in conformity with the market to a greater extent. The quan-
titative limits on guarantee prices were extended to grains and vegetable oils. At 
the same time, removal of approximately ten to fifteen percent of total agricul-
tural land from production was promoted; smaller agricultural enterprises were 
accorded direct income subsidies. Lastly, a currency reserve was amassed that 
would make agricultural sales on the world market independent of fluctuations 
in the dollar. At the same time, the Community thereby undertook initial efforts 
to be able to engage in the upcoming Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations.
Regarding the Structural Fund, the Council in Brussels agreed to no less than 
a doubling of its resources—not for the year 1993 as demanded by the Commis-
sion but for 1994. In so doing, the goals of the Structural Fund were made more 
precise: assisting regions that were lagging in development, supporting the struc-
15 Delors, Erinnerungen, pp. 285–297; the conclusions of the Brussels Council meeting in Jahr-
buch der Europäischen Integration 1987/88, pp. 438–458.
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tural transformation of industrial regions in decline, battling long-term unem-
ployment, promoting integration of young people into the workforce, moderniz-
ing agricultural production, and promoting rural development. Support from the 
Structural Fund was made contingent on simultaneous allocation of certain per-
centages of national resources. It was still the case that loans from the European 
Investment Bank would augment assistance funding, the bank acting in close 
coordination with the Commission on individual projects. Taken together, these 
measures were to ensure that the elimination of hindrances to competitiveness 
would not further exacerbate inequalities but on the contrary open up additional 
productive potential.
In order to finance the Structural Fund, the research program, and the other 
Community tasks, the budget for 1988 was raised to 1.15 percent of the cumulative 
gross national product of the member states; up to 1992, it was to rise incremen-
tally to 1.2 percent. For 1988, this corresponded to an increase of twenty percent—
to some forty-five billion ECUs. To the extent that this amount was not taken in 
from tariffs, levies, and the designated percentage of the value-added tax (1.4 
percent), contributions from member states would be added as a fourth source 
of income, in accordance with each one’s share of the cumulative gross domestic 
product. The Council of Ministers and the Commission were empowered to reach 
an agreement with Parliament on a five-year “Financial Projection” that struc-
tured income and expenditure in advance at the designated levels, thus reducing 
wearisome and unproductive disagreements over individual budget lines.
In order to increase the pressure on the governments, Delors commissioned 
a comprehensive scholarly study on “The Cost of Non-Europe” and had the 
findings made public in late March of 1988. Under the leadership of the Italian 
economist Paolo Cecchini, the authors expected that completion of the internal 
market would result in an increase in gross domestic product of approximately 
five percent. Consumer prices were to drop by an average of six percent, unem-
ployment to be significantly reduced, government budgets to see a gain in income 
of 2.2 percent of GNP on average, and the foreign-trade balance to improve by 
approximately one percent of the gross domestic product. The authors empha-
sized however that these results could only be achieved if systematic elimination 
of non-tariff barriers to trade were accompanied by targeted economic assistance, 
strengthened competitiveness policy, and a continuance of the stability course in 
monetary policy. Beyond that, firms would need to take advantage of the chance 
offered them to pursue an active investment policy.16 As with all economic prog-
noses, this report was of course open to challenge. However, given that the upward 
16 Paolo Cecchini, et al., Europa ’92. Der Vorteil des Binnenmarktes, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
1988.
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movement of the world economy in the second half of the 1980s was gradually 
sweeping over the countries of the European Community, the report enjoyed an 
overwhelmingly positive reception. Entrepreneurs began making investments in 
anticipation of the internal market and in turn put pressure on the governments 
to bring it about.
The spirit of optimism that the Commission generated with its measures 
and announcements did indeed help overcome the opposition of various lobbies 
to individual elements of the internal-market project. By the end of 1988, the 
Council of Ministers had passed 109 of the 279 proposals made in the white paper 
of 1985. By the deadline of 31 December 1992, some 264 Commission proposals 
had become directives of the Council of Ministers, which allowed the European 
Council in Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December 1992 to determine that the goals of 
the white paper had essentially been achieved or at least initiated. Admittedly, 
only forty-five percent of the directives had become national law in all member 
states by that time. The rate of fulfillment was lowest in Greece with 70.4 percent 
and highest in Denmark with 88.7 percent. With some seventy-seven percent 
each, France and the Federal Republic had the same rate of non-compliance.17 
Hence, the internal-market project proved to be a long-term endeavor, one that 
would be a subject of European politics into the twenty-first century.
The Commission achieved the most progress in the elimination of the 
so-called “technical” hindrances to trade in the form of differing national regula-
tions and technical norms. This was aided by a case-law ruling of the European 
Court in February of 1979: A ground-breaking decision was handed down in favor 
of the West German Rewe Trade Group against the ban on importing black-cur-
rant liquor of the “Cassis de Dijon” brand. West German officials had justified the 
ban with reference to the fact that “Cassis de Dijon” was not at least twenty-five 
percent alcohol by volume, as the FRG’s brandy-monopoly law stipulated. The 
court argued against that position by stating that “every product produced legally 
in a member state and offered for sale” should also be able to be sold “in the other 
member states in principle”—insofar as public health and consumer protections 
as well as the honesty of the trade could be ensured. According to the principle 
of mutual recognition of national provisions stemming from this decision and 
additional ones on food products over the following years, the Commission and 
Council could content themselves with establishing minimal standards for safety, 
health, and consumer protection. Thus, the replacement of national norms by 
common European norms in accordance with Article 100 of the EEC Treaty lost 
17 Hans-Eckart Scharrer, “Binnenmarktpolitik,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 
1988/89, pp. 132–142; ibid., 1992/93, pp. 139–150.
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urgency; it could be left to European committees on norms with which national 
committees cooperated.18
In a similar way, the guidelines for mutual recognition of university diplo-
mas, which the Council had passed in January of 1989, represented significant 
progress on the free exercise of professions in the common economic area. There 
followed guidelines for professional qualifications, for eliminating administra-
tive hurdles in the practice of free academic professions, and for opening public 
service to citizens of other member states. It was the case however that there were 
delays in incorporating all this into national law, especially in regard to employ-
ment in public service. On 1 July 1992, freedom of residency was extended to those 
citizens of member states who were not employed: students, pensioners, others 
of independent means, and their relatives. However, approval for residency was 
contingent on their not being an economic burden on the country. Additionally, 
the Commission made some efforts to encourage the mobility of scholars and stu-
dents. It was especially the Erasmus Program for promoting academic exchanges, 
initiated in 1987, that quickly gained great significance.
Thanks to the transition to majority voting, the Commission was also suc-
cessful in eliminating hindrances to competition stemming from different forms 
of national policy on competition and cartels. With the 1989 “Merger Regula-
tion,” which the Commission had already proposed in 1973, it finally gained sole 
right to approve or reject mergers and financial stakes of Community-wide sig-
nificance. With reference to the need to guarantee competition on the national 
level, this prohibited bans on capital contributions from other member states; 
at the same time, mergers that seemed appropriate for strengthening the compe-
tiveness of European firms on the world market were made easier. On 1 July 1990, 
the movement of capital was freed within the Community; however, member 
states reserved the right to limit it again for a maximum of six months if needed 
to support their currencies. Likewise, on 1 January 1993, banks gained the right to 
operate in all member states. In accordance with the principle of mutual recogni-
tion, the regulation of banking remained with the land of origin.
Conversely, it proved difficult to grant the same freedom of movement for 
insurance due to the complexity of the subject matter. From 1990, however, insur-
ance firms were able to offer a portion of their services across the whole Com-
munity. Likewise, it proved difficult to open public procurement to competition. 
Procurement orders above a certain size issued by state agencies did need to be 
advertised in the Official Journal of the Community, and a series of further provi-
sions was made for guaranteeing competition in issuing procurement contracts 
18 On this and the following, Gerbet, Construction, pp. 359–363; Franz Knipping, Rom, 25. März 
1957. Die Einigung Europas, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2004, pp. 234–238.
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by state agencies. However, the member states retained many exceptional regu-
lations, especially in the field of energy supply. There were also many violations 
of these stipulations, and it took a long time for an attitudinal change to set in.
Regarding the harmonization of tax rates on goods, services, and investment 
income, only a certain amount of convergence was possible. In October of 1992, 
the governments agreed to equalize their value-added tax rates within a period 
of four years. Fifteen percent was set as the “lowest normal rate,” and the normal 
level for reduced tax rates was to be five percent. Likewise, minimum rates were 
established for the various special taxes on alcohol, tobacco, mineral oil, and so 
forth. The Commission was given authority to propose “objective tax rates” in 
regard to Community goals on health, energy, transportation, and environmental 
policy; member states were to use them as guidelines in harmonization. It was 
not at all possible to achieve a harmonization of taxes on investment income that 
would be necessary to prevent tax avoidance via countries with low taxes or none 
at all. The Commission proposed a uniform withholding tax of fifteen percent, 
which corresponded to the average of the taxes on investment income in the 
member states. Britain and Luxembourg, which profited the most from low tax 
rates, bridled at this. They claimed that if there were a uniform tax, capital would 
then flee the European Community altogether.
Free movement of goods within the Community was made easier in 1988 by a 
standardization of shipping documents, and on 1 January 1993, these were elim-
inated altogether. The paperwork that arose from differing value-added tax rates 
was no longer taken care of when borders were crossed but would instead be 
left to the particular finance office responsible. Likewise, checking of animals 
and plants at borders was eliminated and replaced by harmonization of national 
norms under the oversight of the Commission.
In contrast, the checking of persons when crossing borders, the most obvious 
characteristic of a truly common market, could not be abolished everywhere; nor 
could progress in this area be very quickly realized. It presupposed uniform regu-
lation of immigration, of crime fighting, and of the art and antiquity trade, which 
could not be achieved without great effort. Moreover, many countries, especially 
Britain, did not want it at all. Initially, an agreement was reached only among the 
Federal Republic, France, and the three Benelux states; it was signed in the Lux-
embourg border village of Schengen on 14 June 1985. It called for lifting controls 
on persons in 1990 as an extension of an agreement reached between France and 
the Federal Republic in 1984. Implementation had to be postponed twice, initially 
to 1993 and then to 1 July 1995. In the meantime, Spain and Portugal had joined 
the agreement, so that free movement of persons, along with common entry and 
asylum regulations as well as cooperation in crime fighting, now encompassed 
seven states.
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With the abolition of national regulations in favor of European framework 
guidelines and the accompanying development of new political fields, the cit-
izens of the Community got “more Europe.” Initially, the Council of Ministers 
had consisted of only four different specialized formations after the Treaties of 
Rome came into effect and had grown to twelve distinct formations by 1975. By 
1990, however, the total number of Council formations had risen to no less than 
twenty-two. Almost every ministry in national governments, with the exception 
of defense, now had a corresponding body at the European level in which minis-
ters from specific fields cooperated and also often made decisions. The number 
of legal acts issued by the Council of Ministers had already nearly doubled during 
the 1970s (from 375 in 1970 to 627 in 1980) and grew still further to 724 in 1986. 
The total number of civil servants working for the Commission rose from approx-
imately five thousand at the end of the 1960s to nearly thirteen thousand in 1990. 
Likewise, the number of special-interest groups and non-governmental organiza-
tions that saw fit to have their own representatives in Brussels grew to over two 
thousand.19
After development toward the internal market had gotten underway, Delors 
devoted increased efforts to expanding the social dimension of the Community. 
According to his understanding, the elimination of protectionist regulations at 
the national level, necessary for the realization of the internal market, should 
not lead to the unleashing of unhindered capitalistic competition but should be 
cushioned by the establishment of regulations via partnerships at the European 
level; this was important to him due to his long connection to the Christian labor 
movement in France. In light of workers’ great fear of the consequences of dereg-
ulation, Delors called for “sending a strong political signal in this area” during 
the Council meeting in Hannover on 27 and 28 June 1988.20 Shortly thereafter, 
having just been nominated for a second term as Commission president, he spoke 
before the European Parliament and called for a further expansion of the Com-
munity: In ten years, “80 per cent of the laws affecting the economy and social 
policy would be passed at a European and not a national level.” To achieve this, 
he let it be known to the deputies—and indirectly to the national governments—
that a further strengthening of European institutions would be necessary: “We 
are not going to manage to take all the decisions needed between now and 1995 
unless we see the beginnings of a European government.”21
19 Wolfgang Wessels, Die Öffnung des Staates. Modelle und Wirklichkeit grenzüberschreitender 
Verwaltungspraxis 1960–1995, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2000, pp. 195–260.
20 Delors, Erinnerungen, pp. 383ff.
21 Speech of 6 July 1988, Verhandlungen des Europäischen Parlaments, 2–367/156–157.
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This message was understood by the representatives of workers’ organiza-
tions. The British trade unions, which in light of the simultaneity of British entry 
into the Community and economic crisis had mostly been in the camp of the EC 
opponents, now celebrated Delors as nothing less than a savior from the impu-
dence of Thatcherism. When the Commission president spoke at their annual 
congress in Bournemouth on 7 September 1988 and promised he would advocate 
for an “internal market beneficial to all” and that “one day Europe-wide condi-
tions secured by treaty” would be achieved, the enthusiastic delegates joined 
together in singing “Frère Jacques.” Chairman Clive Jenkins, who had advocated 
an exit from the Community during the 1975 referendum, openly admitted that “I 
got it wrong.”22
In Margaret Thatcher’s eyes, this forcing of regulation at the European level 
meant that Delors had mutated from an ally in the struggle for the internal market 
to a megalomaniacal champion of an all-powerful Brussels bureaucracy. She 
did not realize that with her own engagement for the internal market, she had 
to a goodly extent contributed to the strengthening of the Community, underes-
timating the supranational implications of her concessions in the process. She 
became all the angrier at what she perceived as the creeping transfer to Brussels 
of responsibilities not covered by treaties. Firmly resolved to halt this tendency, 
she made use of a speech that she had promised to give to the College of Europe 
in Bruges in order to present her interpretation of the internal-market program 
with unmistakable clarity: As she said to the students and professors of this cad-
re-training school for the European movement, “We have not successfully rolled 
back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them re-imposed at a European 
level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.” In 
the heat of the moment, she uttered a general renunciation of the supranational 
principle—the principle to which British governments, including her own, had 
committed themselves in the form of treaties. Instead, she conjured up the ideal 
of “willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states.”23
The Foreign Office had seen to it that some particularly provocative passages 
inserted into the draft of the speech by Thatcher’s foreign-policy advisor Charles 
Powell were stricken—for example, the prideful pronouncement that Britain 
alone had freed Europe from “Prussian domination” as well as the appeal to 
“forget” the goal of a United States of Europe. Nevertheless, the long, emotional-
ly-charged speech worked like a beacon. She spoke from the soul to conservatives 
22 Clive Jenkins, All against the Collar, London: Methuen Publishing, 1990, pp.  130, 137–140; 
Delors, Erinnerungen, pp. 368ff.
23 Text in: www.margaretthatcher.org/archive; on the origins and reaction, Young, Blessed 
Plot, pp. 346–351.
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plagued by feelings of uncertainty, and she contributed much to popularizing the 
distorted image of a Brussels “superstate” in Britain. At the same time, however, 
pragmatic Europeans in the government, such as Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe 
and Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, began to turn away from the 
prime minister. The speech could do nothing against the dynamic that the inter-
nal-market project had developed. Instead, Thatcher’s words contributed over 
the long term to her fall in November of 1990.
The Project for an Economic and Monetary Union
The economic upswing and political optimism were furthered by the fact that 
monetary-policy cooperation was making progress. After the volte-face in French 
economic policy in March of 1983, all member states of the European Monetary 
System were now without exception prioritizing the fight against inflation. As 
a consequence, inflation rates edged closer to the low Dutch and West German 
levels, and monetary re-alignments were more seldom needed. Only Italy and 
Ireland had to endure significant devaluations: The lira lost six percent of 
its value in July of 1985, and the Irish pound eight percent in August of 1986. 
Underperforming countries prevented flight from their currencies by having their 
central banks purchase marks when their currencies were strong; when their own 
currencies were threatened with weakening, they then made use of these hold-
ings before the intervention thresholds had been reached. The mark therefore 
developed more and more into a second reserve currency alongside the dollar 
and also into the anchor currency of the EMS. Orientation on the mark helped the 
stabilization efforts of the governments gain vigor and credibility.
With the consolidation of the EMS, its further development into a monetary 
union came onto the agenda once again. François Mitterrand became a partic-
ularly strong advocate of such a move after having decided over the course of 
1983 to make the expansion of the European Union into a central theme of his 
presidency. A memorandum produced by Roland Dumas with support from the 
Quai d’Orsay and the French Finance Ministry was presented on 1 June 1984. It 
emphasized the necessity of increased co-ordination of monetary policy and the 
development of common economic framework planning so as to safeguard sta-
bility and growth. Private use of the ECU was still to be promoted. Lastly, the 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund ought to be expanded into a European 
Monetary Fund with which the European currencies could be defended against 
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the dollar. In this way, a genuine European and international currency should be 
developed out of the ECU.24
The resumption of plans for a monetary union was justified in the Dumas 
Memorandum primarily by citing the necessity of overcoming subordination to 
swings in the dollar exchange rate and American interest-rate policy. With the 
growing self-commitment to the mark there was a second motive: one-sided 
subordination to the dollar policy and interest-rate policy of the West German 
Bundesbank. This was all the more difficult to bear because the Bundesbank was 
contributing far less to preserving the parities than the central banks of the weaker 
countries; this was due to the prevalence of preventative unilateral intervention 
before the intervention threshold had been reached. The “deviation threshold” 
on an ECU basis, at which the Bundesbank too would be forced to intervene, was 
seldom reached; and over time, this instrument for balanced promotion of con-
vergence was practically forgotten.25
Along with the comfortable position that the Bundesbank had attained 
through this development, there also grew the opposition to mutualizing mon-
etary reserves or monetary policy. Indeed, Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl 
did guard against appearing as the principle opponent of a European Monetary 
Union. However, by demanding that before any individual reform measures 
were taken, a definitive institutional design for this union be agreed upon, he 
did consciously raise the hurdles for realizing such a plan. Kohl was not able 
to reduce them very easily because Finance Minister Stoltenberg, who worked 
closely with the Bundesbank, was increasingly gaining popularity and soon con-
stituted a potential rival of the chancellor. In principle, Kohl was already in favor 
of the monetary union; he regarded it as self-evidently belonging to his vision of 
a unified Europe. He had to be careful however to succeed with it in consensus 
with West German politics or at least with those of his party, and that led him to 
hesitate to embrace the French initiatives. The concessions that he found himself 
willing to make during the formulation of the Single European Act did not go 
nearly as far as Mitterrand had hoped.
A first breach in the West German defensive front came in the winter of 
1986–87, when a dramatic drop in the dollar put the French franc under deval-
uation pressure and also put pressure on the mark to rise. Jacques Chirac, who 
had been prime minister under Mitterrand ever since the Gaullists’ victory in the 
parliamentary elections of March 1986, blamed this on the hike in money-market 
24 Reported in Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating 
Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 152ff.
25 Horst Ungerer, A concise history of European monetary integration: From EPU to EMU, West-
port: Quorum Books, CT, 1997, p. 163.
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interest rates by the Bundesbank. Stoltenberg defended the Bundesbank against 
the public criticism from Paris. Internally, however, he had to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the criticism and drew the conclusion that the monetary system had 
to be equipped with better mechanisms to protect against speculative pressure. 
The Bundesbank was in this way to be prompted to take a more flexible approach 
and at the same time be protected against further attacks. The Franco-German 
confrontation ended on 12 January 1987 with a decision of the finance ministers to 
raise the value of the mark and Dutch guilder by a modest three percent and the 
Belgian-Luxembourg franc by two percent. The demand for devaluing the French 
franc was dropped.
At the same time, the finance ministers commissioned the Monetary Com-
mittee and the Committee of the Central Bank Governors to develop a concept 
for strengthening the intervention mechanisms of the monetary system. This was 
passed by the central bank governors on 8 September 1987 in Basel and then 
confirmed without revision by the finance ministers in Nyborg in Denmark on 
12 September. Notably, the Basel-Nyborg Agreement contained two concessions 
that the Bundesbank had rejected in a similar initiative by the European Com-
mission in March of 1982: Very short-term EMS credits could in the future also be 
used for financing preventative “intra-marginal” interventions, and repayment 
of intervention credits could in the future be paid entirely in ECUs, not only half 
in ECUs as had been the case up to that point. Additionally, the central bank gov-
ernors were to make increased efforts to call attention to cases of inconsistency 
in national monetary policies and also pursue interest-rate policy with the goal 
of preserving parities. Pöhl also succeeded in having his colleagues explicitly 
commit themselves to greater internal and external stability.26
Foreign Minister Genscher was obviously not yet satisfied with the increased 
commitment of the Bundesbank to the goal of monetary union as contained in 
the Basel-Nyborg Agreement. For him, the valuation crisis of late 1986 and early 
1987 had made it clear that monetary union needed to be put on Bonn’s agenda 
despite the temporizing opposition of the Bundesbank. Not only was he pressured 
by Dumas, to whom it was abundantly clear that a public initiative needed to 
come from the German side in order to succeed. Genscher moreover feared that 
the monetary system could not survive the continuance of the existing asymme-
tries much longer. The goal of Political Union would also be endangered by such 
a prospect—and at a point in time when it was needed more than ever, given the 
reform initiatives of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.
26 Ibid., p. 180. On this and the following, cf. Dyson and Featherstone, Road, pp. 156–180 and 
306–342.
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The reforms in the Soviet Union and the efforts to overcome the Cold War 
being undertaken by Gorbachev gave the project of a European Monetary Union 
a wholly new urgency in Genscher’s view: “The East-West rapprochement called 
for nothing less than an EC more capable of acting, one that worked closely 
together rather than drifting apart. Moreover, in light of the new developments, 
the German attitude on this was watched keenly not only in Paris: Would the 
Germans remain on board the European Union ship or would they again go their 
own way? As soon as German reunification became an issue, this question would 
heat up; there could be no uncertainties, no ambiguities, because these would 
have had devastating consequences.”27 Genscher clearly perceived that behind 
the growing pressure from the French side there also lay worries about an eman-
cipation of the Germans from the European Community. These worries could only 
be countered by timely efforts for more strongly integrating the Germans.
The West German foreign minister therefore sought an opportunity for sub-
stantially reducing the Bundesbank’s influence over Bonn’s attitude toward the 
monetary-union project. He found it when in the national elections of January 
1987 his FDP gained significantly and when Stoltenberg lost appreciable influ-
ence in the autumn and winter of 1987–88 due to the “Barschel Affair” in his 
political base of Schleswig-Holstein. After the German success in passing the 
“Delors Package” at the Brussels Council meeting of 11 and 12 February 1988 had 
further increased Genscher’s esteem in the West German public as well as his 
European partners, he publicly presented a carefully-worked-out plan for creat-
ing a “European monetary area” on 26 February. This was intended to outmaneu-
ver the opposition of the Bundesbank and to force the hand of the still-hesitant 
chancellor.
The memorandum was deliberately not coordinated within the government 
and therefore functioned as a personal statement by Genscher, not as an official 
declaration of the foreign minister. It took up the objectives for a monetary union 
that had been expressed by Pöhl and other representatives of the Bundesbank 
and combined them with a proposed procedure that aimed for realization in short 
order. The centerpiece of the monetary union was to be the establishment of a 
European Central Bank, which was to be as autonomous as the Bundesbank and 
likewise committed to the goal of price stability. In order to get this underway, the 
European Council was to create at its next meeting in June an “expert committee” 
with “professional and political authority”; within a year’s time, this body was 
to determine the key points for creating a European economic space, to work out 
the statutes of the European Central Bank, and to develop plans for the transition 
27 Genscher, Erinnerungen, p. 387.
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period up to the completion of the monetary union, which were to be guided by 
the principle of parallelism in economic and monetary integration.28
It was now the case that the opponents of the currency union could only 
raise objections as to the process, and they did so immediately. On 15 March, 
Stoltenberg sent the State Secretary Committee for European Affairs and mone-
tary committee of the EC Council of Ministers a counter-memorandum that had 
been developed in close cooperation with the Bundesbank. This document listed 
a whole series of preconditions to be fulfilled before a European Central Bank was 
established: further “augmentation” of monetary cooperation and orientation on 
the stability goal, irrevocable freedom of capital movement in the Community, 
increased convergence of economic development, unrestricted participation 
of all member states in the monetary system, guaranteed independence of the 
national central banks, and a substantial transfer of national sovereign rights to 
the Community level—a transfer that went beyond the field of monetary policy.29 
From this perspective, the monetary union remained a long-term goal that could 
be realized only if all member states had adjusted to German conditions, thus in 
keeping with the “crown theory” that was so beloved of German financial experts.
Genscher’s arguments made obvious sense to Kohl. However, in light of the 
now-public conflict within his government, the chancellor continued to lie low, 
awaiting further reactions to Genscher’s initiative. Only after representatives of 
industry and commerce had expressed themselves overwhelmingly positively 
and after Mitterrand had been re-elected on 7 May did the chancellor decide take 
up the proposal for creating a committee of experts. In order to ensure success, 
he insisted that the membership must include not only a group of independent 
personages but also the central bank governors. At the Franco-German summit of 
2 June in Evian, Kohl proposed that Delors—with whom he was in the meantime 
working closely—be the chairman of the committee. At the same time, the chan-
cellor asked that Mitterrand fulfill a precondition that was especially important to 
Stoltenberg: the free movement of capital in the Community.30 After the French 
had acceded to this request and after the EC Council of Ministers on 24 June had 
decided that capital should move freely no later than 1 July 1990, the way was 
clear for Kohl to emerge at the next Council meeting as the initiator of the mon-
etary union. Stoltenberg’s opposition could be neutralized by reference to the 
success in liberalizing capital movement.
28 Henry Krägenau and Wolfgang Wetter, Europäische Währungsunion. Vom Werner-Plan zum 
Vertrag von Maastricht. Analysen und Dokumentation, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, pp. 310–312.
29 Ibid., pp. 337ff.
30 Noted in Jacques Attali, Verbatim. Tome 3: Chronique des années 1988–1991, Paris: Fayard, 
1995, p. 32.
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At the Council meeting in Hannover on 27 and 28 June, Kohl first sought to 
persuade Thatcher in a private conversation that she had nothing to fear from a 
committee that consisted essentially of orthodox central bankers. Then, just after 
the members of the Council had confirmed Delors for another term as Commission 
president, Kohl made the proposal at dinner that the Frenchman be appointed 
chairman of the committee. The entity was also to consist of all twelve central bank 
governors along with Frans Andriessen (as an additional member of the Euro-
pean Commission) as well as Miguel Boyer (president of the Foreign Trade Bank of 
Spain), Alexandre Lamfalussy (general director of the Bank of International Settle-
ments), and Niels Thygesen (an economics professor in Copenhagen) as indepen-
dent members. With this constellation, the proposal was accepted by one and all. 
Thatcher only insisted that the issue of creating a European Central Bank not be 
explicitly written into the committee’s mandate. And Tietmeyer, who once again 
was part of the delegation as “watchdog” from the finance ministry, succeeded at 
the last moment in adding a provision that the central bank governors act only 
in their own names and not for their institutions. In the closing press conference, 
Kohl—then serving as Council president—stated that he was “ninety percent sure” 
that the European Central Bank would be realized by the year 2000.31
With the creation of a committee to develop a roadmap to monetary union, the 
transition to a common currency had in fact once again been put on the agenda of 
the Community; and with the inclusion of the central bank presidents, the oppo-
sition of the Bundesbank had been neutralized. Pöhl did complain that Delors 
was an unqualified politician and also sought to shift his committee assignment 
to another member of the Bundesbank directorate. In light of the participation of 
all the other central bank presidents, however, he could not in the end avoid the 
assignment. The only possibility remaining to him was to represent the position 
of the Bundesbank as aggressively as possible in the Delors Committee and so 
keep the hurdles high on the path to monetary union.
The Delors Committee met in Basel, following on the monthly sessions of 
the committee of the central bank presidents. It quickly became apparent that 
Pöhl had ended up on the defensive. In his reservations against accelerating 
the movement toward monetary union, it was true that he was for the most part 
supported by Danish Central Bank President Erik Hoffmeyer and his Dutch col-
league Wim Duisenberg. On the other side, the Italian Carlo Ciampi, the Belgian 
Jean Godeaux, and the Frenchman Jacques de Larosière were zealous advocates 
of the monetary union; Boyer and Thygesen, as members of the “Committee for 
the Monetary Union of Europe” that had been created by Schmidt and Giscard 
31 Europa-Archiv 43 (1988), pp.  D443–D447; on the course of the meeting, also Delors, Erin-
nerungen, pp. 383–385.
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in late 1986, were already focused on rapid progress on monetary unification. 
Yet, Delors concentrated on achieving a common answer among all the members 
regarding the path to monetary union. Hence, he did not insist further when Pöhl 
characterized certain demands as non-negotiable; and the chairman also strove 
for the utmost civility. When an exasperated Pöhl took off his headphones during 
Delors’ French-language remarks, the undaunted chairman continued speaking 
in his poor English.
Delors’ firm purposefulness and the mediation services repeatedly provided 
by Duisenberg worked to ensure that by 12 April 1989 a report had in fact been 
produced, one that was supported by all Committee members. It steered the course 
charted by Genscher but also contained some fuzziness, behind which lay ongoing 
differences of opinion. It followed the German input in describing the goal of an 
independent European Central Bank system, led by the directorate of the European 
Central Bank as well as the presidents of the national banks and committed to the 
goal of price stability. In this, Mitterrand had given de Larosière his blessing because 
he knew that the monetary union could not be achieved in any other way. In order 
to demonstrate the irrevocability of the setting of the exchange rates, there was 
also nominally to be a Community currency. In contrast, when it came to the par-
allel development of common economic and fiscal policy, which Delors regarded 
as necessary if the monetary union were to function over the long term, there was 
only vague talk of “macro-economic coordination, including binding rules in the 
budgetary field.” The explicit mention of the “transfer of decision power” to the 
European level contained in an early draft was struck by Delors because he thought 
it would not be possible to gain approval for it.
Regarding the roadmap, Delors succeeded in winning approval for a process 
in three stages as well as the recommendation that right at the beginning of this 
process there be “a clear political commitment to the final stage.” Regarding a 
timetable, as the Schmidt-Giscard Committee had demanded, there remained 
only the recommendation to let the first stage begin no later than when movement 
of capital was freed up on 1 July 1990. Aside from that, it was not clearly stated as 
to which conditions needed to be fulfilled in order to move from the first to the 
second stage or from the second to the third, nor were any time points specified 
for these transitions. In the first stage, convergence was to be further promoted by 
economic development and economic policy; and all member states were to join 
the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS. Additionally, a treaty on economic and 
monetary union was to be worked out. After ratification of the treaty, the second 
stage was to be entered upon, in which the European Central Bank system was to 
organize the transition to full monetary union for the third stage.
As to organizing the transition in the second stage, the report of the Delors 
Commission likewise remained vague. Pöhl successfully fended off de Larosière’s 
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demand for the establishment of a European Monetary Fund for this transition 
phase, likewise the idea of creating a parallel European currency that was to 
be legal tender alongside the national currencies. The report only retained the 
provision that the European Central Bank was to have the possibility of accu-
mulating “a certain amount of reserves” and using them for intervening in the 
foreign-exchange markets. The bandwidths among the national currencies were 
to be narrowed to the extent allowed by circumstances and by progress toward 
convergence. Additionally, precise rules were to be agreed upon for the size and 
financing of budget deficits; these were not yet to be binding, however. “Guide-
lines” for macro-economic development were to be passed by majority vote; at 
the same time, “ultimate responsibility” for political decisions in this phase was 
still to rest at the national level.32
It was true that the Bundesbank’s fundamental essentials regarding the 
shape of the future monetary union were thereby retained and that the tempo 
of its realization remained unclear. Nevertheless, with the recommendation for 
an immediate launch along with simultaneous commitment to the final goal, a 
strong impetus had now been given for further developing the monetary system 
into a monetary union. Immediately after the publication of the report on 17 April, 
Pöhl began to distance himself from its contents and to warn against a “hasty” 
realization of the recommended steps. New West German Finance Minister Theo 
Waigel reacted by publicly affirming the “crown theory”; he clearly rejected accel-
eration on the path to monetary union. The Academic Advisory Board of the West 
German Economic Ministry went further by speaking out against binding budget-
ary rules at the European level. In a letter to Economic Minister Helmut Hauss-
mann, this body warned against beginning treaty negotiations on the basis of the 
Three-Step-Plan.33
Against this, Mitterrand, Delors, and Genscher pushed for approval of the 
report of the Delors Commission at the next Council meeting in Madrid and also 
for approval of a government conference to draft the treaty that was necessary for 
stage two. The fact that it had been possible to get all the central bank presidents 
to commit themselves to a common program had to be made use of—the iron had 
to be struck while it was hot. Therefore, Mitterrand spontaneously shoved aside 
32 “Bericht zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion der EG,” in: Europa-Archiv 44 (1989), 
pp. D283–D304; Krägenau and Wetter, Europäische Währungsunion, pp. 33–40. On the negotia-
tions in the Delors Committee, Dyson and Featherstone, Road, pp. 342–350 and 713–720; Delors, 
Erinnerungen, pp. 385–389; James, Making the European Monetary Union, pp. 234–261. 
33 Letter of June 5, 1989, Krägenau/Wetter, Währungsunion, pp. 213ff. Cf. Hans Stark, Kohl, l’Al-
lemagne et l’Europe. La politique d‘intégration européenne de la République fédérale 1982–1998, 
Paris: Éditions l’Harmattan, 2004, pp. 90ff.; Dyson and Featherstone, Road, pp. 348ff.
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the reservations of French Finance Minister Pierre Bérégovoy regarding the lack 
of economic- and fiscal-policy taxing authority for the projected union. During a 
conversation at the Élysée Palace on 11 May, the president made it clear that the 
risks entailed by France in allowing the free movement of capital were more than 
outweighed by the advantages of the monetary union.34
With the pressure that the advocates of the monetary union were putting 
on him, Kohl once again found himself facing a dilemma: On the one hand, he 
shared their analysis of the situation and the conclusions they drew from it; on 
the other hand, it was exactly at that time that he needed to act with particu-
lar caution in regard to domestic politics. The criticism of his leadership had 
escalated, and his own general secretary, Heiner Geissler, was about to have 
him removed. Therefore, he simply could not afford to deceive Finance Minister 
Waigel, who had succeeded Franz-Josef Strauss as chairman of the Bavarian CSU 
and who was supporting the chancellor against the criticism within the party. 
In cabinet discussions, Genscher did succeed in gaining government support 
the adoption of the Delors Report as well as the start of the first stage on 1 July 
1990. However, Waigel and Tietmeyer—whose expertise the new finance minister 
greatly valued—argued that before a determination had been made on beginning 
the government conference, there was still a series of “technical issues” that had 
to be resolved. Kohl did not dare to contradict them.35
In Madrid, where the heads of state and of government gathered on 26 and 27 
June, it was thus not possible to decide anything more. Kohl made use of Thatch-
er’s opposition to a new treaty to present himself as a mediator and then worked 
toward a result that would again give him some time: The report of the Delors 
Commission was hailed as an indispensable basis for the preparations for the 
monetary union, and the start of the first stage was set for 1 July 1990. The gov-
ernment conference was only to meet after the responsible entities—that is, the 
General Council, the Finance Ministers Council, the Commission, the Committee 
of the Central Bank Governors, and the Monetary Committee—had completed the 
necessary preparations. Under no circumstances was the government conference 
to begin before the start of the first stage. Additionally, the Council explicitly 
approved the West German proposal to set unambiguous convergence criteria; it 
also rejected the French plan for a European Reserve Fund.36
Mitterrand then sought to make use of his European Council presidency in 
the second half of 1989 to give decisive impetus to the preparations for the gov-
ernment conference and to wring from the Germans a binding date for its start. It 
34 Ibid., p. 188.
35 Ibid., pp. 350–354.
36 Europa-Archiv 44 (1989), pp. D406ff.
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was at least to begin before the end of 1990. The decisions necessary for it were to 
be made at the next Council meeting in December in Strasbourg; these were to be 
prepared by a work group made up of representatives of all foreign and finance 
ministries under the leadership of Mitterrand’s European advisor, Elisabeth 
Guigou. As Mitterrand said to Thatcher during a lightning visit on 4 September, 
his intention was “to put the train on its wheels”; and it should not be impeded 
by “one or two states.”37 In other words, France was prepared to start moving on 
the monetary union even if Britain would not immediately join in.
In pressing to have a government council summoned, Mitterrand was helped 
by circumstances: The prospects for overcoming the division of Europe and 
thereby also the division of Germany—which were becoming more clear over 
the course of the summer and autumn of 1989—generated wider support for the 
understanding of strategic necessities that drove Mitterrand and Genscher. In 
light of the opening of Hungary’s border with Austria and the formation of an 
all-party government in Poland, both Bérégovoy and Waigel began to realize that 
regardless of their different conceptions as to how it was to be accomplished, the 
monetary union had to be implemented quickly. At their first encounter within 
the framework of the Franco-German Economic Commission (at Tegernsee on 24 
and 25 August), the two men came to trust one another. Their two agencies no 
longer worked secretly against the monetary union but now worked construc-
tively toward it. Even Pöhl now became convinced that for political reasons the 
monetary union had to come.
Added to this was the fact that Kohl was able to prevail in the intraparty power 
struggle of the CDU at the Bremen party congress during the second week of Sep-
tember. With new self-confidence, he now spoke for the Germans of the GDR too. 
He also perceived the necessity of making timely gestures so as to counter possible 
irritation among his allies regarding a new special German path of development 
away from the Community. On 13 October, European advisor Joachim Bitterlich 
informed his French colleague Guigou that at the upcoming December Council 
meeting in Strasbourg, the chancellor would make an appeal for an agreement on 
the meeting of the government conference. It would open before the end of 1990. 
Negotiations were to lead to a treaty by the end of 1991, and ratification was then 
to follow over the course of 1992.38 Mitterrand understood that these negotiations 
37 AN, 5AG4, 88 EG d.1, quoted from Jean-Marie Palayret, “La voie française vers l’Union écono-
mique et monétaire durant la négociation du traité de Maastricht (1988–1992),” in: Martial Libera 
and Birte Wassenberg (eds.), L’Europe au cœur. Études pour Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Brussels: Émile 
Bruylant, 2009, pp. 197–221, here p. 209.
38 Guigou to Mitterrand, 13 October 1989, AN, 5AG4, 6874; cf. also Attali, Verbatim III, p. 321.
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should begin only after the German elections of December 1990 so as to keep the 
issue of the monetary union out of the election campaign.
Despite the fact that Kohl had backed down, nothing had actually been decided 
yet, although Mitterrand thought otherwise. Rather, with the upheavals in Hungary 
and Poland as well as the visible decay of the SED regime in East Germany, the 
chancellor drew the conclusion that along with economic and monetary integra-
tion, the political unification of Europe had to be accelerated. This seemed neces-
sary to him, firstly, in order to create a strong framework for the process of German 
reunification; secondly, he also saw new tasks for the Community in overcoming 
the legacies of Communism in Eastern Europe. Eleven days after the message that 
Bitterlich had communicated, Kohl himself flew to Paris to say this to Mitterrand. 
As Attali noted during a dinner shared by the two leaders on 24 October, “it would 
be necessary to take up a political European project after the economic one.” The 
chancellor also made it clear that such an initiative was urgent in his view: “The 
summit in Strasbourg must send a clear message to the East.”
It did not escape Mitterrand that his guest reacted evasively to his question 
about the date for the government conference: “One can’t decide anything before 
seeing what happens in Strasbourg.” That made the French president mistrustful. 
Attali concluded his notes on this “head-spinning” meeting with the observation 
that “I feel for the first time that the chancellor is not confiding in us everything 
that he knows and that he wants.”39 This mistrust grew into great anxiety when 
Kohl specified his ideas in a letter to Mitterrand on 27 November: In Strasbourg, the 
finance ministers and central bank presidents should be commissioned to prepare 
the government conference; and the conference should not only concern itself with 
the economic and monetary union but also, in a second phase from the end of 1991 
onward, deal with the other institutional reforms, especially with the strengthening 
of the position of the European Parliament. The “political decision for implement-
ing the government conference on the economic and monetary union” should be 
made only in the middle of December 1990, and the negotiations should first begin 
in early 1991. Both parts of the negotiations should be wrapped up over the course 
of 1992, “in December at the latest.” As was emphasized in the conclusion of the 
document, the ratification could then take place promptly before the next elections 
to the European Parliament in May and June of 1994.40
39 Attali, Verbatim III, pp. 325–327. On this and the following, also Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “La 
controverse entre le Chancelier Helmut Kohl et le Président François Mitterrand à propos de 
la réforme institutionnelle de la Communauté européenne (1989/1990),” in: Bitsch, Le couple 
France-Allemagne, pp. 487–516, here pp. 491–496; Dyson and Featherstone, Road, pp. 363–366.
40 Kohl to Mitterrand, 27 Nov. 1989, in: Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bun-
deskanzleramtes 1989/90, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1998, pp. 565–567. 
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This announcement of postponing the political decision on the monetary 
union for another year, along with its incorporation into a more comprehensive 
reform project containing many pitfalls, was perceived in Paris as a covert rejec-
tion. “If that really is the position of the chancellor,” Attali commented, “then 
it means that he’s been swayed by the British arguments. And that everything 
is buried. German problems will sweep across the European construction.”41 It 
was not only the project of the monetary union that threatened to fail at exactly 
the moment when, in the French view, it was especially urgent but also the incor-
poration of Germany altogether. This was after all an essential motif of policy on 
Europe—and not only of French policy.
European Security and German Unity
Fundamentally, Mitterrand could be won over for a project for a political Europe 
too. Ever since his rapprochement with Kohl in the winter of 1983–84, he had 
been appealing for a common foreign policy and also a common European 
defense organization, which was to emerge from cooperation between France 
and the Federal Republic. In February of 1984, after the resolution of the British 
contribution question and of the southern expansion, he had told Kohl of his 
willingness “to go further and speak with you about European defense.” In the 
process, “nothing [was to be] excluded, neither conventional armaments nor, 
beyond them, nuclear ones.” When Kohl immediately raised the possibility of a 
French commitment to consultation for the use of nuclear weapons on German 
soil or from it, as had been accepted by President Reagan, Mitterrand only said, 
“Why not?” Three months later in his keynote speech before the European Parlia-
ment, the French president also publicly embraced the necessity of a “common 
defense by the Europeans.”42
Behind this lay not only continuing anxiety that neutralization tendencies 
might achieve a breakthrough in German politics; Mitterrand also appeared 
increasingly worried about the arbitrary actions and inconsistencies in the policy 
of Ronald Reagan, especially regarding the SDI program for a space-based missile 
defense system that wantonly disregarded the security interests of the Europe-
ans. Moreover, the French president was receptive to the vision of his friend Régis 
Debray, who saw in an autonomous Western Europe the possibility of promoting 
41 Attali, Verbatim III, pp. 349.
42 Conversation between Mitterrand and Kohl, 2 Feb. 1984, Attali, Verbatim I, pp. 583ff.; speech 
of 24 May 1984 in François Mitterrand, Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France. Intro-
duction à vingt-cinq discours (1981–1985), Paris: Fayard, 1986, pp. 280–297.
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the democratization of Eastern Europe. In any event, Debray’s “Thoughts on the 
Foreign Policy of France,” published in early 1986, conjured up the reconciliation 
of both halves of Europe on the basis of shared values and democratic socialism, 
which was to become possible after overcoming the excesses of American liberal-
ism as well as those of Communism.43
By July of 1985, Mitterrand’s Socialist Party had worked out a report on defense 
policy that had been coordinated with its West German counterpart, the SPD; 
Egon Bahr had been especially engaged in the project. This document empha-
sized the strategic solidarity that bound France together with the rest of Western 
Europe, especially the Federal Republic; it also called for an “internal shifting 
of weight within the Atlantic Alliance” in light of the erosion of the American 
security guarantee. This was to be based on “increased and more autonomous 
cooperation among the Europeans in the area of defense” and an “expansion of 
French responsibility in this area.” The French armed forces, including nuclear 
components, ought to be explicitly oriented toward the security of Europe.44
In concretizing the proposals, however, Mitterrand reduced the French offer. 
First of all, he emphasized that the Germans and the French should “undertake 
everything together that isn’t forbidden to you [the Germans], that is, space, 
chemical weapons, and lasers.” Especially in regard to an autonomous European 
missile defense, German support seemed to him both necessary and feasible. As 
he explained to Kohl in November of 1985, this was to provide the Federal Repub-
lic “an actual defense capability” within a period of twenty years. He excluded 
the idea of an “integration of nuclear weapons”: That would hinder the sought-af-
ter improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and would rob France of its 
necessary counterpoise to German economic power. In December, he also spoke 
out against an extension of the French nuclear guarantee to the Federal Republic, 
as Schmidt and Giscard had agreed upon; at the same time, he stressed that the 
discussion in Paris on the participation of French troops in forward defense on 
German soil had not yet been concluded.45
Even the commitment to consultation in the event French nuclear weapons 
were used on German soil—a commitment Kohl repeatedly urged—was only given 
by Mitterrand with reservations, due to the opposition of the chief of the French 
general staff, Jean Saulnier. In a joint declaration issued at the Franco-German 
summit on 27 and 28 February 1986 in Bonn, the president declared his willing-
ness to make this commitment “on the borders, which necessitates the extraor-
43 Ibid., pp. 12, 68–71, 101; cf. Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, pp. 387ff.
44 Le Monde, 4 July 1985; Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, Munich: Blessing, 1996, p. 512.
45 Conversations between Mitterrand and Kohl, 29 Oct. 1984, 7 Nov. and 17 Dec. 1985, Attali, 
Verbatim I, pp. 513ff., 874ff., 902–905.
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dinary haste of such decisions.” Moreover, he “reminded” his listeners that “the 
decision in this area cannot be divided.” More satisfactory for the Germans was the 
assurance made at the same time that the staffs of both sides would work together 
operationally and that Mitterrand would have French forces march immediately 
to the inter-German border in the event they were needed for defense.46
Disappointment over the meager substance of the French consultation pledge 
did not prevent Kohl from calling for an expansion of military cooperation on his 
own. He had reacted positively to the French proposals because, like Mitterrand, 
he too feared American withdrawal tendencies as well as the German penchant for 
neutralization. In his view, this latter factor was strengthened by Gorbachev’s disar-
mament initiatives; and so he now pressed for “very close cooperation,” as he said 
to Mitterrand at a meeting at Chateau Chambord on 28 March 1987.47 Four months 
later, Kohl’s national security advisor, Horst Teltschik, presented his plans on this 
during a visit by his French counterpart Attali in Bonn: The creation of a Franco-Ger-
man brigade that could be joined by Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy; more 
joint maneuvers and expanded joint logistics, the whole thing “within the prospect 
of a fusion of the EEC and the WEU”; the establishment of a Franco-German defense 
council and a permanent general staff; and lastly, a more precise definition of the 
agreed-upon consultation before use of French nuclear weapons.48
For Mitterrand, that was again going too far. Yet, he did agree to joint maneu-
vers; in September of 1987, some twenty thousand soldiers of the First French 
Army and the Rapid Deployment Force participated in spectacular maneuvers 
with the Bundeswehr. At the fiftieth Franco-German summit in November of 1987, 
the creation of the Franco-German brigade was announced; on 22 January 1988, 
at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Franco-German Treaty, the 
joint Defense and Security Council came into being. Although the joint maneu-
vers took place outside the framework of NATO and Bundeswehr soldiers in the 
joint brigade were for the first time acting outside the integrated NATO command 
structure, Mitterrand was not prepared to extend the commitment to consultation 
to joint deployment planning or to grant the defense council operative functions. 
The Franco-German brigade—consisting of some 4,200 soldiers—thus did not go 
beyond a symbolic function, and the agreement on a joint defense concept still 
did not come into being.49
46 Ibid., p.  933. Cf. also Ulrich Lappenküper, Mitterrand und Deutschland. Die enträtselte 
Sphinx, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011, pp. 224ff.
47 Attali, Verbatim II, p. 287.
48 Notes by Attali, 24 July 1987, ibid., pp. 363–365.
49 Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, pp.  391–394; Stark, Kohl, pp.  130–133; Lappenküper, Mitter-
rand, pp. 237ff.
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In dialogue between the two leaders it nevertheless proved possible for their 
stances on Gorbachev’s disarmament initiatives to come closer together so that 
common European interests could be safeguarded in the then-emerging end of 
the arms race. At an improvised summit in Reykjavik on 11 and 12 October 1986, 
Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a period 
of ten years. Kohl and Mitterrand quickly agreed that this would be highly danger-
ous and that it was therefore in the vital interest of the Federal Republic that the 
French nuclear deterrent be preserved and further modernized. After quickly con-
ferring with Mitterrand, Thatcher went to Washington to impress upon Reagan 
that there could be “no second Reykjavik”; Kohl cautioned the American pres-
ident that before strategic missiles were reduced by more than fifty percent, a 
conventional balance of power in Europe had to be achieved.50
Gorbachev’s offer to eliminate all medium-range missiles was viewed posi-
tively by Mitterrand, in contrast to the stance of French Defense Minister André 
Giraud and the officials of the Quai d’Orsay. From the president’s perspective, 
opposing the offer was impossible, not only in light of the expectations of the 
public in France as well as the Federal Republic: He had in the meantime also 
come to the conclusion that neither short- nor medium-range missiles contrib-
uted to French or American security. As he explained to Kohl, “our nuclear force is 
the submarines, and added to them, the eighteen British missiles that can reach 
the USSR.”51 He thus advocated the “double-zero solution” to both the British 
and West German governments, an option that combined the elimination of all 
medium-range missiles with the destruction of shorter-range ones. Kohl, under 
pressure from FRG military experts who wanted to retain at least the old Persh-
ing IA missiles as a counterweight to the conventional superiority of the Warsaw 
Pact, gave up this position too in August of 1987.52 Thus, the way was clear for 
the signing of the Washington Agreement on the elimination of medium-range 
missiles on 8 December 1987.
According to US strategists, the short-range missiles stationed in the Federal 
Republic needed to be modernized so as to compensate for the elimination of the 
medium-range weapons. For his part, Mitterrand advocated negotiations before 
a decision to modernize. At the same time, he supported Kohl in his demand for 
talks on reducing the asymmetry in conventional weapons, which might render 
unnecessary the unpopular deployment of new short-range missiles. At Gen-
50 Cf. Mitterrand’s memorandum in the French Council of Ministers, 4 March 1987, Attali, 
Verbatim II, pp.  270ff.; on the disarmament talks in general, Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, 
pp. 188–204.
51 Conversation between Mitterrand and Kohl, 28 March 1987, Attali, Verbatim II, pp. 287–291.
52 Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 446–449.
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scher’s urging, a speech by Kohl in the Bundestag on 27 April 1989 included a call 
for the rapid opening of negotiations on short-range weapon systems and also 
let it be known that the chancellor no longer excluded a third “zero solution” for 
this area too. Mitterrand worked to calm the Americans and British, who feared 
a denuclearization of the Federal Republic. He urged Reagan’s successor George 
Bush to concentrate on making progress in the talks on conventional disarma-
ment and to defer the issue of short-range weapons for the time being. In fact, the 
heads of state and of government of NATO put together a resolution to that effect 
at a summit in Brussels on 29 and 30 May 1989, allowing the Western alliance to 
respond to Gorbachev’s proposals with great unanimity.53
Rapid progress was now made in the talks on conventional forces in Europe 
that had been going on since 9 March in Vienna. During a state visit by Gorbachev 
to the Federal Republic from 12 to 15 June, Kohl was able to assure his guest that 
after those talks had been successfully concluded, the modernization of short-
range missiles would no longer be an issue. Mitterrand appealed to Bush to 
support Gorbachev in his reforms and urged the American president to meet with 
the Soviet general secretary as soon as possible. The summit in Malta on 2 and 
3 December, at which Bush and Gorbachev proclaimed the end of the Cold War, 
was thus not least of all the result of parallel, though not closely coordinated, 
action by the West German chancellor and the French president.
As to the danger of a neutralization of the Federal Republic, Mitterrand now 
regarded it as sufficient, firstly, to support Kohl in the domestic policy dispute 
and, secondly, to emphasize the necessity of a European framework for reunifi-
cation. At the conclusion of a state visit by Gorbachev on 5 July, journalists asked 
the French president about his attitude toward German reunification. He stressed 
the legitimacy of German desires but hastened to add that naturally the process 
must “occur peacefully” and must not generate any “new tensions.” Three weeks 
later, he repeated this position in an interview that he gave to five European news-
papers at once: Reunification had to occur “peacefully and democratically”; the 
process needed to involve a dialogue among the Four Powers and agreement 
between “both German governments.”54
Conceptually, what lay behind this foray into public discussion of the German 
question was the idea of a deepening of the European Community as the “hard 
core of any organization of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.” Political Direc-
tor Bertrand Dufourcq of the French Foreign Ministry wrote to the president in 
53 Conversation between Mitterrand and Bush, 20 May 1989, Attali, Verbatim III, pp. 241–243; Fré-
déric Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht, 
Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 2005, pp. 70–79.
54 La politique étrangère de la France, July–August 1989, pp. 21–23 and 78–82.
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February of 1989, saying that in light of the loosening of the Soviet imperium, it 
was necessary to bind the Federal Republic more strongly than ever to the Commu-
nity and to accelerate the Community’s development into a Political Union with a 
common defense. Requests for entry by EFTA states such as Austria should for the 
time being be deferred in the interest of deepening the Community. Simultane-
ously, however, there should be common efforts with these states of the “second 
circle” to organize cooperation with the East-Bloc states (the “third circle”); this 
was to include areas such as culture, media, social issues, and technology. The 
convergence of both halves of Europe and both Germanys should thus happen in 
sync.55 In August, Attali expanded this vision to include the dimension of finan-
cial support for the reforms of the East-Bloc states: All European countries includ-
ing the Soviet Union were to discuss the problems involved in the transition at a 
common forum (Mitterrand spoke of a “confederation”), and a European Devel-
opment Bank was to assist in dealing with the economic dimension.56
In late October, Mitterrand shared the idea of a confederation and a develop-
ment bank with his European allies. This was not exactly met with great interest, 
neither from Kohl—who at dinner on 24 October did not respond at all to the presi-
dent’s remarks on the subject—nor from the circle of the twelve heads of state and 
of government, whom he invited to an informal gathering at the Élysée Palace a 
few days after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Instead, those dining on 18 November 
were witness to an intense confrontation between Margaret Thatcher, who could 
not hide her fear of German reunification, and the chancellor, who did not want 
to be restricted by his eleven partners in deciding on the steps now necessary in 
the reunification question. When Kohl quoted a NATO declaration of 1970 that 
contained support for the German position on reunification, Thatcher interrupted 
him with the observation that at the time, people “didn’t believe it would ever 
happen.” Kohl barked back, “You can’t prevent the German people from pursuing 
its destiny.” Thatcher answered this ominous threat with an angry “You see, you 
see, that’s what he wants.”57
At this point, Mitterrand viewed German-policy developments much more 
calmly. True, he was worried that an uncontrolled unification movement among 
the Germans could possibly lead to the fall of Gorbachev and thereby possibly even 
to a major war between East and West. Yet, at the same time, he—unlike Thatcher—
had a conception for a peaceful solution of the German question; and he had strong 
hopes that Kohl would help him realize this European option. He was therefore 
all the more alarmed when, on 27 November, the chancellor for all practical pur-
55 Memorandum of 20 Feb. 1989, reported in Bozo, Mitterrand, pp. 98–101.
56 Attali, C’était François Mitterrand, pp. 308ff.
57 Ibid., pp. 311, 315–318.
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poses withdrew his approval for the summoning of a government conference on 
monetary union. The anxiety increased when the very next day Kohl made public 
a ten-point reunification plan without having informed his partners in advance. 
Even if the announced path via “confederative structures” left much unclear—not 
least of all the timeframe of the unification process—it was unmistakably clear that 
the chancellor had put political reunification on the international agenda. This 
meant for Mitterrand, as he explained to Gorbachev on 6 December at a meeting in 
Kiev, that Kohl was prioritizing German unification over the deepening of European 
unity and the creation of a European peace order.58
The president now did his utmost to convince the chancellor to offer binding 
approval for the summoning of a government conference on the monetary union 
at the upcoming Strasbourg Council meeting. As welcome as an understanding on 
negotiations for a Political Union would be in principle, it was to be deferred so as 
not to endanger the breakthrough on the monetary issue. On the afternoon of 28 
November, Mitterrand got on the phone to threaten Kohl that France would only 
approve his reunification plan if Bonn made three distinct commitments before-
hand: beginning of negotiations on the monetary union, definitive recognition of 
the border with Poland, and confirmation of the Federal Republic’s renunciation 
of nuclear weapons. He spoke still more darkly to Genscher, who had sought him 
out on 30 November in order to smooth the waves that Kohl’s solo initiative had 
generated: “If German unity is achieved before European unity, you’ll have the 
Triple Alliance (France, Great Britain, and the USSR) against you, exactly as in 
1913 and 1939. […] You’ll be encircled, and that’ll end in a war in which all Europe-
ans will ally themselves against the Germans once again. Is that what you want? 
Conversely, if German unity is achieved after there’s been progress on the unity of 
Europe, then we’ll help you.”59
No later than when Genscher reported this conversation to Kohl, it must have 
become clear to the chancellor that his engagement for a Political Union was not 
sufficient to win France’s support for the reunification process. It followed from 
this that he did after all need to take a bigger domestic-policy risk if he wanted 
to retain the necessary maneuvering room for the shaping of the reunification 
process without at the same time endangering the European construct. Nor was 
it possible to exclude the danger that if the monetary union continued to be 
blocked, he could lose the initiative to Genscher in the one question as well as 
the other. Taken together, all those factors led him to give in on the issue of com-
mitting to the monetary union. Shortly before the opening of the Council meeting 
58 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 364.
59 Attali, Mitterrand, pp. 320–323; on Genscher’s visit, also Attali, Verbatim III, pp. 353ff. and 
Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 390 and 677–680.
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on 8 December, the chancellor’s office let the Élysée know that Kohl was now 
willing to set the date for the opening of the government conference in December 
of 1990.60
The Strasbourg Council meeting then began in a relatively relaxed atmo-
sphere. As early as the opening luncheon, Kohl declared that a clear roadmap 
was necessary “in order to demonstrate our will to achieve progress.” As Council 
president, Mitterrand was able to confirm “that the necessary majority exists for 
the summoning of a government conference in accordance with Article 236 of the 
treaty. The government conference will meet before the end of 1990 at the invita-
tion of the Italian government.” No decisions were made regarding the Political 
Union; it was only determined “that the economic and monetary union [was to] 
take the democratic requirement fully into account.” Against the vote of Margaret 
Thatcher, the “Community Charter on Social Rights of Workers” was adopted, 
a move for which Mitterrand and Delors had long fought. Lastly, the Twelve 
also approved the establishment of the “European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.” Mitterrand only had to concede to Thatcher that “the other OECD 
member states”—that is, especially the US—would also be invited to participate 
in it.61
In return for his concession on the monetary issue, Kohl wanted to receive 
explicit support for his reunification policy. This proved difficult because he 
was still not prepared to commit himself to the Oder-Neisse border as the future 
eastern frontier of a reunified Germany; this was out of concern for votes from the 
conservative camp.  In the preparatory group, there was thus no agreement on 
the exact wording of a declaration; and at dinner on 8 December, Kohl was once 
against subjected to severe attacks from Thatcher. This time, she was joined by 
Giulio Andreotti and Ruud Lubbers; only Felipe González supported the chancel-
lor. Mitterrand finally commissioned Dumas and Genscher to find a compromise 
formulation.
The text, ready the next morning, was closer to Kohl’s position than that of 
his opponents: The Twelve pledged support for the “strengthening of the state of 
peace in Europe in which the German people in free self-determination achieves 
its unity.” As conditions for this process, however, the document specified only 
the “preservation of the agreements and treaties as well as all the principles laid 
down in the Helsinki Final Act” and embedding that process “in the prospect of 
60 Bozo, Mitterrand, p.  152; on the following, ibid., pp.  152–156; Thilo Schabert, Wie Weltge-
schichte gemacht wird. Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002, pp. 425–
428; Lappenküper, Mitterrand, pp. 269–271.
61 “Schlussfolgerung des Vorsitzes der Straßburger Ratstagung 8./9.12.1989,” Jahrbuch der Eu-
ropäischen Integration 1989/90, pp. 421–438.
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European integration.”62 It was rather unclearly formulated regarding the rec-
ognition of the western border of Poland, which the Federal Republic had made 
in the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw; it was however rather clear on making 
reunification possible along with the simultaneous strengthening of the Euro-
pean Community. With the definitive commitment to the monetary union, Kohl 
had been able to secure fundamental support for the process of reunification.
However, this did not mean that giving up the D-mark and the comfortable 
position in the European Monetary System that the Federal Republic had in the 
meantime attained was the price that had to be paid for reunification, as the 
magazine Der Spiegel later asserted.63 Kohl had only recognized that, regardless 
of the reservations of those seeking to protect the currency and the associated 
domestic political risks, the step to monetary union had to be taken now if the 
growing together of the two German states—in whatever form and at whatever 
tempo—was not to endanger the continued existence or the deepening of the 
European Community. On the basis of shared worry over the European project, he 
could come to agreement with Mitterrand on a formula for German unity within 
a European perspective.
After he had thus secured the European framework for the reunification of 
Germany, Kohl could further accelerate the reunification process in response to 
the decay of the GDR.64 In the middle of January 1990, he halted the project for 
a treaty community that was to be agreed upon with the East German govern-
ment under Hans Modrow according to the ten-point plan; on 6 February, he 
offered the East German population participation in the monetary zone of the 
Federal Republic within six months. Mitterrand viewed that with great unease. As 
much as he was relieved regarding Kohl’s concession on the monetary issue, his 
apprehension about the possible fate of Gorbachev was growing more intense. 
“Kohl wants to organize the reunification very quickly,” as he assessed the sit-
uation after a visit by the chancellor to his country retreat in Latché. “He makes 
us believe he can’t do anything about it, that he’s being driven by the crowd. The 
whole world will cry out—but in vain. Only Gorbachev can stop him. If he doesn’t 
succeed, he’ll lose his office. And then we’ll have a general in the Kremlin. You’ll 
see that everything will happen very fast. Two or three years at most.”65
62 Ibid., p. 431.
63 “Dunkelste Stunden,” in: Der Spiegel (18), 27 April 1998, pp. 108–112.
64 On the decision-making process on German policy in 1989–90, see Wilfried Loth, “Michail 
Gorbatschow, Helmut Kohl und die Lösung der deutschen Frage 1989/1990,” in: Gian Enrico Rus-
coni and Hans Woller (eds.), Parallele Geschichte? Italien und Deutschland 1945–2000, Berlin Dun-
cker und Humblot, 2006, pp. 461–477; Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland. Die Geschichte 
der Wiedervereinigung, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009, pp. 146–225; Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 535–580.
65 Attali, Verbatim III, p. 390.
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The only thing he could do in attempting “to slow down German reunifica-
tion in order to save the gains of perestroika”66 was to appeal repeatedly to Kohl’s 
discretion. When on 20 January Thatcher urged him to take joint actions, he told 
her that ultimately there was not much that could be done, and “nothing would 
be worse than raising objections that have no effect.”67 During a visit by Kohl 
on 10 February, Gorbachev recognized in principle the right of the Germans to 
reunification; this meant that hopes vanished that the Soviet general secretary 
would block rapid progress toward German unity purely out of his own self-in-
terest. “What’s gotten into Gorbachev?” was the question that Mitterrand blurted 
out after Kohl had informed him via telephone of the results of the conversation 
in Moscow. “Four days ago, he wrote to me that he would stand firm—and today 
he concedes every point!”68
Deep disappointment over Gorbachev’s weakness did not prevent Mitterrand 
from adjusting to the “new German reality” with remarkable speed. “One must 
come to terms with it,” as he let Kohl know during a dinner at the Élysée on 15 
February.69 He warned his guest to continue to be cautious and to take Gorbachev 
into consideration. At the same time, the French president made great efforts to 
have German unity, now unavoidable, formulated in treaty terms acceptable to 
France and to Europe. Hence, he supported the American proposal to resolve the 
international aspects of the unification of the two German states at a conference in 
which the West German government, a democratically-legitimated East German 
government, and the governments of the four Allied Powers would participate. 
Mitterrand thought that it should be a “Four-plus-Two” conference rather than 
a “Two-plus-Four” conference. After it was ascertained that both German states 
would not only simply present the Four Powers with the results of their internal 
talks, he accepted the latter formulation. With satisfaction, he noted that Kohl 
too agreed to this in the end—on 13 February in a telephone conversation with 
Bush that gave the green light for a decision of the six foreign ministers assem-
bled in Ottawa. In light of the agreement of the Four Powers on this issue, Kohl 
could no longer fend off the resulting limitations on his freedom of maneuver in 
decision-making.
66 Thusly after the telephone conversation with Gorbachev on 2 February 1990, Attali, Ver-
batim III, p. 411. The material-rich presentation in Bozo, Mitterrand, pp. 156–202, edits out this 
aspect of Mitterrand’s policy; in contrast, cf. Lappenküper, Mitterrand, pp. 273–302.
67 Conversation between Mitterrand and Thatcher, 20 Jan. 1990, French protocol quoted from 
Bozo, Mitterrand, p. 180. 
68 Attali, Mitterrand, p. 333.
69 Ibid., pp. 333–336; Deutsche Einheit, pp. 842–852; Attali, Verbatim III, pp. 422–429, the quote 
on p. 424.
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During a dinner on 15 February, Mitterrand then sought to have Kohl stipulate 
the conditions for German unity that the French president regarded as indispens-
able: Acceleration of the economic and also the political unification of Europe, 
a united Germany’s continued membership in NATO but without extension of 
American command authority to the territory of the GDR, confirmation of the 
renunciation of nuclear weapons, and recognition of the Oder-Neisse border in a 
treaty. Kohl indicated that he was in complete agreement on the first two points; 
both were based on the proposal by Irish Council President Charles Haughey to 
discuss the consequences of German unification for the European Community at 
a special summit in April. Kohl wanted nothing to do with any determination in 
advance regarding the issue of nuclear weapons, and he reacted with the greatest 
indignation to the demand for pre-determination on the border issue. Under the 
influence of the looming victory of a political movement close to Kohl, the “Alli-
ance for Germany,” in the elections to the GDR parliament, the chancellor then 
began to edge incrementally toward the French positions in early March. In the 
end, it proved possible to include both the renunciation of nuclear weapons and 
the renunciation of the former German eastern territories in the “Two-Plus-Four” 
Treaty. German unification was completed on 3 October 1990 in accordance with 
the foreign-policy conditions on which Mitterrand had insisted.70
The Path to Maastricht
Jacques Delors had been the first to articulate the need for an acceleration of the 
European integration process to accompany an acceleration of German unifica-
tion, saying so internally and more or less clearly in public as well. Only three 
days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he had declared on German television that 
according to the provisions of the Treaties of Rome, the way stood open for the 
citizens of the GDR to enter the European Community. In his inaugural address 
to the European Parliament at the beginning of his second term, he had argued 
“that the Community can only retain its attractiveness if it accelerates its integra-
tion.” In his view, this included the idea “that comprehensive executive authority 
be transferred to the Commission” and as a consequence, there be an “expansion 
of the powers of Parliament.”71
Mitterrand’s Europe advisor, Elisabeth Guigou, a one-time staffer of Delors 
during his time as finance minister, embraced the essentials of this argument in 
70 Bozo, Mitterrand, pp. 202–241; on Kohl’s motives, a telephone conversation with Mitterrand 
on 5 March 1990, Attali, Verbatim III, p. 439.
71 Europa-Archiv 45 (1990), pp. D 269–282; Delors, Erinnerungen, pp. 327–329.
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a memorandum to the president on 6 February. As she wrote, it is in the interest 
of “the Community very quickly to invent an institutional structure to make the 
German situation ordinary” and “to ensure that Germany sets its course within 
the framework of the Community and not autonomously.” She therefore proposed 
taking up Kohl’s initiative for the creation of a Political Union and creating a “Euro-
pean Union” that would overarch existing European institutions. Justifying the 
urgency of her proposal, she wrote that it would be better “to negotiate a Euro-
pean Union with a Germany that is for the time being still divided into two states 
and that needs the Community rather than with a reunited German that no longer 
needs anyone.”72 In the run-up to the dinner on 15 February to which Mitterrand 
had invited Kohl, Guigou established contact with her West German counterpart 
Joachim Bitterlich and was able to reinforce her proposal with information on the 
chancellor’s willingness to undertake a joint initiative for the Political Union.
Mitterrand hesitated to agree to the proposal for launching the Political 
Union, however. He still feared that differing views on the institutional configu-
ration of the final political form of the Community could delay implementation of 
the monetary union. On 15 February, his only concrete suggestion to Kohl was to 
bring forward the beginning of the government conference on monetary union, 
which was swiftly rejected by the chancellor. Mitterrand only gave his approval 
to a joint Franco-German initiative for the Political Union in late March. This had 
come only after the Germans had approached the French side with a proposal 
to that effect and after Kohl had pressured Council President Haughey to make 
a decision on a government conference for the Political Union at the upcoming 
special meeting of the heads of state and of government set for 28 April. Mean-
while, Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens had brought more pressure to bear 
on Mitterrand by means of a memorandum to the partner governments—inspired 
by Delors—that called for a government conference on institutional reform.
The Franco-German initiative in the form of a joint letter from Mitterrand and 
Kohl to Council President Haughey on 18 April did not envision making a deci-
sion yet on the introduction of a further government conference at the upcoming 
Council meeting. Because Mitterrand feared a hasty commitment to Bonn’s insti-
tutional conceptions, it was only possible for the time being to propose that the 
foreign ministers make preparations for a government conference on the Political 
Union. Only on the basis of their report was a decision to be made at the next 
regular Council meeting in late June. Regarding the timeframe for the government 
conference on Political Union, the joint letter suggested that it occur parallel to 
the government conference on the monetary union so that “the totality of the 
72 Memorandum by Guigou, 6 February 1990, AN, 5AG4, AH 35, quoted from Bozo, Mitterrand, 
pp. 198ff. On the following, ibid., pp. 196–202 and 244–249.
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relations among the member states can be transformed into a European Union by 
1 January 1993.” In terms of content, the proposal was relatively indefinite: The 
Political Union was to “strengthen the democratic legitimization of the Union” 
and “flesh out more efficiently” its institutions, but also provide for the “unity 
and coherence” of its activities “in the areas of economy, currency, and politics” 
as well as “defining and implementing a common foreign and defense policy.”73
In Dublin, where the heads of state and of government met on 28 April, the 
Franco-German initiative ran into opposition from Thatcher, as expected. In the 
view of the British prime minister, German unification provided no argument for 
the deepening of the European Community—on the contrary, there was reason 
to block such a deepening: “The European construct will not bind Germany; it’s 
rather the case that Germany will dominate the European construct,” as she had 
said at a dinner at the French embassy in London in mid-March.74 As a conse-
quence, it was only possible to decide in Dublin that before the next Council 
meeting on 25 and 26 June, the foreign ministers were to review the necessity 
of possible treaty amendments for strengthening democratic legitimacy and for 
effectively responding to the “challenges of the new situation.” It was left open 
as to whether the summoning of a second parallel government conference would 
then actually be decided on. The European Council stipulated only that the treaty 
amendments necessary for the second stage of the monetary union had to be in 
force by 1 January 1993.75 For Kohl, that was not the strong signal for progress on 
political unification that he regarded as necessary in order to secure the monetary 
union with the German electorate.
With great unanimity, the European Council also approved numerous prin-
ciples for integrating the GDR into the Community. This was to occur without 
amendment to the treaties but was to take into consideration transitional provi-
sions for which the Commission was to develop proposals “as soon as possible.” 
At the Council meeting, Delors proposed special integration subsidies, but Kohl 
rejected these out of consideration for his partners’ sensitivities. Instead, it was 
decided that, like all other Eastern Bloc states, the GDR was initially to participate 
in the EC Assistance for Economic Reforms, and that the new states of the Federal 
Republic would then be incorporated into the existing structural program of the 
Community. Kohl explicitly renounced the idea of an increased presence of the 
Federal Republic on the Commission as well as stronger weighting of the German 
voice in the Council of Ministers. Any adjustments that might be necessary should 
be left to the talks on institutional reform.
73 Europa-Archiv 45 (1990), p. D 283.
74 Embassy report of 13 March 1990, quoted in Bozo, Mitterrand, p. 242.
75 Europa-Archiv 45 (1990), pp. D 284–D288.
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In accordance with the proposals of the Commission, which were specially 
put together by the work groups under great time pressure, mutual free access 
to markets was to be realized as early as the establishment of the German-Ger-
man monetary union, that is, on 1 July 1990. Transitional regulations were to 
expire no later than the completion of the internal market on 31 December 1992. 
Until that time, the trade treaties with the COMECON countries were to remain in 
effect. Technical regulations relating to law on food, transportation, telecommu-
nications, environmental protection, and workplace safety did not yet come into 
force. A lump sum was determined for structural assistance. National assistance 
was permitted for the realignment of agriculture.76
Yet, the foreign ministers of the Twelve did succeed in agreeing on numer-
ous principles for the Political Union during a meeting on 19 and 20 May. Kohl 
and Genscher had reduced their conceptions for the institutional strength-
ening of the Community to a realistic level so that unity could be more or less 
achieved on the idea that the European Council would continue to constitute the 
central institution of the Union; above it, the Community area and the area of 
political cooperation were to be more strongly interlinked. On the other hand, 
Dumas accommodated the reservations of various partners regarding a common 
foreign and defense policy to the effect that these were initially to be developed 
incrementally. At the regular Council meeting on 25 and 26 June, likewise held 
in Dublin, it was possible on this basis to reach agreement that parallel to the 
government conference on the monetary union, a government conference on the 
Political Union was also to meet. More specifically: The monetary conference was 
to begin on 13 December 1990 and the “Political” one on 14 December. Both were 
to complete their work so that the resulting treaties or treaty amendments could 
be ratified before the end of 1992.77
In preparing for the second government conference, Kohl and Mitterrand 
continued to work closely together. Their motives were to an extent different: For 
Kohl and the West German government, it was primarily a matter of reducing 
the democratic deficit of the Community that had emerged after the expansion 
of Community activities into many new policy areas through the Single European 
Act; addressing that issue would secure the European orientation of German 
policy over the long term. The German public’s fatigue over Europe, evident in 
several respects including the lower turnout for elections to the European Par-
liament in June of 1989, was definitely perceived in Bonn as an alarm signal. 
For their part, Mitterrand and his advisors were primarily aiming to strengthen 
common foreign and defense policy. They fully expected that after the end of the 
76 Cf. Delors, Erinnerungen, pp. 346ff.; Stark, Kohl, pp. 170–177.
77 Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1990/91, pp. 417–420.
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Cold War, the American presence in Europe would diminish sooner or later; the 
French wanted to make use of this opportunity to achieve substantial progress in 
promoting European autonomy in world politics.
Both governments were however in agreement that the completion of the 
monetary union had to be accompanied by a strengthening of the political struc-
tures of the Community if the integration of the now-sovereign Germans was to 
succeed over the long term. On the day after German unification had come into 
effect, Kohl sent a letter to the French president in which he expressed gratitude 
for Mitterrand’s support and pledged to work for the acceleration of European 
unification. In a conversation with Attali, Mitterrand appeared to have been pro-
pitiated and was at the same time resolved to make use of the opportunity for 
strengthening the European Union that was available to him with Kohl: “The 
chancellor is sincere. And he will do all that if he has the time. That’s a man of 
very great worth. But after him? One must integrate Germany into the Political 
Union, dissolve it in it, before Kohl leaves. If not, German arrogance—this time 
Bavarian rather than Prussian—will once again threaten the peace in Europe.78 
Both statesmen were at pains to demonstrate publicly that their divergences on 
the question of German unification policy—which had not remained completely 
hidden from the public—had by no means diminished their resolve to advance 
European unification together.
Taking up a suggestion that Dumas had made to his German counterpart 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Franco-German summit of 17 and 18 September in 
Munich, both sides worked on another joint declaration that was to be presented 
by Kohl and Mitterrand in the run-up to the opening of both government confer-
ences. In a joint letter of 6 December to the Council president (now Giulio And-
reotti), Kohl committed himself more explicitly to the goal of a “common defense” 
than he had in his efforts for the development of a joint Franco-German defense 
concept in the summer of 1987. For this purpose, a “clear organic tie” between the 
Political Union and the WEU was to be created; in the long term, the WEU was to 
become a component of the Political Union and consequently was also to include 
those Union members that had not belonged to it up to that time. As areas in which 
a “genuine common foreign policy” could develop, the document cited relations 
with the former Eastern Bloc states and the states bordering the Mediterranean, 
disarmament talks, as well as development policy. Decisions would be made “fun-
damentally unanimously,” but it would also be possible to allow for majority deci-
sion-making, especially involving modalities of policy implementation.
Paris acceded to Bonn’s demands regarding incorporation of immigration 
policy and the battle against international crime in the Community. It was in 
78 Note, 4 Oct. 1990, Attali, Verbatim III, p. 606.
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these areas that after the elimination of the “Iron Curtain” and the re-emergence 
of ethnic conflicts in the former Eastern Bloc states, Bonn was confronted with 
problems that it did not want to face alone and could not address alone. There-
fore, the joint letter also urged the creation of a council of ministers of the inte-
rior and justice. Regarding the strengthening of Community organs, Paris and 
Bonn agreed on “co-decision” by Parliament for legislative acts “in the narrower 
sense,” which ultimately opened up the possibility of a veto right; there was also 
to be confirmation of the Commission president and the Commission by a major-
ity of Parliament as well as the introduction of majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers as a rule. Additionally, in order to strengthen the democratic legitimacy 
of the Community, a “genuine European citizenship” was to be created.79
In the Delors’ view, however, that was insufficient for actually securing the 
Community’s legitimacy and ability to act. In February of 1991, making use of 
elaborations by his deputy cabinet chief, François Lamoureux, Delors presented 
the government conference with a series of draft texts that moved in the direction 
of more supra-nationality. Actions in the foreign-policy realm were always to be 
submitted for approval if the Council president, the Commission, or a group of 
more than six member states required it. The decision to become active in a certain 
field was still to be made unanimously by the European Council. Regarding the 
nature of the measures to be taken, it was to be compulsory that the Council of 
Ministers then decide by qualified majority; execution was primarily to be in the 
hands of the Commission.80 In general, the Commission was to receive greater 
freedom of action in issuing provisions for implementation. It was also to assume 
the representation of the Community in international organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund. Lastly, the Commission proposed that the Commu-
nity be given the right to impose taxes of its own.
This went well beyond any consensus that could have been reached among the 
twelve governments; it also ran counter to antipathy toward an increase in the Com-
mission’s power that had been repeatedly expressed by Mitterrand. Government rep-
resentatives at the working level showed little inclination to adopt the Commission’s 
proposal. “We simply set aside the Commission’s drafts and proceeded with others,” 
as one member of the Council Secretariat remembered.81 In the middle of April, the 
79 Europa-Archiv 46 (1991), pp.  D25–27. On the course of the government conference on the 
Political Union, Jim Cloos, Gaston Reinsch, Daniel Vignes, and Joseph Weyland, Le traité de 
Maastricht. Genèse, analyse, commentaires, Brussels: Émile Bruylant, 1994, pp.  73–93; Endo, 
Presidency, pp. 170–190; Rometsch, Rolle, pp. 181–195; Stark, Kohl, pp. 179–213; Bozo, Mitterrand, 
pp. 303–325; in the view of a participant, Delors, Erinnerungen, pp. 403–411.
80 Commission Proposals on Common External Policy, Agence Europe, Documents, Nr. 
1697/1698, 7 March 1991.
81 Interview with Ken Endo, Presidency, p. 178.
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Luxembourg Council presidency submitted a first draft treaty. This document took 
up the principle of different “pillars” of the future Union. This had been brought into 
the discussion by French representative Pierre de Boissieu in order to counter the 
Commission’s claims to power. In accordance with this concept, foreign and defense 
policy as well as justice and interior policy would each constitute distinct pillars of 
the Union, ones in which proceedings were to be strictly intergovernmental. In the 
Community area, the initiative right of the Commission was to lose some of its signifi-
cance because Parliament would be accorded such a right too. The Council was to be 
able to alter Commission proposals by simple majority. When there was a difference 
of opinion between the Council and Parliament, the Commission was no longer to 
have authority to make amendment proposals or simply withdraw the bill.82
Delors attacked this draft as an attempt to reduce the Commission to a kind 
of secretariat that would be subordinate to the other institutions of the Commu-
nity. He had some success in this: At an informal Council of Ministers gathering 
hosted by Genscher in Dresden on 2 and 3 June, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans von 
den Brock and his Belgian colleague Mark Eyskens severely criticized the pro-
posed pillar structure. Genscher and Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis, 
along with their counterparts from Spain, Ireland, and even Greece also voiced 
criticism. This convinced the Luxembourg Council presidency of the necessity of 
reworking the draft treaty. In the version presented at the Luxembourg Council 
meeting on 28 and 29 June, the uniformity of the institutional framework of the 
Union was more strongly emphasized.83
Nevertheless, the pillar structure was retained in the draft, and the Com-
mission would thereby be prevented from having access to the fields of foreign 
policy and domestic security. The Dutch Council presidency of the second half of 
1991 sought to change this once again by advocating its own draft treaty, which 
bound the three pillars together under Community law and further strength-
ened the rights of Parliament. Given that the Dutch draft also downplayed the 
role of common foreign and defense policy, it failed to find support among many 
advocates of strengthening the Community organs.84 In late September, Bonn 
decided—heeding pressure from Paris—to support retention of the Luxembourg 
draft. At the Council of Ministers session of 30 September, the so-called “Black 
Monday” of the Dutch presidency, the decision was made.
Delors was only able to eliminate the reductions in Commission authority 
contained in the Luxembourg draft. During a conclave of government representa-
82 Non-Paper of the Luxembourg Presidency, 15 April 1991, Agence Europe, Documents, Nr. 
1709/1710, 3 May 1991.
83 Draft treaty, 18 June 1991, ibid., Nr. 1722/1723, 5 July 1991.
84 Draft treaty, 23 Sept. 1991, ibid., Nr. 1733/1734, 3 Oct. 1991.
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tives at Noordwijk in the Netherlands on 12 and 13 November, it was decided that 
legislative initiatives of Parliament were first to be presented to the Commission. 
This meant that the Commission’s monopoly on initiatives was preserved, at least 
in the sense of having a veto right. Also, the Commission was still to be able to 
withdraw bills if it was not in agreement with the changes made by other organs. 
The strengthening of Parliament’s position was essentially limited to the intro-
duction of a co-decision-making process in individual areas and the expansion 
of oversight rights; also, the Commission would henceforth need to be confirmed 
by a parliamentary majority. The terms for Commission members were extended 
from four to five years. For the Council of Ministers, majority voting was intro-
duced as a rule, but there was to be a group of exceptions, such as when defining 
research framework programs and industrial policy.
Bonn’s decision against the Dutch treaty draft was simultaneously an affirma-
tion of the choice for an autonomous European defense. That had been opposed 
not only by the Dutch government, but also by the British, Danish, and Portu-
guese governments, which had argued that one ought not to endanger further 
the already-threatened cohesion of NATO by emphasizing a European defense 
identity. The formulation of the Franco-German program, which Dumas and Gen-
scher had presented on 4 February,85 therefore did not find acceptance every-
where. At the Luxembourg Council Meeting, it was only possible to determine 
that the decision on it would be postponed until the closing phase of the govern-
ment conference. In Paris, doubts began to arise as to whether Bonn was actually 
willing to involve itself in an independent defense; in the main question of the 
day for common foreign policy—the attitude toward Serbian intervention against 
the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in late June—the two 
partners took opposing positions. Mitterrand was once again worried about the 
stability of borders in Europe, whereas the German government was under pres-
sure from south German sympathizers of former Habsburg territories.
In order banish the danger that the Franco-German initiative for a common 
foreign and defense policy would fail, Kohl suggested to Mitterrand that there be 
another joint foray, he proposed this at a meeting in Lille on 25 June. By the begin-
ning of October, this had resulted in a new joint letter to the Council chair, now 
Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. The document made the goal of foreign and 
defense policy more specific in three points: Firstly, a draft text of treaty terms on 
these matters was offered, naming the WEU as the organ charged with carrying 
out common foreign policy but at the same time declaring that the “specifics of 
the defense policy of individual member states” were “unaffected.” A review of 
85 Der Bundesminister des Auswärtigen informiert. Mitteilung für die Presse vom 6.2.1991 (Ger-
man Foreign Minister Press Release of 6 Feb. 1991).
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these terms was announced for no later than 1996. Secondly, Bonn and Paris pre-
sented a draft declaration of WEU member states, which was to be appended to 
the Union treaty; this emphasized the “incremental expansion of the WEU into 
the defense component of the Union” as well as the goal of “creating a European 
pillar” of the Atlantic alliance. Thirdly, the chancellor and president announced 
not only an expansion of Franco-German military units, but also declared that 
these could “constitute the nucleus of a European corps,” in which “forces of 
other members of the WEU” participated.86
Thatcher’s successor John Major declared to Mitterrand that subordination of 
the WEU to the guidelines of the Union would be absolutely out of the question. 
However, after the US government had accepted the “development of a defense 
identity for Europe” in a declaration of the NATO Council on 8 November, the 
British prime minister had to content himself with a weakening of the formula-
tions of the Franco-German draft at the conclusion of treaty negotiations at the 
Council meeting of 9 and 10 December in Maastricht. The treaty text now contained 
only the statement that the common defense policy “could in due course lead to 
a common defense”; for practical measures following from Council decisions on 
defense policy, there was an assumption of “accord” between the Council and the 
organs of the WEU. Additionally, majority decision-making on “questions that have 
defense-policy characteristics” was explicitly forbidden.87 Through close cooper-
ation, Mitterrand and Kohl were able to prevent any further watering down of the 
defense perspectives during the Council meeting in Maastricht.88
As to the timetable for the monetary union, Mitterrand and Delors voted in 
agreement for precise political determinations. The second stage of the monetary 
union was to begin as soon as possible, that is, when the treaties came into force 
on 1 January 1993. Conveniently, that was also the date on which the internal 
market was to be completed. The German finance ministry, now with Theo Waigel 
and new State Secretary Horst Köhler at the head, were averse to setting a date 
and instead wanted the fulfillment of objective criteria such as the achievement 
of price stability and budgetary discipline. Finally, at a Council meeting in Rome 
on 28 and 29 October 1990, Kohl was ready for a compromise: The second stage 
was to begin on 1 January 1994, at least if “sufficient” progress in real-economic 
86 Letter of 14 Oct. 1991, Europa-Archiv 46 (1991), pp. D571–574. 
87 EU Treaty, Art. J.4.
88 On the course of the meeting, Françoise Carle, Les Archives du Président. Mitterrand intime, 
Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1998, pp.  233–236; Pierre Favier, Michel Martin-Rolland, La Décen-
nie Mitterrand, Vol. 4: Les Déchirements, 1991–1995, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999, pp.  227ff.; 
Georges Saunier, “La négociation de Maastricht vue de Paris,” in: Journal of European Integration 
History 19 (2013), pp. 45–65.
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and monetary convergence had been achieved by then—a vague formulation that 
no longer left much maneuvering room for the German neo-liberals to delay the 
actual beginning of the monetary union any further.89
Kohl still did not however give in to pressure from Mitterrand to set a date 
for the transition to the third stage, the introduction of the Community currency. 
Only when in March of 1991 Genscher publicly pleaded for 1 January 1997 as the 
transition date did Kohl acknowledge the necessity of a clear timeline. Yet, in 
order to avoid drawing criticism from those who had a sentimental attachment to 
the German mark, he still did not want to name a concrete date. It was Andreotti 
at the Maastricht Council meeting who first brought 1 January 1999 into play as 
the latest date for the beginning of the currency union, and this was accepted. If 
before the end of 1996 the Council was to determine by qualified majority that 
a majority of member states had fulfilled the criteria for joining, the monetary 
union could then begin on 1 January 1997. Otherwise, there was to be a decision 
before 1 July 1998 on which states could participate.
Pressure was thus put on the economically-weaker countries to make serious 
efforts to meet the entry criteria: New debt not over three percent, total debt not 
over sixty percent of GNP, an inflation rate not over 1.5 percent of the average 
of the rates in the three most stable states, long-term interest rates not over two 
percent more than in those states, and no devaluation within the EMS over the 
previous two years. At the same time, however, there developed a certain amount 
of maneuvering room for interpreting these criteria generously in case that in 
1998 a country such as France still would clearly diverge from the level of the 
Federal Republic. Waigel and Köhler, who were completely surprised by Kohl’s 
decision to agree to set a firm date for the introduction of the Community curren-
cy,90 had to accept that the chancellor regarded the irreversibility of the decision 
more highly than an absolute stability guarantee.
Great Britain was granted the possibly, even with a positive assessment of 
its economic performance, of foregoing participation in the third stage. This was 
the price that had to be paid in order to avoid having British Prime Minister John 
Major use his veto to block the necessary treaty amendments. At the same time, 
this settlement still kept open a path for British participation. Such a decision—
fundamentally desired by all partners—could not in fact be excluded from the 
realm of possibility after the up-coming 1992 parliamentary elections. Earlier, 
while serving as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Major, along with Foreign Minis-
89 Dyson and Featherstone, Road, pp. 395–399; on the following, ibid., pp. 202–255, 370–451, 
and 726–740; Harold James, “Designing a Central Bank in the Run-Up to Maastricht,” in: Journal 
of European Integration History 19 (2013), pp. 105–122.
90 According to Hans Tietmeyer’s account, quoted in Schwarz, Kohl, p. 701.
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ter Douglas Hurd, had forced through Britain’s entry into the EMS on 5 October 
1990; then, widespread criticism of Thatcher’s aggressively anti-Europe rhetoric 
had six week later even led to the prime minister’s fall. It was not necessarily 
an intention to participate in the Community currency that lay behind this. Yet, 
Thatcher’s opponents did hope that the problems of the British economy, such 
as rising inflation and a massive balance of trade deficit, could be better brought 
under control if the country participated in the European Monetary System. They 
were also convinced that there would be a better chance of having influence over 
its construction as a member rather than by standing on the sidelines. Britain 
should take its place “at the very heart of Europe,” Major proclaimed as the new 
prime minister during his first public appearance in Bonn.91
The Dutch government proposed that all member states have the option of quit-
ting the monetary union after the point when the Council had made the decision 
for the transition to the third stage; this was rejected at an informal meeting of the 
finance ministers on 1 December 1991 in Scheveningen in the Netherlands. After that, 
the Danish government demanded a special right to withdraw, citing the provisions 
of the country’s constitution: The Danish government asserted that entry into the 
monetary union might well require approval in a national referendum, and thus it 
could not commit itself definitively in a treaty at that juncture. The partners did agree 
to this demand by providing an additional protocol, knowing that regarding the 
weight of the Community currency in the world currency structure and the cohesion 
of the internal market, much less was at stake here than in the British case.
The compromise character of the agreements on the monetary union revealed 
itself still more clearly in the decisions for the second stage: Köhler, who carried 
on the negotiations for the German side with backing from Waigel and Kohl, had 
to accept that the preparations for the third stage were not simply left to the Com-
mittee of National Bank Governors but would be taken up by a “European Mone-
tary Institute,” which was under the leadership of an external president chosen 
by the European Council. This monetary institute would not however take over the 
coordination of national monetary policies at that time, as France—represented 
by Treasury Director Jean-Claude Trichet—and the Commission were demanding 
of a European Central Bank to be created at the beginning of the second stage. 
Likewise, this institute was not to take on responsibility for currency reserves at 
that time. National central banks would be able to transfer currency reserves to it, 
but it would then act only under their mandate.
Regarding the already-accepted independence of the European Central Bank 
system and the commitment to the goal of currency stability, the German side 
91 Speech of 11 March 1991, quoted from Young, Blessed Plot, p.  374. Cf. ibid., pp.  362–374; 
Dyson and Featherstone, Road, pp. 644–682.
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had to accept that the independence of the national central banks would have 
to be realized before entry into the third stage rather than before entry into the 
second. On the other hand, French Economy Minister Pierre Bérégovoy’s hopes 
for a comprehensive “economic government” of the Community as a necessary 
accompaniment to the Community currency were diminished in that instead of 
binding “guidelines,” the Council would only be able to issue a “recommenda-
tion”; and financial support for members states that had gotten into difficulties 
would be dependent on the unanimous vote of the Council. As the Bundesbank 
had demanded, there was an explicit ban on holding the Community liable for 
the debts of individual member states; for states with an “excessive government 
deficit,” there was the threat of “fines of an appropriate size.” At the final min-
isters meeting in Brussels on 2 and 3 December, Waigel and Köhler were able to 
have a decision made to the effect that the Council would only be empowered to 
provide “general orientations” regarding exchange-rate policy, not “guidelines.” 
Additionally, it was determined that these orientations “shall be without preju-
dice to the primary objective of the ECB to maintain price stability.”92
Waigel and Köhler were also successful in fending off a Spanish demand for 
the establishment of a “convergence fund” to assist the weaker member states. 
Commitment to social and economic cohesion was inserted in a protocol attached 
to the EU Treaty. This announced the creation of a “Cohesion Fund” with which 
the weaker member states could be supported on “projects in the areas of envi-
ronment and trans-European networks.” The redistribution to be needed as part 
of the promotion of convergence was thus kept within narrow boundaries. Like-
wise, determinations on the authority of the Community in the realm of social 
policy—securing minimal standards in promoting employment, working condi-
tions, equality between the sexes, and worker participation in management—
were relegated to a separate agreement, which Great Britain did not sign. At 
Maastricht, Kohl was able to push through a decision that a further government 
conference in 1996 would review the practicability of the agreed-upon stipula-
tions. This preserved the prospect of all participants’ having an opportunity to 
make improvements in line with their views.
The agreement in Maastricht can therefore be regarded in two different 
lights: On the one hand, Kohl and Mitterrand had succeeded—through signifi-
cant effort—in saving the European unification process from endangerment by 
German reunification and had even succeeded in advancing that process further. 
With a common currency, there was a degree of integration and European state-
like structures that made it irreversible. On the other hand, progress in areas 
92 Articles 103, 104, and 109 (2) of the EC Treaty. For an overview of the decisions on the mon-
etary union, see Unger, History, pp. 229–242.
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especially important to either the German chancellor or the French president had 
remained much more meager than what would have been necessary for lasting 
success. Contributions to dismantling the deficit of democracy through strength-
ening the rights of Parliament and expanding majority-voting in the Council of 
Ministers had to a great extent been offset by the proliferation of procedures. 
Commitment to the goal of common decision-making structures in the field of 
defense was relativized by mandating unanimity on the way to their realization.
These shortcomings, which prompted Delors to speak of an “organised 
schizophrenia,”93 were to an extent attributable to the fact that cooperation 
between Delors and Mitterrand had since the turn of the year 1989–90 given way 
to prickly tension. With an obvious exaggerated self-regard, Delors had neglected 
to coordinate with Mitterrand on the institutional questions. For his part, the 
French president had given little thought to how the “economic government” and 
the common foreign and defense policy were to function. A coherent negotiat-
ing strategy for the expansion of the Community could not develop under such 
circumstances. The network that Delors, Genscher, and Dumas had established 
(with Guigou as intermediary to Mitterrand), could not completely develop. From 
the beginning of 1991, Delors was acting largely in isolation. In the end, he had to 
be content with having preserved the status quo for the Commission.
Several weeks went by before the treaty on the founding of the European 
Community, which built on the revised EEC Treaty, as well as the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union with all the protocols and declarations could be edited and translated 
into all official languages. On 7 February 1992, the foreign and finance ministers 
of the Twelve assembled in Maastricht once again in order to sign the treaties. 
Three-and-a-half months later, at the conclusion of the Franco-German summit 
in La Rochelle on 22 May 1992, the two governments announced the formation 
of the Franco-German corps, which would number approximately 35,000. At the 
Council meeting in Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December 1992, it was finally possible 
to make decisions about the seat of important Community organs: The Commis-
sion, which in the meantime was employing more than seventeen thousand civil 
servants, was assigned Brussels as its official seat—shortly after the Berlaymont 
Building had been vacated due to asbestos contamination. Parliament was to 
meet once per month in Strasbourg, while further plenary sessions and commit-
tee meetings as well as sessions of the Council of Ministers were to take place in 
Brussels. The multiplicity of the arrangements made in Maastricht was reflected 
too in the inconsistency of its geographic localization.
93 Speech to the European Parliament, 20 Nov. 1991, quoted in Endo, Presidency, p. 187.
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Implementing the Monetary Union
Realizing the Maastricht decisions was not a straightforward affair. Not only was 
there still the open question as to whether Great Britain and Denmark would par-
ticipate in the third stage of the monetary union. The completion of the inter-
nal market and the introduction of a common currency also brought so many 
changes to the economic organization and everyday lives of Europeans that it was 
unknown whether these developments would be readily accepted. Moreover, in 
achieving the convergence criteria necessary for the transition to the third stage, 
the member states had to contend with divergent economic developments that 
they could influence only to a limited extent.
The ratification of the Treaty on European Union and of the revised EEC 
Treaty (now called the Treaty on Foundation of the European Community) was 
endangered when on 12 May 1992, the Danish Folketing voted on the ratification 
bill: Although it did win a majority, it failed to achieve the constitutionally-man-
dated five-sixths support necessary for immediate adoption. A referendum now 
had to be organized. In response, those who were against Danish membership in 
the European Community on principle and those who opposed its further devel-
opment joined together in a campaign that garnered a surprisingly-high level of 
support. Against the vote of almost all parties represented in parliament, against 
the labor unions, and against the major newspapers, some 50.7 percent of the 
voters opposed the Maastricht Treaties in the referendum of 2 June 1992. The gap 
between those against and the 49.3 percent who voted in favor amounted to only 
46,000 votes altogether.
The surprising Danish “no” caused a considerable shock in the Community. 
The Council of Ministers immediately decided that the ratification process in the 
other countries would continue according to the envisaged schedule. Meeting in 
Lisbon on 26 and 27 June, the heads of state and of government ruled out any 
renegotiation of the treaties; in other respects, the Danish problem was deferred 
for the time being. In the public opinion of the other countries, however, those 
forces opposed to individual aspects of the treaties for various reasons or opposed 
to the entire direction of the unification process were given a boost. Up to that 
point, those opponents had not seemed to have much prospect of success; now, 
they were in a position to spark intense fundamental discussions on the progress 
of European unification.
In most countries, this changed nothing in terms of the results of the ratifi-
cation process. In Ireland, supporters of the treaties were successful with 68.7 
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percent of the vote in a referendum of 18 June. During July, the parliaments of Lux-
embourg, Belgium, and Greece gave their approval by quite large majorities, like-
wise the Italian Chamber of Deputies and the Spanish parliament in October, fol-
lowed by the Portuguese parliament in December. In the Netherlands, the House 
of Representatives voted in favor on 17 November and the Senate on 15 December. 
As earlier in the European Parliament, there was much criticism here regard-
ing the democratic deficit, the failure to include foreign and domestic policy in 
the Community system, and the non-binding character of the European Social 
Charter. Dissatisfaction with the results of the negotiations did not however lead 
to any blocking of the progress that had nevertheless been made.
Things transpired differently in France. There, a congress consisting of a joint 
gathering of the National Assembly and the Senate approved the treaty amend-
ments necessary for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaties on 23 June by a 
broad majority. Mitterrand however wanted to leave the decision on the treaties 
themselves to the people; he had decided this in late May in light of the debate in 
Denmark. On the basis of opinion polls, he figured on winning a majority in his 
country, one that would at the same time benefit the beleaguered position of the 
Socialist government. Also, he had convinced himself that a common currency 
needed the approval of the voters if it were to have success over the long term. 
Ever since a sudden worsening of his cancer, he had moreover been plagued by 
a certain weariness of office that served to increase his willingness to take risks. 
As he said to Jacques Attali, if he were to lose, he would resign, and that would in 
fact be a fine departure.1
Mitterrand announced his decision on 3 June, one day after the rejection of 
the treaty by a slim majority of the Danes. In the lively debate that ensued, it was 
not only the Communist Party under Georges Marchais and the “National Front” 
under Jean-Marie Le Pen that reaffirmed their opposition to European unification. 
It was also minorities among the Gaullists (Charles Pasqua, Philippe Séguin), the 
Conservatives (Philippe de Villiers), and the governing Socialists (Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement), who made names for themselves as the defenders of national 
identity and sovereignty against “Brussels technocracy” and the hegemony of the 
Germans. They gained impetus from the Danish “no” as well as from the pressure 
on the French franc that was unleashed by it and the high interest-rate policy of 
the Bundesbank that threatened the growth of the French economy.
As a majority for the treaty rapidly melted away, Kohl decided to hasten to the 
aid of the president via an appearance on French television. On 3 September, he 
1 Attali, Mitterrand, p. 354. On the ratification process overall, Gerbet, Construction, pp. 400–
409; Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Issues, Debates and Future Implications, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
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participated in a television marathon in which Mitterrand defended the common 
currency and celebrated Franco-German friendship. The chancellor vowed to the 
French people that he would not fail in his support for the great work being under-
taken by their president.2 It remains difficult to determine whether and to what 
extent this helped. In any event, a very slim majority of 51.05 percent voted for rat-
ification on 20 September; some 48.95 percent voted against, with a bare third of 
the voters staying away from the polls. “Maastricht” was thus saved once again. 
In France as well as the other important member states, the broad support for the 
European project that Mitterrand had had in mind did not materialize, however.
In the Federal Republic, the tabloid Bild and the magazine Der Spiegel 
opposed “the end of the mark”; and some politicians of the CSU—Peter Gauweiler 
most loudly—stoked fears of “Esperanto money.” After the Danish rejection, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published a “manifesto” of sixty German econ-
omists who criticized the convergence criteria stipulated in Maastricht as “too 
weak” and warned of “severe economic tensions” in the wake of an “overhasty 
introduction” of the Community currency.3 The Bundesbank cautioned once 
again that a “comprehensive political union” was the prerequisite for the “endur-
ing existence” of the monetary union and pursued its high-interest policy for 
financing German unity without worrying about endangering a majority for the 
treaty in France. However, after the decision for ratification was made in the Fifth 
Republic, Kohl and Waigel succeeded in isolating the opposition voices within 
the parties. On 2 December, the Bundestag approved the treaties by the over-
whelming majority of 543 to seventeen.
In Denmark, meanwhile, the parties in parliament had on 30 October come 
to agreement on a declaration in which they demanded a special statute for their 
country in the European Union: no participation in a common defense or the Com-
munity currency or Union citizenship or common authority in the areas of justice 
and police. The European Council however stuck by its position of not negotiat-
ing further on exceptional regulations. A the Council meeting in Edinburgh on 11 
and 12 December only “acknowledged” that Denmark would not participate in 
a common defense or the Community currency. In regard to Union citizenship, 
the Council declared that it would “in no way take the place of national citizen-
ship.” In a unilateral declaration, the Danish government added that transfers of 
authority in the areas of justice and police would have to be approved by referen-
dum.4 On the basis of these specifications, some 56.8 percent of Danish voters 
2 Lappenküper, Mitterrand, pp. 324ff.
3 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 June 1992.
4 “Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates in Edinburgh 11./12.12.1992,” in: Jahrbuch der Eu-
ropäischen Integration 1992/93, pp. 439–478, here pp. 457–460.
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approved the Maastricht Treaties in a second referendum on 18 May 1993; the 
government presented the ratification document on 17 June.
In Great Britain, a small but highly-aggressive minority of the governing 
Conservatives, spearheaded by Margaret Thatcher, along with a minority of the 
Labour Party fought against the Maastricht Treaties. As a result of the elections 
of 9 April, the government’s majority had dwindled to twenty-one seats; and the 
Conservative opponents of Maastricht were then able to compel Prime Minister 
John Major to accept that, after the Danish “no,” the process of ratification in the 
British Parliament would be halted until it could be known what would follow 
from the rejection of the treaties in Denmark. After the Danish Folketing had 
issued its demand for a special statute within the framework of the European 
Union on 30 October, the House of Commons resumed debate. It was only possi-
ble to vote after the positive outcome of the second Danish referendum on 18 May 
1993 and after serious parliamentary conflict as well as a whole series of amend-
ments. On 20 May 1993, the House of Commons approved the Maastricht Treaties 
by a vote of 292 to 112. By abstaining, a majority of Labour MPs had helped the 
treaties succeed.
Even with the submission of the British ratification documents on 2 August, 
the treaties still could not come into effect. No fewer than twenty-nine opponents 
of the treaties in Germany submitted complaints to the German Constitutional 
Court. The court however agreed to hear only one of the complaints, needing 
until 12 October before announcing its decision. The complaint was rejected, and 
the German government was then able to submit the ratification document in 
Brussels the same evening so that the treaties could come into effect on 1 Novem-
ber 1993—some ten months later than anticipated. Nevertheless, the justices 
linked their approval of the treaties to an interpretation of them that left open 
further political possibilities for the opponents of Maastricht: They characterized 
the Union as a “confederacy of states,” in which the member states remained 
masters over the treaties. The transfer of further sovereign rights to the Union 
was thereby made conditional on the approval of the Constitutional Court, which 
also certified the right of the Bundestag to reject the transition to the third stage 
of the monetary union on 1 January 1999 if the stability goals had not been met.5
Calling into question a central agreement of the modified Community Treaty 
was all the more significant as the stability guidelines being followed by the 
members of the European Monetary System in anticipation of the monetary union 
became ever more difficult to maintain due to reduced economic growth. Ten-
sions among the participating currencies were heightened by the inflation in the 
Federal Republic in the wake of the conversion of the GDR’s currency at a ratio 
5 Stark, Kohl, pp. 247–253.
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of one to one as well as the growing debt from financing German unity, along 
with a significant drop in the US dollar. The Bundesbank decided to combat this 
inflation by a drastic hike in the prime rate, with the discount rate rising from 
2.0 percent in 1987 to 8.75 percent in July of 1992. This meant that countries with 
weaker economies faced a dilemma; if they continued to adhere to the rates, 
sharp economic declines would result.
Then, as the Danish “no” of June 1992 suddenly made the realization of the 
monetary union uncertain, the markets began to speculate on the devaluation 
of individual currencies. In late August, the British pound came under severe 
pressure and shortly thereafter the Italian lira too. John Major and Chancellor 
of Exchequer Norman Lamont did not initially want to devalue; for its part, the 
Bundesbank showed little inclination to assist its partners by lowering interest 
rates. Thus, the monetary committee of the central bank governors was only able 
to decide on devaluing the lira by seven percent during their meeting on 12 and 
13 September, along with a negligible reduction of the prime rates of Germany, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands. This half-hearted decision further increased the 
pressure on the pound and the lira. On 16 September, “black Wednesday,” the 
pressure reached such intensity that it forced the British government to withdraw 
from the exchange-rate mechanism of the monetary system—at least “temporar-
ily,” as was said. After a hastily-called nighttime meeting of the monetary com-
mittee, Italy too had to leave the exchange-rate mechanism; the Spanish peseta 
was also devalued by five percent. A British demand to suspend the monetary 
system altogether was rejected by the partners.6
After the humiliating defeat of the British, speculation concentrated on the 
French franc. As Major and Lamont had done earlier, Mitterrand and French Trea-
sury Director Jean-Claude Trichet now requested a reduction in German interest 
rates. Additionally, they demanded a declaration that nothing would change 
regarding the parity of the franc and the mark. This was wholly unacceptable to 
Bundesbank President Helmut Schlesinger, who had taken over the post after the 
resignation of Pöhl in June of 1991. At a meeting between the German and French 
finance ministers and central bank governors on the fringes of the annual gather-
ing of the International Monetary Fund in Washington on 22 September, he said, 
“I would not like to expose myself to ridicule by being proven wrong by the facts 
after twelve or twenty-four or forty-eight hours.” For his part, Trichet conjured up 
the danger of the failure of the common currency project: “The alliance between 
France and Germany since their reconciliation is the fulcrum of the European 
6 Ungerer, History, pp. 263–265; Dyson and Featherstone, Road, pp. 682–685; David Marsh, Der 
Euro. Die geheime Geschichte der neuen Weltwährung, Hamburg: Murmann, 2009, pp. 210–223.
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system. What one hears in your words and your tone is the dissolution of the 
system.”7
Trichet received support in this critical situation from Helmut Kohl. In a 
conversation at the Élysée Palace on the same day, Mitterrand made clear to 
the chancellor the gravity of the situation. Kohl then picked up the phone and 
told first Horst Köhler and then Hans Tietmeyer, Schlesinger’s deputy, that he 
desired “within the next few hours” a declaration of the governors on the pres-
ervation of the parity of the two currencies.8 With an eye toward the indepen-
dence of the Bundesbank, he of course added that the bank itself must make the 
decision in the end. The pressure he exerted was sufficient to change the view of 
the German delegation in Washington. At the close of an over four-hour session, 
there emerged a joint communiqué of the central bank governors and the finance 
ministers in which the parity of the franc and the mark was declared to be invio-
lable. Moreover, the Bundesbank expressed its willingness to increase its loans to 
the Banque de France to thirty-nine billion marks, some four billion more than it 
had accorded the Bank of England on “black Wednesday.”
Together with a minor reduction of German interest rates and a hike in 
French ones, these measures were in fact sufficient to rein in speculation against 
the franc. Spain had to accept two more devaluations, as did Portugal; and after 
the British pound had lost more than ten percent of its worth against the mark 
by year’s end, Ireland too had to devalue despite solid economic data. Finland, 
Sweden, and Norway dissolved the pegs to the European currency unit that they 
had established in 1990–91. In contrast, the franc (with an inflation rate of two 
percent in France) began to replace the mark (with its inflation rate of more than 
four percent in the Federal Republic) as the anchor currency.
Yet, France had to pay a high price for the policy of the “hard” franc: Unem-
ployment in the country rose to almost twelve percent. During the summer of 
1993, this unleashed renewed and now more severe speculation against the 
franc. When in late July it became clear that parity between the mark and the 
franc could no longer be maintained, Prime Minister Édouard Balladur asked 
that Kohl either to bring about a substantial reduction in German interest rates 
or that the Federal Republic be allowed to leave the exchange-rate mechanism. 
He hoped that this would reduce the problems of the other countries and at the 
same time give France the leading role in what would be left of the monetary 
system. Waigel, Schlesinger, and Tietmeyer sought out the chancellor at his vaca-
tion spot on an Austrian lake, the Wolfgangsee; Kohl did not agree to the request. 
7 Notes by Trichet, 22 Sept. 1992, quoted from Marsh, Euro, p.  230. On the following, ibid., 
pp. 223–235.
8 Meeting between Mitterrand and Kohl, 22 Sept. 1992, French protocol, ibid., p. 227.
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In the end, France thus had to be satisfied with an increase in the bandwidths 
of the exchange-rate mechanism, Kohl accepting that the fluctuations would be 
expanded from the then-current 2.25 percent to nothing less than fifteen percent. 
A decision in accordance with this was made by the finance ministers and central 
bank governors during the night of 1 to 2 August. Only the Netherlands and 
Germany agreed to retain the limit of 2.25 percent between themselves.9
A formal devaluation of the franc was thereby averted once again, and spec-
ulation was contained. Speculators witnessed the loss of the profits they had 
anticipated from a devaluation of the French currency. Henceforth, they had to 
reckon with much higher risks as to exchange rates, which noticeably reduced 
their inclination to speculate against individual currencies. At the same time, 
however, the stability goal of the treaty on monetary union had been loosened. 
If the countries whose currencies had become the target of speculators were now 
to lower their interest rates and increase their money supply so as to spur growth 
and reduce unemployment, the realization of the Maastricht Treaty would recede 
unreachably far away.
It was of decisive importance for the fate of the project of monetary union that 
Balladur—whom Mitterrand had named as head of a conservative government 
after the electoral defeat of the Socialists in late March of 1993—refrained from 
doing that. The hard-currency countries among the EMS members under attack—
Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland—followed his example. As a consequence, the 
exchange rates of their currencies vis-à-vis the mark quickly recovered; and with 
the exception of the franc, they once again moved mostly within the old, narrow 
bandwidths. The mark could thus retain its status as anchor currency, and it was 
ideally protected from speculation on the path toward the community currency.
In order to calm the German public, which was plagued with growing anxiety 
about inflation, Kohl insisted during a meeting of the European Council on 29 
October 1993 that Frankfurt am Main, home to the Bundesbank, should be chosen 
as the seat of the European Monetary Institute. This was to demonstrate to the 
Germans that the future European Central Bank would be just as independent 
and just as much focused on stability as the Bundesbank.10 The Monetary Insti-
tute took up its work with the transition to the second phase of the monetary 
union on 1 January 1994, in accordance with the treaty. From late October of 
1994, it occupied the former headquarters of the Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft in the 
Frankfurt city center. It initially employed 150 people, coming mostly from the 
central banks of the member states; the number had grown to six hundred by the 
9 Ibid., pp. 237–241; Ungerer, History, pp. 265–267.
10 Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1990–1994, Munich: Droemer 2007, p. 614; “Schlussfolgerungen 
des Europäischen Rates vom 29.10.1993 in Brüssel,” in: Europa-Archiv 49 (1994), pp. D2–D9.
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time of the actual launch of the Community currency at the end of the decade and 
had reached some 1,400 by 2008.
After Jacques Chirac had been elected to succeed Mitterrand on 7 May 1995, 
the German government began pushing for further measures to secure the stabil-
ity goal. In his election campaign against Balladur, Chirac had called for boost-
ing the French economy and had repeatedly attacked the stability course of the 
Banque de France, which had become independent of the government and had 
been led by Trichet since September of 1993. In the wake of lower receipts due 
to recession and increased expenditures for the unemployed, the French budget 
deficit had risen to five percent. In order to counteract that, Theo Waigel had been 
calling for the conclusion of a “Stability Pact” since early September of 1995. This 
agreement was to ensure that budget deficits would have an upper limit of three 
percent of GNP after completion of the monetary union. Countries going beyond 
that limit would automatically be subject to punishment in the form of fines.
Waigel’s demand found little favor among the advocates of “different” eco-
nomic policy in France. Nor was there much willingness in the Southern Euro-
pean countries Italy, Spain, Portugal, or Greece to have the Germans keep them 
from pursuing a policy of economic stimulus. In the end, however, Chirac had to 
accept that without such security against the threat of inflation, opposition to the 
actual completion of the monetary union would be too great in Germany. During a 
meeting with Kohl on 25 October, the chancellor made the concession of promis-
ing to speak with Bundesbank President Tietmeyer about lowering German inter-
est rates; thereafter, the French president found himself willing to turn away from 
the course he had been pursuing. In a televised address on 26 October, he took 
the side of those advocating a strong franc and the Community currency. At the 
Madrid Council meeting of 15 and 16 December 1995, Kohl was then able to push 
through a principle commitment to the “Stability Pact.” As he assured Chirac in 
a chummy way, “I see you and me as a common team for Europe. Your success is 
also my success.”11
Even in determining the name of the Community currency, the sensitivities of 
the Germans needed to be taken into account. France wanted to retain the name 
of the unit of account then in existence, which had been incorporated into the 
treaty and which was reminiscent of old French silver coins. For Kohl, however, 
the name “ECU” was completely out of the question—this unit of account had 
lost almost forty percent of its value vis-à-vis the most stable currencies that were 
part of its composition owing to the many devaluations by individual member 
states over the sixteen years of its existence. At a Brussels Council meeting 
there occurred a debate of considerable length. John Major proposed the name 
11 Jacques Chirac, Le temps présidentiel. Mémoires 2, Paris: Pocket, 2011, pp. 90ff.
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“Gulden,” which had once been used in English Aquitaine. Helmut Kohl signaled 
his willingness to accept the name “Franken,” which evoked the stable Swiss cur-
rency and which also would allow the French to retain the name of their existing 
currency. That was not acceptable to Filipe González however given that it would 
conjure up memories of Franco’s dictatorship. The Spanish prime minister there-
fore finally suggested that the new currency simply be named the “Euro.” This 
met with broad agreement. Chirac, who would gladly have stayed with the “ECU,” 
had to accede.
In light of the then-current size of the budget deficits—even the Federal 
Republic had a deficit of 3.5 percent in 1995 due to the recession—it had in the 
meantime become clear that there was no prospect of allowing the monetary 
union to begin on 1 January 1997. In Madrid, the Council therefore definitively set 
1 January 1999 as the date; and in accordance with a “Green Book” of the Euro-
pean Commission, it decided on the procedure that would lead to determining 
which countries would be members of the monetary union. In early 1998, the 
Commission was to ascertain which member countries in the base year 1997 had 
met the entry criteria; on this basis, the European Council was to make a decision 
in the spring of 1998 as to the composition of the monetary union. The European 
Monetary Institute would accordingly be transformed into the European Central 
Bank, and the exchange rates of the currencies vis-à-vis the Community currency 
were to be definitively set. The members of the monetary union were to have the 
possibility of allowing some time to pass before the new banknotes and coins 
were introduced. No later than 1 January 2002, however, the Euro was to be in 
circulation; on 1 July 2002, the banknotes and coins of the previous currencies 
would no longer be legal tender.12
As Kohl had foreseen in the negotiations over the Maastricht Treaty, the deci-
sions made at the Madrid Council meeting gave a strong impulse to improving 
national budgets. Heavily indebted countries such as Italy (with a budget deficit of 
6.7 percent in 1996), Spain (6.6 percent in 1995), and Greece (14.1 percent in 1994) 
also wanted to participate in the introduction of the Euro—in part for reasons 
of prestige but above all because of the lure of lower interest rates with which 
they could finance the modernization of their economies. Without participating 
in the monetary union, there was a danger of languishing in second place indef-
initely. Chirac therefore held to his new austerity course despite a wave of strikes 
in December of 1995 that paralyzed France for four weeks. In Italy and Spain, new 
heads of government came on the scene with drastic austerity programs (Romano 
12 “Schlussfolgerungen des Europäischen Rates in Madrid 15./16. Dezember 1995,” in: Interna-
tionale Politik 6/1996, pp. 81–86; on this and the following, Ungerer, History, pp. 272–292; Gerbet, 
Construction, pp. 432–445.
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Prodi as the candidate of the left and the conservative José Maria Aznar, respec-
tively). After the resignation of Andreas Papandreou in January of 1996 due to 
health reasons, Kostas Simitis, an economic modernizer, asserted himself as new 
Prime Minister of the PASOK government in Greece.
The efforts toward budget rehabilitation were assisted by two developments 
that were not necessarily to be expected: First, the US dollar gained value again 
from the middle of 1995 onward. This made European and especially German 
exports less expensive and helped the economies recover. Second, the Bundes-
bank began to understand that continuing devaluations in the Community coun-
tries threatened German exports to an extent that was no longer reconcilable with 
maintaining the current German level of production: Otmar Issing, chief econo-
mist of the Bundesbank, stated at a conference in November of 2007, “I and others 
came to the conclusion that the Common Market would not withstand another 
such monetary crisis [like that of 1992–93].”13 As a consequence, the guardians 
of the German currency found themselves willing to accept reductions in interest 
rates in 1996 to an extent that they had hitherto always rejected. The discount rate 
was lowered to 2.5 percent, the Lombard rate to 4.5 percent. The cost of borrowing 
consequently fell not only for German companies but for their European neigh-
bors as well. At the same time, the cost of debt service decreased, and that in turn 
contributed to the reduction in budget deficits.
In order to satisfy the requirement of two years’ membership in the Euro-
pean exchange-rate mechanism, Prodi pushed through the re-entry of Italy at the 
last minute, on 4 December 1996. The markets thereupon began to adjust to the 
idea of the country’s participation in the monetary union, and interest rates in all 
of Europe plateaued at the German level. More and more, the financial markets 
came to assume that the monetary union, despite all difficulties, would begin 
punctually and with a relatively large membership.  Only in Great Britain was 
there no perceptible willingness to re-enter the exchange-rate mechanism: Free 
floating and the abandonment of the German interest-rate level had promoted 
economic growth to such a degree that a return to the discipline of the EMS was 
no longer seen as a necessity. Tony Blair, who had succeeded John Major after a 
landslide victory of the Labour Party on 1 May 1997, had new Chancellor of Exche-
quer Gordon Brown declare that the time for British participation in the monetary 
union had not yet come.
Despite all the efforts, it nevertheless remained questionable as to whether 
the Southern European countries along with France and Germany would actu-
ally achieve a curtailment of new debt to three percent in the reference year 1997. 
Consequently, more and more voices also began calling for the recession to be 
13 Quoted in Marsh, Euro, p. 253.
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taken into account when budget stability was measured; and the same voices 
began arguing the case for assessing the “trend” in budget development too. In 
France, Socialist party leader Lionel Jospin won early parliamentary elections on 
25 May and 1 June 1997 with the slogan that the fight against unemployment must 
take precedence over a pinpoint introduction of the euro. Having been appointed 
prime minister by Chirac, Jospin refused to sign the Stability Pact in its existing 
form; signing of the document had been envisioned for the Council meeting in 
Amsterdam on 16 and 17 June.
For their part, however, the German government and the Bundesbank cat-
egorically rejected all attempts to weaken the Maastricht criteria or modify the 
Stability Pact. So often and so doggedly did Waigel repeat his insistence on exact 
adherence to the upper limit for budget deficits that his forcefully-Bavarian for-
mulated “dreikommanull” (“three point zero”) for a time became a German catch-
phrase in the French press. Passage of the Stability Pact at the Amsterdam Council 
meeting was only saved when the heads of state and of government—taking up a 
mediation proposal from Commission President Delors—simultaneously issued 
a decision by which the coordination of national economic policy in accordance 
with Articles 102 and 103 of the Maastricht Treaty be extended to social policy, 
employment policy, and structural reform. Moreover, a special summit for com-
bating unemployment was promised. This took place on 21 and 22 November 1997 
in Luxembourg and led to the coordination of national employment strategies 
with support of the European Investment Bank.
Regarding the Stability Pact itself—now dubbed the “Stability and Growth 
Pact” following a demand by Chirac—Kohl and Waigel had already had to accept 
reductions to their vision at a turbulent Council meeting in Dublin on 13 and 14 
December 1996. Instead of automatic sanctions, there were to be decisions made 
by the Council of Ministers on sanctions. Beyond this, the possibility of “extraor-
dinary circumstances” was acknowledged, under which sanctions could be set 
aside. At a Council of Ministers meeting on 7 July 1997, it was agreed that a reces-
sion amounting to two percent of GNP would be regarded as an extraordinary 
circumstance. In cases of a recession falling between two and .75 percent, the 
Commission was to provide recommendations regarding sanctions. Violating the 
upper limit of the budget deficit in the event of a recession amounting to less than 
.75 percent was to warrant sanctions in every case. For each percentage point by 
which a country went over the permissible deficit limit, funds equal to .25 percent 
of GNP were to be deposited with the Commission. The depositing country would 
lose the sum if the impermissible deficit were not eliminated after two years.
The Amsterdam Council meeting also regulated the relationship between 
countries that would be included in the introduction of the Community currency 
and those that could not or would not be: For the latter countries, the European 
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Monetary System with a bandwidth of plus/minus fifteen percent would continue 
to be valid. Britain clearly saw no reason in any of this to return to the exchange-
rate mechanism. Sweden, which in the meantime had joined the Maastricht 
Treaty, announced that it wanted to hold off on entry into the monetary union. 
Denmark however accepted the new regulations and even officially returned to 
the old fluctuation range of plus/minus 2.25 percent.
The governments interested in participating in the monetary union from the 
beginning then helped a bit more with short-term stability measures and with 
more or less creative bookkeeping. Jospin’s government followed through with 
the hike in the value-added tax that had been decided by its conservative pre-
decessor; it also raised the business tax and the increment value tax. The Prodi 
government undertook sharp cuts in social welfare benefits and decided on a 
temporary tax hike that two years later was to be refunded at sixty percent. Even 
the Kohl government incorporated proceeds from privatizations and surpluses in 
health insurance and old-age pensions into its calculations of the German budget 
deficit. In the assessment undertaken in the autumn of 1997, the Commission was 
thus able to determine that all candidates would in fact satisfy the entry criteria. 
Only Greece, with a current budget deficit of over four percent would need to 
remain outside the Eurozone. The criterion of total indebtedness of not more than 
sixty percent—which especially threatened to disqualify Italy and Belgium—was 
disregarded. Here, the Commission argued with strong political plausibility that 
progress in debt reduction had been made by all candidates without exception.
The publication of the evaluations by the Commission on 14 October 1997 
caused much surprise. A few months earlier, hardly anyone had expected that 
nearly all members of the monetary system would qualify for the transition to 
the third stage. Worries about monetary stability and opposition to social welfare 
cuts after a “summer of uncertainty” thus dwindled, and the implementation of 
the decisions on the transition could everywhere be carried out in a climate of 
secure majorities. On 25 March 1998, the Commission and the European Mone-
tary Institute officially announced that eleven countries had met the conditions 
for entry on 1 January 1999: Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland as well as new members Austria and 
Finland. On 2 May 1998, the heads of state and of government issued a decision 
on the start of the monetary union. In order to forestall speculation at the last 
minute, it was agreed that the bilateral exchange rates of the currencies to be 
unified would not be changed up to the end of the transition period.14
The decision to create a monetary union with eleven members was overshad-
owed by wrangling over the appointment to the governorship of the European 
14 Agence Europe, Special issue, 3 May 1998.
 Implementing the Monetary Union   335
Central Bank. The former Dutch Central Bank Governor Wim Duisenberg was in 
fact envisioned for the post; he had assumed the office of president of the Euro-
pean Monetary Institute on 1 July 1997 only after more or less clear assurances 
that he would also remain at its head after it had been expanded to become the 
European Central Bank. The new French government however was of the opinion 
that the office should be held by a French person, and Chirac concurred. On 4 
November 1997, Chirac and Jospin jointly presented Jean-Claude Trichet as their 
candidate. Tietmeyer and Waigel blocked compromise proposals by which the 
term would be divided between Duisenberg and Trichet. The struggle over the two 
candidates stretched into the night of 2–3 May 1998. In the end, it was decided 
that Duisenberg should receive the appointment but at the same time he was 
asked not to serve the entire eight-year term due to age; after his resignation, 
Trichet would succeed him.
This compromise was not at all well received. Duisenberg raised eyebrows 
in hard-currency countries with his declaration that he had “freely chosen not to 
serve the whole eight years.” When four days later he explained to the European 
Parliament that he could ultimately remain in office for the whole eight years, 
the French felt that they had been duped.15 It was in fact the case that the advo-
cates of a strong Community currency had once again prevailed. In the Federal 
Republic, however, that was not clearly perceived. Kohl faced criticism for the 
slightly-absurd Brussels decision. It is difficult to know if this contributed to his 
electoral defeat on 27 September 1998. What is certain is only that, despite earlier 
assurances to his wife and to Wolfgang Schäuble (who wanted to succeed him), 
Kohl once again stood for election not least of all because he feared that the intro-
duction of the euro could fail without him.16
That did not happen, however. Kohl’s successor Gerhard Schröder had once 
in an interview with the Bild-Zeitung characterized the new currency as a “sickly 
premature birth” that would increase unemployment in Germany;17 after his 
election to the chancellorship, however, he emphasized the opportunities that a 
weaker Community currency offered to German exports. Duisenberg welded the 
heterogeneous ECB Council into a collegial body that was wholly committed to 
the goal of price stability. In October of 1998, the new guardians of the currency 
agreed to a target of holding the increase in consumer prices to just under two 
percent over the medium term—exactly as the Bundesbank had always practiced. 
Aided by a continuing economic recovery and historically-low inflation rates, the 
15 Marsh, Euro, p. 273; Schwarz, Kohl, pp. 813–815.
16 Heribert Schwan, Die Frau an seiner Seite. Leben und Leiden der Hannelore Kohl, Munich: 
Heyne, 2011, pp. 242ff.
17 Bild-Zeitung, 26 March 1998.
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transition to the Community currency took place in a relatively-relaxed atmo-
sphere. In December of 2001, the citizens of the Eurozone were able to receive the 
first common coins and bank notes; and these could then be put to use beginning 
on 1 January 2002.
Among those citizens were the Greeks. Nothing less than a national trauma 
had been unleashed by the determination that Greece was the only willing 
country that had failed—just barely—to meet the entry criteria. The Simitis gov-
ernment had stepped up its reform efforts once again at least in order to be able 
to join in when Euro cash was introduced. In December of 1999, it announced 
that the convergence criteria had been achieved; in June of 2000, this finding was 
confirmed by the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers. Doubts as to the 
soundness of the Greek figures (which would be confirmed four years later by the 
conservative successor government) were overshadowed by the concern about 
fundamentally endangering Simitis’ modernization program if the country were 
to be rejected again. According to the decision of the Ecofin Council, Greek entry 
into the monetary union could occur on 1 January 2001, that is, still with time 
enough to prepare for the general introduction of Euro cash.18
The Northern Expansion
Parallel to the contention over ratification of the Maastricht Treaties and the 
implementation of the monetary union, the Council of Ministers and the Com-
mission were negotiating on the accession of countries that up to that point 
had been hindered from becoming members of the European Union due to their 
neutral status in the East-West conflict. After the EEC entry of Britain, Ireland, 
and Denmark in 1972–73, Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Sweden, and 
Finland had—along with the remaining EFTA countries Iceland, Portugal, and 
Norway—completed bilateral tariff and trade treaties with the Community. These 
amounted to the incremental establishment of free-trade zones for the commer-
cial and industrial sectors but provided for only limited liberalization for the 
agricultural sector. The Danish government, with its special interest in the dis-
mantling of limitations on trade with its northern neighbors, had in 1982 taken 
the initiative for a further rapprochement between the EC and EFTA. In 1984, this 
had resulted in an agreement for creating a “unified European Economic Area” 
18 Wilfried Loth, “Kreativ, vor allem in Buchführung. Wie Athen in die Eurozone gelangte und 
Berlin seinen Widerstand aufgab,” in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 18 Sept. 2011.
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(EEA) that was to be characterized by further dismantling of protectionism and 
expansion of economic cooperation.19
The agreement was signed on 9 April 1984 in Luxembourg, but implementa-
tion did not occur. On the EC side, there was too much fear of disrupting the inter-
nal-market program, while on the EFTA side there was a too-categorical rejection 
of supranational elements. In formal negotiations that began in June of 1990, the 
EC Commission on the one hand demanded complete adoption of all regulations 
of the internal market, while on the other hand rejecting the creation of common 
decision-making mechanisms. In the Agreement on the European Economic Area 
signed on 2 May 1992 in Porto, the EFTA countries had to content themselves with 
specified transition deadlines for sensitive individual economic areas. Liberal-
ization in the agricultural and fishing sectors was left to future bilateral talks. 
Beyond that, the EFTA countries had to participate in the Cohesion Fund for 
structurally-weak EC regions; in the transit agreement, Switzerland and Austria 
had to concede the passage of increased truck traffic through Alpine passes.
It was not least of all for this reason that the Agreement on the EEA was 
rejected by a very small majority of 50.3 percent of the Swiss people in a refer-
endum of 6 December 1992. The agreement went into effect on 1 January 1994 
after the remaining EFTA countries had committed themselves in an additional 
adaption protocol to paying some seventy-eight percent of the Swiss portion of 
the Cohesion Fund.20
In the meantime, five of the seven remaining EFTA countries—Portugal of 
course having joined the Community on 1 January 1986—had already submitted 
applications for full membership in the EC. The first to do so was Austria on 17 
July 1989. Sweden followed suit on 1 July 1991 after Prime Minister Ingvar Carls-
son had held conversations with his fellow Socialists Felipe González in Spain 
and Franz Vranitzky in Austria. The Finnish government submitted its applica-
tion for membership on 18 March 1992, the Swiss on 26 March 1992, and the Nor-
wegians initiated their second application on 25 November 1992. If they would 
have to adopt the regulations of the internal market anyway so as not to face dis-
crimination in economic exchanges with their most important trading partners, 
the governments of all these countries wanted to be able to participate in deci-
sion-making on an equal footing. After the Swedish government had submitted 
19 Waldemar Hummer, “Annäherung zwischen EG und EFTA-Staaten: Außen-, Neutralitäts- 
und Wirtschaftspolitische Problemfelder,” in: Fritz Schwind (ed.), Österreichs Weg in die EG – 
Beiträge zur europäischen Rechtsentwicklung, Vienna: OAW Verlag, 1991, pp. 7–52.
20 Thomas Pedersen, European Union and the EFTA Countries. Enlargement and Integration, 
London, 1994, pp. 33–78; Michael Gehler, Vom Marshall-Plan bis zur EU. Österreich und die eu-
ropäische Integration von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2006, pp. 201–203.
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its application, the remaining governments additionally became fearful of losing 
out on the opportunity of increasing their competitiveness.
Among those countries that had been neutral up to this point, there was more-
over the necessity of repositioning themselves after the elimination of the East-West 
division of the European continent. In its application, the Austrian government 
under Chancellor Franz Vranitzky had emphasized the need to hold fast to the Aus-
trian commitment to neutrality, which raised some eyebrows in Brussels and in 
Paris too. In the Swedish application that came two years later, there were merely 
reservations as to participating in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
Finnish government even made assurances that it wanted to constructively take 
part in CFSP, which had in the meantime been secured in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Now having been freed from the commitments of the Finno-Soviet Treaty, Helsinki 
was seeking protection against turbulence in neighboring Russia.21
It was not only in Copenhagen that the EFTA countries’ applications for entry 
were welcomed. In Bonn and London too, the prospect of opening new markets 
was appealing. John Major also saw an opportunity to water down the suprana-
tional dimension of the Community that had just been strengthened in Maas-
tricht. Conversely, in Paris and Brussels, there were fears for the EU’s ability to 
act if the number of members were to grow so quickly from twelve to seventeen. 
Delors therefore undertook efforts to revise the decision for the pillar structure of 
the Treaty on European Union. In a paper that he wanted to present to the Euro-
pean Council in Lisbon in late June of 1992, he advocated for a new institutional 
model to be developed parallel to the upcoming entry negotiations and for new 
members to be required to accept it along with the acquis communautaire.
The surprising Danish “no” to the Maastricht Treaties in the referendum of 2 
June rendered this initiative void. Now, even some of the Commission members 
no longer saw it as opportune to push the supranational dimension of the treaties. 
The Commission also issued a warning about assuring the EU’s ability to function 
and reducing the democratic deficit. Nevertheless, as Delors complained, “the 
members of the European Council dismissed our concerns with a wave of the 
hand without according them the requisite attention.”22 The Commission was 
instructed “to accelerate the necessary preparatory work” in order to achieve a 
“speedy conclusion to negotiations” with the EFTA countries that were seeking 
admission. Before the opening of accession negotiations, it was the case that only 
the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaties was to be completed and that 
21 Ibid., pp. 167–199; Maria Gussarsson, “Combining dependence with distance: Sweden,” in: 
Kaiser and Elvert (eds.), Enlargement, pp.  170–188; Hanna Ojanen, “If in ’Europe’, then in its 
‘Core’? Finland,” ibid., pp. 150–169.
22 Delors, Erinnerungen, p. 431.
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the budgetary framework planning of the “Delors II Package” for the years 1993 
to 1999 be passed.23
The latter was achieved at the Council meeting in Edinburgh on 11 and 12 
December 1992. Delors was not able to win the sought-after expansion of the Com-
munity’s budget volume from 1.20 percent of GNP to 1.37 percent by 1997, but 
an expansion to 1.27 percent to 1999 was approved. Any increase in the agricul-
tural budget was halted in accordance with a reform decision of 21 May 1992 that 
foresaw the reduction of guarantee prices as well as quantitative caps along with 
premiums for shutdowns. Also, a “monetary reserve” was stricken by which a 
weak dollar’s negative effects on the competiveness of agricultural exports were 
to be compensated. At the same time, the Council was able to raise expenditures 
for the Regional Fund by seventy-two percent; and with great skill, González 
was able to push through a proposal whereby the new Cohesion Fund would be 
accorded a more or less reasonable amount of fifteen billion ECUs. Only on the 
issue of increasing the research budget did Delors suffer a bitter disappointment.
Mitterrand’s second precondition for the opening of accession negotiations—
completion of the ratification process—was dropped at this Council meeting. 
Under pressure from Kohl, the French president now also agreed to the demand 
that negotiations start right at the beginning of the next year so that entry could 
take place on 1 January 1995. The German chancellor was convinced that offense 
would be the best defense in stanching the growing weariness with Europe that 
had shown itself during the ratification debates. Institutional reforms that Delors 
had regarded as necessary were put off until negotiations on a revision of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which were envisioned for 1996.24
Talks with Austria, Sweden, and Finland began on 1 February 1993 and with 
Norway on 5 April. For Switzerland, however, the Commission did not prepare 
any negotiation package. After the rejection of the EEA Agreement in the referen-
dum of December 1992, the Swiss application was no longer regarded as current, 
even though it had not officially been withdrawn. Given that large portions of 
the items for negotiation had already been dealt with as part of the EEA talks, 
progress was rapidly made. Sweden, like Britain and Denmark, wanted the right 
to say “no” to the transition to the third stage of the monetary union; this was 
categorically rejected. The reservations shown by Austria and Sweden regarding 
Common foreign and security policy were dispelled by assurances that active, 
23 “Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes des Europäischen Rates vom 26./27.6.1992,” Jahrbuch der 
Europäischen Integration 1992/93, pp. 408–433.
24 “Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes des Europäischen Rates vom 11./12.12.1992,” ibid., 
pp. 439–478.
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solidarity-focused participation in these policies would be very much compatible 
with the principles of non-alignment.
Aside from this, the candidates pressed to participate in regional promotion 
and to receive generous exceptional and transitional regulations for agriculture 
and fishing. After tough resistance, this was largely conceded at the last minute. 
With British and German support, Delors succeeded in crafting compromises in 
February and March of 1994 that accommodated the interests of the applicants. 
Austria was able to negotiate a certain prolongation of the limits on traffic tran-
siting the country as well as equalization payments for agriculture; Sweden was 
able to win higher levels of support for its agriculture; Finland got Community 
assistance for some eighty-five percent of its territory; and Norway obtained the 
continuation of exclusive fishing rights north of the 62nd parallel for three years. 
On balance, these exceptional regulations meant that the new members would 
become net payers into the Community in 1998 for the first time.25
There were significant tensions at the close of negotiations on the future 
weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers. Whereas the issue of representation 
of the new members in the Commission and in Parliament was resolved simply by 
expanding the number of seats, the British and Spanish governments refused to 
accept any increase in the number of votes needed to block a decision by qualified 
majority in the Council. The British were motivated by a desire to render major-
ity decision-making more difficult, whereas the Spaniards feared a permanent 
ascendancy of the “northern countries” at the expense of the south. At a meeting 
of the foreign ministers in the northern Greek city of Ioannina on 24 March 1994, 
it was agreed that the number needed for a minority block would indeed be raised 
from twenty-three to twenty-seven. However, when reaching a quorum of at least 
twenty-three votes, it was to be the case that “everything [would be] attempted” to 
win over four more votes for a majority solution in “an appropriate timeframe.” In 
vain, the Commission called attention to the fact that this self-commitment had 
no legal weight given that it was not specified in a treaty. In fact, it became more 
complicated to reach decisions in the Council due to this “Ioannina Formula.”
The European Parliament viewed this all the more critically as its demand that 
before the Community expanded to accept new members, there be negotiations on 
improving the functioning of the Union was disregarded, just as the warnings of 
the Commission had been. When after the initialing of the accession treaties on 
30 March 1994 the Council of Ministers submitted the applications to Parliament 
for approval (as had been foreseen ever since the Single European Act had taken 
25 Francisco Granelli, “The European Union’s Enlargement Negotiations with Austria, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden,” in: Journal of Common Market Studies 1/1995, pp. 117–141; Delors, 
Erinnerungen, pp. 463ff.; Gehler, Vom Marshallplan, pp. 210–225.
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effect), there was thus much unwillingness among the MEPs to take up the matter 
in the current legislative period. The governments feared however that if a decision 
had to wait until new parliamentary elections in June, there would not be sufficient 
time for ratification before the end of the year. The governments therefore put great 
pressure on the deputies, many of whom had to fear for their re-nomination. In a 
letter to the chairs of all factions in Parliament, Kohl promised to start a work group 
to prepare institutional reforms in which Parliament would participate along with 
representatives of the countries and the Commission. Whole delegations of minis-
ters from the candidate countries implored the deputies not to stir up opposition to 
the entry applications in their countries via an attitude of refusal.
This multifaceted pressure brought results: On 4 May, a majority of 305 to 150 
MEPs (with thirteen abstentions) voted against a bill by Claude Cheysson and 
others to defer the accession treaties. The treaties themselves were then passed 
with still greater majorities. On 25 June, they were signed at the meeting of the 
European Council on the island of Corfu.
In the ratification debates that began immediately thereafter in all four coun-
tries, it became clear that entry implied a clear step into globalized modernity. 
In regions that lived largely from agriculture or fishing, fear of this step predom-
inated, whereas in cities there was often passionate promotion of entry. Those on 
the left who were conscious of tradition as well as environmentalists often spoke 
out against it. In Austria, where a referendum occurred at an early date (12 June) 
there was a clear majority of 66.4 percent in favor. In Finland too, where a refer-
endum was held on 16 October, there was unambiguous approval by a margin of 
56.9 percent. Conversely, only a slim majority of 52.2 percent approved Swedish 
entry on 13 November. In Norway, where a referendum was held on 28 November, 
a similarly slim majority of 52.2 percent rejected entry; the dynamic coming from 
the entry decisions of neighboring countries had not been sufficient to overcome 
the persistent opposition in the north of the country this time either.
On 1 January 1995, it was thus only Austria, Finland, and Sweden that entered 
the European Union. The Europe of the Twelve had now become the Europe of the 
Fifteen. Norway remained in a less comfortable European economic sphere, much 
to the regret of its industry and urban population in the south. So too Iceland, 
which in order to protect its fishing grounds from the fleets of EU states had not 
even presented an application for membership.  Conversely, Liechtenstein had 
not applied after the rejection of the EEA Treaty by neighboring Switzerland. The 
membership numbers of the institutions were once again revised after Norway 
failed to enter: Now, only three additional votes rather than four were required for 
a qualified majority according to the Ioannina Formula.26
26 Gerbet, Construction, pp. 413–416.
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With the new members, it was possible to continue the course of deepening 
the EU and making it more substantial overall. Austria experienced a boost in 
economic internationalization and a rise in productivity, which served to main-
tain the high approval rating seen in the referendum on entry but which also 
brought more support to the xenophobic rightwing populism of Jörg Haider. In 
terms of integration policy, the government was above all engaged in deepening 
economic integration; it also thereby contributed to the realization of the mone-
tary union on a broad basis. Finland too participated energetically in the estab-
lishment of the monetary union. Moreover, Finnish European policy was engaged 
in the expansion of Common foreign and security policy; it also consistently con-
tributed to the strengthening of European organs. In contrast, Sweden remained 
aloof from the supranational perspective of the EU and therefore did not partic-
ipate in the transition to the monetary union. Sweden was however thoroughly 
engaged In the Common foreign and security policy and also spoke out for east-
ward expansion of the Union as quickly as possible.
The Way to Amsterdam
The difficulties in which the Maastricht Treaties found themselves after the 
Danish referendum of 2 June 1992 led the heads of state and of government to 
extend the mandate of Jacques Delors for two additional years, up to the turn of 
the year 1994–95. The experience he had in the meantime gained would help not 
only in steering clear of the rocks that threatened the ratification of the treaties 
but also in carrying out the upcoming enlargement with the EFTA countries in 
such a manner that the precarious consensus that underlay the conclusion of the 
treaties would not be shattered. The European Council in Lisbon on 26 and 27 
June 1992 therefore confirmed the extension of Delors’ term for two more years.
Delors made use of the additional period in office to initiate a project that had 
engaged him more and more since the Danish referendum: improving the com-
petitiveness of the European Union in global terms. He saw with concern that the 
economies of the US and of Far Eastern countries were growing faster than those 
in Europe and that unemployment in the countries of the Union was at a high 
level and continuing to increase, whereas it was much lower in the US and the Far 
East. As he explained to the heads of state and of government at the Copenhagen 
Council meeting of 21 and 22 June 1993, the unemployment rate in the Community 
had gone from two percent before the oil crisis of 1973–74 to an average of seven-
teen percent. Fewer than sixty percent of the working-age population actually 
held a job. In the US, the figure was approximately seventy percent and more 
than seventy-five percent in Japan. Not without some justification, Delors saw in 
 The Way to Amsterdam   343
this one of the reasons for the growing opposition to deepening the integration 
process as well as a threat to the stability of the democratic order per se.
With support from the Forward Studies Unit (“Cellule de prospective”), 
which he had established within the Commission in 1989, he therefore developed 
a plan for securing competitiveness and employment on a European level. He 
found support for this from Kohl and Mitterrand as well as the Danish Council 
presidency of the first half of 1993. He was thus able to have the European Council 
in Copenhagen charge the Commission with drafting a “White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness, and Employment.” Presented to the European Council in Brus-
sels on 10 and 11 December 1993, this document emphatically portrayed once 
again the structural problems in European economies and called for quite varied 
measures: Firstly, it advocated more flexibility in the job market, part-time work, 
and division of jobs on the company level, better job-placement services, and 
continual upgrading of worker qualifications. Secondly, it envisioned massive 
investment in the expansion of efficient transportation networks, energy supply, 
and telecommunications across Europe. Thirdly, the introduction and spread of 
new information technologies were to be promoted; and fourthly, it urged addi-
tional efforts in the promotion of research once again.27
According to the white paper, the amount of money needed for the neces-
sary infrastructure initiatives totaled some 120 billion ECUs spread over the sub-
sequent six years, that is, twenty billion per year. Five billion of this was to come 
annually from the Community budget, seven billion from the European Invest-
ment Bank, and the remaining eight billion from Community bond issues, the 
so-called “Union bonds.” It was exactly here that the Achilles’ heel of the plan 
was to be found: Although the heads of state and of government approved the 
white paper in principle, neither John Major nor Helmut Kohl nor Ruud Lubbers 
would hear of new Community bond issues—the Briton taking this position on 
principle, the German and the Dutchman doing so with an eye toward the stabil-
ity goal of the monetary union. At the Brussels Council meeting, there was thus 
only a decision to create two work groups—on the question of networks and on 
information technologies—which were to report initially to the Council of the 
Finance Ministers.
One year later, at the Council meeting of 9 and 10 December 1994 in Essen, 
it was nonetheless possible to approve a list of priorities for the expansion of 
transportation infrastructure that encompassed fourteen different major proj-
ects. However only three billion Ecus from the Union were available to finance 
them; thirteen billion was contributed by the member states. In regard to the IT 
27 “The White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. The Challenges and Ways 
Forward into the 21st century.” COM (93) 700 final, Brussels, 1993.
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revolution, the heads of state and of government saw their task as primarily one 
of creating the necessary legal and economic parameters. Beyond this, the white 
paper essentially aided in initiating and coordinating national employment pol-
icies, about which there were regular reports at the level of the European Union. 
Delors’ initiative therefore did not bring about a great leap into the leading posi-
tion in global economic competition as he had envisioned. It did however con-
tribute to having the economic policies of the Union face up to the challenges of 
globalization, even before the concept became fashionable, and also to having 
those economic policies become more strongly harmonized.28
The launch of the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employ-
ment also served to increase once again Delors’ reputation and political weight at 
the end of his term in office, both of which had suffered due to his high-handed 
behavior when the Maastricht Treaties were being worked out. Several heads of 
government therefore asked that he serve another term. His time in office had 
already been extended beyond eight years, however; and Delors had stated that 
this would be his last term. Moreover, Mitterrand had now categorically deter-
mined that “It’s enough.”29 It is possible that he was thinking that the Commis-
sion president, who had in the meantime become quite popular in France too, 
should be won over as his successor in the French presidency. For his part, Delors 
certainly did not go in for that proposition. He was now sixty-nine years old and 
had repeatedly suffered from sciatica; the French presidency seemed to him too 
grueling and the prospects of winning it too uncertain as well. After maintaining 
a low profile for several months, he announced in early December of 1984 that he 
was not willing to be a candidate for the office.
Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers was initially suggested as Delors’ suc-
cessor in the office of Commission president. However, neither Kohl nor Mitter-
rand was willing to accept that—the chancellor because the Christian Democrat 
Lubbers had all too clearly sided with those wanting to slow down the process 
of German unification and the French president because he was convinced that 
Lubbers had steered the Maastricht Summit all too much to the benefit of the 
British. Consequently, the two presented a competing candidate at the Council 
meeting on Corfu on 24 and 25 June: Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, 
likewise a Christian Democrat. With both candidates having their foreign minis-
ters represent them, the Council gave eight votes to Dehaene and four to Lubbers. 
As president of the Council, Papandreou then wanted to push through the can-
didacy of Dehaene. However, he ran into fierce opposition from Major, whose 
slogan was that there should be no second Delors and who rejected Dehaene as 
28 Endo, Delors, pp. 191–206; Drake, Delors, pp. 113–143; Delors, Erinnerungen, pp. 465–479.
29 Ibid., p. 454.
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“too federalist.” In the end, the decision on the nomination of the next Commis-
sion president had to be deferred—to a special meeting of the European Council 
set for 15 July in Brussels.30
After returning from Corfu, Kohl reached an agreement with Major, Mitter-
rand, and new Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi that Luxembourg Prime 
Minister Jacques Santer be the common candidate. Santer too was a Christian 
Democrat and from his whole political socialization no less federalist in orien-
tation than Dehaene. Since 1987, he had been chairman of the European Peoples 
Party and had been in close contact with Kohl. This may have been unknown to 
Major, or perhaps he felt it sufficient to have demonstrated his toughness to the 
British public at least once. Santer hesitated somewhat to take up the post given 
that Luxembourg’s voters had just confirmed him for a second term as prime min-
ister. Only after Kohl explained to him that he was the only candidate who could 
find all-round acceptance did he agree. On 15 July, he was unanimously nomi-
nated by the Council. The office of prime minister of Luxembourg was assumed 
by Foreign Minister Jean-Claude Juncker.
As a compromise candidate, it was difficult for Santer to garner authority. 
The newly-elected European Parliament confirmed him on 21 July by a margin of 
only 260 to 238, with twenty-three abstentions. The mistrust that was expressed 
in those results stemmed less from the person of Santer than from the process 
by which he had come to office. Santer however understood how to apportion 
responsibility in the new Commission such that effective cooperation among 
the now-twenty commissioners was assured. Parliament honored this in that it 
approved the Commission as a whole on 18 January 1995 by a margin of 416 to 103, 
with fifty-nine abstentions. In regard to further implementation of the Internal 
Market, the transition to the monetary union, as well as engagement for growth 
and employment, the Santer Commission continued the course charted by Delors.
Conversely, in regard to the strengthening of European institutions, the new 
Commission did not evince the strong profile that had characterized Delors. 
Santer initially had to concern himself with building consensus in the heteroge-
neous Commission. This did not allow him any opportunity to make a mark per-
sonally as an advocate of effective government in the Union. He left the represen-
tation of the Commission within the Reflection Group, which was to prepare the 
revision of the Maastricht Treaty, to former Spanish Foreign Minister and General 
Secretary of the European Council Marcelino Oreja.
30 Ibid., p.  480; Michael Gehler, “Jacques Santer (1995–1999): President of the Commission 
in times of transition,” in: Jan van der Harst and Gerrit Voerman (eds.), An Impossible Job? - 
The Presidents of the European Commission, 1958–2014, London: John Harper Publishing, 2015, 
pp. 197–222.
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The Reflection Group was established by the European Council in Corfu in 
accordance with Kohl’s promise to the faction leaders in the European Parlia-
ment. Mitterrand’s former European advisor Élisabeth Guigou and the German 
Christian Democrat Elmar Brok represented Parliament in the body. Together with 
the representative of the Commission president, they saw to it that the report the 
group presented on 5 December 1995 under the chairmanship of former Spanish 
Foreign Office State Secretary Carlos Westendorp actually did list the problems 
of the Maastricht construct: The inadequacy and lack of coherence of the second 
and third pillars as well as the extraordinary complexity of the decision-mak-
ing process. The report offered a three-part objective for treaty revision: To bring 
Europe closer to the citizens, to strengthen the Union’s ability to act in the wider 
world, and to organize the institutions of the Union so as to be more democratic 
and more effective—especially with an eye toward the next (and larger) expan-
sion to the east that was coming up.31
Discussion of the pending reform was enlivened by a position paper pub-
lished by the CDU/CSU faction of the German Bundestag on 1 September 1994 
under the names of its chairman, Wolfgang Schäuble, and his foreign-policy 
spokesman, Karl Lamers. In the document, these two German specialists in Euro-
pean policy voiced support for accelerated integration of the Eastern-European 
countries into the Union as well as development of a common foreign policy and 
creation of a European defense. Secondly, they called for a stronger focus of the 
Union on “the model of a federative state structure”: The reform should orient 
itself on conceptions “according to which the European Parliament incremen-
tally develops into a law-making organ on an equal footing alongside the Council 
[…] and the Commission takes on characteristics of a European government.” 
Thirdly, these two German Christian Democrats demanded that the “hard core of 
countries focused on integration and willing to cooperate” be institutionalized 
and further solidified. The countries belonging to this core—in the view of the 
CDU/CSU faction there were only France, Germany, and the Benelux states at that 
time—should be involved in all projects of increasing integration or cooperation, 
the other countries only insofar as they were interested and insofar as it was pos-
sible for them.32
31 Bericht der Reflexionsgruppe, Messina 2. Juni 1995 / Brüssel 5. Dezember 1995. Dokument 
des Generalsekretariats des Rates, Nr. SN 520/1/95/REV 1 (REFLEX 21); excerpts in: Mathias Jopp 
and Otto Schmuck (eds.), Die Reform der Europäischen Union. Analysen – Positionen – Doku-
mente zur Regierungskonferenz 1996/97, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1996, 
pp. 107–114.
32 CDU/CSU Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, “Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik, 
1.9.1994;” published in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 10/1994, pp. 1271–1280.
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The Schäuble-Lamers Paper generated manifold criticism. Some rejected the 
focus on federalism, some bridled at the creation of a hard core, whereas others 
rejected both. Berlusconi immediately complained to Kohl about the attempt to 
shove Italy—a founding member—into the ranks of a second-class of less-inte-
grated states. Mitterrand appeared “troubled.” Major polemicized against the 
attempt to accord individual states a “privileged status.” The intense and some-
times rather muddled debate33 nevertheless led in the run-up to the government 
conference on reform of the Maastricht Treaties to agreement between Chirac 
and Kohl to anchor the principle of selective integration in the Union Treaty; this 
principle was already being practiced in regard to the Franco-German corps, the 
abolition of border controls, and the monetary union. On 6 December 1995, they 
wrote a joint letter to the chairman of the Council, stating that “While preserving 
the unitary institutional framework of the Union, states that desire it and are in 
a situation” to do so should have “the opportunity opened to them of developing 
increased cooperation.”34
The government conference opened with a meeting of the Council of Minis-
ters on 29 March 1996 in Turin. The main work lay with a committee consisting 
of representatives from among the foreign ministers and the Commission. The 
representatives of Parliament who had participated in the work of the Reflection 
Group were not part of this committee; they were however regularly informed 
as to the progress of the negotiations and could express their opinions on them. 
Moreover, the president of Parliament could present positions at the monthly 
meetings of the Council of Ministers and the gatherings of the European Council. 
Up to the end of 1996, this office was held by German Social Democrat Klaus 
Hänsch; in accordance with an internally-coordinated agreement of the two 
largest parliamentary factions, he was succeeded by the Spanish Conservative 
José-Maria Gil-Robles. With this setup, there was greater openness in the negoti-
ations, though with more contingency in the results.
The draft treaty was ready by 12 June 1997 and was then once again modi-
fied and made more precise in some important points at the Amsterdam Council 
meeting of 16 and 17 June.35 Regarding the introduction of “increased coopera-
33 Cf. Stefan Honecker, “Die Debatte um das ‘Kerneuropa’-Papier der CDU/CSU-Fraktion,” in: 
Roland Erne, et al. (eds.), Transnationale Demokratie. Impulse für ein demokratisch verfasstes 
Europa, Zurich: Realotopia Verlag, 1995, pp. 330–341; Valérie Guérin-Sendelbach, Frankreich und 
das vereinigte Deutschland, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1999, pp. 205–220.
34 Jopp and Schmuck, Reform, pp. 115–117.
35 On the course of the government conference and the results, Mathias Jopp, Andreas Maurer, 
and Otto Schmuck (eds.), Die Europäische Union nach Amsterdam. Analysen und Stellungnahmen 
zum neuen EU-Vertrag, Bonn: Europa Union, 1998; Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Amsterdam in der 
Analyse, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1998.
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tion,” it was above all the British government that voiced opposition. This resulted 
in a significant limitation on the possibilities for applying it. In principle, it was 
only to be possible when more than half of the member states wanted to partic-
ipate. Only in regard to the third pillar of justice and police cooperation could 
there be a decision by qualified majority. Its use was not foreseen at all in the 
realms of foreign and security policy, and in the Community area, a veto right was 
enshrined against its introduction by majority decision. Furthermore, motions 
could only be proposed after the Commission had given its approval to them; and 
they were not allowed to involve areas that lay solely within the responsibility 
of the Community. This meant that a systematic strengthening of the core of the 
Union, as the authors of the Schäuble-Lamers Paper had envisioned, was as good 
as eliminated.
Of immediate practical significance in this context was only that the aboli-
tion of border controls within the EU area was a concrete case of increased coop-
eration that was taken up in the treaty; this had been agreed upon by Kohl and 
Mitterrand in May of 1984 and had in the meantime been gotten underway via 
the Schengen Agreement of 14 July 1985 and an implementation agreement of 19 
June 1990. The original agreement among France, Germany, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxembourg had in the meantime been joined by Italy (1990), Spain 
(1991), as well as Portugal and Greece (both 1992). Austria joined in 1995, and at 
the end of 1996 so too did Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. This meant that only 
the island nations of Britain and Ireland remained outside the Schengen Agree-
ment. Border crossing without checkpoints had been achieved for the core group 
of Schengen states in March of 1995. It also applied to Austria from 1997 and to 
the Scandinavian states from 2000.36 Owing to the designation of the Schengen 
agreements as “increased cooperation,” Community organs became responsible 
for carrying them out.
In general, a substantial portion of cooperation in the area of “internal affairs 
and justice” (the so-called third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty) was taken into the 
Community sphere with the Amsterdam Treaty. It was not only in regard to the 
lifting of internal borders and common regulation of external borders but also 
in common regulation of visa issuance, asylum and immigration policy, pun-
ishment of organized crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking as well as coopera-
tion in civil law areas that a “space of freedom, security, and law” was to emerge 
within five years. At the urging of some German states and Austria, all of which 
36 Hans-Claudius Taschner, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen zum Abbau der Personenkontrollen 
an den Binnengrenzen von EU-Staaten, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997; Andreas Pudlat, “Der lange 
Weg zum Schengen-Raum: Ein Prozess im Vier-Phasen-Modell,” in: Journal of European Integra-
tion History 17 (2011), pp. 303–325.
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saw themselves confronted to an especially great degree by the flood of immi-
grants from Eastern Europe, the countries reserved the right of retaining unani-
mous decision-making on visa issuance even after the expiration of the five-year 
period.37 In the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal affairs, which 
remained in the third pillar, procedures were simplified and agreement was 
reached on increased participation by the common police authority Europol in 
criminal investigations within five years.38
Also contributing to the strengthening of the common legal area was the fact 
that the Council in its constellation of heads of state and of government was given 
a guardian role in the preservation of the “basic principles of freedom, democ-
racy, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the 
rule of law.” If it were unanimously determined that a country was impinging 
on these basic principles (and here the vote of the country in question would 
not be included), the Council could then by qualified majority decide to suspend 
“certain rights” of said country indefinitely; the country’s responsibilities would 
however remain. Respect for the basic principles was also explicitly declared to 
be a criterion for accepting further candidates for membership. Lastly, the Euro-
pean Court was given authority to monitor adherence to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights in the activities of Community organs. Out of this came a 
higher level of protection of fundamental rights of EU citizens by the Union.
The desired increase in the Union’s closeness to the citizenry would also 
serve to strengthen the social responsibilities of the Community. Right after the 
election victory of the Labour Party on 1 May 1997, new British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair declared that Great Britain would join the social policy protocol of the 
Maastricht Treaty. This meant that the agreement on introducing minimum stan-
dards in occupational safety, equality between men and women, social security, 
and collective exercise of workers’ interests—which during the treaty negotiations 
of 1991 had met with the stubborn opposition of John Major—could be included in 
the new Community treaty at the last minute. Moreover, a section on employment 
could be included and was additionally fostered by the victory of leftist parties 
in the French parliamentary elections of 1 June 1997. It declared the promotion of 
a “higher level of employment” to be a goal of the Union and sought to further 
it via regular required reporting by member states, recommendations, exchange 
of information, and pilot projects. Farther-reaching conceptions for promoting 
employment-policy measures financially were derailed by opposition from the 
German government. At base, the conservative-liberal government in Bonn did 
37 Amsterdam Treaty, Articles 61–69.
38 Amsterdam Treaty, Articles 30–32.
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not think much of such measures; furthermore, it did not want its voters to incur 
any further financial burden via the Community.
The change of government in London also made possible an expansion of 
the rights of Parliament: The process of equal co-decision-making by Parliament 
was extended to almost every area of Community policy in which the Council 
decided by qualified majority with the exception of the monetary union. This 
involved approximately seventy percent of all legislative acts of the Community; 
beforehand, it had been only roughly thirty percent. Beyond that, the process of 
co-decision-making was significantly simplified: Legal acts could from now on 
be passed at their first reading (as long as Parliament made no changes to the 
Council proposal or in cases when the Council accepted all such changes). A third 
reading, which put the blame for the failure of a mediation process one-sidedly 
on Parliament, was completely eliminated. It continued to be the case that the 
Council would need to consult Parliament before passing binding legal acts in the 
area of criminal law and police cooperation. In regard to the naming of the Com-
mission president, it would in the future be the case that a hearing in advance 
would no longer suffice—Parliament would now be explicitly required to approve 
the mutual proposal of the governments.
The latter was all the more significant because in naming the other Commis-
sion members, it would no longer suffice to consult the designated president. 
Rather, mutual agreement would need to be reached with him or her. Beyond 
this, the president was given the “political leadership” of the Commission. In a 
declaration passed by the government conference, it was additionally specified 
“that he will enjoy broad discretion in the allocation of tasks within the Commis-
sion, as well as in any reshuffling of those tasks during a Commission’s term of 
office.”39 This amounted to a kind of power to direct in the areas of strategies and 
division of tasks. Taken together, Parliament’s required approval along with the 
strengthening of the position of the Commission president opened up the chance 
for the European party alliances to name alternative candidates for the office of 
president, thus having the voters participate in the decision on the next president 
and his or her program.
For the European Parliament, the expansion of its rights and the strengthen-
ing of the position of the Commission president constituted “a breakthrough,” as 
President of the European Parliament Klaus Hänsch commented in retrospect: 
“In Maastricht the door from advisory to decision-making parliament had been 
opened a crack; it now stood open.”40 This success was due not least of all to 
its two representatives, Guigou and Brok, who had largely concentrated on these 
39 Erklärung zur Organisation und zur Arbeitsweise der Kommission.
40 Klaus Hänsch, Kontinent der Hoffnungen. Mein europäisches Leben, Bonn: Dietz, 2011, p. 113.
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points in the negotiations and were thereby able to exercise significantly more 
influence over the results of those negotiations than had been formally accorded 
them. Important too was that Kohl had been able to win over his new partner 
Chirac—who had been hesitant at first—for the generalization of the co-deci-
sion-making process.
Parliament’s success was nevertheless significantly limited given that the 
number of policy fields in which the Council decided by qualified majority was 
hardly expanded at all. It was only Belgium and Luxembourg that were prepared 
to accept thoroughgoing application of the majority principle. France, Spain, and 
Britain rejected the introduction of majority voting in institutional questions; the 
German delegation opposed majority voting in sensitive individual areas such as 
cultural policy, industrial policy, and environmental policy due to pressure from 
individual ministries and German states. In general, there was little willingness 
to allow majority voting for legal acts that would directly affect the budget of the 
Community. In the end, of some fifty-six policy areas in which unanimous deci-
sion-making had been in effect, only four were transferred into the category of 
majority decision-making, mainly in the realm of research and technology policy. 
It was not only the case that the Council and Commission alone would continue 
to decide on policies regarding agriculture, industry, competitiveness, and taxes, 
but also that Parliament would have no co-decision-making authority on basic 
questions of the monetary union or on policy regarding water, regional planning, 
energy, or the introduction of increased cooperation.
The French government would have been willing to offer greater concessions 
on the issue of majority decision-making if there had simultaneously been a recal-
culation of vote strength in the Council to the benefit of the larger member states. In 
fact, the already-completed inclusion of new states and the accession of additional 
members implied a loss of voting weight by those states that in terms of popula-
tion and economy were the largest; at the same time, this situation offered Parlia-
ment greater opportunities for finding allies in the Council for a blocking minority. 
However, the smaller states rejected a reweighting of the votes to the benefit of 
larger states either completely (as was the case with Greece, Ireland, Finland, 
and Sweden), or appealed for a system of double majorities (that is, majority of 
the weighted votes plus majority of the population) along with simultaneously 
raising the minimum number of votes needed for majority decisions. Likewise, 
they opposed reducing the number of Commission members to the number of 
distinct task areas (approximately ten) and instead insisted that each country be 
represented by a member on the Commission. Mediation attempts by the German 
delegation, which advocated a system of double majorities without an increase in 
the minimum number of votes required, failed due to the resistance of the French 
representatives. They did not want to accept the loss of equal status with Germany 
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that such a system threatened to bring about. In the event that the number of Com-
mission members was reduced, the French were also unwilling to forgo a French 
Commission member occasionally, as the smaller states were demanding.
The government conference almost threatened to collapse over the issues 
of the distribution of weight within the Council and the Commission’s ability 
to act. In light of the sluggish pace of negotiations, Kohl had already signaled 
in the autumn of 1996 that “Maastricht II” might well need to be followed by 
a “Maastricht III”; he therefore suggested to his colleagues on the Council in 
Amsterdam on the night of 17–18 June 1997 that the disputed issues be deferred 
to a subsequent government conference.41 They decided to do that. In the 
treaty, the status quo as to the weight of votes and the number of Commission 
members was confirmed. A protocol was then passed in which an agreement 
in two stages was envisioned: If the weighting of votes in the Council had been 
“changed in a way that was acceptable to all member states” by the time the 
next enlargement of member states had come into effect, then from that point 
onward, each member state would be able to appoint only one commissioner. 
“No later than one year from the date on which the number of member states 
exceeds twenty,” a further government conference was to be called “in order to 
review comprehensively the terms of the treaties regarding the composition and 
operating principles of the organs.”42
In the final analysis, adjusting the weight of votes in the Council and the 
composition of the Commission to the demands of expansion had failed due to 
the refusal of French policy to give up the central role that France had up to that 
point always played at the European level.43 Conversely, the continuing Fran-
co-German harmony regarding Common Foreign and Security Policy led to some 
progress compared to the terms of the Maastricht Union Treaty. The foreign and 
Europe ministers of the two countries agreed on common guidelines, which they 
passed on 27 February 1996. These called for improving the decision-making 
ability in foreign and security policy by introducing the principle of constructive 
abstention, the creation of a planning and analysis unit for developing common 
strategies, and the establishment of a “new function, which will contribute to 
better visibility and coherence of CFSP.”44
41 Weidenfeld, Amsterdam, p. 32.
42 Protokoll über die Organe im Hinblick auf die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union.
43 In the contemporary French literature, a supposed backing away by Kohl from the goal of 
deepening the integration is often made responsible for the failure of the reform proposals re-
garding representation on the Council and in the Commission; see, for example, Stark, Kohl, 
p. 387. However, this ignores the French attitude toward mediation proposals.
44 Jopp and Schmuck, Reform, pp. 118–120.
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It proved possible to have these goals approved in the government confer-
ence in their essentials, though also with nuances. The instrument of construc-
tive abstention was defined to the effect that a country declaring itself not bound 
to participate in implementation would still be bound to participate in financing. 
In the future, majority voting was to be possible not only in the implementation 
of common actions but also in all measures within the framework of a common-
ly-defined strategy. Nevertheless, dissenting Council members were accorded the 
right, as in the case of setting up “increased cooperation,” to prevent application 
of majority voting. Such a decision could only occur if the heads of state and of 
government in the European Council had decided differently than their foreign 
ministers had done previously in the Council of Ministers. Additionally, majority 
rule was not to be in effect for the sending of troops on a foreign military mission. 
On this point, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Defense Minister Volker 
Rühe differed from French conceptions.
Further, a declaration of the government conference created a “policy plan-
ning and early-warning unit,” which was to be recruited from the ranks of the 
General Secretariat of the European Council, the ministries of the member states, 
the Commission, and the WEU. Its leadership lay with the general secretary of the 
European Council, who now additionally took on the task of a “High Represen-
tative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.” French conceptions of shaping 
the CFSP representation as a political office with great foreign impact could not 
be approved given opposition from the British and the neutral states. Also, the 
German proposal to entrust the High Representative with the chairmanship of the 
Political Committee—the weekly gathering of the political directors of the foreign 
ministries of all member states—was rejected as too far-reaching.
Neither did the French and Germans succeed in anchoring in the treaty a 
roadmap for transferring the WEU into the EU. However, there was a decision 
regarding “closer institutional links to the WEU with a view to the possibility of 
the integration of the WEU into the Union”; these were to be worked out within 
a year after the treaty came into effect. It was to be possible for the European 
Council to decide on further steps as to common defense policy and the integra-
tion of the WEU in the EU. Aside from that, the European Council’s responsibility 
for guidelines was already to be extended to the WEU at that time. In regard to 
“humanitarian tasks and rescue efforts, peacekeeping tasks, as well as combat 
deployments for overcoming crises,” as defined in June of 1992 to be tasks of WEU 
military deployments (the “Petersberg Declaration” of the WEU Council of Minis-
ters), those EU member states that were not also members of the WEU gained the 
right of equal participation.45
45 Amsterdam Treaty, Article 17 and Protocol to Article 17.
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The instrument of “increased cooperation” was not extended to the provisions 
on foreign and security policy. It was indeed the case that the German government 
had been willing to do so in October of 1996. However, after the representatives of 
Britain, Sweden, and Denmark had insisted on being able to prevent the introduc-
tion of increased cooperation by means of a veto, it was only the French delegation 
that continued to advocate the possibility of a group of states acting in the name of 
the Union. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel no longer felt himself bound by 
the proposal that he had made together with his French colleague Hervé de Char-
rette. Increased defense policy cooperation by a core along the lines of the Fran-
co-German model was thus left out of the treaty’s regulations.46
The strengthening of Common Foreign and Security Policy thus did not end 
up being exactly as clear as Kohl and Chirac had called for in their joint letter of 
December 1995. Nothing else was to be expected given a situation in which the 
British and Dutch resistance from the time of the Maastricht negotiations had 
been augmented by the reticence of the new neutral and non-aligned members.
Together with the glaring failure of French leadership on the issues of the 
weighting of votes in the Council and the number of future Commission members, 
the impression arose that the government conference on reform of the Maastricht 
Treaties had contributed little to overcoming the problems facing the EU. “Muted 
jubilation,” was the headline of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung over its report 
on the results of the Amsterdam Council meeting.47 It was the case that the rights 
of the European Parliament had been considerably expanded and that the Com-
mission president had seen a significant strengthening of his position, but those 
results ended up somewhat in the background. Little discussed by the public, the 
Amsterdam Treaty was signed on 2 October 1997. After conclusion of the ratifica-
tion process, it came into effect on 1 May 1999.
Inspired by its success in the reform negotiations, the European Parliament 
exercised its oversight rights extensively even before the treaty had come into 
force. In so doing, it encountered all sorts of inconsistencies in the Commission’s 
budget management for the year 1996. The approval envisioned for March of 1998 
had to be postponed, and then more and more irregularities began coming to 
light. The criticism applied especially to Commissioner for Research, Innovation, 
and Science Édith Cresson, who had briefly served as a French prime minister 
under Mitterrand and who had clearly engaged in cronyism, as well as the Com-
missioner for External Relations with the Southern Mediterranean, Latin America, 
and the Middle East Manuel Marín, a Spaniard, in whose area of responsibility 
there was fraud in the handling of humanitarian aid. After demands for the resig-
46 Stark, Kohl, pp. 352–358 and 376ff.
47 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 June 1997.
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nation of Cresson and Marín had brought no result, Parliament for the first time 
in its history refused to give the Commission its approval on 17 December 1998.
When this step did not lead to the voluntary resignation of the tainted com-
missioners, the MEPs pursued a vote of no confidence against the entire Com-
mission, although a motion to that effect did not garner the required two-thirds 
majority on 14 January 1999. An investigatory commission was instead created 
and served to bring the Commission into still greater difficulties. In this body’s 
report, presented on 15 March, the accusations against Cresson were expanded 
still further; and the Commission in general was accused of having lost control 
over the activities in its administration. There was no willingness, either individ-
ual or collective, to assume responsibility; and it was “difficult to find someone 
who exhibits the least sense of responsibility in this regard.”48
After the disastrous impression that the report of the independent investigatory 
commission had produced, the Santer Commission could no longer hold. On the 
evening after the report’s release, those deputies of the Socialist faction who had 
backed the Commission up to that point informed the president that they too would 
support a vote of no confidence. Santer, who up till then had been counting on the 
national governments to withdraw the controversial commissioners, was only able 
to avoid having the entire Commission removed from office by pushing through 
a decision for the collective resignation of all the commissioners on the evening 
of 15 March. The resignation was declared on the 16th. Santer and his colleagues 
remained in office as caretakers until a new Commission could be appointed.
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who held the Council presidency in the first half 
of 1999, now busied himself as a crisis manager. Already at the Council meeting of 
24 and 25 March 1999 in Berlin, he succeeded in having Romano Prodi named the 
new president of the Commission; while serving as prime minister of Italy, Prodi 
had been able to bring his country into the Eurozone. The European Parliament 
confirmed Prodi in his new post on 5 May, and the appointment of the remain-
ing Commission members then followed according to the co-decision-making 
process of the Amsterdam Treaty. Only a few people from the Santer Commis-
sion were named to the new Commission: Neil Kinnock as representative for the 
upcoming administrative reform, the Austrian Franz Fischler as commissioner for 
agriculture and fisheries, and the Italian Mario Monti as commissioner for com-
petition. Among the newcomers who would have a significant impact were the 
Frenchman Pascal Lamy, former cabinet chief under Delors, as commissioner for 
trade; as commissioner for enlargement, the German Günter Verheugen, who up 
to that point had been Social Democratic minister of state in the Foreign Office; 
48 Quoted from Hänsch, Kontinent, p. 109. Cf. ibid., pp. 105–109 and Dietrich Rometsch, “Die 
Europäische Kommission,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1998/99, pp. 71–78.
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and as commissioner for external relations, the Briton Chris Patten. After all the 
nominees had individually gone through hearings, Parliament voted to appoint 
the new Commission on 15 September 1999 by a very large majority. The new 
Commission then took up its work on 18 September.
Overall, the European Parliament emerged further strengthened from the 
confrontation with several members of the Santer Commission. The European 
Council also gained prominence, and the authority of the Commission was again 
increased over the medium term. The forced change in the membership of the 
Commission did not however suffice to arrest the loss of confidence in European 
politics by citizens. In the fifth direct election of the European Parliament, which 
took place between 10 and 13 June 1999, the percentage of nonvoters, which in 
1994 had already been 43.2 percent, rose to 50.6 percent. It was also the case that 
the pressure to concentrate on necessary administrative reforms hindered the 
Prodi Commission, at least in its beginnings, from aggressively fulfilling its role 
of providing impetus to the integration process.
Security and Eastern Policy
Implementing decisions for developing a common foreign and defense policy 
remained arduous. On the level of the Council of Ministers, it was indeed the case 
that a whole series of common positions was worked out, for example, in regard to 
pacification policy after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the civil wars in Central 
Africa, and the prolonged conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Incremen-
tally, the Western European Union oriented itself toward its role as an instrument 
of common defense policy: with the transfer of its Permanent Representatives 
Council and its general secretariat from London to Brussels; the establishment 
of a satellite center, a logistics center, a planning unit, and a crisis-monitoring 
center; as well as the acceptance of new member Greece along with the NATO 
countries Turkey, Iceland, and Norway as associate members and the neutral EU 
countries Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland as observers. Several multina-
tional military units developed: for example, the Eurocorps consisting of fifty 
thousand French, German, Belgian, Spanish, and Luxembourger soldiers that 
was ready for deployment at the end of 1995; a Multinational Division made up of 
Belgian, British, Dutch, and German units; and the multinational Mediterranean 
forces Eurofor and Euromarfor.
However, common actions remained largely confined to the posting of Union 
representatives to crisis regions, support for democratization and rebuilding pro-
grams, and the sending of election observers. The armed forces of the WEU were 
hardly made use of. It was only the case that from 1992 to 1996, the WEU together 
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with NATO and the UN secured an arms embargo against the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia and a trade embargo against Serbia-Montenegro. Beyond that, 
the EU administration of Mostar was supported by a military police force num-
bering about 180. Participation in the UN peace mission for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was primarily by France, along with Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and lastly 
Great Britain; Italy provided air logistics. The weakness of the Europeans became 
clear when in May of 1995 some four hundred Blue Helmets were taken hostage 
by Bosnian Serbs and two months later when Dutch Blue Helmets had to stand 
by helplessly as soldiers of the Bosnian-Serbian Army murdered approximately 
eight thousand Muslims during the capture of the Protected Zone of Srebrenica. 
Only after American NATO warplanes had bombed Serbian positions in August 
was it possible to force a cessation of hostilities. The Dayton Peace Accords of 14 
December 1995 were mediated by the US and overseen by an international peace-
keeping force under the leadership of NATO.
The Europeans’ glaring weakness in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina could 
be attributed not least of all to the hesitancy of the Germans to engage militarily in 
an area outside the boundaries of NATO. This contributed to a situation in which 
the advantage gradually shifted in favor of NATO in the struggle over the auton-
omy of European defense. At the beginning of the 1990s Mitterrand had expected 
that after the end of the Cold War NATO would be dissolved and that an auton-
omous European armed force could take its place; it was now the case however 
that the Germans were gradually losing interest in a French nuclear umbrella and 
that NATO could acquire new tasks in the absence of available European alter-
natives. After a debate on the resumption of French nuclear testing by President 
Chirac in June of 1995 had once again made clear the difficulties that stood in 
the way of an Europeanization of nuclear strategy, Chirac decided in November 
to seek an European pillar within NATO. On 5 December, he announced that the 
French defense minister and chief of the general staff would in the future partic-
ipate in the operations of the alliance. Six months later, Paris and Washington 
signed an agreement on the exchange of nuclear development data that was to 
make further test explosions unnecessary.
With this, French efforts for European autonomy were de facto reduced to 
the conventional sphere. Specifically, the Europeans would have the opportu-
nity to receive material and logistical support from NATO for carrying out their 
own operations if and insofar as the US abstained from having American ground 
troops participate. At the NATO Council meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996, a prin-
ciple decision to that effect was formulated: The WEU was supposed to be able to 
operate in the future with support from NATO, though only if the particular oper-
ation had been unanimously approved by the NATO Council in advance. France 
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pledged to return to the command structure of NATO at the implementation of 
this decision and to give up its special role within the Western alliance.49
Implementation of this decision did not come about however. France sought 
the permanent transfer of regional command authority in Europe to European 
generals. The Clinton administration in Washington was not willing to do that, 
however; it did not want to go beyond conceding individual, carefully defined 
missions that would be carried out autonomously by the Europeans. In February 
of 1997, Chirac then declared to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during 
her visit to Paris that the conditions for France’s return to the command struc-
ture of NATO had not yet been fulfilled. Hubert Védrine, foreign minister in the 
Socialist government formed by Jospin in June of 1997, reinforced him in this deci-
sion. For him, the rapprochement of France with NATO undertaken by Chirac in 
December of 1995 constituted a strategic blunder that needed correcting.50 At 
the Madrid meeting of the NATO Council on 8 and 9 July 1997, the continuing 
antagonism between France and the US became public; for its part, the German 
government, which was still not prepared to undertake military action outside 
allied territory, did nothing to support the French position. As a consequence, the 
exact structure of the “European pillar” of NATO remained unresolved.51
At the same time, NATO took a major step toward lastingly establishing itself 
as the decisive security organization on the European continent: Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic were invited to negotiate on entry into the Atlantic Alliance 
in 1999. It was less a clear strategy that lay behind this than Bill Clinton’s desire to 
make a name for himself in foreign policy, along with his receptiveness to Polish 
and Czech desires. NATO got more problems than solutions with this eastward 
expansion but was from that point onward always present in the countries of East-
ern-Central Europe; it was also to be expected that the expansion would go still 
further. Slovenia and Romania, which had likewise submitted applications, were 
not yet admitted despite support from a majority of European members of the alli-
ance; in the closing communiqué of the Madrid NATO Council meeting, they were 
however named as possible candidates for the next round of expansion.52
New dynamism came into European security policy only in the autumn of 
1998 with the threatened escalation of the conflict between Serbian military 
forces and Kosovo-Albanians, who were fighting to gain independence from 
Serbia. Blair, who a year earlier had not yet had the courage to advocate British 
49 Soutou, L’Alliance incertaine, pp. 414–426.
50 Chirac, Le temps présidentiel, pp. 220ff.
51 Stark, Kohl, pp. 339–348.
52 Vojtech Mastny, Reassuring NATO. Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Western Alliance (Fors-
varsstudier 5/1997), Oslo: IFS, 1997.
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participation in the Community currency, now saw a chance to profile himself in 
the sphere of European politics in which a leadership role for Britain was most 
likely to be had. With the Europeans’ fear of a repetition of the traumatic expe-
rience of Bosnia-Herzegovina in mind, he advocated “fresh thinking” in security 
policy at an informal gathering of the European Council on 25 and 26 October in 
the Austrian town of Pörtschach: the assembly of credible European crisis reac-
tion forces capable of deployment and that could engage autonomously if the US 
was not willing to get involved; this initiative could potentially be combined with 
the full integration of the WEU into the EU.53
Chirac immediately made use of this British change of course in security 
policy to get Blair to commit himself to the greatest extent possible to accelerated 
implementation of the Amsterdam decisions on security policy. At a meeting in 
St. Malo on 3 and 4 December, he gained Blair’s agreement to a joint declaration 
in which the French president and the British prime minister announced that 
they wanted to work together because “the European Union needs to be in a posi-
tion to play its full role on the international stage. […] To this end, the Union must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, 
the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond 
to international crises.” As to the transfer of the WEU into the EU, there was still 
rather vague mention of “taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the 
evolution of its relations with the EU.”54
Military intervention in Kosovo was once again left to NATO. After the Serbian 
Army had begun a broad offensive against the Kosovo Albanians on 20 March 
1999, NATO reacted on 24 March with air attacks on military and economic targets 
in Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. After more than two months of bombard-
ment, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević agreed to a withdrawal from Kosovo 
on 3 June; the UN decided on an international peacekeeping force, organized by 
NATO, with a temporary occupation of the province seeking independence.
The renewed experience of powerlessness in determining the targets of air 
strikes strengthened the will of the Europeans to achieve the ability to act auton-
omously. Still more important was the fact that because of the dispute in Kosovo, 
new German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had been compelled to push through 
in his “Green” Party—which traditionally had tendencies toward pacifism—funda-
mental approval of Bundeswehr deployments outside of NATO territory and have 
such deployments become capable of winning majority support in Germany overall. 
In order to avoid the isolation of Germany or the collapse of the Red-Green coalition 
even before its assumption of power, Fischer had to agree to participation of the 
53 Agence Europe, 26–27 Oct. 1998, pp. 4ff.
54 www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=News&id=2244063. 
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Bundeswehr in a possible NATO intervention against the Greater-Serbian Army in 
the middle of October 1998. In mid-March, Milošević refused to sign a “temporary 
agreement” for the partial autonomy of Kosovo, an agreement that had come about 
not least of all due to pressure from the German government. He then began his 
offensive, and the government of Schröder-Fischer honored its commitment. Fischer 
justified his actions with the argument that he had drawn the lesson from recent 
German history not only of “never again war” but also of “never again Auschwitz.”55
At the same time, Fischer made use of the German Council presidency during 
the first half of 1999 in order to develop more substance in European security 
policy at the European level, which had become possible due to the British 
change of course. At an informal gathering of the Council of Ministers on 13 and 
14 March 1999 in the town of Reinhartshausen, he presented a discussion paper 
that made concrete proposals for implementing the St. Malo program. On that 
basis, the Cologne Council meeting of 3 and 4 June 1999 decided to improve the 
structures for a “European Security and Defense Policy” (ESDP): At the Council 
meetings of the foreign ministers, the defense ministers would now also partici-
pate as needed. The Political Committee of CFSP was to be expanded into a stand-
ing “Political and Security Committee” made up of high officials or ambassadors. 
Further, an EU Military Committee was to be created consisting of the national 
chiefs of general staffs as well as an EU Military Staff, which along with strategic 
planning was also to be responsible for implementing operations. The tasks of 
the WEU were to be “integrated” into the EU by the end of 2000.56
Beyond this, the German government ensured that with the very first strategy 
decided on after the Amsterdam Treaty came into effect—it involved the future 
relationship with Russia—the enforcement of unanimity for implementation mea-
sures would be dispensed with, and the treaty stipulations on it receded into the 
background. Likewise, the German government participated decisively in efforts 
to have none other than NATO Secretary General and former Spanish Foreign 
Minister Javier Solana named as first “High Representative” for CFSP. This gave 
the office political weight that went significantly beyond what had been decided 
in Amsterdam. Taking up his new post on 1 November 1999 and also assuming 
the office of WEU general secretary in a personal union, he gave the foreign policy 
line of the EU a face that was noticed by the public too.
55 Joschka Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre. Deutsche Außenpolitik – vom Kosovo bis zum 11. Sep-
tember, Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007, p. 185. Cf. ibid., pp. 110–147, 156–251.
56 Europäischer Rat in Köln 3./4.6.1999, Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes, Ziffer 17 und Anhang 
III. Cf. Uwe Schmalz, “Aufbruch zu neuer Handlungsfähigkeit. Die Gemeinsame Außen-, Sicher-
heits- und Verteidigungspolitik unter deutscher Ratspräsidentschaft,” in: Integration 3/1999, 
pp. 191–204.
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Taking into account the qualms of NATO-oriented EU states as well as those 
of non-aligned ones, there were efforts up to the Council meeting in Helsinki on 
10 and 11 December 1999 to specify that the EU military structure would actually 
only deal with crises outside the territory of the alliance. One result—contrary to 
what the German government had sought—was that the WEU was retained as an 
organization with a collective obligation of its members, even if its instruments 
and missions were taken over by the EU. Additionally, the heads of state and of 
government in Helsinki, following a British suggestion, committed themselves 
to organizing their militaries by the year 2003 so that a rapid deployment force 
of fifty to sixty thousand troops could be mobilized and its deployment be main-
tained for at least a year. At an “input conference” of the foreign and defense min-
isters on 20 November 2000, this decision was concretized to the effect that the 
sixty thousand ground troops were to be augmented by thirty thousand marines 
and air force personnel; some four hundred military aircraft and one hundred 
ships would be needed for this. Including the reserves necessary to maintain a 
deployment for more than a year, a total of approximately 150,000 personnel 
would be needed altogether.
In March of 2000, work began on setting up new institutions, regulating their 
relationships to NATO and the non-aligned EU states, as well as determining their 
modes of operation. In June, a Council committee on civil crisis management was 
added. Additionally, in the Portuguese city of Feira on 19 and 20 June, the Euro-
pean Council decided to keep five thousand police personnel available for civil 
crisis management. One thousand were to be deployable within thirty days. At the 
Council meeting in Nice from 7 to 10 December 2000, the responsibilities, mode 
of operation, and forms of cooperation were definitively regulated. The chiefs of 
the general staffs were to meet in the Military Committee two to four times a year, 
and the military representatives accredited in Brussels were to meet once a week. 
For those countries participating in NATO integration, these representatives were 
to be the same ones who were part of the NATO Military Committee. The Politi-
cal and Security Committee was to meet twice per week at the level of ambassa-
dors in Brussels; it could also however come together in the then-current form 
of a conference of the Political Directors of the Foreign Offices. An attempt by 
Germany and France to establish the High Representative of CFSP as chairman 
of the Political Committee was not successful; in the Nice reform treaty, it was 
only the case that there would be the possibility of entrusting him or her with the 
chairmanship in times of crisis.57
57 Mathias Jopp, “Gemeinsame Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,” in: Jahr-
buch der Europäischen Integration 1999/2000, pp. 243–250; idem., “Europäische Sicherheits- und 
Verteidigungspolitik,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2000/2001, pp. 233–242.
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With such results, France was no nearer to the goal of autonomous defense 
planning for Europe. It had received the option of doing such planning, however, 
at least in the conventional sphere. At the same time, the EU had created the mil-
itary capability to act autonomously as crisis manager outside the territory of the 
alliance. It thereby had reacted in a basically appropriate way to Europe’s changed 
security situation and so prevented further damage to European self-confidence.
This was all the more important given that the way had in the meantime been 
opened for enlargement of the European Union toward the east. Many countries 
and interest groups had hoped that the date of such expansion could be put off 
still further—the membership of numerous formerly communist states consti-
tuted a threat owing to competition from cheaper products and labor, transfer of 
production to countries with lower wage levels, as well as massive increases in 
expenditure for agricultural policy and structural improvements or the reduction 
of such expenditures or their transfer to the countries of Eastern and Southeast-
ern Europe. In June of 1991, Mitterrand had said that it would take “decades” 
until membership in the Community would be possible for these countries.58 The 
association agreements that the EU had completed with Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia in December of 1991 after difficult negotiations—with similar 
agreements following in 1993 with Romania and Bulgaria, in 1995 with the Baltic 
States and Slovenia—explicitly included the proviso that these agreements would 
not predetermine later entry into the Union.59
The governments of the associated countries had however quickly declared 
that they could not be satisfied with mere association over the long term. They 
were supported in this by the German government, which had an active interest in 
the establishment of stable and prosperous democracies to the east of Germany. 
The British and Danish governments pushed even more strongly for the quickest 
possible accession of the associated countries, not least of all because they saw in 
eastward expansion a possibility of slowing down the supranational deepening of 
the Union. The hesitant governments of Western and Southern Europe ultimately 
could not close their minds to the demands for stabilizing the Eastern-European 
region. Thus, after repeated forays by the Commission, the European Council in 
Copenhagen on 21 and 22 June 1993 agreed to a declaration that “future coopera-
tion with the associated countries is to be coordinated with the now-established 
58 Radio interview, 12 June 1991, quoted from Bozo, Mitterrand, p. 357.
59 On this and the following, cf. Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the 
European Union, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998; Barbara Lippert (ed.), Osterweite-
rung der Europäischen Union – die doppelte Reifeprüfung, Bonn: Europa Union, 2000; Stark, 
Kohl, pp. 397–417; Peter Becker, Die deutsche Europapolitik und die Osterweiterung der Europäi-
schen Union, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011, pp. 27–63 and 143–202.
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goal of membership.” At the same time, criteria were set down that would have to 
be met if the desire for entry were to be granted: Stable democratic order and rule 
of law, a functioning market economy, economic competitiveness, willingness to 
accept the acquis communautaire and the political objectives of the Union in full, 
as well as the existing Union’s capacity to accept such countries.60
In order accelerate the fulfillment of these criteria, the European Council 
in Essen on 9 and 10 December 1994—after input from the Commission and the 
German Council presidency—established a “Structured Dialogue” between the 
governments of the member states, the European Parliament, and the govern-
ments of the associated countries. Already in the run-up to the Essen Council 
meeting, ministers with expertise from the candidate countries were brought into 
the process of working out a pre-accession strategy; it was essentially a matter of 
getting to know the Union’s methods of operation. With his sense for symbolism, 
Kohl invited the heads of state and of government of the associated countries a 
few days before the Essen meeting for a first encounter with the members of the 
European Council on the fringes of the Council meeting; in the candidate coun-
tries themselves, this was regarded as a clear sign of the actual willingness of the 
Union to accept them.
However, the material preparation strategy could only be partially implemented 
through further measures to facilitate trade and promote investment as agreed to 
in Essen. In light of manifold opposition to unwelcome competition from the can-
didate countries, it took until November of 1995 before there was a majority in the 
Council of Ministers for a mere five percent increase in the tariff quota for Central- 
and Eastern-European countries. The German agricultural minister was among 
those opposing a greater increase or more flexibility in the quota. Intensive pres-
sure from the German chancellor was once again needed for the European Council 
of 15 and 16 December 1995 in Madrid to hold out a concrete date for the beginning 
of entry negotiations: six months after conclusion of the government conference 
on reform of the Maastricht Treaties, that is, at the beginning of the year 1998. The 
only countries that received a firm commitment to the opening of negotiations at 
that time were the Mediterranean states Cyprus and Malta, which had submitted 
applications in 1990. For the Central- and Eastern-European countries, it was only 
the case that the Council was “anxious to reach” the beginning of negotiations at 
the same point in time. The European Commission was given the task of taking a 
position on the entry requests and producing a report on all the issues involved.61
60 “Europäischer Rat in Kopenhagen 21./22.6.1993, Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes.” in: Euro-
pa-Archiv 48 (1993), pp. D258–D276, the quote on p. D264.
61 “Europäischer Rat von Madrid 15./16.12.1995, Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes, Teil A, Ab-
schnitt III,” in: Bulletin der Europäischen Union 12/1995, pp. 9–85, the quote on p. 20.
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In accordance with the prevailing trend among the governments, the Com-
mission decided to seek entry dates that varied according to the developmental 
level of the applicants and to organize the entry process so that the Union would 
not be faced with any additional financial requirements. After evaluating the 
application materials submitted by the candidates, Commission President Santer 
came to the conclusion that along with Cyprus (Malta had withdrawn its candi-
dacy), entry negotiations should initially begin only with Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic. However, the German, British, and Dutch commissioners called 
for including at least one Baltic State and one country from the former Yugoslavia 
for political reasons. Thus, in the Report “Agenda 2000” that was presented by the 
Commission on 16 July 1997, the start of negotiations with Estonia and Slovenia was 
also recommended; different views could be taken on their ability to compete in 
five years. It was emphasized however that the beginning of negotiations did not in 
any way predetermine that they could be concluded at the same time.62
At the Luxembourg Council meeting of 12 and 13 December 1997, the Euro-
pean Council agreed to the recommendation to start accession talks with the 
six nominated countries. A Greek proposal to include Romania and Bulgaria 
in the first round of negotiations was disregarded, as was an appeal made by 
Denmark and Sweden for the participation of Latvia and Lithuania. At the same 
time, “accession partnerships” were agreed on between the Union and all ten 
Eastern-European candidate countries; under the auspices of these partnerships, 
financial and other assistance for restructuring was linked to annual progress 
reports. Also, following the recommendation of the Commission, a “European 
Conference” was established in which all European countries with a possibility 
of entry (that is, going beyond the circle of Eastern-European reform states) could 
confer about issues of cooperation beyond the pillars of the Community. In this 
way, a differentiated expansion was to be secured without holding back those 
countries in the second rank from intensifying their reform efforts.
In contrast, it was not possible for the heads of state and of government to 
come to agreement on the reform of cost-intensive Community policies as the 
Commission had also proposed: a further reorientation of agricultural policy away 
from guarantee prices to direct assistance or a geographical and thematic concen-
tration of regional structural promotion. Speaking on behalf of all net-recipient 
countries, the conservative Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar opposed 
any reduction or reapportionment of the current transfer payments, while Kohl 
once again made it clear that Germany was not prepared to see its position as a 
net payer expanded but would much rather even have it reduced in the future. 
62 Europäische Kommission, “Agenda 2000. Eine stärkere und erweiterte Union,” KOM (97) 
2000 endg., 15 July 1997.
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However, with an eye toward parliamentary elections in Germany in the autumn 
of 1998, Kohl was also unwilling to hear of reductions in guarantee prices for agri-
cultural products. Negotiations with the first six candidates for entry thus began 
on 31 March 1998 without the financing of the expansion having been settled.
No agreement on the difficult financial issues came about at the Council meet-
ings in Cardiff in June or in Vienna in December either. Only at the Berlin Council 
meeting of 24 and 25 March 1999 was there agreement on the financial framework 
for the years 2000 to 2006—after a dramatic nighttime session and at the price of 
lasting resentment between Schröder and Chirac. The German government had had 
to give up its demand for national co-financing of agricultural subsidies. In return, 
the guarantee prices for agricultural products were reduced (though not as much or 
as quickly as the Commission had proposed, on average by about fifteen percent); 
expenditures for structural policy were also reduced by a small amount (from 230 
to 213 billion euros). Another forty billion euros was to be available for the first new 
countries. The Commission had calculated that a hike of approximately twenty-five 
percent by 2006 ought to be made in total expenditures based on assumed annual 
rates of growth, but this was not undertaken.63
In any event, the German government had achieved a result by which eastern 
expansion would not include with any further increase in its financial burden. 
Those countries receiving subsides in the Union had to accept only small reductions; 
for Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, there was even an increase in the Cohesion 
Funds. No major breakthrough in agricultural reform occurred. At the same time, 
there did remain questions as to the financing of eastward expansion. Lengthy tran-
sitional deadlines for incorporating entering countries into Community programs as 
well as further disputes about reform of the budget had been built in.
The experience of the Kosovo War then led to a shift of emphasis in the 
expansion strategy: It was especially Fischer and Schröder who envisaged more 
clearly the dimension of security and stability in expansion. This led them to see 
expansion in the area of the former Yugoslavia as more urgent, and they also 
developed new arguments for the inclusion of Turkey. In the autumn of 1998 in its 
first progress report on developments in the candidate countries, the Commission 
found that there had been significant progress on the political criteria for entry 
among the candidates of the second rank; it was anyway the case that the Danish 
and Swedish governments had already been demanding (in vain up to that point) 
the beginning of entry negotiations with Latvia and Lithuania. This resulted in an 
orientation toward negotiations with all the other candidates.
63 Winfried von Urff, “Agrar- und Fischereipolitik,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 
1998/99, pp. 125–134; from the viewpoint of the German government, also Fischer, Die rot-grünen 
Jahre, pp. 287–297.
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Encouraged by the German government, new Commission President Romano 
Prodi decided to make the upcoming eastward expansion the focal point of his 
Commission; and so he set up a separate general directorate for expansion with 
horizontal responsibility. He entrusted that function in the Commission to Fischer’s 
deputy Verheugen. After a further review of the situation in the candidate countries 
and assessment of political conditions, he made the recommendation that nego-
tiations now be started with all the candidates of the second rank, that is, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria—as well as Malta, which after an elec-
toral victory by the pro-European Nationalist Party had renewed its application for 
membership. A decision to this effect was made at the Council meeting in Helsinki 
on 10 and 11 December 1999. At the same time, it was agreed that the preparations 
for accepting further members should be completed by the year 2003.64
That decision did not imply giving up on the strategy of differentiation then 
in effect. The conclusion of negotiations and the actual completion of accession 
remained dependent on reform measures and the performance of the land in 
question. This decision made the expansion process more dynamic only to the 
extent that, for political-strategic reasons, there was more willingness to take 
greater risks in evaluating economic problems. Furthermore, it was now the case 
that significantly greater personnel capacity of the Commission was invested in 
simultaneous negotiations with no fewer than twelve candidates.
Additionally, the heads of state and of government in Helsinki granted Turkey 
the status of a candidate for accession. This was a noteworthy step insofar as the 
EU had always rejected the Turkish desire to enter, even after the country’s return 
to a parliamentary system in 1983. Freedom of movement for workers, pledged 
for 1986, had been rejected due to German efforts; the official entry request of 14 
April 1987 had been put on the back burner by the Community. In March of 1995, 
agreement was successfully reached that the completion of the customs union 
between Turkey and the Community was the “end phase” of association. Then, 
however, Greece had blocked the release of financial assets frozen since 1981; in 
the decision on expansion issued in Luxembourg in December of 1997, Turkey was 
not taken into account this time either.
In Turkey, the bitterness over the new postponement of the entry decision 
was all the greater given that the new round of enlargement was characterized 
as the “reunification of Europe.” It was not possible to miss the message that 
the governments of the member states and the candidates for entry no longer 
64 Europäischer Rat. Tagung vom 10. und 11. Dezember 1999 in Helsinki, Schlussfolgerungen 
des Vorsitzes, excerpts in: Internationale Politik 2/2000, pp. 80–85. Cf. Günter Verheugen, Europa 
in der Krise. Für eine Neubegründung der europäischen Idee, Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 
2005, pp. 78–85.
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regarded Turkey as part of Europe or no longer unambiguously did so. Additional 
pain resulted from the fact that Cyprus was invited to the entry negotiations even 
though the Turkish regime in the north of the island did not want it. The govern-
ment of Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz therefore rejected an invitation to 
participate in the “European Conference” of potential candidates for entry and 
froze all links to the EU with the exception of the customs union.
The bestowal of candidate status and the financial assistance connected with 
it were attempts to prevent the looming isolation of Turkey. Involved in bringing 
this about was the government of Yilmaz’s successor Bülent Ecevit, which cor-
rectly regarded defiance as none too productive, as well as the Clinton adminis-
tration, which admonished the Europeans not to close themselves to EU entry by 
the NATO member Turkey. The American admonitions had an effect not only on 
the government of Schröder-Fischer but also on Greece’s Simitis government. In 
the summer of 1999, Greek Foreign Minister Georgios Papandreou succeeded in 
initiating a rapprochement with Ankara. This was accelerated by the unexpected 
wave of mutual willingness to provide assistance after the severe earthquakes in 
Turkey in August and in Greece in September. The conferring of candidate status 
did not however mean that any actual breakthrough had been achieved on acces-
sion negotiations: Given that Turkish entry appeared to be looming, a debate 
about the “European” character of Turkey now took place in the member states; 
for its part, the Turkish government showed little inclination to make necessary 
reforms within the meaning of the Copenhagen criteria.65
The Nice Complex
After the decision to broaden the entry negotiations, the European governments 
felt it necessary to tackle the last hurdle before carrying out eastern expansion: 
the adjustment of European institutions. This was indispensable according to a 
declaration made by the heads of state and of government of France, Belgium, 
and Italy at the close of negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty. The ambition 
of the German government was therefore to have a decision made on calling a 
further government conference—necessary before the membership expanded 
beyond twenty—under the auspices of the German Council presidency. This effort 
65 Oya Susanne Abali, “Türkei,” in: Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration 1999/2000, pp. 437–
442; Jürgen Reuter, “Werden Athen und Ankara ihren historischen Konflikt beiliegen? Griech-
isch-türkische Beziehungen im Lichte der türkischen EU-Beitrittskandidatur,” in: Wilfried Loth 
(ed.), Das europäische Projekt zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2001, 
pp. 295–323; Kramer and Reinkowski, Die Türkei und Europa, pp. 161–166.
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succeeded in that at the Cologne Council meeting of June 1999 it was decided that 
over the course of the year 2000, there would be negotiations on the future com-
position of the Commission and the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers.
Fischer clearly did not want to content himself with a mere adjustment of 
Community organs to an appreciably larger number of member states. He inter-
preted the commitment of the Council members to “comprehensive” review of the 
organs’ composition and methods of work in such a way that there was now an 
opportunity with the elimination of deficits to make a major leap forward in polit-
ical integration at last. With strong emphasis on the “historical challenges” that 
he saw the Union facing, he sought out his French counterpart Hubert Védrine so 
as to win his support for a common initiative to strengthen European institutions. 
The Frenchman put him off, however: As the servant of two masters, a Socialist 
prime minister and a conservative president, he was not in a position to make his 
own mark on French European policy. However, after the Commission had also 
spoken out for a “far-reaching reform of European institutions in its position on 
the government conference,”66 Fischer decided to go it alone: With a personal 
programmatic speech, he sought—in a way similar to Genscher in 1981 and 1987—
to give European unification policy an impetus that would steer negotiations 
among the governments in the direction he desired.
In his speech at Berlin’s Humboldt University on 12 May 2000, to whose prepa-
ration Jacques Delors and others had contributed, Fischer spoke dramatically of 
“probably the greatest challenge ever faced by the Union since its founding,” and 
then called for nothing less than “the transition from the Union’s grouping of states 
to full parliamentarization in a European federation.” This was to be achieved by 
passage of a “European Constitutional Treaty,” as Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl 
Lamers had proposed one year earlier.67 Fischer termed this “a conscious politi-
cal refounding act for Europe” to be accomplished “within the next decade” either 
by “a majority of member states” or by a “smaller group” that, as the “center of 
gravity,” was ready “to advance” with political integration. As to which countries 
should belong to this group, Fischer—unlike Schäuble and Lamers—purposely did 
not name names; he also left open the issue of the relationship of the current gov-
ernment conference to the proposed act of foundation.68
66 KOM (2000) 34, 26 Jan. 2000.
67 Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers, “Europa braucht einen Verfassungsvertrag,” in: Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 May 1999.
68 Joschka Fischer, “Vom Staatenbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der eu-
ropäischen Integration,” in: Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 24 May 2000, reprinted in among oth-
ers: Wilfried Loth, Entwürfe einer europäischen Verfassung. Eine historische Bilanz, Bonn: Europa 
Union, 2002, pp. 241–252; on the origins, Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, pp. 298–304.
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Chirac actually responded very positively to Fischer’s foray. In a speech to 
the German Bundestag on 27 June 2000 (now meeting in the Reichstag Building 
in Berlin), the French president committed himself to the principle of “common 
sovereignty” (a remarkably courageous step for a Gaullist) as well as to increased 
democratization and the expansion of majority decision-making. He then agreed 
to the creation of a “pioneer group,” if only in the form of increased cooperation. 
Lastly, he also embraced the idea of a constitutional treaty. Here, he was more 
concrete than Fischer: This treaty was not to be worked out under the auspices 
of a government conference but instead soon thereafter with the inclusion of the 
people’s representatives in the European Parliament and in the national parlia-
ments.69 Adjustments necessary for the expansion should not be delayed by 
lengthy disputes as to fundamental reform of the Union.
In the wake of this, some improvements in the Union’s ability to act could 
be achieved at the government conference that had been meeting since 14 Feb-
ruary 2000. According to the treaty completed in Nice in early December, the 
Commission president and the commissioners would in the future be elected by 
qualified-majority vote, likewise the High Representatives for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy as well as special representatives in the area of CFSP. The Com-
mission president was to be able to decide on the division of responsibilities and 
be able to dismiss commissioners. In the future, majority decision-making was to 
be the practice in foreign economic policy as well as foreign and security policy, 
this latter area to feature the development of “common standpoints and actions” 
in cases of “increased cooperation.” In the areas of the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds as well as the issuance of visas, immigration, and freedom of movement, 
majority decision-making was likewise to be introduced, though with the reser-
vation that agreement be reached on the adoption of the next financial projection 
as well as regulations for entry and for immigration.
The rights of the European Parliament were also increased. Its right to partic-
ipate within the framework of co-decision-making was extended to six new cases; 
in three new areas, its approval was now necessary. Yet, the extension of Parlia-
ment’s rights did not keep pace with the expansion of majority decision-making. 
To the disappointment of MEPs, majority decision-making in areas relevant to 
finance was not linked to co-decision-making by Parliament. The instrument of 
“increased cooperation” was indeed extended to the area of foreign and security 
policy and its use was made easier (by reducing the minimum number of partic-
ipating states to eight and by the possibly of deciding by qualified majority in 
the area of police and justice cooperation), but it could not be used for opening 
up new political areas or for altering the procedural rules in a particular polit-
69 The text in among others Bossuat, Faire l’Europe, pp. 513–520.
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ical field. It was still not very appropriate for forming an avant-garde group. A 
“Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,” commissioned by the 
European Council in Cologne, was approved; but taking the opposition of the 
British government into account, it was not integrated into the treaty.70
It certainly would have been possible to achieve more clear progress and less 
of a confusing overall picture if Germany and France had been in agreement as to 
conference strategy. That was not the case, however. Instead, Schröder and Chirac 
engaged in a fierce battle over the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers, 
hindering productive decisions until the final phase of the Council Meeting in Nice. 
With brutal openness, Schröder let Chirac know that the Federal Republic’s pop-
ulation increase stemming from reunification must finally result in a higher vote 
weight in the Council; Chirac answered engagingly but also with determination 
that forsaking the principle of equal ranking for France and Germany was out of 
the question. The result, completed on the night of 10–11 December in an “abomi-
nable climate” (Chirac) consisted of preserving equal ranking but simultaneously 
granting the Federal Republic (and every other member state) the possibility of 
insisting on a majority of sixty-two percent of the total population of the Union. 
The “large” states (including Spain and Poland) were accorded a bare fifty percent 
higher weight than before; for the “smaller” states, there was a success via the 
introduction of the additional criterion of the “majority of the member states.”71
Thus, a difficult-to-calculate threefold majority had been introduced without 
thoroughly rectifying the problem of deficiency in representation. The remain-
ing disproportions between population and share of the vote created dissatis-
faction among the disadvantaged members. Only Aznar and Poland (which was 
not even represented in Nice) could regard themselves as victors. Moreover, the 
lack of agreement among the “big ones” meant that there was no resolution to 
the problem of the Commission’s ability to act: Germany, Britain, France, and 
Italy did dispense with having a second commissioner; but the other countries 
did not give up the principle that each nation be represented with one seat on 
the Commission. Only after the signing of the accession treaty of the twenty-sev-
enth country (that is, after the successful conclusion of all ongoing entry nego-
tiations) was the rotation principle for the composition of the Commission to be 
70 On the analysis of the Treaty of Nice, cf. Wilfried Loth, “Nach Nizza. Die Aufgaben der Eu-
ropapolitik nach den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Nizza,” in: idem., Das europäische 
Projekt, pp.  383–389; Mathias Jopp, Barbara Lippert, and Heinrich Schneider (eds.), Das Ver-
tragswerk von Nizza und die Zukunft der Europäischen Union, Bonn: Europa Union, 2001; Werner 
Weidenfeld (ed.), Nizza in der Analyse. Strategien für Europa, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2001.
71 With opposing assessments, cf. Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, pp.  342–356 and Chirac, Le 
temps présidentiel, pp. 301–311, the quote on p. 310.
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introduced. It remained open as to how many countries would then have to forego 
a seat on the Commission for a term.72
With the devastating impression that this conclusion of the government con-
ference in Nice had made not only among many participants but also among the 
public and in the European Parliament, the progress that had been achieved on 
the Union’s ability to act and its democratic oversight was largely missed. The 
“Declaration on the Future of the Union,” with which the heads of state and of 
government announced a “more thorough and broader discussion about the 
future development of the European Union” as well as a further government con-
ference for 2004,73 appeared to be an admission of failure in the negotiations at 
Nice. In fact, it only put on the agenda of European politics that which Fischer 
had urged and Chirac had embraced.
The heads of state and of government additionally declared that the new 
treaty was to come into effect by the end of 2002, and they expressed the hope 
that the first new member states would be able to participate in elections to the 
European Parliament in June of 2004. For the candidate countries, a potential 
timeline had thereby been given for the first time. The Treaty of Nice was signed 
by the foreign ministers on 26 February 2001. Surprisingly, its ratification failed 
initially in Ireland, where the government had done little in the way of bringing 
together a majority for the referendum of 7 June 2001. A second referendum on 19 
October, this time with massive support of the government, rectified that vote. On 
1 February 2003, the Treaty of Nice was able to come into force.
In the decade after the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU had by and 
large succeeded with the essential steps of enlargement and deepening that were 
necessary after the collapse of the Soviet imperium. Once again, Helmut Kohl had 
played a large part in this success. Even with occasional Franco-German discord 
after the end of the Mitterrand era, one must not overlook the importance of 
Jacques Chirac’s repeated success in going beyond the ideological shadow of the 
Gaullist tradition. Additionally, for the creation of a security-policy crisis instru-
ment, the turns made by Tony Blair and Joschka Fischer were decisive. It was the 
case however that the plethora of differing individual regulations that the heads 
of state and of government accepted did to an extent void the progress in reducing 
the democratic deficit. As a consequence, the development of the European con-
sciousness also lagged behind the Europeanization of ever more political fields.
72 Protocol 10 to Treaty of Nice, Article 4.
73 Vertrag von Nizza (Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 2001/C 80/ 01), pp. 85–86.
8  Constitutional Struggle and Euro Crisis, 
2001–2012
The Eastward Enlargement
No expansion of the designated financial resources was linked to the extension of 
accession negotiations to six further candidate countries that had been approved 
by the European Council in December of 1999 in Helsinki. As a result, countries 
of the first negotiation group, set up in December of 1997 in Luxembourg, reacted 
to the increased competition with something less than enthusiasm. At the same 
time, however, a “race to Brussels” also developed among the candidates: Each 
country now wanted to attain the status of readiness for entry as early as possible 
and thus secure the best conditions for that entry. The pace of reform in the coun-
tries of the first group, which had slackened after the success of Luxembourg, 
once again accelerated; and the countries of the Helsinki group made intensive 
efforts to catch up with the Luxembourg group.
Clearly, there was a danger of problematic setbacks in the modernization 
and democratization process in those countries relegated to the last place in the 
system of successive entries based on the principle of competition. It was espe-
cially in Poland and the Czech Republic, both of which were noticeably not at the 
forefront of reform measures, that opposition to entry under the conditions set 
by Brussels threatened to become insurmountable. Doubtful too was that there 
would be political majorities in all the existing member states for an expansion 
round without Polish or Czech participation. Hence, Enlargement Commissioner 
Günter Verheugen ventured a major effort: In a newspaper interview in October of 
2000, he hinted at the possibility that ten countries could enter at the same time 
in the year 2004. He then presented to the European Council in Nice a roadmap 
for further accession negotiations that divided the various negotiation chapters 
among the next three Council presidencies and envisioned a conclusion of talks 
at the end of 2002.1
Many of the heads of state and of government regarded the entry of ten new 
members in 2004 as utopian. They did however accept the Commission road map 
1 Europäische Kommission: Strategiepapier zur Erweiterung. Bericht über die Fortschritte jedes 
Bewerberlandes auf dem Weg zum Beitritt 2000, KOM (2000) 700, 8 Nov. 2000. On this and the 
following, Graham Avery, “The Enlargement Negotiations,” in: Fraser Cameron (ed.), The future 
of Europe. Integration and Enlargement, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp.  35–62; 
Verheugen, Europa in der Krise, pp. 83–103; Becker, Die deutsche Europapolitik, pp. 63–77 and 
202–260.
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and thereby sparked a competition among the Council presidents, firing their 
ambitions to complete the negotiation chapters assigned to them within their 
terms of office. And to a great extent, it did succeed. During the Swedish presi-
dency in the first half of 2001, the chapters on freedom of movement, social policy, 
and environment (among other things) were negotiated. During the Belgian pres-
idency in the second half of 2001, far-reaching agreement was achieved in the 
areas of agriculture, energy, as well as justice and domestic affairs.
In regard to the free movement of workers, which the bordering countries 
Germany, Austria, and Italy viewed with great concern, it proved possible to work 
out a complex compromise: For a transition period of initially two years, individ-
ual member states could limit access. If necessary, this could be extended for three 
years and for a final time for another two years. In the area of agriculture, there 
was broad agreement on production quotas and the promotion of rural develop-
ment; in the case of seven countries, there was also the commitment to standards 
for protecting animals and plants. A multi-stage plan was agreed with Lithuania 
for shutting down the gigantic and highly-dangerous Soviet-era nuclear power 
plant Ignalina. With Verheugen acting as intermediary, the Czech Republic and 
Austria reached an agreement allowing the new nuclear power plant in Temelin—
close to the Austrian border—to enter service but also requiring that it be subject 
to an environmental review one more time as well as a system of communication 
and cooperation across borders.
In its next progress report in November of 2001, the Commission projected—
after a thoroughly-critical review of developments in the candidate countries—
that if the then-current reform tempo were maintained, all the candidates except 
Romania and Bulgaria would be ready for accession by the end of 2002. Then, in a 
gathering at the Brussels Royal Palace of Laeken on 14 and 15 December 2001, the 
European Commission declared that Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, and Cyprus as well as Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, and Malta should 
comprise the group for which negotiations were to be completed by the end of 
2002. For Romania and Bulgaria, entry in 2007 was envisaged.
In order to achieve this negotiation goal, it was necessary to deal with some 
areas that were sensitive (because they were financially related): direct payments 
for the Common Agricultural Policy, promotion of structurally-weak regions, 
and participation of the new member states in the financing of the Community. 
It proved possible to neutralize struggles over inevitable apportionment thanks 
to the fact that the Council presidency in the first half year of 2002 had to be 
held by Spain. This meant that the Spanish government could no longer serve 
as the spokesman for those in the South who were protective of the status quo. 
Moreover, the governments of all the member and candidate countries were now 
condemned to success: After a common timetable for no fewer than ten accession 
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candidates had become binding, no one could any longer risk taking the blame 
for the failure of the great accession project.
In late January of 2002, the Commission presented an apportionment pro-
posal with 40.16 billion euros of additional resources for the years 2004 to 2006. 
This was admittedly somewhat below the financial framework agreed in Berlin in 
1999, but with incremental incorporation of the new members into the system of 
direct subsidies of the Common Agricultural Policy, it opened the way for signif-
icant additional burdens in the future. In the first year of membership, farmers 
in the new member states were to receive twenty-five percent of that which was 
paid in older member states, thirty percent in the second year, and so on until one 
hundred percent was reached in 2013. As to regional structural promotion, the 
existing assessment ceilings for recognition of areas to be promoted were to be 
retained. Accordingly, all the countries entering (except Cyprus) would fall into 
the highest category (“Target 1”). Only the capital regions of Prague, Bratislava, 
and Budapest would fall within the limits of “Target 2” in terms of eligibility for 
assistance. A sum of 25.6 billion euros was earmarked for the first three years of 
assistance.
In the eyes of the net-payers Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, and the Nether-
lands, it was especially the inclusion of the new countries in the system of direct 
subsidies that went too far. Instead, they called for a reduction in direct subsidies 
for the old members as well, so as to free up additional resources for assistance 
to the new members. France opposed this, and so over the course of the first half 
of 2002, a severe Franco-German dispute developed over agricultural reform. 
It was resolved only via a meeting between Schröder and Chirac in the run-up 
to the Brussels Council of 24 and 25 October 2002: Germany now accepted the 
direct payments to the new members. However, the total expenditure for direct 
payments and for the organization of markets was frozen until 2013 at the (high) 
level of 2006. The incremental incorporation of the new member states thereby 
implied an incremental reduction of the payments in the old states from 2007 
onward. Furthermore, Chirac finally conceded in the struggle over greater weight-
ing of German votes in the Council of Ministers.2 On the basis of this compro-
mise, the Council was able to make the policy decision for acceptance of the ten 
applicant countries on 25 October. In the process, the maximum contribution for 
the Structural and Cohesion Fund was reduced from 25.6 to 23 billion euros. The 
annual inflation adjustment of 1.5 percent that Schröder had conceded to Chirac 
for the assessment of the agricultural budget from 2007 onward was reduced to 
one percent in the face of stubborn insistence from Dutch Prime Minister Jan-Pieter 
Balkenende.
2 Chirac, Le temps présidentiel, pp. 526.
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The accession candidates were visibly disappointed by the outcome of the 
struggle over the apportionment of the resources for assistance. It was especially 
Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller, being pushed by his coalition partner the 
Farmer’s Party, who fought back strongly against a situation in which (due to the 
complex regulations for requesting structural resources) his country was threat-
ened with becoming a net payer right from the beginning of its membership in the 
Community. The governments of the Fifteen initially accommodated the concerns 
of the Ten by postponing the envisioned accession date from 1 January to 1 May 
2004; by this means, four months’ contributions could be saved during the first 
year of membership. At the concluding Council meeting on 12 and 13 December 
2002 in Copenhagen, Poland and the Czech Republic were accorded special cash-
flow facilities for a transition period, which would be financed from the budget 
for structural assistance; this arrangement stemmed from a mediation proposal 
made by Schröder. The structural policy budget was reduced still further to 21.7 
billion euros. Likewise, the new member countries were allowed the possibility 
of increasing the annual direct-payment quotas through the year 2006, though at 
the cost of resources earmarked for rural structural assistance. Poland was addi-
tionally granted higher milk-production quotas.3
Due to the increase in agricultural production quotas and the allocation of 
additional funds for the complete incorporation of the new countries into the 
Schengen area as well as securing the new external border of the Union, the total 
cost of obligations and payments for the new countries rose to 40.85 billion euros. 
Nonetheless, that figure was 10 billion lower than the highest contribution level 
agreed upon in Berlin. To that extent, the calculus of the Commission had been 
successful, having created maneuvering room for negotiation solutions by means 
of a lower proposal. The shifting of structural assistance into consumption—
further increased by the concessions made in Copenhagen—was problematic in 
regard to the success of the integration process of the former planned economies. 
That represented the price to be paid politically for avoiding a situation in which 
entry into the Common Market was allowed to fail due to modernization anxieties 
stirred up at the last minute.
On 9 April 2003, the European Parliament approved the entry of each individ-
ual country with over ninety percent of the vote in each case. Then, the accession 
treaty was signed by twenty-five heads of state and of government along with 
their foreign ministers in a solemn ceremony in the Stoa of Attalos, the ancient 
marketplace at the foot of the Acropolis in Athens. Owing to the many transition 
3 Cf. Barbara Lippert, “Erweiterungspolitik der Europäischen Union,” in: Jahrbuch der Euro-
päischen Integration 2002/2003, pp. 417–430; Peter Ludlow, The Making of the New Europe. The 
European Councils in Brussels and Copenhagen 2002, Brussels: EuroComment, 2004.
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regulations, unilateral declarations, and exchanges of correspondence, the treaty 
comprised almost five thousand pages bound in two thick folios. In part, these 
additions concerned basics such as restrictions on the free movement of labor for 
up to seven years and restrictions on purchasing agricultural and forest land in 
the new countries for seven years (in Poland for no less than twelve years). There 
were also declarations regarding very specific interests such as the possibility of 
the continued hunting of brown bears in Estonia and the protection of the domes-
tic honey bee breed in Slovenia. The entry of the new countries into the Schengen 
Area was made dependent on a later vote of the European Council; envisaged for 
October of 2007, it would actually take place only a year later. As to entry into the 
euro area, the same criteria and procedures used for the founding members were 
to apply to the new countries. The first new member to join the monetary union 
was Slovenia on 1 January 2007. One year later, there followed Cyprus and Malta; 
a year after that, Slovakia; and Estonia on 1 January 2011.
Overall, the many transition regulations ensured that opposition to the 
great expansion was meager in the existing EU member countries and remained 
below the critical threshold in the applicant countries as well. In the parliaments 
of the old members, only a few deputies voted against the accession of the new 
members. In the referenda held in all entering countries except Cyprus, the 
approval rate varied between fifty-four percent in Malta, which was divided as to 
European politics, and ninety-two percent in Slovakia. In Poland and the Czech 
Republic, more than seventy-seven percent of voters gave their approval, whereas 
in Hungary it was eighty-four percent.
Memories of the energy-sapping struggle over the terms for Eastward expan-
sion faded into the background at the special summit of the twenty-five heads 
of state and of government held on 1 May 2004 at Phoenix Castle some twenty 
miles from Dublin. “I saw many a teary eye this afternoon in Ireland,” reported 
Verheugen, “No one at this moment was thinking of milk quotas, internal-market 
regulations, or convergence programs.” What prevailed was satisfaction over the 
Community achievement, in which outstanding politicians of the old as well as 
the new member countries, such as Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmus-
sen as Council president during the last negotiation period and Polish President 
Alexander Kwasniewski, had had their share, just as Prodi and Verheugen did 
too. And there was a sense for the symbolic meaning of the day: “This is Europe’s 
triumph over the twentieth century,” was how Latvian Foreign Minister Sandra 
Kalniete formulated it; she was to become one of the first members of the EU 
Commission from the former Soviet imperium.4
4 Verheugen, Europa in der Krise, pp. 63, 68.
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The self-confidence and solidarity of the network of expansion strategies 
that had developed here rubbed off on the European institutions. After represen-
tatives of the new member states had already been participating in the work of 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers as “active observers” since the signing 
of the accession treaty, the Commission was expanded by ten new members on 1 
May 2004. As in the case of Latvia, it was predominantly experienced European 
politicians of the rank of minister or top-level civil servant who transferred to 
the Commission. The new countries had been represented in a normal manner in 
the European Parliament since the elections of 10 to 13 May 2004. It was the case 
however that the euphoria over the successful expansion did not go far enough 
to have Borislaw Geremek elected president of the European Parliament. This 
prominent Polish historian, longtime advisor to the Solidarity Movement and 
foreign minister from 1997 to 2000, had been put up by the liberal faction but lost 
in the first round of voting on 20 July owing to the now-traditional arrangement 
between the two largest factions, the European People’s Party and the Socialists. 
Spanish Socialist Josep Borrell was elected president for the first two and a half 
years of the new legislative period and was to be followed by the Christian Demo-
crat Hans-Gert Pöttering in 2007.
Only to a very limited extent did the population in the old as well as the new 
member countries join in the euphoria over the clear success of the reunification 
of Europe. It was too seldom recognized that the path into the European Commu-
nity contributed significantly to stabilizing an order based on democracy and rule 
of law and to promoting prosperity in the post-Communist countries. Instead, 
there lingered diffuse anxieties in the older member countries over low-wage 
competition in the employment market, unforeseeable funding commitments, 
and a Union of twenty-five or even twenty-seven members being ungovernable. 
In the new member countries, conflicts continued between winners and losers of 
the transformation; and the tendency to revert to buried nationalist conceptions 
also remained strong. There was little understanding of the mechanisms of the 
Union and thus also of the implications of accession, which large majorities had 
approved.
Hence, the tension between European and Europeanizing elites on the one 
hand and large segments of the population of the member states on the other 
continued with a changed emphasis. Gains in European élan on the one side 
were offset by increasing nationalist reflexes on the other. In the elections to the 
European Parliament in May of 2004, the participation rate in the old member 
countries rose to 52.6 percent vis-à-vis the 1999 level of 49.4 percent. In the new 
member countries, however, the average turnout was 31.2 percent of those eligi-
ble. This was in part due to unfamiliarity with the new institutions, together with 
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the tendency to punish those parties that had successfully managed the acces-
sion negotiations.
What the architects of the great enlargement could not do was overcome the 
division of Cyprus. Initially, the leader of the Turkish ethnic group in the north, 
Rauf Denktaş, had opposed giving back land to Greeks who had fled to the south 
during the war of 1974. Then, when a majority of Turkish Cypriots became con-
vinced that their economic problems could only be resolved by membership 
in the EU, the view became dominant among Greek Cypriots that the plan for 
the unification of both halves of the island in a federation—as presented by UN 
General Secretary Kofi Annan—granted too many special rights to the Turkish 
minority. In the referendum of 24 April 2004, the Annan Plan was approved by 
64.9 percent of Turkish Cypriots and rejected by 75.8 percent of Greek Cypriots. 
This was much to the disappointment of the Commission, which had hoped to be 
able to use the accession application by the Greek Cypriot government as a means 
of promoting reunification of the island. Accordingly, the residents of the north-
ern part were regarded as citizens of the EU; but the acquis communautaire could 
only be applied in the southern part for the time being. Exports from the northern 
part of the island to other EU countries remained dependent upon approval from 
Greek-Cypriot authorities, so that pledges of support from the EU Council of Min-
isters for accession of the north to the south could only be partially obtained.5
In the negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania, the same criteria were used 
that had already been in effect for the “Ten.” In the process, it became apparent 
that Bulgaria was making more progress than its northern neighbor in terms of 
ability to participate in the market, rule of law, and administrative organization. 
The bitter poverty of Romania, the destruction of its civil society by the Ceauşescu 
regime, as well as the high level of criminality and corruption resulting from it 
presented challenges that would not be easily overcome. In February of 2004, 
the reporter of the European Parliament therefore called for the Commission to 
suspend talks with Romania for the time being. Whereas all negotiation chapters 
for Bulgaria could be provisionally concluded in June of 2004, the accession of 
Romania was threatened with postponement until 2008.
The especially difficult negotiation chapters on competitiveness as well as 
justice and domestic affairs could be finalized with Romania only on 8 Decem-
ber 2004. The Commission thereupon took a positive position on the Romanian 
application as well on 22 February 2005, and the Council approved the accession 
treaty with both Bulgaria and Romania on 25 April 2005. Immediately thereafter, 
5 Cf. Heinz-Jürgen Axt, “Zypern: Mitglied der Europäischen Union, aber weiterhin geteilt,” in: 
Rudolf Hrbek (ed.), Die zehn neuen EU-Mitgliedsländer. Spezifika und Profile, Baden-Baden: Ber-
liner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2006, pp. 115–130; Verheugen, Europa in der Krise, pp. 83ff. and 93ff.
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the document was signed by all twenty-seven contracting parties in Luxembourg. 
In order to take into account reservations as to Romania’s readiness for entry, 
a protective clause was added whereby a postponement of the treaty’s effective 
date from 1 January 2007 to 1 January 2008 was stipulated in the event the Council 
determined that severe deficiencies in the areas of competitiveness or justice and 
domestic affairs had not yet been eliminated; the decision was to be based on the 
Commission’s Monitoring Reports. In the case of Bulgaria, a unanimous vote of 
the Council would be necessary for postponement, whereas for Romania a quali-
fied majority would suffice.6
In its Monitoring Report of 26 September 2006, the Commission chided Bul-
garia for lagging in the passage of laws and revision of its constitution. The lack 
of sweeping successes in combating corruption and organized crime was attested 
in both countries. However, the Commission could not bring itself to recommend 
postponing accession. Instead, it proposed continued oversight for three years 
after entry and mandated semi-annual progress reports from the countries. If 
they did not meet their commitments, they would be threatened with having their 
judgments and judicial decisions go unrecognized. Additionally, a mechanism 
was to be created for punishing deficiencies in the administration of EU agricul-
tural funds. The Council approved these recommendations on 17 October 2006, 
such that the accession of Bulgaria and Romania could in fact take place on 1 
January 2007. The package for financing their entry in the years 2007 to 2009, 
which the Council had already agreed upon in March of 2004, amounted to an 
additional 15.4 billion euros.7
Both of these new members certainly remained the problem children of the 
Eastward enlargement. In 2009, the monitoring system was extended indefi-
nitely. In Romania, the fight against corruption and criminality was hindered by 
ongoing power struggles between President Traian Băsescu, elected in Novem-
ber of 2004, and changing prime ministers. In July of 2011, the Commission con-
firmed “significant steps” by the Romanian government in the reform of justice 
and the investigation of cases of corruption, even at the highest level.8 Then in 
May of 2012, when incoming Social Democratic head of government Victor Ponta 
sought to rule by decree and remove Băsescu from office, the implementation of 
reforms was once again called into question. “Among us, there are cliques carry-
6 Barbara Lippert, “Erweiterungspolitik der Europäischen Union,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäi-
schen Integration 2005, pp. 425–434; Anneli Ute Gabanyi, “Rumänien,” ibid., pp. 441–444.
7 Barbara Lippert, “Die Erweiterungspolitik der Europäischen Union,” in: Jahrbuch der Euro-
päischen Integration 2007, pp. 423–434.
8 Europäische Kommission: Bericht über den Fortschritt Rumäniens im Rahmen des Koope-
rations- und Kontrollverfahrens, KOM (2011) 460 endgültig.
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ing on a battle of life and death to conquer the state and plunder it,” commented 
EU anti-corruption advisor Alina Mungiu-Pippidi.9
The experience with Bulgaria and Romania, along with some minor diffi-
culties in the new European work apportionment and with the new competitors 
contributed to skepticism regarding further applications for entry. This was espe-
cially the case with the western Balkan states, to which the European Council in 
Thessaloniki in June of 2003 had conceded a “European prospect.” Croatia had 
submitted an application as early as February of 2003. It was followed by Mace-
donia’s in March of 2004, Montenegro’s in December of 2008, Albania’s in April 
of 2009, and Serbia’s in December of that year. In April of 2004, the Commission 
certified that Croatia was fundamentally capable of accession; after a delay due 
to insufficient cooperation on the part of Croatian authorities with the Interna-
tional Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, negotiations began in October of 
2005. The Commission—now under the presidency of José Manuel Barroso of Por-
tugal and with Olli Rehn of Finland as enlargement commissioner—developed an 
incremental process that made the beginning of accession negotiations explicitly 
dependent on the fulfillment of preconditions: Initially, there was to be a review 
to determine if the preconditions for the conclusion of a Stability and Association 
Agreement (SAA) existed; then, if the commitments of the SAA were adhered to, 
the status of candidate for accession would be awarded. Entry negotiations were 
to begin only after there had been significant progress on economic and acquis 
criteria.10
Macedonia was accorded candidate status in December of 2005, and in 
October of 2009, the Commission recommended that accession talks be started. 
In the Council, however, this recommendation was blocked by Greece: The 
Athens government insisted that the Republic of Macedonia change its name 
such that any claim to Macedonian areas of Greece would be excluded: Up to that 
point, a formulation acceptable to both sides had not been found. Montenegro 
received candidate status in December of 2010, and entry negotiations began in 
June of 2012. Serbia had been declared a candidate in March of that year, and 
entry negotiations started in January 2014. Albania has up to this point not yet 
gone beyond the status of an associated state, however. Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo, which have not yet submitted applications for accession, are still in the 
run-up to a Stability and Association Agreement. Impulses for negotiation in the 
9 Quoted from the Westfälische Nachrichten, 22 Aug. 2012.
10 Europäische Kommission: Strategiepapier zur Erweiterung, KOM (2005) 561 endgültig, 9 Nov. 
2005. Cf. Barbara Lippert, “Die Erweiterungspolitik der Europäischen Union,” in: Jahrbuch der 
Europäischen Integration 2006, pp. 429–440.
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neighboring states Austria and Greece have proven too weak to unleash a stron-
ger integration dynamic in the Balkan States.
The Commission sought to respond to the languishing integration dynamic 
in the Western Balkans by seeking a breakthrough in negotiations with Croatia in 
2009. This plan was however thwarted when Slovenia blocked the opening of the 
last twelve negotiation chapters with reference to the conflict between Slovenia 
and Croatia over the course of the border in the Adriatic. Only after the Slovenian 
government in September of 2009 had—under pressure from the Swedish Council 
presidency—declared its willingness to leave the final settlement of the border 
to an international court of arbitration could negotiations then enter the final 
phase. Here, it was especially the governments of the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Great Britain that once again stepped on the brakes because they still perceived 
significant deficits in justice, the fight against corruption and criminality, as well 
as cooperation with the tribunal in The Hague. On 11 June 2011, however, Com-
mission President Barroso was able to declare the negotiations completed. The 
accession took place on 1 July 2013.11
While the expansion in the Balkans suffered due to the painful aftereffects of 
inherited ethnic conflicts and significant lack of a democratic tradition, it was the 
case with Turkey that concerns increasingly arose over the cultural compatibility 
of a state shaped by Islam and over the Community’s capacity to absorb it. Critics 
of the country’s entry repeatedly pointed out that in 2013 Turkey’s population 
of seventy-nine million was about as large as all ten of the countries that had 
entered in 2004; but it was expected to have only half the combined economy of 
those ten members.12 The accession of Turkey would mean “the end of the Euro-
pean Union,” as former French President Giscard d’Estaing warned in Le Monde 
in November of 2002.13
The reforms that the Turkish political system had brought itself to undertake 
in the period from 2002 to 2004 thus did not have the hoped-for success. In August 
of 2002, the Turkish National Assembly voted for the permanent abolition of the 
death penalty (which notably meant not executing PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan), 
approval of the Kurdish language in radio and television programming and also 
in private educational institutions, the right of religious minorities to purchase 
land, as well as the admission of liaison offices of foreign non-governmental orga-
nizations. After the electoral victory of the conservative-religious Justice Party 
(AKP) in November of 2002, new Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan achieved 
11 Ibid., 2011, pp. 503–516; Sisina Kusic, “Kroatien,” ibid., pp. 513–516.
12 Cf. for example Wolfgang Quaisser and Alexandra Reppegather, EU-Beitrittsreife der Türkei 
und Konsequenzen einer EU-Mitgliedschaft, Munich: Working Papers, 2004.
13 Le Monde, 9 Nov. 2002.
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a fundamental liberalization of Turkish criminal law and the “civilianizing” of 
the National Security Council, which up to that point had been dominated by 
the military. Moreover, he brought about a transformation in Turkey’s policy on 
Cyprus: From the winter of 2003–2004 onward, the reunification of the island on 
the basis of the Annan Plan was supported by Turkey.
After contentious internal discussion, the Commission found in its progress 
report of 6 October 2004 “that Turkey fulfills the political criteria to a satisfactory 
extent” and recommended the opening of negotiations on accession. No con-
crete date for this was specified, however. Instead, the Commission announced 
stepped-up oversight of the reform process, made mention of the possibility of 
the suspension of negotiations, and emphasized “that this is an open-ended 
process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed in advance.” It declared that a 
conclusion could only come after decision-making on the financial preview for 
the period from 2014 onward. Additionally, the accession treaty was to have long 
transition regulations and perhaps even indefinite protective clauses in regard 
to the free movement of labor, for example.14 After further contentious discus-
sion, the European Council in a Brussels meeting of 16 and 17 December 2004 
opted for beginning negotiations on 3 October 2005. It insisted however that the 
measures on the reform of criminal law be implemented beforehand and that a 
supplementary agreement for harmonizing the Customs Union between Turkey 
and the Community with the ten new members be signed as well. Indirectly, the 
Council thereby made the recognition of the new EU member Cyprus by Turkey a 
precondition for the actual start of negotiations.15
Of necessity, the Erdoğan government agreed to sign the additional protocol 
to the Treaty of Ankara. Under domestic pressure over the prospect of becoming 
a second-class member, however, the Turkish government declared at the signing 
on 29 July 2005 that this action was not be regarded as recognition of the Republic 
of Cyprus. It therefore did not apply the protocol to Cyprus; that is, Turkish ports 
and airports remained closed to ships and aircraft from the Republic of Cyprus. 
This did indeed allow the opening of talks on 3 October 2005 as planned. An 
attempt by the Austrian government to write into the negotiation framework a 
mere “partnership” as an alternative goal was derailed at the last moment. Yet, 
after the Turkish government stood firm in its position of not applying the addi-
14 Europäische Kommission: Empfehlung der Europäischen Kommission zu den Fortschritten 
der Türkei auf dem Weg zum Beitritt, KOM (2004) 656 endgültig, 6 Oct. 2004.
15 European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16-17 Dec. 2004. Cf. Peter Ludlow, 
Dealing with Turkey. The European Council of 16–17 December 2004, Brussels: EuroComment, 
2005; Barbara Lippert, “Die Türkei als Sonderfall und Wendepunkt der klassischen EU-Erweite-
rungspolitik,” in: Integration 28 (2005), pp. 119–135.
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tional protocol even after the “screening” phase of negotiations, the EU Council 
of Ministers decided on 11 December 2006 to suspend talks on all chapters 
directly linked to the Customs Union and therefore affecting the economic core 
of the Community.
A spectacular failure of negotiations was thereby avoided. The reform 
dynamic in Turkey nevertheless waned, and the date of possible entry into the 
EU retreated ever further into the future. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in 
office since September of 2005, assessed the strategic necessity of Turkish EU 
membership significantly lower than had her predecessor. Chirac’s successor 
Nikolas Sarkozy, elected in May of 2007, even spoke out explicitly against Turkish 
membership as a goal of negotiations. He vetoed the opening of five further nego-
tiation chapters (economic and monetary union, Common Agricultural Policy, 
regional policy, institutions, and budget) that he viewed as favorable to member-
ship. Additionally, Cyprus blocked the opening of the chapters on energy as well 
as education and culture. Up to 2012, only thirteen of thirty-five chapters were 
able to be opened; only one chapter (science and research) could be provisionally 
concluded.16
After Erdoğan’s major victory in parliamentary elections in June of 2011, 
Turkish politicians began to search for alternatives to EU membership due to the 
stagnation in negotiations. Trade relations with the growing economies of the 
Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa were expanded, the ambition grew for 
creating a regional power that could act autonomously, and legal harmonization 
with EU norms was postponed indefinitely due to the high costs involved. When 
in the second half of 2012 the Cypriot government took its turn chairing the EU 
Council, Ankara even implemented a temporary freeze in relations with the EU. 
This history of Turkey’s approach to Europe is not thereby at an end, but its prog-
ress is however highly uncertain.
Whereas the issue of Turkish membership remained open, a consensus 
gradually emerged in the EU that for the foreseeable future no prospect of mem-
bership should be offered to any other countries undergoing transformation. 
Instead, economic development and democratic structures should be promoted 
by means of financial and technical assistance along with granting market 
access, as the Commission had envisioned since 2004 within the framework of 
the “European Neighborhood Policy.” Relations with the sixteen countries for 
which this program was conceived have up to now developed in very different 
ways; agreement on a coherent strategy has not yet been reached. In 2008, at 
Sarkozy’s urging, a “Union for the Mediterranean” was created with the goal of 
16 Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2006, pp.  431–435; ibid., 2007, pp.  425–429; ibid., 
2008, pp. 454–458; ibid., 2009, pp. 448–450; ibid., 2010, pp. 468–471; ibid., 2011, pp. 507ff.
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promoting regional cooperation among Mediterranean neighbors. In 2009, at the 
initiative of Sweden and Poland, there followed an “Eastern Partnership” that 
included Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The 
possibilities of neighborhood policies have been used to the greatest extent by 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Up to this point, however, these countries have 
hoped in vain for any prospect of accession.17
In contrast, the institutions of the EU and the governments of the member 
states had no problem in positively receiving the accession application of Iceland, 
submitted to the chair of the European Council on 16 July 2009. The small island 
nation in the North Atlantic had decided on this step after the financial collapse 
of 2008 brought its government to the verge of bankruptcy. A majority of Iceland-
ers believed that the financial turbulence could only be overcome via member-
ship in the Eurozone. To accomplish this, they were prepared to accept reduc-
tions in the exclusive use of their fishing grounds. Given that Iceland had already 
been integrated into the European Economic Area since 1994 and had addition-
ally joined the Schengen Agreement in 2001, the complete adoption of the acquis 
communautaire seemed relatively unproblematic to arrange. Entry negotiations 
began on 27 July 2010 and made rapid progress.18 After the massive devaluation 
of the Icelandic króna had helped the fishing and tourism industries get back on 
their feet, however, the attitude of the descendants of the Vikings changed over 
the course of 2012. Following the victory of the conservative Independence Party 
in parliamentary elections in May 2013 the new government suspended the nego-
tiations for an indefinite time.
With the conclusion of the expansion project of 1999, the signs thus predom-
inantly pointed toward consolidation of the EU 28. This was and will be rightfully 
seen as the prerequisite for having the Union remain capable of acting and for 
having its interests on the European and international stages to be appropriately 
represented.
The Constitutional Treaty
There had been fears, primarily in France, that the Union would become inca-
pable of acting after the great expansion; yet it did not turn out that way. This 
was above all attributable to the talks over further treaty reform, approved by 
17 Karin Böttger, Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik. Ak-
teure und Koalitionen, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010.
18 Burkhard Steppacher, “Island,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2010, pp.  479ff. 
and ibid., 2011, pp 511ff.
 The Constitutional Treaty   385
the European Council in Nice in 2000, and running parallel to negotiations on 
accession.
In preparing for the government conference of 2004, France and Germany 
once again worked closely together. Given the hangover from the disastrous 
impression that their confrontation during the Nice summit had left, Chirac and 
Schröder very quickly came to agreement that they would in future meet every 
six to eight weeks on very intimate terms, accompanied only by their foreign min-
isters, to discuss ongoing problems of European politics over dinner. At the first 
of these meetings, held at Chirac’s initiative on 31 January 2001 in the Alsatian 
town of Blaesheim near Strasbourg, the two leaders agreed to work out a joint 
position in preparing for the government conference. This did not come about 
as quickly as anticipated however because Foreign Minister Herbert Védrine was 
anxious not to give up control over the reform process. On 31 May, the European 
Parliament voiced its support for organizing the preparations for the government 
conference in the form of a convention following the model and the division of 
mandates of the Convention on Fundamental Rights. Chirac and Schröder then 
pushed through the vote for a convention and for the development of a consti-
tution as a joint position. In a joint resolution issued at the seventy-eighth Fran-
co-German summit on 23 November in Nantes, they proclaimed their resolve “to 
seek agreement consistently and persistently on all issues that will arise from the 
activity of the convention.”19
Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt could thus be sure of support from 
Chirac and Schröder when as Council president in the second half of 2001 he 
sought suggestions from the governments for institutional reform of the Union. 
These were to be discussed at a convention made up of representatives of the 
governments, the national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the Com-
mission. He also advocated giving the reform the character of a constitutionaliza-
tion. In order to structure the talks, he presented to the European Council in the 
Laeken district of Brussels on 14 and 15 December 2001 a catalogue of no fewer 
than sixty-seven questions on which the convention was to take a position. The 
convention’s talks were to begin on 1 March 2002 and be completed within a year. 
It was to meet publicly and to be open to input from civil society.
Verhofstadt’s proposal to charge the convention with the development of 
a single draft constitution that would then be binding to a great degree on the 
subsequent government conference could not win acceptance at Laeken. After 
contentious discussion, it remained an open question in the “Laeken Declara-
tion” as to whether several alternative drafts could be available at the end of the 
19 Internationale Politik 67 (2002), p. 101. On the initiation of the Blaesheim process, also Chi-
rac, Le temps présidentiel, p. 311.
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talks. In other respects, however, the heads of state and of government accepted 
the Belgian proposal, including the composition of the convention (one repre-
sentative per government, two per national parliament, sixteen members of the 
European Parliament, two representatives of the Commission, along with repre-
sentatives of the governments and of the parliaments of the candidate countries 
in an advisory capacity). They also accepted the strong position of the convention 
president, who was to produce an initial working basis for the convention and 
“evaluate” the public debate in the plenum for each successive session.20
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing became the president of the convention. The former 
president of France had since late September insistently put his name in play 
for this office, and Chirac supported him—firstly, because Chirac wanted to see 
a French person hold the position and, secondly, because he hoped to be able 
to neutralize a potential opponent in his own re-election bid. When Schröder 
immediately concurred with Chirac’s choice, no other candidate had a chance—
neither Jacques Delors, who had hesitated all too long, nor Dutch Prime Minister 
Wim Kok, nor his former Italian college Giuliano Amato, whom the leaders of the 
smaller member countries, among them Verhofstadt, would have preferred. In the 
end, the nomination of Giscard was unanimous after Verhofstadt had proposed 
adding two vice presidencies and had also put forward Amato and former Belgian 
Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene for those posts. Amato and Dehaene, a Socialist 
and a Christian Democrat respectively, were also nominated unanimously.21
The convention took up its work on 28 February 2002. Rather than being led 
by its president, it was de facto under the leadership of a twelve-person presidium 
that consisted of representatives of all member groups. Giscard certainly had his 
own ideas as to how the convention was to be run and to what results it should 
come; in the nonpublic debates of the presidium however he occasionally had to 
defer to the better argument. Klaus Hänsch, one of the two representatives of the 
European Parliament on the presidium, confirmed that the seventy-six-year-old 
president exhibited an “astounding combination of leadership ability and will-
ingness to learn.”22 The presidium succeeded with its proposal that the conven-
20 Erklärung von Laeken zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union, among others in: Daniel Göler, 
Die neue europäische Verfassungsgdebatte. Entwicklungsstand und Optionen für den Konvent, 
Bonn: Europa Union, 2002, pp. 112–122. Cf. idem., “Der Gipfel von Laeken. Erste Etappe auf dem 
Weg zu einer europäischen Verfassung?” in: Integration 25 (2002), pp. 99–110; Peter Ludlow, The 
Laeken Council, Brussels: EuroComment, 2002; Fischer, Die rot-grünen Jahre, pp. 357–360. 
21 Didier Pavy, “Giscard: retour par l’extérieur,” in: Le Nouvel Observateur, 20 Dec. 2001.
22 Hänsch, Kontinent, p. 166. On the work of the convention, ibid., pp. 161–205; Alain Lamassou-
re, Histoire secrète de la Convention européenne, Paris: Albin Michel, 2003; Andrew Duff, The 
Struggle for Europe’s Constitution, London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2007; 
Peter Norman, The Accidental Constitution. The Story of the European Convention, Brussels: 
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tion commit itself to seeking consensus. This meant that instead of having the 
plenum vote on differing proposals, the president would in the end determine 
where the consensus on an issue lay. Consensus was to be determined by that 
which had not met with “considerable opposition” in any member group. What 
exactly constituted “considerable opposition” was left to the discretion of the 
president.
In fact, opposition needed to be watched especially when it came from of 
the ranks of the governments. The convention was programmed to reach a com-
promise that could not be called into question by the subsequent government 
conference. The process ensured that at the end there would not be several drafts 
but rather only one—a draft behind which there stood something more than a 
slim majority. Such a draft could not be sidestepped by the governments. Foresee-
able opposition by individual governments to individual points would thereby be 
isolated; the veto power of each government, which had made previous govern-
ment conferences so arduous, thus tended to be devalued. Compromise no longer 
amounted to the least common denominator but rather constituted that which 
was genuinely achievable with common sense in light of actual power relations.
In order to have time enough to find consensus, the presidium approved an 
additional three months’ work time for the convention right at the beginning. The 
results were however to be available for the European Council in June of 2003. 
Nevertheless, the exchange among working committees, led by a member of the 
presidium, in meetings with member groups and with families of political parties 
had progressed so far in the plenum and in the presidium that Giscard d’Estaing 
could present the presidium with a first skeleton of the draft treaty by October of 
2002.
This outline foresaw the dissolution of previous treaties on the European 
Union and the European Community as well as the replacement of the three-pil-
lar structure of Maastricht with a unified treaty. A first section would describe 
the principles, the organs, and the processes. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
approved in Nice would follow as a second section. A third would consist of the 
previous treaty contents regarding the three pillars, including process modifica-
tions. The treaty was to be termed a “constitution” regardless of the fact that it 
would be approved by the states involved and would not rest upon the vote of the 
European people. For the first time, there would also be provision for the possi-
bility of an exit from the Union.23 Some individual participants such as Hänsch 
EuroComment, 2003; Mathias Jopp and Saskia Matl, “Perspektiven der deutsch-französischen 
Konventsvorschläge für die institutionelle Architektur der Europäischen Union,” in: Integration 
26 (2003), pp. 99–110; as well as the contributions in Integration 26 (2003), vol. 4, pp. 283–575.
23 Preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty, 28 Oct. 2002, CONV 369/02.
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had concerns about employing the constitution concept, thinking that it might 
give impetus to criticism of a presumed “superstate”; but Giscard knew how to 
push such concerns aside.
With the presentation of the outlines of a constitutional treaty on 28 October, 
the character of the convention’s work changed. Whereas up to that point skep-
ticism had predominated as to whether the convention would bring forth any-
thing more than nonbinding declarations of intent, now it seemed that it actually 
would be in a position to predetermine the future character of the Union to a great 
extent. Hence, the governments now increasingly sought to influence the results 
of the talks. Foreign minister Joschka Fischer took over the representation of 
the German government in the convention himself; SPD General Secretary Peter 
Glotz had earlier held that position. Chirac’s new Foreign Minister Dominique de 
Villepin replaced Europe Minister Pierre Moscovici, who had been appointed by 
the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin. The French and German governments 
then submitted a series of joint positions to the convention.
The compromises that they had to accept in so doing primarily affected the 
configuration of the executive of the Union. Whereas Chirac had initially joined 
Giscard in supporting the appointment of a fulltime president of the European 
Council, who could access the executive powers of the Commission, the German 
government along with those of most of the smaller states advocated the election 
of the Commission president by the European Parliament and his assignment as 
chairman in the European Council. The compromise consisted essentially in that 
the German government now also backed the introduction of a fulltime president; 
however, he was to be elected for only two-and-a-half years (with the possibility 
of one re-election). Also, he would not be able to encroach upon the purview of 
the Commission. The convention revised the election process of the Commission 
president by Parliament (which was now acceptable to France) by stipulating 
that it take place at the recommendation of the European Council. However, the 
Council was to make its recommendation while “taking into account the elections 
to the European Parliament.” 24
The German proposal to assign the Commissioner for External Relations the 
chairmanship of the Council for External Relations and Defense and so to become 
the “foreign minister” of the Union was modified: The foreign minister named by 
the European Council with the approval of the Commission president would at 
the same time be a member of the Commission. He would be solely responsible 
for initiatives in the areas of foreign policy; the Commission would no longer hold 
that authority collectively. As a vice president of the Commission, however, he 
would also be intimately involved into the work of the Commission. The Direc-
24 Article I–26 of the draft Constitution.
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torate-General for External Relations and the foreign-policy areas of the Council 
Secretariat were to be combined in one European Diplomatic Service. The Fran-
co-German demand for majority decision-making in foreign policy (but not for 
military or defense-policy aspects) failed once again in the face of British oppo-
sition. The advocates of a more effective foreign policy only won the possibility 
of increased cooperation among a core group of states extending to all areas of 
CFSP and ESDP, along with the establishment of higher hurdles for blocking it by 
individual members.
The role of the European Parliament as a legislature was further strength-
ened—above all by abolishing the distinction between obligatory and nonoblig-
atory expenditures, a proposal made by the Benelux states. This meant that 
the agricultural budget, the largest item in the budget, was now in the area of 
co-equal legislation. In the future, Parliament was to collaborate in ninety-two 
political areas rather than only thirty; in some seventy of those areas, it was now 
to be on an equal footing with the Council of Ministers, rather than only thirty as 
heretofore. The scope of the budget was still to be determined by the Council of 
Ministers on a unanimous basis. Its apportionment was however to be made by 
majority decision and a parliamentary majority would also be needed.
Following upon a Franco-German proposal, meetings of the Council of Min-
isters were to be public insofar as the body acted in a legislative capacity; and 
“as a rule” it was to decide by qualified majority. However, fearing that otherwise 
the whole treaty would be blocked by some governments, majority rule would be 
breached not only in regard to foreign policy. Other areas that would continue 
to require unanimity were decisions on the system and upper limit of financial 
resources, important measures in the realms of domestic affairs and justice policy 
(harmonization of penal law, creation of a European attorney general, police 
cooperation) and sensitive areas of trade policy (services in the realms of culture, 
radio and television, social policy, education, and health). At Germany’s behest, 
the choice of various sources of energy was still to remain at the national level.
After Chirac had given up his resistance to more strongly taking into account 
the demographic factor in the weighting of votes in the Council, the principle of 
double majority (that is, majority of the member states plus majority of the pop-
ulation) could be put through. It was indeed the case that the representative of 
Spain in the presidium sought to defend the settlement made in Nice, which was 
significantly more favorable to both Spain and Poland; in so doing, however, he 
ended up more and more isolated. At the end of a stormy session of the presidium 
in late May of 2003, Giscard d’Estaing determined shortly before midnight that 
there was consensus on the formulation “majority of the member states, which 
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represented at least three fifths of the population of the Union.” 25 There was no 
further attempt in the plenum to call this result into question.
Still more intense was the controversy over the issue of the size of the Com-
mission. Whereas Giscard and most of the representatives of the larger countries 
spoke in favor of a significant reduction in the number of seats on the Commis-
sion, the representatives of the smaller countries persisted in their position that 
each member state must appoint one commissioner, especially in light of the 
decision for a fulltime president. In the end, Giscard voted for a compromise that 
left hard feelings on both sides: A Commission consisting of fifteen members 
(president, foreign minister, and thirteen commissioners) along with non-voting 
Commission members from those countries not represented among the fifteen 
(with twenty-seven member countries, there would thus be another twelve 
members). In contrast, there was general agreement on the further strengthening 
of the position of the Commission president: He was in the future to be able to 
choose his Commission members from among three proposed candidates from 
the respective countries. He was also to be able to determine the structure of his 
Commission and exercise policy-making power for its work.
In the compilation of individual treaty elements into a complete draft, Giscard 
presented to the presidium and to the public in late April the idea of setting up 
a congress of national and European deputies, an idea originally shared by the 
French government as well. It was to gather once a year to pronounce upon the 
condition of the Union and later also to elect the president of the Union. Because 
this construction threatened to disrupt the arduously-achieved balance between 
Council and Parliament, it was rejected in the very next session of the presid-
ium. The body then accepted some deviations from the majority principle and 
sent Giscard in advance to sell the result to individual member groups in sepa-
rate sessions. This proved successful: “With a brilliant mixture of argument and 
appeal, the president won over the national and the European parliamentarians 
for the final compromise and pacified the grumbling representatives of the gov-
ernments.”26 He followed up by announcing at a press conference that consen-
sus had been reached. It only remained for the convention members to confirm 
this in the plenary session of 13 June.
The draft treaty was thereby ready in time for the European Council in Thes-
saloniki on 19 and 20 June. There was not however enough time for a thoroughgo-
ing discussion by the heads of state and of government. Also, the old treaty texts 
still needed to be revised and incorporated into the operative third part on the 
political areas of the Union. The members of the convention made use of the time 
25 Article I–24 of the draft Constitution; see Hänsch, Kontinent, p. 195.
26 Ibid., pp. 201ff.
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required for these technical adjustments in order to make a few more additions 
to the basic section of the document. For example, a paragraph on symbols of 
the Union was added. This specified the circle of twelve golden stars on a blue 
field as its flag, Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” as its anthem, “United in diversity” as 
its motto, and the 9th of May as Europe Day. At the suggestion of German Social 
Democrat Jürgen Mayer, a European Citizens’ Initiative was made possible. The 
Austrian Green Party member Johannes Voggenhuber succeeded in his effort to 
keep the Euratom Treaty out of the Constitutional Treaty; opponents of nuclear 
energy were not to be given a reason to decide against the document.
After final quarrels over the French demand for unanimity in decision-mak-
ing on trade treaties that “could infringe upon the cultural and linguistic diversity 
in the Union,” all members of the convention signed the revised draft on 10 July. 
Many did so only with grumbling and internal reservations, but the overwhelm-
ing majority was convinced that an acceptable compromise had been found, one 
that for the sake of needed success ought not to be reopened. On 18 July, President 
Giscard d’Estaing submitted the convention document in Rome to new Council 
President Silvio Berlusconi.27
When the government conference came together on 4 October, the foreign 
ministers of Spain and Poland demanded that the convention’s draft not be con-
sidered at all but that instead the Treaty of Nice be taken as the starting point of 
negotiations. The Austrian and Finnish representatives joined with them. Pas-
sionate appeals by Fischer and Villepin were needed before the body brought 
itself to accept the Constitutional Treaty as the basis of negotiations. There were 
still demands for retaining the weighting of votes as decided in Nice (Spain and 
Poland) as well as for having one commissioner for each member state (Austria 
and Finland). Disputes over these issues were not resolved at the Council meeting 
in Brussels on 12 and 13 December. Berlusconi, who would gladly have signed the 
convention document as a new “Treaty of Rome,” failed miserably in his efforts 
to mediate between the opposing sides.
A breakthrough in the talks first began to emerge when the Socialist José Luis 
Zapatero replaced the Conservative José María Aznar in elections to the Spanish 
Congress of Deputies on 14 March 2004. The new prime minister immediately sig-
naled his willingness to compromise on the constitution issue, and so his Polish 
colleague Leszek Miller found himself isolated. With new efforts to sound out 
views, the Irish Council president worked out a compromise proposal, which was 
adopted with some modifications after a long struggle at the Brussels Council 
meeting of 17 and 18 June 2004. It retained the principle of the double majority 
27 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Official Journal of the European Union, Information and Notices 
series, C 169 of 18 July 2003.
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but with the quorum of member states raised from fifty to fifty-five percent and 
from sixty to sixty-five percent of the population. Additionally, a majority would 
require the affirmative votes of fifteen states or rejection by fewer than four. For 
the areas of justice and domestic affairs, foreign policy, as well as economy and 
finance, a majority of seventy-two percent was required if the proposal in ques-
tion did not stem from the Commission or from the European foreign ministers, 
respectively.
In the putting together of the Commission, the distinction between voting 
and non-voting members was given up. For the first Commission formed after the 
Constitutional Treaty had been implemented, the Nice regulations would con-
tinue to be in force. Thereafter (that is, from 2014 onward), only two thirds of 
the members states would be represented in the Commission. In regard to the 
multi-year financial framework, the heads of state and of government insisted 
on unanimity in the Council; the transition to qualified-majority voting was only 
incorporated into the treaty text as a possibility. In the annual passage of the 
budget, Parliament’s power to make the final decision was taken away; instead, 
in the event there was a lack of unity between the Council and Parliament, the 
Commission would have to produce a new draft.28
With these alterations, the treaty lost some of the coherence of the original 
draft from the presidium; and the Union lost some of its ability to act, along with 
some of its democratic legitimation as well. Substantial progress in collectiv-
ization, as many had wanted in regard to foreign and security policy as well as 
finance and budget policy, were not by and large achieved. Yet, compared to the 
Treaty of Nice, all the organs of the Union had been substantially strengthened 
structures and procedures harmonized and at least partially tightened up as well. 
Above all, however, there was success in getting closer to the principle of the 
equivalence of majority decision-making and equal co-decision-making by Par-
liament. This prevented the danger that with the expansion of the Union’s ability 
to act, its democratic legitimation would be reduced.29 This was made possible, 
firstly, by Chirac’s willingness to give up Gaullist dogmas and the resulting con-
vergence of the French and German governments on institutional questions. Sec-
ondly, however, an essential role was played by the strategic abilities of Giscard 
d’Estaing and his colleagues on the presidium. The representatives of the gov-
ernments were torn out of their national program schemata and were confronted 
28 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 29 Oct. 2004, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2005.
29 On the significance of this principle, see Wilfried Loth, “Die Verfassung für Europa in his-
torischer Perspektive,” in: idem. (ed.), Europäische Gesellschaft. Grundlagen und Perspektiven, 
Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005, pp. 245–264.
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with the majority opinions of elected representatives of the people, which they 
could not well defy.
The “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” was signed on 29 October 
2004 by a total of now twenty-five heads of state and of government of the Union. 
The ceremony took place in the same Hall of the Horatii and Curiatii in the Palazzo 
dei Conservatori on the Capitoline Hill in Rome in which the Treaties of Rome had 
been signed in 1957. It was probably without conscious intent that the signatories 
thereby signaled that they stood in continuity with European treaty creation up 
to that point. The European Union had thus far exhibited a constitutional quality 
insofar as it possessed an autonomous sovereign authority. Nevertheless, it did 
not become a state via the new treaty—the member states and their parliaments 
remained the masters of the treaty and its potential further development. Despite 
what the first-time use of the term “constitution” in the title of the treaty sug-
gested, the heads of state and of government had in actuality approved a consti-
tutional improvement, not the issuance of a constitution.30
From Prodi to Barroso
Hopes for strengthening the international profile of the European Union, which 
Tony Blair, Joschka Fischer, and others had linked to the Eastward expansion 
and the project for a constitutional treaty, were only partially fulfilled, however. 
Yet, it was certainly the case that the formation of a European rapid-deployment 
force, a permanent military committee, and a military staff (decided on in 1999) 
were proceeding as planned. Common standpoints among the EU countries on 
foreign-policy issues became more frequent occurrences, thanks not least of all to 
the energetic and suave engagement of High Representative Javier Solana. When 
voting in the United Nations, the representatives of the EU countries succeeded in 
taking common positions approximately seventy-five percent of the time; and the 
High Representative received the right to speak in the Security Council. In January 
of 2003, the EU took over the international police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
from the UN. Three months later, the EU assumed the military mission in Mace-
donia from NATO. From June to September 2003, the EU undertook a quickly-ar-
ranged peacekeeping action in the civil war in the province Ituri in eastern Congo. 
Altogether, some nineteen police or military missions in crisis regions had been 
30 Cf. Franz C. Mayer, “Verfassungsstruktur und Verfassungskohärenz – Merkmale europäi-
schen Verfassungsrechts?” in: Integration 26 (2003), pp. 398–413; in general, Werner Weidenfeld 
(ed.), Die Europäische Verfassung in der Analyse, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005.
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initiated up to the summer of 2007, and some had also been completed by that 
point.31
These missions received little attention from the public, however. They 
remained modest in scope and at least in the beginning still suffered from difficul-
ties in coordination and conflicts over financing. After the attacks of 11 September 
2001, the EU did succeed in developing a coherent strategy for combating inter-
national terrorism; this was accomplished under the aegis of Council President 
Guy Verhofstadt. Due to deficient military preparation and differing viewpoints, 
however, it was not in a position to offer a common strategy for waging war and 
so counter the American option for a “coalition of the willing” to fight the Taliban 
in Afghanistan. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, thirteen EU members and 
four accession candidates took part in forming an international protective force at 
the beginning of 2002, coordinated by the British, that was to safeguard the con-
struction of a liberal-democratic state. A special representative of the EU made 
efforts—not always successful—to coordinate the national activities on site.
The European position in world politics was further weakened when Blair, 
Chirac, and Schröder fell out in the second half of 2002 over the issue of mili-
tary action against the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. In the autumn of 2001, 
the “Big Three” of the EU were still repeatedly coordinating with each other 
in the struggle against terrorism and thereby provoking dissatisfaction among 
the smaller EU partners. Now, however, Blair decided to embrace the American 
option for energetic action against the Iraqi program for producing weapons of 
mass destruction—even if as a consequence there would be a war that toppled the 
Saddam regime. For the British leader, Saddam was a “monster” who threatened 
the peace in the Middle East and who unhesitatingly supported the terrorism of 
Al Qaida. Moreover, Blair regarded it as fatal to part the company with his Amer-
ican ally on an issue that for the latter had become existential after the shock of 
11 September 2001. 32
In contrast, Chirac and Schröder were convinced that Saddam posed no 
immediate danger and that military action to remove him from power would only 
make the struggle against terrorism and the efforts to achieve peace in the Middle 
East more difficult. At the same time, they saw in the insistence on collective 
action by the United Nations an opportunity to cut down to size the high-handed 
unilateralism of President George W. Bush’s administration and to give new 
31 Cf. the compilation in Mittag, Kleine Geschichte, pp. 301–303; in general, Christopher Hill, 
“Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001,” in: Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies 42 (2004), pp.  143–63; Mathias Jopp and Peter Schlotter (eds.), Kollektive 
Außenpolitik – Die Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007.
32 Tony Blair, A Journey, London: Hutchinson, 2010, p. 423; see also pp. 395–476.
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impetus to the vision of an independent Europe in world politics. After a meeting 
in Schröder’s private apartment in Hanover on 7 September, the French president 
and German chancellor declared that there could be no deviation from the deci-
sion of the Security Council to have inspectors once again search for weapons 
of mass destruction in Iraq. With an eye to the ongoing parliamentary election 
campaign in Germany, Schröder added that the Federal Republic would under no 
circumstances participate in a military action against Iraq. Chirac avoided such a 
categorical commitment for the time being, likewise with an eye to the uncertain 
outcome of the German elections.33
In light of the hostility of broad segments of the European public to the unilat-
eral action of the Bush administration against the “axis of evil,” Paris and Berlin 
regarded it as opportune to propose to the European Convention “the continued 
development of the ESDP into a European Security and Defense Union.” In a 
joint paper of 22 November, French Foreign Minister Villepin and his counterpart 
Fischer sketched out a union that would not only take on crisis missions if NATO 
as a whole was not involved but also would guarantee “the security of its territory 
and its people” and contribute to “the stability of its strategic environment.” In 
order to become fully capable of acting, the Europeans not only ought to increase 
their efforts to modernize their armaments; but the Union ought also to develop 
its own command structures parallel to NATO.34
At the same time, Commission President Romano Prodi began to make public 
criticism of the British alignment with American unilateralism and to advocate 
a Europe “with a single voice on all aspects of external relations.” In a speech to 
the European Convention on 5 December, he called on the heads of government 
to “act on their commitment to make Europe a superpower,” to “build the first 
true supranational democracy in the world.” As he continued, “speaking with 
one voice is essential to defend Europe’s social model in a globalised world and 
protect our values.” Particularly targeting the British government, he warned 
against hopes of having influence via nurturing the “special relationship” with 
Washington. The British ought to join in the efforts of the other Europeans in 
creating Europe because “Britain’s full participation in Europe was required if the 
two continents were ever to develop into a partnership of equals.” 35
33 Chirac, Le temps présidentiel, pp. 372ff. Cf. idem. pp. 361–401; Joschka Fischer, “I am not con-
vinced.” Der Irak-Krieg und die rot-grünen Jahre, Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Wisch, 2011, pp. 151–153.
34 Europäischer Konvent: Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Vorschläge für den Europäischen 
Konvent zum Bereich Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, CONV 422/02, 22 Nov. 
2002.
35 “Prodi Seeks Strong Power for Brussels,” 5 Dec. 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu-
rope/2545331.stm.
396   Constitutional Struggle and Euro Crisis, 2001–2012
In the meantime, Tony Blair was working to escape from the threat of isolation 
by seeking support for his position on the Iraq issue among his European allies. 
He was relatively successful in this. He published a declaration in The Times 
of London on 30 January 2003 in which he warned of “the continuing threat to 
world security by the Iraqi regime” and the breakdown of trans-Atlantic relations, 
calling for the “disarmament” of Saddam’s regime. This declaration drew support 
not only from conservative Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar along with 
his Atlanticist-oriented Portuguese colleague José Manuel Barroso, Danish Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. 
It was also the case that the heads of state or of government of the three largest 
accession candidates lent their support to Blair’s appeal: Leszek Miller of Poland, 
Václav Havel of the Czech Republic, and Péter Medgyessy of Hungary.36 Con-
cerned about France and Germany affiliating with Russia, these leaders made 
use of the opportunity to demonstrate autonomy in the face of a feared Fran-
co-German dominance. A few days later, the other candidate countries in the East 
voiced similar views in the framework of a declaration of the “Vilnius Group.” 37
For the advocates of an autonomous Europe, that was a nasty surprise and 
a bitter setback. Bush’s Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld poured salt in the 
wound by deriding France and Germany as representative of the “old Europe,” 
which time had passed by: “If you look at all of the European NATO members, 
the center of gravity has shifted to the east. And there are many new members 
there.”38 With a veto in the UN Security Council on 10 March, Chirac was able to 
prevent the legitimization of an attack on Iraq through a resolution of the United 
Nations. Nevertheless, the “old” Europeans were powerless in the face of the 
opening of the war on 20 March, and they came under heavy attack from the 
“Atlanticists.” US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that Russia was to be 
“forgiven,” France “punished,” and Germany “ignored” in the future.39
A lack of support from the governments of the Eight did not prevent Chirac and 
Schröder from further advancing the project of an independent defense. At Belgian 
initiative, they met on 29 April with Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt and his 
Luxembourgish colleague Jean-Claude Juncker in Brussels to discuss details of the 
path toward a defense union. In anticipation of the union, the four agreed “to get 
36 German translation in: Internationale Politik 58/3 (2003), p. 79. 
37 Declaration of 5 Feb. 2003. On this and the following, cf. Mathias Jopp and Sammi Sandawi, 
“Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 
2002/2003, pp. 241–250.
38 Press conference of 22 Jan. 2003, U.S. Department of Defense. Presscenter: News Transcript, 
22 Jan. 2003.
39 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 April 2003.
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going with various concrete initiatives”: a “rapid response capability,” a strategic 
air command, a common ABC defensive capability, a system of emergency relief 
aid, and European training centers. By the summer of 2004, there was above all, 
however, to be the creation of the “nucleus of a collective capability for planning 
and conducting deployments.” In concrete terms, it was planned that this central 
command would be based in the Belgian town of Tervuren.40
Atlanticist-oriented observers attempted to make the meeting in Brussels 
laughable by dubbing it a “praline summit.” Yet, the governments of the Eight 
increasingly came under pressure in their own countries; also, the vision of a 
common European foreign and security policy gained more plausibility when the 
victorious troops had found no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and when a 
difficult-to-comprehend civil war among Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds broke out after 
the dictator’s fall. In October of 2003, even Blair showed tendencies toward agree-
ing to the creation of an autonomous command center.41
It did not come to that however because Bush was able to make it clear to 
the British premier that he would regard such a step as a splitting of NATO. In 
the end, Fischer and Villepin were nevertheless still able to put through in the 
constitutional convention the expansion of increased cooperation in security 
and defense policy. At the European Council in Thessaloniki on 19 and 20 June 
2003, the heads of state and of government authorized the creation of a Euro-
pean armaments agency. At the Brussels Council meeting of 12 and 13 December, 
there was approval for a “European Security Strategy” prepared by Solana and 
his staff. Here, the EU committed itself explicitly to a world order “which rests 
on an effective multilateralism” and called for improving Europe’s ability to act 
through better coordination among the members, increasing the allocation of 
civil resources, and improving the building of “more flexible mobile deployment 
forces.”42 None of this brought the defense union any closer, but security policy 
was given substance.
Blair’s ambition of having his British compatriots, even if they did not partic-
ipate in the monetary union, lead the development of a powerful common foreign 
and security policy at the center of the Union fell by the wayside. After he had so 
decidedly taken the side of Bush in the dispute over the Iraq War, his appeals for 
40 Gemeinsame Erklärung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburgs und Belgiens zur Europäi-
schen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Brussels, 29 April 2003.
41 Stephen Wall, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2008, pp. 172–175; Hans Stark, La politique internationale de l’Allemagne. 
Une puissance malgré elle, Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2011, p. 139.
42 Europäischer Rat: Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie. Ein sicheres Europa in einer besseren 
Welt, Doc. 1088/03, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003.
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a united Europe that would play a strong role in world politics no longer had cred-
ibility. The Conservatives let themselves be seduced by their American political 
counterparts into placing their hopes wholly in a close alliance of Great Britain 
with the US. In the public sphere the reigning Euro-skepticism mutated into 
nothing less than hysterical hostility to Europe. “Newspapers with a combined 
circulation of eight million,” as Blair recalled, “were absolutely, totally, and hope-
lessly hostile and reported completely subjectively about it. For them, it was very 
simple: Everything that Brussels favored was bad for the British. The Murdoch 
press was especially malicious.” Given that the British, as Blair felt, “had stopped 
loving me,” he was no longer in a position to fight against it.43
The disputes between Blair on the one hand and Schröder and Chirac on the 
other continued to have an effect when in June of 2004 it came to selecting a new 
Commission president. Extending Romano Prodi’s term was out of the question 
because the president now also needed confirmation from Parliament—and the 
new conservative majority there was not of a mind to express support for a repre-
sentative of the left. It was also held against Prodi that the fundamental admin-
istrative reform that Neil Kinnock had gotten underway led to a loss of effective-
ness and creativity among EU bureaucrats in a climate of general suspicion. Prodi 
had understood neither how to create significant authority for himself within the 
administration nor how to attract attention to himself in the public or hold his 
own against the governments. The Commission had not played a meaningful role 
in the development of the Treaty of Nice or in the subsequent negotiations of the 
European Convention. Blair and other “Atlanticists” resented the fact that Prodi 
had taken the opposing side in the Iraq War; for his part, Berlusconi did not want 
to give a rival in domestic politics a platform any longer.
At the Council meeting of 17 and 18 June 2004, Blair and Berlusconi initially 
supported the candidacy of Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten, 
a member of the British Conservative Party; his candidacy was promoted by the 
European People’s Party faction. For fundamental reasons, however, Chirac 
rejected a candidate from a country that belonged neither to the Eurozone nor 
to the Schengen Area. The French president thus underscored the fringe position 
in which the British had in the meantime ended up. Together with Schröder, he 
proposed Guy Verhofstadt. This candidate was however “too federalistic” and 
too anti-American for Blair. Together with Berlusconi, the British prime minis-
ter formed a defensive front, which all the “Atlanticists” joined. A resolution to 
this standoff could have been found in the person of Jean-Claude Juncker, but 
he rejected the idea of leaving his post in Luxembourg for Brussels. The Council 
meeting ended without having nominated a candidate.
43 Blair, A Journey, p. 533.
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After further consultations, Irish Council President Bertie Ahern presented 
José Manuel Barroso as a compromise candidate. The Portuguese prime minis-
ter had indeed made a name for himself as an “Atlanticist” but had also won 
confidence for his consistent efforts to rehabilitate the Portuguese government 
budget. From his beginnings as a Maoist in his youth to his successes as a lib-
eral-conservative prime minister, he had had a brilliant career. With his perfect 
command of French, English, and Spanish, he offered a refreshing contrast to 
Prodi, who could only express himself in his native Italian. Chirac and Schröder 
accepted him perforce, and so he was nominated at a special summit on 29 June. 
The German chancellor clearly had not forgiven Blair for having impeded Verhof-
stadt: “During the dinner at which Verhofstadt’s appointment was blocked, he 
attacked me in a very personal way. I attempted to explain to him that I was not in 
agreement with Verhofstadt’s conception of Europe. It was nothing personal. But 
Schröder made it clear to me that it was personal for him. Period.”44
A portion of the Socialists in the European Parliament continued to reject 
Barroso. Hence, he was unable to win the necessary majority and was compelled 
to make a deal: In order to gain the decisive votes of the liberals, he would refrain 
from giving the commissioner for industrial policy a coordinating function for all 
portfolios related to economic policy, a move that Schröder had demanded. With 
this precondition, he was elected on 22 July. Verheugen, who after the successful 
conclusion of the great Eastward expansion had been proposed by Schröder for 
this key task of the Commission, had to content himself with the title of vice pres-
ident and with a normal share of the industry portfolio.
In the process of appointing members, Parliament put through further changes 
in the composition of the new Commission: Rocco Buttiglione, who was intended 
for the justice portfolio, was rejected due to discriminatory remarks about women 
and homosexuals; Foreign Minister Franco Frattini was given the post instead. 
The Hungarian candidate László Kovács had to switch from the energy portfolio to 
the tax portfolio, and the Latvian candidate Ingrida Udre was replaced by Andris 
Piebalgs, who took over the energy portfolio. Aside from that, Barroso sought to 
ensure the necessary coherence of the Commission, now expanded to twenty-five 
members, by assigning the portfolios himself and not shying away from conflicts 
with governments in the process. Convinced of the necessity of making promo-
tion of economic growth, competitiveness, and employment the centerpiece of 
the new Commission, he saw to it that the portfolios important for those issues 
went to people who shared his liberal viewpoint. Thus, the Dutchwoman Neelie 
Kroes, who came from the private sector, held the portfolio for competitiveness; 
44 Tony Blair, Mein Weg, Munich: Bertelsmann, 2010, p. 590. This passage is not found in the 
English original. On the dispute, Gerbet, Construction, pp. 506–508.
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the internal market was entrusted to the Irishman Charlie McGreevy; and trade 
went to Peter Mandelson, who had provided ideas to Blair.45
The decision to make economic growth the focus of the new Commission was 
proceeded by intense criticism of the results to date of the “Lisbon strategy” that 
had been approved by the European Council in 2000. At that time, the heads of 
state and of government had set the ambitious goal of making the EU “the most 
competitive and most dynamic knowledge-based economic sphere in the world” by 
the end of the decade; they had done so at the urging of Portuguese Council Chair-
man Antonio Guterres, who was advised by the dynamic economist Maria João 
Rodrigues. The weakness in growth that Europe had been experiencing since the 
1990s compared to the US was to be overcome through “open coordination” (read: 
agreement on targets and measures and regular review of them). Additionally, 
it was declared important to create an “information society for all” and a “Euro-
pean area of research and integration,” a “favorable environment for the founding 
and development of innovative enterprises,” as well as “efficient and integrated 
financial markets.” The “modernization of the European societal model” was to 
be advanced by means of investments in education and an active welfare state.46
In the following two years, the targets had been made more precise. In 2001, 
ecological sustainability had been added to the catalogue of goals; in 2002, there 
was agreement to increase expenditures on research and development by 2010 
to nearly three percent of GNP. In actuality, however, achievements in nearly all 
areas remained significantly below the objectives, such that the gap between 
American and European growth widened still further. The Commission appointed 
a group of experts under the chairmanship of former Dutch Prime Minister Wim 
Kok, which presented a provisional appraisal in November of 2004 that came to 
the sobering conclusion that it would not be possible to overtake or even catch up 
with the US by 2010.47
Barroso also saw stronger economic growth, more and better jobs and a rise 
in the quality of life as the key to increased acceptance of the EU and greater 
confidence in its institutions on the part of the population. At the beginning of 
his term, he therefore announced nothing less than a “renewal of Europe” to be 
45 Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2003/2004, pp. 85–87; ibid., 2005, pp. 91ff.
46 Rat der Europäischen Union: Schlussfolgerungen des Vorsitzes, Europäischer Rat (Lissabon), 
23–24 March 2000, SN 100/00. Cf. Daniel Göler, “Die Lissabon-Strategie: Ein europäischer Gestal-
tungsversuch?” in: Christoph Linzbach, et al. (eds.), Globalisierung und europäisches Sozialmo-
dell, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007, pp. 147–166; Maria Joăo Rodrigues (ed.), Europe, Globalization 
and the Lisbon Agenda, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009.
47 Bericht der Hochrangigen Sachverständigengruppe unter Vorsitz von Wim Kok, Nov. 2004, 
Luxemburg 2004.
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achieved via a “revived and newly-oriented Lisbon agenda.”48 It was especially 
the case that he wanted to make labor markets more flexible, modernize social 
welfare systems, improve the qualifications and adaptability of workers, and also 
employ the Structure and Cohesion Fund in a more targeted manner. “Open coor-
dination” was to be more strongly structured via the introduction of a three-year 
cycle: firstly, the provision of “integrated guidelines” by the Commission, then 
development of national reform programs and a Community program oriented 
on them, and, lastly, annual reports on implementation in the member countries 
and at Community level.49
The commitment to national programs and annual reporting, which the 
European Council was willing to embrace in its Brussels session of 22 and 23 
March 2005, led to increased opening of protected areas that had thus far eluded 
the competition of the internal market, for example, telecommunications and the 
realm of local government services. The level of educational attainment and the 
flexibility of the workforce rose. At the same time, however, the number of pre-
carious and temporary employment situations also grew; and the ranks of the 
unemployed fell only marginally—the EU average dropping from 9.2 percent in 
2004 to 7.0 percent in 2008, with great variations from country to country.50 The 
economy grew at a rate of .7 percent per year—sufficient to prevent the gap with 
the US from increasing but too little to reduce it either. The requirements for eco-
nomic growth proved too complex to be promoted with equal effectiveness via 
one unified strategy everywhere. At the same time, deregulation and the market 
focus of educational efforts associated with it posed threats that were not easy to 
ward off: new societal polarizations and a loss of creativity.
The efforts of the Barroso Commission within the framework of the Lisbon 
strategy thus did not contribute to overcoming the loss of confidence in the Euro-
pean project. On the contrary, they fostered the strengthening of an oppositional 
movement that perceived the EU and its institutions as nothing other than agents 
of a globalization aimed at dismantling the European social model and maxi-
mizing capital gains. It was especially within the milieu of militant globalization 
critics of the ATTAC organization along with neo-socialist parties and party wings 
48 Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Strategische Ziele 2005–2009, Europa 2010: 
Eine Partnerschaft für die Erneuerung Europas, Wohlstand, Solidarität und Sicherheit, KOM 
(2005) 12 endgültig, Brussels, 26 Jan. 2005. 
49 Europäische Kommission: Mitteilung für die Frühjahrstagung des Europäischen Rates. Zu-
sammenarbeit für Wachstum und Arbeitsplätze – Ein Neubeginn für die Strategie von Lissabon, 
KOM (2005) 24 endgültig, Brussels, 2 Feb. 2005; Für Wachstum sorgen und Arbeitsplätze schaf-
fen: Ein neuer und integrierter Koordinierungszyklus für Wirtschaft und Beschäftigung in der 
EU, SEK (2005) 193, Brussels, 3 Feb. 2005.
50 Eurostat: File Unemployment Rate, National Level, 2004–2009.
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that such views gained popularity. Such critics deliberately overlooked the fact 
that the Commission also had a concern measures to secure the social cohesion 
of society and, for example, called for “bringing flexibility and employment secu-
rity into a balanced relationship” in the spring of 2005.51
A clear gap loomed between the grandiloquent pronouncements and actual 
successes of the new Commission. Furthermore, Barroso was unable to attain 
much of a profile in other areas of Union policy. Forging coalitions and putting 
through majority decisions were not his forte. It was rather the case that he with-
drew proposals when there was a threat of too intense a disagreement with indi-
vidual governments. “It doesn’t make sense to publish plans if the member-states 
will not do anything with them,” as he said, which dampened the zeal of his Com-
mission colleagues on many occasions.52
On the other hand, Barroso succeeded in consolidating the Commission, with 
inclusion of the members from the many newly-entering countries. Communica-
tion between the different departments of the administration was significantly 
improved, and the decision-making processes within the Commission were tight-
ened up. Many decisions were now reached during informal rounds with the pres-
ident before being confirmed in weekly sessions of the commissioners. Barroso 
“loves to be the center of attention, and he communicates extremely well,” wrote 
the co-author of a study that examined decision-making practices in the Commis-
sion in the autumn of 2007.53 Meetings of the twenty-seven commissioners took 
less time than had the sessions of the fifteen under Prodi. Over 22,000 public offi-
cials of the Commission—even then fewer than the number needed to administer a 
large European city such as Cologne—could once again be credited with efficiency.
The overcoming of internal crises within the Commission, ones that ultimately 
stretched back to the Delors era, found their symbolic expression in the return to 
the Berlaymont Building on the Schuman Roundabout in Brussels in the autumn 
of 2004—more than twelve years after the structure’s closure due to asbestos, after 
the failure of plans to demolish it, and after a costly renovation. Across from it now 
stood the building of the Council of Ministers, named for the early-modern antiquary 
Justus Lipsius and completed in 1996. Since 2001, Parliament had been convening a 
few hundred meters away in an ostentatious glass palace on the Place Léopold; due 
51 Europäische Kommission: Mitteilung der Kommission für die Frühjahrstagung des Euro-
päischen Rates. Zusammenarbeit für Wachstum und Beschäftigung. Integrierte Leitlinien für 
Wachstum und Beschäftigung (2005–2008), Brussels, 2005, p. 6.
52 Quoted from Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, “José Manuel Barroso 2004–2014: The 
cautious reformer in troubled times,” in: van der Harst and Voerman, Presidents, pp.249–276.
53 Ibid. The study was published in February of 2008: S. Kurpas, C. Gron, and P.M. Kaczynski, 
The European Commission after Enlargement: Does More Add up to Less? Brussels, 2008.
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to its half-round middle section reminiscent of a well-known brand of camembert, 
the edifice was soon dubbed “Caprice des Dieux.” Numerous other administrative 
offices and representations had settled in the vicinity. Hence, a well-manicured, 
exclusive residential district dating from the time of rapid industrial expansion in 
the 19th century had gradually been transformed into a government district for the 
Union and was also perceived as such.
The Barroso Commission had a thoroughly-constructive effect on the develop-
ment of the financial framework of the Union for the years 2007 to 2013, which the 
Council, Commission, and Parliament approved on 17 May 2006 in an inter-insti-
tutional agreement. In the run-up to this agreement, the usual tough controversies 
between net-payers and net-receivers as well as beneficiaries and opponents of the 
Common Agricultural Policy were dealt with; the original draft, having been worked 
out by the Prodi Commission, was severely scaled back. The net-payers had pushed 
through a dwindling of the “state ratio,” that is, the claim of resources by the EU 
budget—from a maximum of 1.09 percent of GNP in the year 2006 to a maximum of 
.95 percent in 2013. The Commission was successful however in preserving the ten-
dency toward shifting resources into the new policy areas they had sought. Thus, 
the “Lisbon” spending rose by seventy-one percent and expenditures for Union cit-
izenship by seventy-eight percent, whereas moneys designated for agriculture and 
the development of rural areas dropped by eight percent.
Under pressure from the new member states, Tony Blair had to accept at the 
Brussels Council meeting of 15 and 16 December 2005 that the “British rebate” from 
2009 onward could only be partially applied to the costs of expansion since 2004 
and not at all from 2011. That was equivalent to a reduction in the rebate of approxi-
mately twenty percent. Other member states now also received accession discounts, 
though with time limits. Farther-reaching reforms were put off, though they did 
remain on the agenda: Under public pressure from Chancellor Gordon Brown, Blair 
agreed to the reduction of the “British rebate” only under the condition that the 
Commission be given the task of undertaking a comprehensive review of all aspects 
of EU expenditure and income by 2008–9. Through skillful mediation, Barroso was 
able to win on a series of individual items that were especially close to his heart, 
such as a globalization fund for re-incorporating into working life those who had 
been laid-off. In subsequent negotiations with Parliament, he was willing to find 
savings in the administrative budget that made it possible to increase expenditures 
for research, life-long learning, and Trans-European Networks.54
54 Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2003/2004, pp.  163–167; 2005, pp.  95ff., 171–176; 
ibid., 2006, pp. 92ff., 176–183; Peter Becker, “Die Fortschreibung des Status Quo. Die EU und ihr 
neuer Finanzrahmen Agenda 2007,” in: Integration 29 (2006), pp. 106–121; on the course of the 
Brussels Council meeting, also Blair, Mein Weg, pp. 591–594.
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The Constitutional Crisis
The ratification of the new Treaty of Rome occurred quickly and largely without 
difficulty in many countries, winning approval from broad to very broad majori-
ties. The parliament of Lithuania was the first to approve the treaty, doing so on 
11 November 2004. Hungary followed on 20 December, Slovenia on 1 February 
2005, Italy on 6 April, Greece on 19 April, Estonia (in the first reading) on 9 May, 
Slovakia on 11 May, Austria on 23 May, and Germany on 27 May. In Spain, a refer-
endum on the treaty was held on 20 February, with some 76.7 percent of the voters 
approving it; the parliament confirmed the decision on 11 May.
Blair and Chirac had likewise decided to have the Constitutional Treaty approved 
by referendum. The British prime minister had done so not completely of his own 
free will. The Conservative opposition had demanded such a referendum, and 
Rupert Murdoch had apparently also informed him that if the prime minister did 
not put the treaty up for a vote by the people, then Murdoch would withdraw 
the support of his mass-circulation newspapers for the prime minister. It was a 
surprise to all observers when on 20 April 2004 Blair announced that the voters 
“will be asked for their opinion”; he made this move without any prior consulta-
tion with other heads of government. He feared that without a referendum, the 
treaty would not pass the House of Lords. Even in the House of Commons, he was 
not completely sure of a majority. Additionally, it could be seen that in the next 
year’s parliamentary elections, the Conservatives would profit from a refusal to 
hold a referendum. What remained was a vague hope that a turnaround in public 
opinion regarding EU membership could at last come about through advocacy of 
the treaty. If that did not succeed, Blair would probably have to resign in favor of 
Gordon Brown.55
Blair’s decision put pressure on Chirac. Unlike the situation with the Maas-
tricht Treaties, if France dispensed with a referendum on this treaty while Great 
Britain held one, it would have been difficult to explain to the French public. The 
decision for a referendum, announced during the traditional television interview 
on 14 July 2004, was all the easier for Chirac to make because practically all the 
leaders of French political parties had publicly called for one and because surveys 
indicated a high level of support for the constitution project. An impressive vote 
55 The Guardian, 21 April 2004; Blair, Mein Weg, pp. 547ff., 582; David Gowland, Arthur Tuner, 
and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration since 1945. On the Sidelines, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 176ff.
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for the treaty might even help halt the decline in popularity of the president and 
his party in the face of a continuing recession.56
In the process, Chirac overlooked the fact that the recession gave fertile soil to 
the critics of globalization—who held the EU and its neo-liberal orientation respon-
sible for growing unemployment and cuts in social services—and that this criticism 
could without any great effort be directed against a reform treaty, one which even 
with all the efforts toward coherence had still ended up being quite complex. The 
referendum had hardly been announced when strong polemics developed against 
the alleged attempt to carve in stone the ultra-liberal orientation of Europe. Laurent 
Fabius, onetime prime minister under Mitterrand, could not resist putting himself 
at the head of this criticism so as to win the battle to be Jospin’s successor as leader 
of the Socialist Party and have the presidential candidacy for 2007 decided in his 
favor. Traditional conservative opponents of Europe such as Philippe de Villiers as 
well as opponents of Chirac in his own party even linked the Constitutional Treaty 
to a possible entry by Turkey into the European Union and frightened voters with 
the specter of the impending islamization of Europe.
In March of 2005, the opponents of ratification began to outstrip the advo-
cates. Nor was it helpful that Chirac strictly forbade Barroso, the poster child of 
forced liberalization, to show his colors in the French debate. European Parlia-
ment deputy Daniel Cohn-Bendit of the Greens averred that the opponents of 
the constitution within the alternative milieu were “complètement meschugge” 
(Yiddish for “crazy”).57 Yet such appeals to reason could no longer prevent the 
campaign to strengthen the European Union from becoming a campaign against 
unpopular Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin and Chirac too. Nicolas Sarkozy, 
the leader of the UMP who was impatiently speculating as to the possibility suc-
ceeding Chirac, took cover by differentiating between fatuous EU fundamen-
talists and more levelheaded EU realists of his own cut. On 29 May, some 54.7 
percent of French voters opposed the Constitutional Treaty.
The setback for the reform plans was all the more bitter when three days later, 
on 1 June, the Dutch also rejected the treaty. With some 61.6 percent of the vote, 
the naysayers in the Netherlands had even achieved a significantly larger victory. 
Here too, populist criticism from the right and the left combined with general 
dissatisfaction with a government that had had to make painful budget cuts 
and that had in other respects also drawn much criticism. The rightwing popu-
list party of Geert Wilders, which at the beginning of the year had split from the 
56 Chirac, Le temps présidentiel, pp. 527–529. The criticism from the German side that Chirac had 
“unnecessarily called for a referendum only so as to split the socialist opposition” (according to 
Fischer, “I am not convinced,” p. 246; Hänsch, Kontinent, p. 211), is unfounded.
57 Quoted from Die Zeit, 14 April 2005.
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right-liberal VVD, found great resonance with its warnings against cheap compe-
tition from Eastern Europe and against islamization; the radical leftwing Socialist 
Party around Jan Marijnissen scored points by raising the specter of a “dissolu-
tion of the Netherlands” and its social-welfare model. Although all the parties 
in the government as well as the opposition Social Democrats and Greens had 
voiced support for the Constitutional Treaty, a majority of voters—additionally 
mobilized by the French “no” at the last minute—came out against it, though the 
turnout was low (62.8 percent). The rifts in Dutch consensus democracy, which 
had become all the more apparent since the murder of the rightwing extremist 
Pim Fortuyn in May of 2002, grew still deeper.
As soon as the results of the referendum in France had been announced, 
Council President Jean-Claude Juncker, Commission President Barroso, and Euro-
pean Parliament President Borrell issued a joint declaration in which they called 
for the continuation of the ratification process in those countries that had not yet 
decided on the treaty, despite the negative vote of the French. All EU countries 
were to have the opportunity to ratify the Constitutional Treaty. After the vote in 
the Netherlands, they repeated this declaration; Chirac and Schröder added their 
voices too. French and Dutch voters were to be put under pressure to revise their 
decision, following the model of the handling of the Danish “no” to the Maas-
tricht Treaties. It was to be made clear to them that there would be no renegoti-
ations on a “more social” Europe, which was a prospect that the pro-European 
maximalists among the opponents of the treaty had been holding out.
In fact, the parliament of Latvia did not let the dramatic events in France and 
the Netherlands keep it from ratifying the treaty on 2 June. For Blair, however, 
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by a majority of French and Dutch 
voters was a welcome opportunity to escape the very real danger of a personal 
defeat. “Great news,” as Jack Straw commented on the reports from Paris and 
The Hague.58 While the British opponents of Europe were crowing over this, the 
cabinet decided on 6 June to suspend the ratification process for the time being. 
In light of the vote in two core countries of the Union, the path that had been 
embarked upon with the Constitutional Treaty had to be reconsidered—that was 
Blair’s argument at the European Council in Brussels on 16 and 17 June.
Given the suspension of the ratification process in Great Britain, no clear 
message could any longer be directed to the French or Dutch. True, the Council 
did declare that continuation of the ratification process was not to be called into 
question. At the same time, however, it appealed to all the affected parties to think 
over the situation together. The Council also postponed the anticipated date of 
the treaty’s coming into effect by one year, from 1 November 2006 to 1 November 
58 Blair, A Journey, p. 531.
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2007. In some countries, majorities for the treaty then began to crumble, and their 
governments decided to postpone projected referenda or parliamentary votes, 
respectively—this was the case in Denmark, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic, Portugal, and Ireland. In Luxembourg, Juncker demonstratively persisted in 
holding a referendum planned for 10 July, threatening to resign if there were a 
rejection; the treaty ended up achieving a positive vote of 56.5 percent. That alone 
however would not compel a revision of the decisions in France and the Neth-
erlands nor would the support that came from the parliament of Cyprus (on 30 
June) and Malta (16 July). Neither did conclusion of the ratification process in 
Belgium on 8 February 2006 or in Estonia on 9 May or in Finland on 18 May lead 
to any volte face in public opinion.
As Council president in the second half of 2005, Blair studiously avoided 
any initiative for overcoming the crisis in the ratification process. The “pause to 
think” that he had forced through thus became a “pause in thinking,” in which 
the consensus that had been laboriously achieved in the development of the Con-
stitutional Treaty now faded away. With an eye toward the next parliamentary 
elections in the Netherlands, set for November of 2006, the government around 
Jan-Pieter Balkenende declared the treaty “dead.” Chirac, likewise keeping in 
mind the next electoral hurdle (in this case the presidential elections in May of 
2007), developed the idea of starting from the Nice Treaty in making reforms and, 
furthermore, separating the institutional and content reforms. Sarkozy advocated 
reform in three steps: Initially, near-term reforms as soon as possible to eliminate 
the current grinding of the gears in the Europe of the Twenty-Five, then substan-
tive reforms via the path of increased cooperation and, lastly, the summoning of 
a major new convention after the parliamentary elections of 2009.59
As had been agreed a year earlier, the European Council was to assess reflec-
tions on 15 and 16 June 2006, but it was only possible to decide on extending 
the reflection phase another year. German Chancellor Angela Merkel—Schröder’s 
successor at the head of a grand coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Dem-
ocrats since September of 2005—was given the task of presenting the Commission 
with a report on the status of deliberations and possible future developments in 
the constitutional project; this report was to be submitted at the conclusion of the 
German Council presidency in the first half of 2007 and was to serve as the basis 
for further decisions. This move made it clear that there was to be no decision on 
the issue of further dealings with the Constitutional Treaty until after the elec-
tions in the Netherlands and France.60
59 Jacques Chirac, Declaration at the European Council 15-16 Dec. 2005, www.elysee.fr; Nicolas 
Sarkozy, Speech in Berlin 16 Feb. 2006, www.botschaft-frankreich.de. 
60 European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 June 2006.
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On the other hand, postponing the decision meant that it had essentially 
already been decided how it would turn out: not in favor of new negotiations on 
the basis of the Nice Treaty, as Blair and Chirac ultimately wanted, but rather in 
favor of a minor modification of the reform treaty that would enable the elector-
ate in France and the Netherlands to revise the votes of May and June 2005. From 
the beginning, Angela Merkel had left no doubt as to the fact that to her the sub-
stance of the treaty was not open to negotiation and that she did not regard a divi-
sion into individual parts for negotiation as a promising strategy. As she argued to 
the representatives of the other fifteen states that had already ratified the treaty, 
one should not so easily brush aside the votes of nearly two-thirds of the member 
states. The European Parliament was threatening to block the expansion process 
if the reforms were not carried out as decided upon.
On 17 January 2007, Angela Merkel made clear to the European Parliament 
her aspiration to bring about a solution on the basis of the Constitutional Treaty 
and to hammer out its decisive contours during the June summit at the end of her 
presidency. The details were then to be worked out in a brief government confer-
ence under the Portuguese presidency in the second half of 2007 so that the mod-
ified treaty could then still be passed before the end of the year and could come 
into force before new elections to the European Parliament in June of 2009. She 
found support for this ambitious goal among a gathering of representatives of the 
eighteen countries that had already ratified the treaty (in the meantime, the new 
members Romania and Bulgaria were among them) along with two other coun-
tries that were at base positively disposed toward the treaty (Ireland and Portugal); 
this gathering took place on 26 January in Madrid at the initiative of Zapatero and 
Juncker. The “Friends of the Constitutional Treaty,” as they dubbed themselves in 
a common declaration, proclaimed their resolve to adhere to the substance of the 
treaty, thereby putting the opponents of the treaty on the defensive.61
Council President Merkel joined together with the presidents of the Commis-
sion and Parliament on 25 March 2007 to issue the “Berlin Declaration” on the 
occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. With 
the votes of the twenty supporters of the treaty on their side, Merkel’s emissar-
ies were able to move the opponents of the treaty to include in the document a 
passage in which the organs of the Union declared their intention “to put the EU 
on a renewed, common foundation by the elections to the European Parliament 
in 2009.”62 The chancellor’s roadmap was thereby de facto accepted. Czech Pres-
61 Ministertreffen der Freunde des Verfassungsvertrags: Für ein besseres Europa, Madrid, 26 
Jan. 2007.
62 Text in, among others, Michel Gehler, Österreichs Weg in die Europäische Union, Innsbruck, 
2009, pp.  325–327. Cf. Timo Goosmann, “Die ‘Berliner Erklärung’ – Dokument europäischer 
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ident Václav Klaus, a longtime declared opponent of the Constitutional Treaty, 
distanced himself from this declaration after the fact. In Poland, the Kaczyński 
brothers (Lech Kaczyński as president and his twin Jarosław Kaczyński, initially 
chairman of the new government party “Right and Justice” and from July of 2006 
also prime minister) were critics of Europe and continued to oppose the lack of 
a reference to Europe’s Christian inheritance. That could not however hinder 
Merkel from resolving the issue of what a compromise would look like between 
the “Friends of the Constitutional Treaty” and its opponents from tactical and 
substantive perspectives; she did so in bilateral talks at the highest level.63
The decisive line of compromise was found as early as the run-up to these 
bilateral conversations: After the German government had given up on incorpo-
rating the “constitution” concept into the Berlin Declaration, Nicolas Sarkozy as 
a presidential candidate—with clear recognition of the altered power relations—
backed away without protest from his demand that the treaty package be broken 
into distinct reforms. From the first step of a “mini-treaty” that would do without 
a referendum, the rhetoric of the French election campaign shifted to the “sim-
plified treaty” that dispensed with the constitution concept as well as the inclu-
sion of symbols. On the very day he assumed the French presidency, 16 May 2007, 
Sarkozy sought out Angela Merkel in order to make clear that he would support 
her in the upcoming negotiations. And he did so too: Not without a sidelong 
glance at his own public, to whom he wanted to present himself as the person 
who really had overcome the constitutional crisis, he traveled to London, Brus-
sels, Rome, Lisbon, and Warsaw in order to persuade the heads of government 
there to align themselves with the position on which he and Merkel had agreed.64
With this return of Franco-German cooperation, the way to overcoming the 
constitutional crisis was practically clear. A treaty that did not include an empha-
sis on a constitutional character and therefore did not require ratification via ref-
erendum was in principle also acceptable to Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende. 
The Dutch government that emerged from elections in November of 2006 was a 
coalition of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Christian Union; it only 
called for a kind of veto right for national parliaments over the transfer of new 
tasks to the EU. This meant that the advocates of at least temporary retention of 
Identität oder pragmatischer Zwischenschritt zum Reformvertrag?” in: Integration 30 (2007), 
pp. 251–263.
63 On the organization of the negotiation process, Andreas Maurer, “Die Verhandlungen zum 
Reformvertrag unter deutschem Vorsitz,” in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 43/2007, pp. 3–8.
64 Joachim Schild, “Sarkozys Europapolitik: Das zunehmende Gewicht der Innenpolitik,” in: 
Integration 30 (2007), pp. 238–250; Paul Legoll, Nicolas Sarkozy. Un Européen en action, Paris: 
l’Harmattan, 2012, p. 97.
410   Constitutional Struggle and Euro Crisis, 2001–2012
the Nice Treaty—especially Blair and the brothers Kaczyński—ended up in iso-
lation. It was now only possible for them to seek to separate out from the treaty 
complex some elements that for them clearly went too far. Thus, the British gov-
ernment demanded that the character of a legal personality be taken away from 
the Union and that the Charter of Fundamental Rights be struck out. Beyond that, 
the veto right was not to be so severely limited; and the European foreign minister 
was to be called “High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” as 
heretofore. The Polish government additionally demanded—accompanied by a 
heated campaign under the motto “Nice or death”—that the weighting of votes in 
the Council as decided in Nice be retained.
Little of that could be passed at the Council meeting in Brussels on 21 and 22 
June. It was the case though that the Charter of Fundamental Rights as Part II of 
the treaty was taken out. The new document took on the character of an amend-
ment treaty to the Treaty on European Union (corresponding to part I of the Con-
stitutional Treaty) and to the Treaty on the Founding of the European Communi-
ties (corresponding to part III of the Constitutional Treaty). The legally-binding 
nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights did remain however, even if in a foot-
note to the mandate for the government conference it was maintained that there 
could be no appeal to the charter in British courts. Other than that, only the title 
of the European foreign minister fell by the wayside. Nothing of the position or its 
competencies was changed, and in other respects the substance of parts I and III 
was preserved. Lech Kaczyński stubbornly resisted the introduction of the princi-
ple of the double majority but under pressure from Sarkozy and Juncker assented 
to having it come into force in 2017. When his brother Jarosław declared in a tele-
vision speech from Warsaw that he rejected this compromise, Merkel announced 
that the mandate for the government conference could then be decided without 
Poland. That sufficed to have the Polish prime minister back down.
It was then possible to complete the mandate for the new government con-
ference by the early morning hours of 23 June. The Netherlands was assured that 
there would be notification given to the national parliaments by the European 
Council six months before the expansion of majority voting or of the regular 
legislative procedure.65 The mandate had been formulated in such detail that 
the government conference that met on 23 July under Portuguese chairmanship 
practically had only editorial work to do. The British government was neverthe-
less able to push through some exceptional regulations in the realm of domes-
tic affairs and justice, and Poland joined the British declaration stating that no 
appeals to the Charter of Fundamental Rights would be permitted in national 
65 European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 21-22 June 2007, document number 
11177/07, 23 June 2007: draft IGC mandate.
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courts. The Portuguese presidency energetically opposed all other amendment 
attempts. At an informal gathering of the European Council on 18 and 19 October 
in Lisbon, the final treaty text was passed after eight more hours of negotiation. 
On 13 December, the heads of state and of government along with the foreign 
ministers signed the “Treaty of Lisbon” in a solemn ceremony within the historic 
walls of the Hieronymite Monastery in the Portuguese capital.
For the advocates of strengthening the European Union, the reform treaty of 
Lisbon66 was a belated triumph. Governance of the Union became more demo-
cratic. Its efficiency in some areas was increased; in other areas, the terms of the 
reform ensured that, despite the great expansion, efficiency did not fall below 
the level of Maastricht. Angela Merkel, who with resolute exercise of her lead-
ership role had played the decisive part in overcoming the constitutional crisis, 
received general recognition; on 1 May 2008, she was awarded the prestigious 
Charlemagne Prize of the city of Aachen. The jubilation was admittedly subdued: 
It was less possible to achieve additional transparency and greater closeness to 
the citizenry in a treaty that had to avoid explicit constitutional rhetoric and the 
symbols of European statehood than would have been the case in the treaty of 
2004, which had already been ratified by a majority of the countries involved.
Nevertheless, the new treaty served to help not only the governments in 
Paris and The Hague out of a tight spot but also Blair’s successor Gordon Brown: 
He could now assert that the Lisbon Treaty was not a Constitutional Treaty and 
therefore did not require approval in a referendum. That was indeed contested 
by the Conservatives as well as Euro-skeptics within the ranks of Labour, but the 
campaign for a new referendum did not find any great support in the populace. 
In the House of Commons on 5 March 2008, a motion by the Conservative oppo-
sition calling for a referendum was rejected by a vote of 311 to 248. Six days later, 
the MPs approved the reform treaty by a vote of 346 to 206. Brown remained in 
office, and Great Britain remained in the EU, which was growing stronger. With its 
numerous “opt outs,” however, the UK clearly remained both mentally and polit-
ically on the fringes of the Union. It was no longer conceivable that Britain could 
take on a leadership role as had been envisioned by Blair. That Brown arrived 
late for the signing of the treaty and thus is absent from the official photo would 
prove telling.67
66 Text in, among others, Klemens H. Fischer, Der Vertrag von Lissabon. Text und Kommen-
tar zum Europäischen Reformvertrag, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008. For interpretation, Werner 
Weidenfeld (ed.), Lissabon in der Analyse – Der Reformvertrag der Europäischen Union, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2008.
67 David Allen, “Vereinigtes Königreich,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2009, 
pp. 437–442.
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The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty occurred with large majorities in most 
of the other member states. Only in Ireland did troubles arise: According to a 
ruling by the country’s Supreme Court, a referendum on the amendment treaty 
was mandatory. Opponents of the treaty falsely claimed that the Lisbon Treaty 
endangered tax sovereignty as well as the ban on abortion and euthanasia, along 
with the neutrality of the country. There were also polemics against the alleged 
dwindling influence of Ireland (loss of a seat in the European Parliament, rota-
tion in the occupancy of the Commission). In a climate of general distrust of the 
government, the result of the referendum on 13 June was a negative majority 
of 53.4 percent with a turnout of 53.1 percent, which was higher than originally 
anticipated.
The repeated “no” in a referendum gave rise to despair and perplexity for a 
short while. The old fronts once again emerged: Czech President Klaus declared 
the treaty “dead”; his Polish counterpart Kaczyński announced that he would for 
the time being not sign the treaty given that the Irish voted had made it “irrel-
evant.”68 On the other side, such figures as Jürgen Habermas called upon the 
states that were ready for deepening the Union to embark at last upon the path to 
a “European core” and to put up a consistently democratic European constitution 
for a Europe-wide referendum.69
In contrast to the situation after the French and Dutch “no,” the heads of 
state and of government this time insisted that the ratification process must con-
tinue to move forward. The Irish government was only called upon to provide its 
opinion by the next Council meeting. At that gathering in Brussels on 11 and 12 
December, the heads of state and of government then agreed on what seemed 
appropriate—easing Irish approval in a second referendum: “legal guarantees” 
that the treaty would not place limitations on Ireland in its tax policy or its posi-
tion on the abortion issue or in its security and defense policy. Furthermore, the 
treaty was to be revised to the effect that every member state was always to be 
represented by a seat on the Commission.70 The guarantees were given at the 
Council meeting of 18 and 19 June 2009; as to amending the treaty, the leaders 
continued in their position that it would occur on the occasion of the next acces-
sion treaty.
These assurances and concessions were meant to suffice for turning around 
the sentiment in Ireland. Together with a fundamental information campaign as 
to the actual content of the treaty, it was primarily the fear that Ireland could be 
68 Traktat jest martwy. Nie podpiszę go, in: Dziennik 1 July 2008.
69 Jürgen Habermas, “Ein Lob den Iren,” in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 June 2008.
70 European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 11-12 December 2008, document 
17271/1/08, Annex I.
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isolated in the financial crisis that in the meantime had developed that made the 
referendum of 2 October 2009 come out very differently than the previous one: 
With a turnout of fifty-eight percent, some 67.1 percent now voted for the Lisbon 
Treaty. After that, Polish President Lech Kaczyński finally acceded to the demand 
of Prime Minister Donald Tusk (in office since 2007) to sign the treaty, which had 
long before been ratified by parliament. In early November, the Czech Consti-
tutional Court rejected a complaint filed by Czech opponents of the treaty. This 
meant that it could come into force on 1 December 2009—eleven months after the 
date that the heads of state and of government had agreed on in June of 2007 and 
some three years after the original deadline for the Constitutional Treaty to take 
effect.
Consequently, the elections to the European Parliament of June 2009 took 
place within the framework of the Nice Treaty. Once again, turnout fell slightly, 
from 45.5 to 43 percent. Decisive for that was again the extremely low mobiliza-
tion in many Central and Eastern European states; in those areas, only an average 
of 32.2 percent of the electorate went to the polls. In countries that had already 
been members before the EU expansion of 2004, turnout was an average of 52.4 
percent, only just below the numbers in 1999 and 2004. Overall, the parties had 
not understood how to make use of the opportunities for mobilization already 
contained in the Nice Treaty. The European People’s Party did indeed voice its 
support for a second term for Barroso but did not make it a theme in the cam-
paign. The Social Democrats discussed a possible candidacy by their party chief 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen but could not come to agreement in the end. The depu-
ties of the Labour Party as well as the Spanish and Portuguese Socialists openly 
advocated a second term for Barroso. As ever, national themes predominated in 
the campaign; in terms of European politics, only unsophisticated slogans flew 
back and forth.
Both the EPP and the PES lost votes in the election. Among the winners were 
smaller parties from the spectrum of those amicably disposed to integration as 
well as parties skeptical of and hostile to Europe. The results indicated that a 
grand coalition was still possible in the European Parliament, but the weight 
between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats had shifted significantly: 
The Christian Democrats could now form an alternative majority with the Lib-
erals and the new Conservative faction (consisting predominately of conserva-
tives from Britain, Poland, and the Czech Republic). On the other hand, the Social 
Democrats would require not only the Liberals and the Greens but also the Com-
munists and representatives of both Euro-skeptic factions. Following a proven 
model, Polish EPP deputy Jerzy Buzek was elected president of Parliament for 
the first half of the legislative period. For the time being, assumption of the office 
by someone from the ranks of the Social Democrats remained open. In fact, the 
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German Martin Schulz, up to that point chairman of the Socialist faction, took 
office in January of 2012.71
The campaign of the majority of the Social Democrats and Greens against a 
second term for Barroso as the allegedly “weakest Commission president in the 
history of the EU” (in the words of Martin Schulz)72 failed in light of the election 
results. At a “Blaesheim” meeting on 11 June 2009 in Berlin, Merkel and Sarkozy 
agreed to recommend Barroso for a second term; the European Council added 
its voice without any nays on 18 June. This Commission president was a bit too 
much consensus oriented for the tastes of the German chancellor and the French 
president, but in their eyes that was no reason to prevent him from continuing 
to serve.73 Guy Verhofstadt, now chairman of the Liberal faction in the European 
Parliament, signaled the need for clarification regarding the future program of 
the Commission president and hence prevented a vote before the summer recess.
Barroso understood that it was no longer sufficient to offer his services to the 
governments. He promised the deputies that he would in the future exert more 
effort on the social dimension of the integration process, fight for an expansion of 
the budget, and work more closely with Parliament. Beyond that, he announced 
the installation of new Commission members for three tailored areas of responsi-
bility: for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship; for Internal Affairs and 
Migration; and for Climate Action. That was sufficient for him to gain the support 
of the European Peoples Party, the Conservatives, and the Liberals in the vote of 
16 September. Most of the Social Democrats and Greens along with the European 
United Left voted against him or abstained. Thereafter, Barroso fended off down-
right sovereign claims of individual governments over certain areas of responsi-
bility. Michel Barnier, the French Commission member, received responsibility for 
the Internal Market; the German Günther Oettinger had to content himself with 
responsibility for energy.74
Differing conceptions collided when it came to filling the top positions that 
had been added by the Lisbon Treaty. Under no circumstances did Merkel want 
Tony Blair for the office of Permanent President of the European Council, as 
Sarkozy had proposed. For his part, Sarkozy vetoed Jean-Claude Juncker, who 
would have gladly accepted the office—in contrast to his unwillingness to take on 
the Commission presidency five years earlier. The Frenchman had taken offense 
71 Andreas Maurer, “Europäisches Parlament,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 
2009, pp. 47–54.
72 Quoted from the Financial Times, 17 Sept. 2009.
73 Legoll, Sarkozy, pp.169ff.
74 Udo Diederichs, “Europäische Kommission,” in: Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration 2009, 
pp. 73–82; ibid., 2010, pp. 75–84.
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at the Luxembourg prime minister above all because as chairman of the Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) in the summer of 2007, Juncker had stifled 
Sarkozy’s nascent plans for turning away from the stability course. The twofold 
“no” led to unity on a compromise candidate: In the run-up to the informal Brus-
sels summit of 19 November 2009, Merkel and Sarkozy came to agreement on 
Herman Van Rompuy, a Christian Democrat, who had been serving as Belgian 
prime minister for just over a year.75
Barroso played the key role in filling the office of the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: By nominating Catherine Ashton, who a year 
earlier had replaced Peter Mandelson as trade commissioner, he accommodated 
both the Social Democrats and Sarkozy. Barroso offered the French president this 
colleague of Blair’s as compensation for the fact that Sarkozy had been unable to 
put through his preferred candidate for the Council presidency.
The year before, Sarkozy had made use of the French Council presidency to 
give new impetus to Common Foreign and Security Policy: In the conflict between 
Georgia and Russia, which in early August 2008 had escalated into a military 
confrontation, Sarkozy—in discreet agreement with his most important Euro-
pean partners—mediated first an armistice (12 August) and then a withdrawal 
of Russian troops from the core Georgian area (8 September). The recognition of 
the rebellious provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia would thereby 
not be called into question by sanctions; the EU only sent observers who were 
to monitor the armistice. In the understanding among the heads of state and of 
government on this course, the High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy, at that time still Solana, had played no role, however.76 With the decision 
to appoint Trade Commissioner Ashton, who had hardly any foreign-policy expe-
rience, Sarkozy could be assured that despite the institutional strengthening of 
the Foreign Office, not much would change in regard to the pre-eminence of the 
governments in the foreign-policy profile of the Union.
This foreign policy profile remained half-hearted in that Sarkozy also failed 
in his effort to have a permanent headquarters of European NATO generals 
created. Under pressure from the military establishment, he and Chirac too had 
originally made that demand as a prerequisite for completing the announced 
return of France into the integrated command of NATO. However, Sarkozy had to 
content himself with less prestigious quid pro quos after Gordon Brown, fearing 
that he would appear too pro-European in the eyes of British voters, had backed 
away from such a step and after Angela Merkel had also refrained from campaign-
75 Legoll, Sarkozy, pp. 173–175; on the confrontation between Sarkozy and Juncker, also Petra 
Pinzler, “Sarkozys Zähmung,” in: Die Zeit, 12 July 2007.
76 Legoll, Sarkozy, pp. 136–142.
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ing for the move. In October of 2008, the Pentagon conceded that France would 
receive command over the planning headquarters in Norfolk in the US state of 
Virginia as well as the headquarters of the NATO Response Force in Lisbon.77 
On 11 March 2009, Sarkozy announced the return of France under these terms; at 
the celebratory summit of NATO on 3 and 4 April, which Merkel’s instigation took 
place in the cities of Strasbourg and Kehl together, he let himself be honored for 
this.
The boundaries of Common Foreign and Security Policy became clear once 
again when in the spring of 2011 Sarkozy urged military intervention on behalf 
of the rebels who had begun fighting against Libya’s dictator Muammar Gaddafi. 
Guido Westerwelle, as foreign minister of the coalition of Christian Democrats 
and Liberals that had succeeded Merkel’s first government in November of 2009, 
made it clear to Sarkozy that the risk of becoming entangled in a protracted ground 
war could not be discounted. He stood by this position with the tacit approval of 
Merkel even when both the government of Barack Obama in Washington and that 
of David Cameron in London came out in support of Sarkozy. When on 11 March 
2011 the UN Security Council voted to support the rebels with air strikes on Gadd-
afi’s forces and on Libyan infrastructure, Westerwelle abstained along with the 
representatives of Russia and China. The strikes were coordinated by NATO and 
carried out primarily by French and British units.78
In order to defend itself against accusations from its allies regarding deficient 
solidarity, the German government in late March decided to send an additional 
three hundred soldiers to Afghanistan to assist in radar surveillance by AWACS 
aircraft. This could not however undo the fact that both sides had once again 
ignored the commitment, contained in the Franco-German Treaty that agree-
ment would be reached on a common position before making fundamental for-
eign-policy decisions. The EU had to be satisfied with activities of second rank: 
It organized the evacuation of EU citizens from the combat areas and engaged in 
humanitarian aid to the Libyan population.
Given the fact that the Germans and other EU members had remained on the 
sidelines, the British drew the conclusion that a further strengthening of Euro-
pean security structures was neither sensible nor necessary: As the success of 
the Libyan rebels had demonstrated, bilateral cooperation between Britain and 
France had worked very well and also seemed to suffice to compensate for the 
clear reduction of American engagement in Europe and the surrounding areas. 
After Gaddafi’s fall in the summer of 2011, Cameron and Sarkozy visited Tripoli 
77 Vincent Jauvert, “Otan: Histoire secrète d’un retour,” in: Le Nouvel Observateur, 2 April 2009.
78 Mathias Jopp and Daniel Göler, “L’Allemagne, la Libye et l’Union européenne,” in: Politique 
étrangère 2/2011, pp. 417–428.
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together for a demonstrative celebration of their victory. The Germans found 
themselves subject to intense criticism regarding their alleged lack of solidarity 
within the alliance, and the dialogue on the development of a common Euro-
pean strategy completely collapsed. Catherine Ashton was not in a position to 
get such a dialogue going once again, nor did she apparently see it as her task to 
do so. Joschka Fischer, who had once dreamed of becoming the first European 
foreign minister, observed with a touch of despair: “One can become frightened 
for Europe.”79
The Euro Crisis
After the belated completion of institutional reform, the European project was not 
only burdened by irritations regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Over the long term, the problems arising from the completion of the monetary 
union would prove more dangerous.
Initially, it seemed as if the monetary union could absolutely fulfill the expec-
tations that people had placed on it. Under the sometimes brusque leadership of 
Wim Duisenberg, who in 2003 succeeded the suave Jean-Claude Trichet, the Euro-
pean Central Bank knew how to hold the inflation rate below two percent. Only 
at the time of the unrest in the financial markets in 2007–08 did it rise somewhat 
above that level, so that the average for the years 1999 to 2010 was 2.2 percent. 
Even if selective price hikes during the changeover gave the impression to many 
consumers that they had been subjected to a pricey new currency, this rate was 
significantly lower than those during the same period in the US (2.7 percent) and 
during the fifty years of the D-mark in Germany (2.8 percent).80
Price stability in connection with the emergence of large and liquid financial 
markets and the disappearance of the interest rate premium for defending the 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the D-mark led to low interest rates. This unleashed a burst 
of growth, especially in the member states of the monetary union that had earlier 
been plagued by inflationary tendencies. The average annual growth in the first 
decade of the monetary union was 3.6 percent in Spain, four percent in Greece, 
and even eight percent in Ireland. France witnessed annual growth of 2.1 percent. 
In regard to the whole Eurozone, the growth rate at an average of 2.2 percent per 
year still lay below that of the US with 2.6 percent—but that was essentially attrib-
79 Joschka Fischer, “Deutsche Außenpolitik – eine Farce,” in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 22 March 
2011. On Fischer’s ambitions, Fischer, I am not convinced, pp. 242, 244.
80 Werner Becker, “Zwölf Jahre Euro. Aus ruhigen Gewässern in stürmische See,” in: Viertel-
jahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 59 (2011), pp. 445–466; also on the following.
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utable to the higher population growth of the US. Per capita growth in the Euro-
zone was 1.8 percent, whereas it was only 1.6 percent in the US.81
The monetary union also led to greater integration among the participating 
economies. For example, the share of trade of the euro countries within the Euro-
zone went from approximately 26 percent of GDP in 1998 to approximately 33 
percent in 2008. It was the case that with most of the member states, intra-EMU 
trade reached a share of fifty percent of imports and exports. Cross-border invest-
ment increased significantly thanks to the expansion of the financial markets and 
the falling away of currency risk. “For example, German investors have increased 
their foreign security investment in euros to just over 600 billion from 1999 to 
September 2007. This was approximately three and a half times more than the 
level of 1999.”82 Without the monetary union, Germany would once again have 
come under strong pressure to raise the value of its currency, with corresponding 
negative consequences for its exports and thus for growth.
The advantages of the euro were so clear that a group of new EU members 
joined the monetary union when the convergence criteria had been met in accor-
dance with the treaty: Slovenia in 2007, Malta and Cyprus in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, 
Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014, and Lithuania in 2015. Denmark linked the exchange 
rate of the krone with the euro, which meant that it de facto participated in the 
monetary union; yet the price that Denmark paid for its fear of a negative vote by a 
majority of its citizens was the inability to have any influence over the bodies gov-
erning the monetary union. Furthermore, the euro advanced to become the anchor 
currency for about thirty-five countries closely intertwined with the EU. Its share of 
the currency reserves of national banks rose from eighteen to twenty-six percent 
over ten years; its share in the circulation of international bonds went from nine-
teen to 31.4 percent. Trade in euros also expanded. As the second most important 
currency in the world after the dollar, the euro thereby grew significantly beyond 
the importance of the D-mark, while the Japanese yen lost considerable weight. In 
global cash circulation, the euro even surpassed the dollar.
However, the weaker member states of the EMU did not make use of the lower 
interest rates for energetic continuation of structural reforms and investments 
in modernization. Instead, they let themselves be led astray into raising wages 
beyond the level of productivity increases and into assuming new debt as well. 
Given the low interest rates, private debt levels also increased significantly. This 
led to growing imbalances in the current accounts of those economies, and as 
soon as these became visible, it led to a considerable spread in interest rates for 
government securities. Whereas Germany’s current account grew by nine percent 
81 Marsh, Euro, pp. 311 and 401.
82 Becker, “Zwölf Jahre Euro,” p. 451.
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of GDP in the first ten years of the monetary union, Austria’s by six percent, and 
the Netherlands’ by three percent, it fell in Finland by three percent, in Belgium 
and Italy by four percent, in France and Portugal by five percent, in Ireland by six 
percent, in Spain by nine percent, and in Greece by no less than thirteen percent. 
Germany not only remained the top export country in the world but also took the 
leading position in the increase in exports within the euro area.83
Efforts to put a check on growing indebtedness remained half-hearted. When in 
2002 Germany found itself in a growth crisis, the Schröder government, as advised 
by economists from all over the world, reacted by increasing government expendi-
tures so as to revive the economy. The consequence was that in Germany too new 
indebtedness grew beyond the three-percent level permitted by the Growth and 
Stability Pact. After this three-percent threshold was crossed for a second time and 
another violation was looming for 2004, the European Commission on 18 Novem-
ber 2003 dutifully demanded a reduction of the structural deficit for the budget 
year 2004 under threat of monetary penalties. Against this, Finance Minister Hans 
Eichel mobilized resistance among the other indebted countries: along with France 
(against which procedures were already underway), also Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Greece. On 25 November, the Ecofin Council agreed to suspend 
the proceedings against Germany and France. Eichel and his French counterpart 
Francis Mer only made voluntary commitments that the deficit for 2004 would be 
reduced in part and would be completely eliminated in 2005.84
In material terms, the voluntary commitments were just a bit below the 
demands of the Commission. In political terms, however, the Stability Pact was 
severely damaged by the suspension of the two proceedings. This was all the more 
the case after the European Court had ruled against that Council decision, and then 
the Council had gone on to pass a reform of the stability pact that considerably 
expanded the scope for assessing budget policy in March of 2005. True, the new 
version specified that members were committed to reducing their budget deficits 
during times of strong economic conditions by 0.5 percent of GDP per year, yet no 
sanctions were passed for cases in which this commitment was not sufficiently kept. 
At the same time, there was an expansion of the list of special circumstances that 
allowed for disregarding penal procedures when the stability goal was not being 
met: It now included factual findings of periods of longer weakness in growth; also, 
there was now a possibility of extending the period of adjustment in cases of exces-
sive deficits beyond the previously-stipulated one-year deadline for a second year. 
That may well have been thoroughly sensible in economic terms. However, together 
83 Marsh, Euro, p. 312.
84 Barbara Bötticher, “Währungspolitik,” in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 
2003/2004, pp. 197–202.
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with the determination that in general all factors that “in the view of the affected 
member state are of significance” were to be taken into account, the upshot was 
that there would be many possibilities for dragging out or even completely blocking 
deficit proceedings that were in fact warranted.85
France actually did succeed in reducing its deficit in 2005 to 3.0 percent as 
promised. In contrast, Germany failed to reach the stability goal in 2005 with its 3.3 
percent deficit and only in 2006 was able to bring it below the three-percent-thresh-
old. Thanks to favorable economic conditions, it was possible to suspend the pro-
ceedings against the other budget violators over the course of 2007. When the Euro-
pean economies suffered a considerable downturn in the wake of the worldwide 
financial crisis in the winter of 2008–09, however, deficits in almost all Eurozone 
countries quickly rose well above the three-percent-threshold once again. On the 
one hand, government receipts fell, while considerable sums had to be invested in 
stabilizing the banking system and in promoting economic growth. In Germany, 
the deficit climbed to 3.3 percent again in 2009, in Austria to 4.1 percent, in Italy to 
5.4 percent, in France to 7.5 percent, in Portugal to 10.1 percent, in Ireland to no less 
than 14.2 percent, and in Greece to 15.8 percent.86
This dramatic new debt was not a problem specific to the monetary union. On 
average, the budget deficits of the euro countries were 6.4 percent of GDP in 2009, 
whereas Britain’s deficit amounted to 11.5 percent, somewhat higher than Spain’s 
11.2 percent. Problematic however was that the structurally-weaker countries of 
the Eurozone had greater difficulties getting out of the economic lows, and as a 
result, there was great doubt in the financial markets as to whether they would 
be in a position to repay their debts. Thus, the interest rates demanded for the 
government bonds of these countries rose dramatically even while the rates for 
German bonds, for example, were tending toward zero. It was out of the financial 
and economic crisis in Europe that a government debt crisis developed.
The first country threatened with government bankruptcy stemming from 
these developments was Greece. Here, the loss of credit worthiness had been 
intensified by reckless domestic political maneuvers: The oppositional PASOK 
under the leadership of Georgios Papandreou (son of the legendary prime min-
ister of the accession period) denied the conservative government of Kostas 
Karamanlis support for initial measures to cut the deficit. Then, when PASOK 
won the sped-up elections in October of 2009 and came into power, it vigorously 
demanded new expenditures in order to follow through on its election promises. 
85 European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 22-23 March 2005, Annex II.
86 Compilation from the AMECO Database in Tobias Kunstein and Wolfgang Wessels, “Die Eu-
ropäische Union in der Währungskrise: Eckdaten und Schlüsselentscheidungen,” in: Integration 
34 (2011), pp. 308–322, here, p. 312.
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It then visibly expanded the deficit still further by including the debts of publi-
cally-owned firms in the reckoning and also accused the previous government 
of having knowingly falsified statistics. The Karamanlis government had envi-
sioned a budget deficit of some 6 to 8 percent for 2009, but with these devel-
opments it reached 12.7 percent by year’s end. As it later turned out, even that 
number was too low. The great deviation from previous estimates was sufficient 
to cause severe alarm in the finance markets.87 Banks, insurance companies, and 
pension funds either refused to issue any more loans to the Greek government 
or demanded significantly-higher risk premiums and insured themselves against 
loan defaults. The speculators who sold such default insurance made it still more 
expensive for the Greeks to borrow new money.
The threatened bankruptcy of Greece quickly brought demands for assis-
tance measures onto the agenda of the monetary union. Numerous financial 
firms, not least of all German and especially French ones, had invested in Greek 
government paper and had earned much in the process; such a bankruptcy 
threatened to affect them severely. Above all, however, other weakening member 
states faced the threat of being discredited and hence end up insolvent if specu-
lation on a Greek bankruptcy were to prove true. In contrast, defenders of Euro-
pean monetary stability—among them former chief economist of the ECB Otmar 
Issing—argued that the EMU Treaty explicitly precluded mutual liability among 
the member states.88 The Germans generally felt little inclination to pour their 
money into a bottomless pit, and their chancellor was so dismissive of demands 
for support that the European public dubbed her the new “Iron Lady.”
After Merkel had again rejected any kind of assistance measures during an 
informal gathering of the heads of state and of government on 11 February 2010, 
she had to concede at the Council meeting of 25 and 26 March that coordinated 
bilateral loans to Greece would be possible in the event that refinancing via the 
financial markets were no longer sufficient. However, the decision for that had 
to be unanimous; moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had to be a 
participant in the rescue action. Sarkozy and the ECB had initially rejected that, 
but Merkel insisted on it so that the violation of the “no-bailout” clause of the 
EMU Treaty would not become any too obvious. On the other hand, the chancellor 
gave in a bit to the persistent pressure of Sarkozy to set up a “European Economic 
Government”: Council President Herman Van Rompuy was given the task of pre-
87 “So, What Is the Real Truth about the Greek Catastrophe?” in: New Europe, 22–28 Jan. 2012.
88 Otmar Issing, “Die Europäische Währungsunion am Scheideweg,” in: Frankfurter Allgemei-
ne Zeitung, 29 Jan. 2010.
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senting proposals for improving the “economic-policy governance” of the Union; 
these were to be due by the end of the year.89
By 2 May, after further dramatic negotiations, the European finance minis-
ters, in consultation with the IMF and the ECB and the Commission, had come 
to agreement on the exact nature of the aid to Greece: Up to eighty billion euros 
in loans could be made by the countries of the Eurozone and up to thirty billion 
by the IMF, at an interest rate of five percent in each case. The amount of the 
guarantee by individual countries was based on their proportion of the capital of 
the ECB. Germany therefore had to guarantee 22.4 billion, of that some 8.4 billion 
in the current year and 14 billion in each of the two following years. In return, 
Greece committed itself to a rigorous program of austerity and reform through 
which competitiveness and the ability to service loans were to be achieved once 
again. A troika made up of the Commission, the ECB, and the IMF was to super-
vise adherence to the consolidation commitment.90
At the instigation of ECB President Trichet, the heads of state and of gov-
ernment of the Eurozone in a session during the night of 7 to 8 May decided not 
only on this rescue package for Greece. After Sarkozy had threatened to break off 
the negotiations,91 Merkel also agreed to the creation of a “rescue fund” for the 
entire Eurozone for the next three years so that countries such as Ireland, Portu-
gal, and Spain would not be infected by the Greek crisis. The details of this rescue 
fund were agreed upon by the finance ministers in the wee hours of the morning 
of 10 May: On the one hand, credits of up to 60 billion euros were to be given 
by the Commission within the framework of a “European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism” (EFSM); on the other, credit guarantees by the euro states of up to 
440 billion euros for a three-year “European Financial Stability Facility” (EFSF) 
with its seat in Luxembourg would be able to take out loans on the market with 
favorable terms and pass them on to crisis states. A little later, the IMF pledged a 
further 250 billion euros, so that there would now be up to 750 billion euros avail-
able to defend against speculation targeting euro countries susceptible to crises.
At the same time, the ECB began buying government and private debt of the 
weakening euro countries on the secondary market. This was intended not only 
to help reduce the refinancing costs of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain but 
also limit the threat to German and French banks that held substantial amounts 
of these countries’ bonds. The decision was made in the face of opposition from 
89 European Council: European Council meetings of 25 and 26 March 2010 in Brussels. Presiden-
cy Conclusions, EUCO 7/10.
90 On this and the following, Kunstein and Wessels, “Währungskrise.”
91 Report in Franz-Olivier Giesbert, M. le Président. Scènes de la vie politique 2005–2011, Paris: 
Flammarion, 2011, pp. 193.
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German ECB council members Axel Weber and Jürgen Stark, who perceived it as 
a threat to the focus on stability. However, it served as a kind of first-aid measure 
to calm the markets, promoting confidence in the implementation of government 
decisions, a process that was per force somewhat protracted.92
After the danger of a financial wildfire within the euro area had been elimi-
nated for the time being, a discussion began as to how the stability of the Euro-
zone could be secured over the long term. There would be intense wrangling over 
two ideas during the following months: Firstly, the idea of continuing the rescue 
fund and, secondly, that of increased access at the European level into govern-
ments and countries that wantonly disregarded the focus on stability. Merkel ini-
tially opposed both ideas with an eye toward monetary-policy orthodoxy and the 
mood in Germany. Realizing the catastrophic consequences of a severe reduction 
of the Eurozone—upward valuation that would put a damper on exports, the col-
lapse of financial institutions that had long since been operating across Europe, 
enormous write-downs, along with lasting damage to the European idea—she 
was here following the urgings of Wolfgang Schäuble, who as finance minister of 
the Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition (since November 2009) was aiming at a 
consistent expansion of the monetary and economic union.
At a meeting with Sarkozy in the resort of Deauville on the coast of Normandy on 
18 October, Merkel agreed to continue the rescue fund, with the additional provision 
that private creditors must also be included in the costs of any government bank-
ruptcy in the future. At the same time, the two leaders reached agreement on sharper 
and quicker sanctions against governments that endangered the Community cur-
rency due to excessive debt levels. These were not however to be imposed automat-
ically, as the chancellor and the European Commission had earlier demanded. The 
Commission was to have the right to require deposit payments from governments that 
were dragging their feet on reform; the decision to impose fines was to be retained by 
the Ecofin Council. Member states that were in ongoing violation of the stability pact 
could possibly have their voting rights in the Council taken away.93
The agreement between Sarkozy and Merkel ran into manifold criticism. 
Some argued that the communitization of risk went much too far, while others 
asserted that intervention into national budget sovereignty did not go far enough. 
Nevertheless, the European Council at its Brussels meeting of 28 and 29 October 
agreed in principle to a limited expansion of the Lisbon Treaty to create “a per-
manent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area 
92 See Martin Sedlmayr, “Europäische Zentralbank,” in: Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration 
2010, pp. 95–106.
93 Franco-German Declaration. Statement for the Franco-German-Russian Summit, Deauville, 
18 Oct. 2010.
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as a whole.”94 In configuring it, however, Merkel had to make deletions in two 
respects: Firstly the idea of taking away voting rights was refused as being dis-
criminatory; secondly, the participation of private creditors in financial assis-
tance or debt reductions was left to individual cases. On 16 and 17 December, the 
European Council passed the draft of a corresponding amendment to the Lisbon 
Treaty. From July of 2013, a permanent “European Stability Mechanism” (ESM) 
would take action; and within its framework financial assistance could be given 
with “stringent requirements.”
Three months later, on 24 and 25 March 2011, there followed decisions on the 
financial configuration of the permanent rescue fund: It was to have 80 billion 
euros in basic capital that the euro countries would pay beginning in 2013, along 
with credit guarantees at a level of 620 billion and funds from the IMF of up to 250 
billion. There were not however to be any common securities of the euro coun-
tries, the so-called “euro bonds” that Jean-Claude Juncker had been demanding 
as chairman of the Eurogroup of finance ministers as a means of lowering interest 
rates for and promoting growth in the crisis countries. Merkel argued that such 
common bonds could weaken the willingness of the crisis countries to implement 
reforms and cut spending; at a meeting in Freiburg on 10 December 2010, she 
found support from Sarkozy on this. In fact, the introduction of euro bonds would 
have meant a rise in interest rates not only in Germany but also in France, the 
Netherlands, and Finland.95
In regard to strengthening the Stability Pact, the heads of state and of govern-
ment accepted a compromise at their meeting of 16 and 17 December, one that the 
members of the “task force” under Herman Van Rompuy had agreed upon back 
on 21 October: There were now to be automatic sanctions but only after a period 
of six months during which countries in violation could implement the necessary 
corrective measures, and sanctions would only follow if a majority of the Council 
did not vote against them. Also, the supervisory and sanction mechanism would 
in future be applied not only for preserving the threshold for new debt but also 
the upper limit for total indebtedness. Lastly, governments were to present their 
budget plans to the Commission and the Council, respectively, in the first half of 
the year so that their recommendations could be taken into account in the deci-
sion-making process in the parliaments.96 Augmented with an expansion of the 
system of fines and supervision of macro-economic imbalances, this reform of 
94 European Council: meeting of the European Council of 28 and 29 October 2010 in Brussels, 
conclusions, EUCO 25/1/10.
95 Legoll, Sarkozy, p. 195; Stark, Politique internationale, pp. 270–274.
96 Rat der Europäischen Union: Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe, Brussel, 21 Oct. 2010 
(25.10).
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the Growth and Stability Pact was passed by Parliament and by the Council of 
Ministers on 16 November 2011.97
Going beyond that, Merkel demanded in return for continuing the financial 
guarantees that there be a stronger obligation on the part of the member states 
to pursue economic-policy solidarity and to focus on competitiveness. At the 
Council meeting of 4 February 2011, she and Sarkozy together proposed a “Pact 
for Competitiveness” that called for incorporating a brake on debt in national con-
stitutions, along with a ban on automatic wage adjustments based on the infla-
tion rate, a harmonization of the retirement age, and an equalization of business 
taxes. These demands also met with manifold criticism; Juncker, for example, 
accused the chancellor of wanting to impose the German austerity model on the 
other member states. Merkel and Sarkozy, who had been somewhat contemptu-
ously dubbed “Merkozy” due to their partnership, had to accept that the Euro-
pean Council on 24 and 25 March approved only a “Euro Plus Pact” that included 
the obligation “to implement in national law the budget provisions of the EU con-
tained in the Stability and Growth Pact.” Decision-making on concrete measures 
for increasing competitiveness and convergence was to be reserved for annual 
meetings of the Council. Not all EU member states voted for the pact: Aside the 
seventeen euro states, only Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Romania made these commitments.98
Under the pressure of circumstances in the summer of 2011, Merkel acceded 
to Sarkozy’s demand for stronger economic governance of the Eurozone. After 
a meeting in Paris on 16 August, both leaders repeated their call for including a 
brake on indebtedness in national constitutions—this time limited to the seven-
teen euro countries, however; those national regulations were to follow within 
one year, that is, by the summer of 2012. At the same time, the two advocated 
establishment of “genuine economic governance” of the Eurozone in the form of 
a European Council of the Seventeen. At least twice per year, the heads of state 
and of government of the euro countries would assess measures for adhering to 
the Stability Pact and for averting crises.99 Several weeks later, in light of the 
further need of financial resources for the rescue fund, Sarkozy gave up his oppo-
sition to automatic imposition of sanctions and thereby also his opposition to 
strengthening the supranational level of crisis management.
97 In the form of five regulations and a guideline (the so-called “Sixpack”), printed in Amtsblatt 
der EU, Nr. L 306, 23 Nov. 2011, pp. 1–47.
98 European Council: European Council meetings of 24 and 25 March 2011 in Brussels. Presiden-
cy Conclusions, EUCO 10/1/11.
99 See the joint Franco-German letter to EU President Herman Van Rompuy, 16 Aug. 2011, pub-
lished in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 17 Aug. 2011.
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The joint threat by Merkel and Sarkozy to seek treaty amendments with only 
the seventeen euro states100 led to a willingness on the part of all EU states to 
accept a stronger commitment to stability in the end—all states except Great 
Britain, as it turned out at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 December 2011. After 
the electoral defeat of Gordon Brown in May of 2010, David Cameron had formed 
a coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. With an eye 
toward the growing Euro-skepticism in his party, Cameron insisted that in return 
for strengthening the Stability Pact there also be a loosening of the commitments 
in social and employment policy. After failing to push this through, he rejected 
further amendment of the Lisbon Treaty.
The other twenty-six heads of state and of government thereupon agreed to 
an intergovernmental “fiscal contract.” This contained, firstly, the stipulation 
that sanctions automatically be imposed on states with excessive deficits as soon 
as the Commission had determined that permissible levels had been breached; 
deviation from this automatic imposition of sanctions would only be possible if a 
qualified majority of the Council opposed sanctions. Secondly, participants in the 
fiscal contract would pledge to hold their annual structural budget deficit below 
.5 percent of GDP (countries with a total indebtedness of significantly less than 
sixty percent of GDP would pledge to keep the level under one percent). This was 
“preferably” to be anchored in national law but there was no compulsion for it to 
be at the constitutional level. If a state did not adhere to the commitment to intro-
duce this brake on debt and if charges were filed, it could be punished with fines 
of up to .1 percent of GDP by the European Court. This fiscal contract was passed 
on 2 March 2012 and came into effect on 1 January 2013. Along with Britain, the 
Czech Republic opted not to participate at the last minute.101
Meanwhile, Merkel’s repeated hesitation as well as all-too-draconian auster-
ity measures, and the unclear signals coming from the half-hearted decisions of 
the heads of state and of government had led to a situation in which the Greek 
crisis worsened and other countries also ended up in refinancing difficulties. In 
the autumn of 2010, the threatened collapse of three of the four national banks 
in Ireland compelled the Irish government to be the first to seek assistance from 
the temporary euro rescue fund. On 28 November, loans of altogether 85 billion 
euros for Ireland were approved. In the spring of 2011, Portugal had to appeal for 
help after the failure of a consolidation package in parliament had led to a vola-
100 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 Dec. 2011.
101 Cf. Friedrich Heineman, Marc-Daniel Moessinger, and Steffen Osterloh, “Feigenblatt oder 
fiskalische Zeitenwende? Zur potenziellen Wirksamkeit des Fiskalvertrags,” in: Integration 35 
(2012), pp. 167–182.
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tile climb in interest rates for government loans. On 17 May, up to seventy-eight 
billion euros were granted in support.
Further assistance payments were necessary for Greece after consolidation 
measures had led to a severe increase in unemployment along with a drop in con-
sumption and tax receipts. The Germans (together with the Dutch and the Finns) 
initially refused to grant the aid. Only when in the early summer of 2011 the bank-
ruptcy of the Greek government once again became more likely and speculators 
were already eyeing Spain, Italy, and Belgium did Merkel find herself willing to 
support new assistance. In consideration of the pressure of public opinion in 
Germany and the opposition of her own government coalition, she did however 
insist once again that private creditors participate in the assistance action. She 
was able to push this through in this individual concrete case: After the banks 
had agreed to give up twenty-one percent of the amount they were owed and had 
granted longer repayment terms for Greece (which amounted to a loss of some 
fifty billion euros) the heads of state and of government of the Eurozone on 21 
July approved—after six hours of tough negotiations—a package of longer repay-
ment terms, lower interest rates, purchases of debt, as well as guarantees for the 
remaining claims of private investors amounting to a total of 109 billion euros. 
Beyond this, the term of the EFSF guarantees for Greek loans was extended (from 
7.5 to thirty years) and the interest rate on EFSF loans was lowered (from 4.5 to 
approximately 3.5 percent). The EFSF itself was accorded the possibility of buying 
the government paper of ailing euro countries and taking preventative action to 
ward off an emergency in a euro country.102
Three months later, it became clear that this package of measures would not 
be sufficient to give Greece a prospect of bringing its debt under control. Merkel 
now insisted on an expansion of the sacrifice by private investors from twen-
ty-one to fifty percent. At the same time, the guarantees for the remaining private 
debt were raised to 30 billion euros. The volume of the second government assis-
tance package thereby rose from 109 to 130 billion euros. It was enjoined upon 
the banks to raise their core capital ratio by the middle of 2012 to nine percent so 
that they could deal with the losses from this debt reduction. However, there was 
not to be a doubling or even tripling of the EFSF credit guarantees, as Sarkozy 
had called for, with the critical situation in Italy and Spain in mind. Nevertheless, 
EFSF guarantees could from now on be employed to collateralize government 
bonds in crisis countries preferentially at twenty or twenty-five percent.103
102 European Council: Statement by the heads of state or government of the euro area and EU 
institutions, Brussels, 21 July 2001.
103 Euro Summit statement, 26 Oct. 2011.
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Among the measures approved at a meeting of the heads of state and of gov-
ernment of the euro countries during the night of 26–27 October was also the 
expansion of the supervision of Greek reform measures by the “Troika” consist-
ing of the EU Commission, the EFSF, and the IMF; the commitment to further 
reform efforts; and a call for the Greek opposition to support this commitment. 
When opposition leader Antonis Samaras rejected that and when similar views 
manifested themselves within the ruling PASOK, Prime Minister Papandreou 
on 31 October announced a referendum on the decisions by the summit—to the 
dismay of all the euro partners. Under pressure from them, he had to retract that 
announcement on 4 November and yield to a transition government under former 
ECB Vice President Loukas Papademos. This government accepted the reform 
package, whose details were finalized in negotiations by the spring of 2012. It 
took another six months full of nervous tension (until the formation of a govern-
ment after the elections of 17 June 2012) before a parliamentary majority emerged 
that was serious about implementing the package.
The government made up of conservatives, PASOK, and the Democratic Left 
with Samaras as the new prime minister did however demand two additional 
years for the agreed-upon debt reduction: Less-drastic cuts were to increase the 
chances for a return to economic growth. The finance ministers of the Eurozone 
could not easily reject that even if it would of necessity lead to higher burdens for 
creditors. IMF head Christine Lagarde therefore demanded that after the private 
debt write-off there also be a partial write-off of government debt. The German 
finance minister opposed this, once again keeping in mind the voters and the 
critics of assistance for Greece in the government coalition. After long wrangling, 
the euro finance ministers agreed on 26 November 2012 to finance a modified 
assistance package by means of interest-rate reductions, forbearances, sacri-
fice of profits from interest on bonds that the ECB had issued, and use of credits 
for buying back bonds from private creditors at thirty-five percent of face value. 
Further, the prospect of a debt reduction for 2014 was de facto held out—under the 
condition that Greece shows a clear budget surplus (not including debt service) 
up to that time and that consequently no further loans would be necessary.104
The modification of the assistance to Greece did not however mean that the 
danger of infection in other weak euro countries had been eliminated. Investors 
were less and less willing to make long-term investments in Portugal, Spain, or 
Italy. As a consequence, it was not only interest rates for government loans that 
rose (exacerbated by the private debt cuts in Greece) but also rates for private 
loans. Reform measures aimed at reducing structural deficits in these countries 
also slowed growth and further increased the need for interim financing. The call 
104 Eurogroup statement on Greece, 27 Nov. 2012.
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for communitizing the debts consequently became all the louder, and Merkel 
countered with the demand that European access to national budgets must also 
become even stronger. Views collided at an informal working lunch in Brussels 
on 23 May 2012 to which Van Rompuy had invited all twenty-seven heads of state 
and of government. The Council president, along with Commission President 
Barroso, Eurogroup head Juncker, and new ECB President Mario Draghi were 
given the task of presenting practicable proposals for the long-term stabilization 
of the euro and the EU, to be submitted by the next Council meeting in late June.
In its report of 26 June, this group of four first of all proposed the creation of a 
European bank union, which would include European supervision of banks with 
right of access to national banks along with a common deposit guarantee system 
and a liquidation fund for ailing banks. The report also advocated “a qualitative 
move towards a fiscal union”: Right of access to national budgets was to open a 
pathway to a collectivization of debts. Nothing was said as to how any of this was 
to look; the four only noted that it would be possible to consider various forms 
of fiscal solidarity and that a fully-developed fiscal union, which would perhaps 
exist in ten years, would presuppose the creation of a kind of European finance 
ministry to administer a European budget. The European Parliament and the 
national parliaments would naturally have to be wholly included in the process 
of deciding on this budget.105
In their meeting of 28 and 29 June, the heads of state and of government 
accepted Merkel’s call to “consider as a matter of urgency at the end of 2012” the 
setting up of European bank supervision. In return, the chancellor declared that 
she was in agreement that the ESM (which according to a Council decision of 
December 2011 was to come into effect in the current year) be given the authority 
to recapitalize ailing banks directly “when an effective supervisory mechanism 
is established.”106 There was once again contentious discussion of further steps 
toward a bank and fiscal union. The heads of state and of government were able 
to commit themselves to the principle “of taking the necessary measures in order 
to secure financial stability, competitiveness, and prosperity in Europe.” Van 
Rompuy was commissioned, in collaboration with the three other presidents and 
in close consultation with the governments, to develop a “specific timetable with 
105 European Council. The President: Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. Re-
port by the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, Brussels, 26 June 2012, 
EUCO 120/12.
106 Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June 2012.
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specification of dates” for the necessary decisions and treaty amendments by the 
end of the year.107
The progress toward deepening the monetary union that was contained in 
these decisions was however somewhat obscured: Italy’s Prime Minister Mario 
Monti, who after Berlusconi’s fall in November of 2011 undertook a serious 
program to improve his country’s budget situation, employed an adroit maneu-
ver to get the chancellor to agree to the issuing of bank loans and the purchase of 
ailing government bonds by the ESM even without negotiating additional require-
ments: He made his agreement to a new growth pact, which the oppositional 
German SPD wanted as the prerequisite for ratification of the fiscal package and 
the ESM, dependent on Merkel’s acceptance of this easing of access to ESM finan-
cial assistance. Suddenly, the chancellor stood as the loser vis-à-vis Monti and 
new French President François Hollande, who had advocated the growth pact: To 
his own public, Monti could present himself as the victor—the person who had at 
last wrestled from the iron chancellor an escape from the austerity trap.
The ECB Council decided on 6 September to buy up the government bonds 
of ailing euro countries on the secondary market once again. This was because 
the then-current ESM financial framework was not sufficient to supply funds to 
Ireland, Portugal, and Greece along with Spain and Italy, and because a majority 
in the Bundestag for providing more funds was harder to find than ever after the 
humiliation of Merkel. In presenting this decision, ECB President Draghi declared 
that “there are no ex-ante limits on the amount” of such purchases. However, 
they were only to occur under the provision that the affected country submit itself 
to an ESM regime and that it adhere to agreed-upon reform restrictions stemming 
from it. This commitment did not seem secure enough to Bundesbank President 
Jens Weidmann and so, like his predecessor Axel Weber at the time of the first 
purchase action in May of 2010, he voted against the decision.108
It was in fact the case that the ECB decision, in connection with the ESM’s 
coming into force after a ruling by the German Constitutional Court on 12 Septem-
ber, did allow interest rates to drop in the crisis countries; the first investors then 
began putting new money back into them. This removed much of the pressure to 
act that had been on the leaders at the European level during the spring, and as 
a result, the differing priorities once again emerged more clearly. In Berlin, The 
Hague, and Helsinki, the agreement at the June summit was now interpreted to 
mean that ESM assistance for ailing banks would only apply to future crisis cases. 
Conversely, there was the assumption in Paris and the southern capitals that the 
107 European Council: meeting of the European Council of 13 and 14 December 2012, conclu-
sions, EUCO 205/12.
108 ECB: Press conference and press release, Frankfurt am Main 6 Sept. 2012.
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current crises would of course be included, especially the Spanish banking crisis; 
and there was thus a desire that the bank union be realized on 1 January 2013. 
On the other hand, Merkel and Schäuble urged that there be quick decisions to 
strengthen the right of access to national budgets—in the best case, the summon-
ing of a constitutional convention with a precise mandate and narrow timeframe 
as early as December; François Hollande, for his part, saw no need of that.
The antagonisms became evident in the run-up to the Council meeting of 18 
and 19 October. Seconded by Merkel, Schäuble went public with a proposal that 
the EU monetary commissioners be empowered to reject national budgets that 
violated the agreements on stability policy. Over against that, Hollande main-
tained that the priority was to decide on the banking union, not the fiscal union. 
At the meeting, it was thus only possible to reach an understanding that the deci-
sion for the creation of European bank oversight would be made before the end 
of the year. During the night of 12 to 13 December, the finance ministers of the 
Eurogroup agreed on the details of this “Single Supervisory Mechanism” (SSM): It 
was to begin on 1 March 2014, be located at the ECB, and be responsible only for 
the large, systemically-relevant banks (thus not for other banks of various kinds 
that had rejected a collectivization of their liability risks). The ECB was to have 
authority to examine in advance those banks that were to be refinanced by the 
ESM. This Single Supervisory Mechanism started on 1 November 2014. As agreed 
by the finance ministers and the European Parliament in March 2014 a “Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Mechanism” (BRRM) was to start in January 2015 and be 
completed eight years later on.
The introduction of “an increasing degree of common decision-making on 
national budgets” and a European budget for managing crises were announced 
for the period “after 2014” in the concluding report that the group of four around 
Van Rompuy presented on 5 December 2012. This meant that decisions would 
likely be made only after the European elections of 2014.109 After the Council 
meeting of 13 and 14 December 2012, it remained open however as to whether any 
of it would actually come about. The heads of state and of government had only 
agreed that the definition of “old burdens,” the creation of regulations on liqui-
dating ailing banks, and the organization of the deposit security system would 
occur by the middle of 2013. Van Rompuy was given the task, in cooperation with 
Barroso, of determining by that time to what extent it would be possible to imple-
ment the chancellor’s proposal to conclude treaties for rehabilitation with indi-
109 Herman Van Rompuy in close collaboration with José Manuel Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
and Mario Draghi, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, 5 Dec. 2012.
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vidual member states for which the common rehabilitation funds would then be 
available.110
The danger that the European Union would break apart, a danger that had 
arisen from the mutual rejection of solidarity—rejection of painful structural 
reforms in the crisis countries and rejection of support for those reforms by the 
economic draft horses, especially the Germans, who without intending it had 
risen to be the leading economic power—was a danger that thus seemed to have 
been warded off at the end of 2012. During a difficult period of adjustment, the 
Union had equipped itself with instruments by which it essentially seemed possi-
ble to overcome the government debt crisis. No later than the ruling of the German 
Constitutional Court that allowed German participation in the fiscal pact and the 
ESM, the opponents of a common strategy to deal with the crisis had everywhere 
ended up on the defensive. It admittedly remained an open question as to how 
much strengthening of the European level would be achievable in the process of 
resolving the crisis. And it also remained an open question as to how high a price 
each individual citizen of the Union and each member country would have to pay 
for overcoming the crisis.
110 European Council: meeting of the European Council of 13 and 14 December 2012, conclu-
sions, EUCO 205/12.
Conclusion: The Future of the Union
On 12 October 2012, the chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Thorbjörn 
Jagland, surprised the world with the announcement that the European Union 
was the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for the year 2012. The Nobel Committee 
justified its decision with the observation that this Union had contributed deci-
sively to peaceful development in Europe over the previous six decades. Specifi-
cally, it cited the rapprochement and close bond between the two large Continen-
tal powers France and Germany; the promotion of democratic development in 
Southern Europe after the end of dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Portugal; the 
integration of the states of East-Central Europe after the end of the Communist 
East Bloc; the promotion of pacification in the Balkan region after the wars of 
the 1990s; as well as the advancement of democracy and human rights in Turkey, 
a state seeking accession to the Union.1 In the middle of an acute crisis in the 
European integration process, the Nobel Committee had thus offered a reminder 
that—despite all the crises—the history of European integration has ultimately 
been a success story. At the same time, the committee appealed to Europeans not 
to give up this success frivolously in the face of impositions stemming from the 
desire to preserve the Community currency.
In truth, crises have been a constant accompaniment to the emergence and 
development of the European Union. It has required and still requires a “daily 
plebiscite,” as Ernest Renan once formulated it in reference to the nation2—and 
this plebiscite is by no means taken for granted. This stems from the multidimen-
sional nature of the driving forces at the root of the integration process: The desire 
for securing the peace, the efforts toward a solution to the German question, the 
quest for larger markets, and the concern for self-assertion in the world have 
not always been equally strong and have not always worked in the same direc-
tion. For example, the need for self-assertion as well as the unresolved German 
question made a union of Western Europe seem wholly appropriate; in terms 
of securing the peace, however, this form of union—perforce limited to Western 
Europe—became problematic. The common necessity of unification stood against 
the very different sensitivities and needs of the states to be unified; the overarch-
ing interest in a common market stood against the very diverse economic needs of 
the individual states and the differing interests of individual production sectors. 
Accordingly, Europe policy could not be a unitary policy; it has been and remains 
1 The Norwegian Nobel Committee, Announcement of 12 Oct. 2012.
2 Ernest Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” in: Œuvres Complètes, vol. 1, Paris: Pierre Bordas et 
fils, 1947, pp. 887–906.
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the continuation of disputes among different conceptions of order and different 
interests at the European level.
Nevertheless, it was a certain combination of these four impulses that led in 
the 1950s to the emergence of the first European institutions: the interest in incor-
porating the new West German state, which had become an indispensable partner 
in Western European security policy, combined with the Dutch interest in a rapid 
opening of markets, as well as the French and ultimately also German interest 
in self-assertion vis-à-vis the United States. After the decision for the European 
Economic Community as a modernization project cushioned by the social-welfare 
state, the economic motives steadily gained weight. At the same time, the devel-
opment of the system of bipolar nuclear deterrence meant for a greater impulse 
to achieve European autonomy. The two projects did not necessarily correspond: 
This explains the sluggish pace of political integration even as progress has been 
made in realizing the internal market of an enlarged Community. With the end 
of the Cold War, the goal of a European nuclear force quickly lost significance; 
conversely, the European Community was now needed more than ever to incor-
porate the central power Germany. In place of the ambivalence of the European 
project in the peace question, there now arose new responsibilities on the Euro-
pean and the global level. In the meantime, economic productivity, social con-
sensus, and democratic stability are now no longer conceivable without the bases 
of the Common Market; the common interest in securing the peace tremendously 
outweighs potential national rivalries, and the ability to act on the global level is 
more dependent than ever on a common front among Europeans.
The European Union thereby constitutes an attempt to preserve and further 
develop the civilizational achievements of the democratic nation-state under 
conditions of increasing globalization. It rests on the awareness of the common 
and complementary interests of the European nations and a knowledge of 
common values and traditions, which suggests that there are good prospects for 
taking up the common exercise of these interests.3 As a societal project, “Europe” 
thus exhibits characteristics corresponding to the nation-state projects of earlier 
periods in history.
This project has undoubtedly been promoted by the growing harmonization 
of economic, social, and societal structures that began in the wake of the endur-
ing economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s; this is a harmonization with which 
the post-Communist states of the eastern half of Europe must now catch up via a 
3 Cf. Wilfried Loth, “European Identity: Traditions, Constructions, and Beliefs,” in: Du Luxem-
bourg à l’Europe. Hommages à Gilbert Trausch à l’occasion de son 80e anniversaire, Luxembourg, 
2011, pp. 549–555.
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difficult process of adjustment.4 Likewise, the multifaceted interconnections in 
Europe tend to contribute to its implementation: market integration, professional 
and private mobility, transnational encounters and contacts, transnationally-op-
erating enterprises, increasingly transnationally-active academic communities, 
and, finally, the internationalization of attitudes, fashions, and cultural produc-
tion facilitated by the media. Yet, these linking processes do not encompass all 
parts of European societies to an equal extent; and Western civilization, which 
spreads along with them, extends far beyond Europe. Consequently, there is no 
direct path leading to the emergence of a genuinely European public sphere as a 
medium of self-reference for a European society.
Accordingly, the institutional development of the European Union up to now 
has primarily occurred in a technocratic manner without wide societal discus-
sion or deep identification of the citizens of the European Union with its insti-
tutions. In light of the various possibilities for conceiving a united Europe, there 
were always majorities for affirming Europe in principle in the countries that had 
decided to join the European Community; at the same time, however, there was 
also always a lack of unequivocal support for the form of European unification 
that was feasible. The discrepancy between the Europe that was desired and 
the Europe that was achievable explains, firstly, the outstanding significance of 
individual figures in the decision-making process on Europe policy from Robert 
Schuman and Konrad Adenauer to Jacques Delors, Helmut Kohl, and Angela 
Merkel: Given the ambivalences in public opinion, strong leader personalities 
could clear the way via direct contact with their partners, circumventing the 
routine of the bureaucracies and pledging majorities for their projects. Secondly, 
the discrepancy between the Europe that was desired and the Europe that was 
feasible explains why a form of integration as seen in the European Coal and Steel 
Union as well as the Treaties of Rome could come to be, a form that placed little 
value on citizen participation and that withdrew the integrated political areas 
from public discussion: Only when one left the implications vague was it possi-
ble to prevent negative coalitions from blocking the continually-contested steps 
toward integration.
Thirdly, with this background, it becomes clear how the so-called deficit of 
democracy has in the meantime become the most pressing problem of the Euro-
pean Union: Given the expansion of the Community’s responsibilities and the 
increasing regulation that is concomitant with it as well as the majority deci-
4 Cf. Hartmut Kaelble, Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft. Eine Sozialgeschichte 
Westeuropas 1880–1980, Munich: C.H. Beck, 1987; idem., Sozialgeschichte Europas seit 1945, 
Munich: C.H. Beck, 2007; Günther Heydemann and Karel Vodička (eds.), Vom Ostblock zur EU. 
Systemtransformationen 1990–2012 im Vergleich, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013.
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sions made in the twilight of the various minister formations, the negotiations in 
COREPER and the European Council along with the low democratic legitimation 
of the Commission—all this is no longer acceptable to the citizen, independent of 
what is said by constitutional scholars who orient themselves on the category of 
the nation-state as a model. The technocratic roundabout route to Europe initi-
ated by Jean Monnet in 1950 and successful over many years—most recently once 
again with the launch of the Maastricht program—has now reached an end. This 
was clearly seen in the intense public debates over the Maastricht Treaty and the 
difficulties in winning its ratification. Since the rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty by a majority of the French and the Dutch, it is wholly apparent. The future 
of the European Union is thus to a very decisive degree dependent on the extent 
to which there is success in making the decisions in the European Union trans-
parent, subject to oversight, and open to correction.
The referenda in France and the Netherlands have also demonstrated that 
this is not simple to achieve. Essentially, here was an attempt to provide more 
transparency and democracy that failed in its beginnings exactly because of a 
lack of transparency and democracy—a process that exhibits all the hallmarks 
of a Greek tragedy. The societies of the Eurozone quickly reacted to the threat 
posed by the European debt crisis with a revival of nation-state reflexes, and illu-
sionists oriented on the nation-state along with unprincipled populists did not 
hesitate to make use of those developments for their own purposes. It is uncertain 
as to whether the coalition of Europe-policy realists in the net-payer and net-re-
ceiver countries will be strong enough and enduring enough to win approval for 
the combination of Community bonds and democratically-regulated access to 
national budgets that is necessary for overcoming the debt crisis.
Yet, the chances are good that in the course of the upcoming reform debate, 
the European dimension of identity will become more prominent in the European 
consciousness and that European society will become more articulate. Evidence 
for that is provided not only by the experience of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, the 
European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, and the bank union—instru-
ments that even with all the delays and all the half-measures actually do help 
deal with the acute problems of the Union. It may also be of great importance 
that the current extent of economic and financial links in the Union as well as the 
realities of globalization permit of no plausible alternative to the further develop-
ment of the Community, at least no alternative with a lower cost. Moreover, there 
is the fact that the common European tradition has at the ready wholly sufficient 
stimuli for the creation of a European collective.
Since the middle of the 1980s, the European Community has more and 
more come to be understood as a community of values committed to pluralism 
and democratic freedoms, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of 
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minorities. To that extent, a common constitutional inheritance has evolved in 
the discussions of the previous decades, one that could lead to a constitutional 
patriotism on the European level. This European patriotism, which expresses an 
affirmation of a system of values rather than an emotional affiliation, is compat-
ible with national patriotism. In times of dynamic transformation, it even con-
tributes to stabilizing national patriotism, which is shaped by different historical 
experiences as well as different languages and cultures. In this respect, one can 
definitely speak of a European identity in the singular. It is not however a matter 
of an exclusionary conception of identity but rather a universal one that respects 
national identities and the achievements of nations.5
Hence, the “Europe Project” will not lead to the dying off of nation-states, at 
least for the foreseeable future. Instead, it constitutes the precondition for their 
survival, which can only be survival in a changed form and with restricted func-
tion, however. European identity will therefore not simply replace national iden-
tity in the foreseeable future. Instead, what seems to be emerging is that people 
in Europe are living with a multilayered identity, an identity in which regional, 
national, and European aspects are united. This is regularly apparent in Euroba-
rometer surveys when Union citizens are asked about their self-understanding. In 
May of 2012, thirty-eight percent of the citizens of the EU Twenty-Seven character-
ized themselves exclusively as members of their nation. Some forty-nine percent 
however saw themselves primarily as members of a European nation and at the 
same time in a wider dimension as Europeans too. Six percent even saw them-
selves primarily as Europeans and only secondarily as members of a nation too. 
Three percent regarded themselves exclusively as Europeans.6
Behind these aggregated numbers there are of course different levels of aware-
ness in the different member states of the Union and also within each population. 
In examining the results more closely, it becomes clear that the orientation on 
Europe is correlated with a person’s age, level of education, and amount of socie-
tal responsibility. The younger, the more educated, and the higher in societal posi-
tion, the stronger is the European dimension of identity. Accordingly, “Europe” is 
still a rather elite project; at the same time, however, the “pro-European” faction 
can reckon with further growth over the long term. With the increasing density of 
relationships within the Union, the strengthening of European institutions, the 
foreseeable increase in mobility beyond national boundaries, and the increasing 
5 Cf. Wilfried Loth, “Regionale, nationale und europäische Identität. Überlegungen zum Wan-
del europäischer Staatlichkeit,” in: Wilfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), Internationale 
Geschichte. Themen – Ergebnisse – Aussichten, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000, pp. 357–369.
6 Standard Eurobarometer 77, Spring 2012: European Citizenship.
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significance of professional qualifications, the European dimension of personal 
and collective identity will come to loom larger.
Whether and how long national identity can exercise stronger binding effects 
than European identity must remain an essentially open question. There is no 
plausible evidence for the claim made by Ralf Dahrendorf in 1994 that the nation-
state alone is able to create deep-rooted bonds among societal forces.7 As the pri-
ority of European values and the increasingly transnational nature of life styles 
demonstrate, empirical evidence is already pointing in a different direction. It 
takes neither special courage nor excessive optimism to predict that the common-
alities among Europeans will more strongly emerge with the expansion of social 
tasks and with the democratization of European politics, despite all the reactive 
flaring up of nationalism.
That which results on the level of constitutional law is what might be termed 
a “federation of nation-states,” in the words of Jacques Delors.8 It is true that 
in terms of constitutional law, this concept is not very exact; yet, it expresses 
quite well the ongoing tension between the nation-state and supranationality. 
This federation, which does actually exist now (even if hardly anyone dares to 
characterize it as such) will not dissolve or mutate into a mere free-trade zone, 
as many fear: That is because the benefit all participants receive from the current 
construction is much too great, which becomes clear again and again in cases of 
conflict. On the other hand, we cannot expect any qualitative leap to a Europe 
capable of acting on the world stage anytime soon in the way Europe enthusiasts 
such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Guy Verhofstadt have increasingly been calling 
for recently:9 This is because the nation-state remains too important for the over-
whelming majority of Europeans and because the level of suffering occasionally 
caused by the unilateralism of the United States as a world power is overall too 
meager.
It was the case that the large European party associations and their contin-
gents in the European Parliament succeeded in significantly strengthening the 
supranational level of the Union in 2014. As the Lisbon Treaty had increased Par-
liament’s right of participation in the appointment of the European Commission, 
the parties made use of that by putting up candidates in the European elections 
on 25 May 2014 who were willing and able to assume the office of the next presi-
dent of the Commission. First of all, this meant that they had succeeded in polit-
icizing the European election campaign. Whereas the average turnout of 40.09 
7 Ralf Dahrendorf, “Die Zukunft des Nationalstaates,” in: Merkur 48 (1994), pp. 751–761.
8 Delors, Erinnerungen, p. 506.
9 Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Guy Verhofstadt, For Europe! A Manifesto for a Postnational Revolu-
tion, Munich: Carl Hanser, 2012.
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percent was hardly higher than five years earlier, it did prove possible for the 
first time to debate on the first front questions of European policy – thanks to 
the Europe-wide campaign made by top candidates such as Jean-Claude Juncker 
for the European People’s Party, Martin Schulz for the Socialists, and Guy Ver-
hofstadt for the Liberals. On election night, Schulz and Juncker agreed that the 
candidate of the largest faction—that was, Juncker—would be put forward by Par-
liament to head the Commission.
Parliament’s proposal brought British Prime Minister David Cameron onto 
the scene: For him, the appointment of the pro-integration former Luxembourg 
premier was exactly the wrong signal for an already anti-European British public. 
In order to keep Britain for the Union, the German chancellor Angela Merkel ini-
tially maintained a low profile on the issue of the Commission president. Her 
voters were angered by that, however, and so she finally had to give in, speaking 
out in favor of Juncker on 30 May. She also consented to dispensing with una-
nimity when the European Council decided on the proposed candidate. At the 
Council meeting of 25 and 26 June, Juncker was put forward by twenty-six heads 
of state and of government—against the votes of Cameron and Hungarian Premier 
Victor Orbán. Thus strengthened and with a broad majority in the European Par-
liament, Juncker was able to assume his new office on 1 November 2014. With 
a Commission firmly led by seven vice presidents, he was hoping to be able to 
break through numerous roadblocks to reform in the coming years.
Europe policy has always been the art of the possible, and top-level European 
politicians will in the future too be judged by the extent to which they master this 
art. It is possible that the introduction of Eurobonds will be added to the instru-
ments for overcoming the current debt crisis after all and that as a quid pro quo 
a European-level authority legitimized by parliamentary means will receive the 
right to intervene when national budget discipline is violated. Yet, the prereq-
uisite for such a step to a fiscal union would be agreement between France and 
Germany, the duo without whose cooperation progress in European integration 
is unachievable. That, in turn, presupposes that François Hollande can dispel 
the delusion of the French electorate that the French economy can be rehabili-
tated without painful cuts and without further without further collectivization 
of national sovereignty. It is also conceivable that the aggressive course taken 
by Russian President Vladimir Putin against Ukraine since February of 2014 will 
lead to a strengthening of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In any event, 
the governments in Paris and Berlin developed a high level of unity in crisis man-
agement after the annexation of the Crimea and the support of pro-Russian sepa-
ratists in Eastern Ukraine by the Russian Federation. The government in Warsaw 
was also included in this coordination. With the appointment of Donald Tusk—up 
to that point the Polish prime minister—as the new president of the European 
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Council on 1 December 2014, the heads of state and of government provided an 
example of the assertion of European principles in the face of revived Russian 
great-power ambitions.
It is very unlikely that Great Britain would participate in a fiscal union. It is 
instead possible that David Cameron’s announcement of 23 January 2013 about 
holding a referendum in the year 2017 on Britain’s continued membership in the 
Union will lead to the country’s complete withdrawal. In contrast to the situation 
on the Continent, the number of British citizens who regard themselves as exclu-
sively members of their nation has always been higher than the number who also 
perceive of themselves as Europeans (the figure was sixty to forty-two percent in 
May of 2012). After Tony Blair failed to summon the courage to go on the offensive 
against this, continental Europeans have been showing little inclination to help 
Cameron in overcoming the problems with EU opponents in his own ranks. In any 
event, continental Europeans will not be prepared to give up Community areas of 
responsibility merely to keep Britain in the Union. However, it could also be the 
case that Britons will begin to rethink the situation as soon as it becomes appar-
ent where the priorities of the continental Europeans lie.
The more convincingly the members of the Eurozone succeed in reducing 
excesses of debt and in generating new growth, the more likely that may become. 
Nothing makes the European Union as attractive as success. To that extent, one 
can expect that success in overcoming the euro debt crisis will not only strengthen 
Community consciousness further. One would do well to keep the successes of 
the past more clearly in mind than is usually the case when fixating on current 
frustrations.
Afterword
A history of European unification that begins in the 1940s and extends to the 
present perforce rests on very diverse sources. In regard to the foundational years 
that led to the emergence of the first European institutions, there has been much 
progress in the exploration of government archives and private papers. Here, I 
was able to draw on a great wealth of relevant studies, starting with the work of 
my mentor Walter Lipgens on the inception of the European unification move-
ment as well as my own dissertation on the French Socialists and the postwar 
European order. The first two decades after the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 
March of 1957 have increasingly become the focus of historical research in recent 
years. Here, I was especially able to profit from numerous studies produced in 
connection with my chair at the University of Duisburg-Essen: the dissertations 
of Carine Germond, Philip Bajon, and Henning Türk as well as the habilitations 
of Wolfram Kaiser, Kiran Klaus Patel, and Claudia Hiepel. For this middle period, 
additional research was only necessary in some areas. In contrast, for the period 
since the mid-1970s, the archives and private papers have only been very selec-
tively explored at this point. Here, there was much pioneer work to be done, some-
times using archival collections and private information, more often by recourse 
to memoirs and contemporary political commentary, which is quite rich in detail.
Altogether, it is thus a historiographical hybrid that has emerged: a synthesis 
that increasingly transitions into a pioneering study. The closer it approaches the 
present, the more original the information and the assessments and the more 
provisional the character of the presentation as well. The imbalance in the source 
base is the price that had to be paid for a work providing more in the way of com-
prehensive perspectives and orientation for the present.
Divergences from previous views and positions on research controversies 
have only been very briefly noted in the citations. Those wanting to become more 
familiar with the progress of research on European integration history can turn 
to the balance provided by the contributions in a collection that I published on 
the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 
2007.1 A systematic overview is offered in a stimulating essay by Kiran Klaus Patel 
in a newly-published collection entitled Dimensionen internationaler Geschichte.2 
My own position in the research landscape is spelled out in an essay that seeks to 
situate the work of Alan Milward in the development of historical writing on Euro-
1 Wilfried Loth (ed.), Experiencing Europe. 50 Years of European Construction 1957–2007, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2009.
2 Kiran Klaus Patel, “Europäische Integration,” in: Jost Dülffer and Wilfried Loth (eds.), Dimen-
sionen internationaler Geschichte, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012, pp. 353–372.
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pean integration.3 More detailed information on individual problematics can be 
found in the specialized studies cited in the footnotes. Essays and book reviews in 
the Journal of European Integration History regularly report on the further devel-
opment of research, as does the website of the European Union Liaison Commit-
tee of Historians at the European Commission (www.eu-historians.eu).
I am grateful for the many suggestions that have come from my colleagues 
on the Liaison Committee, to which I have belonged for over thirty years. The 
continuous exchanges as well as the common work toward the development of 
an international community of integration historians have helped me avoid the 
narrowness of a national perspective—something that for a theme such as Euro-
pean integration would prove especially fatal. All this has aided me in developing 
what I hope at least is a European view of the history of European integration. 
My thanks go to the earlier members of the Liaison Committee as well as the 
more recent members, especially to companions of long standing: Marie-Thérèse 
Bitsch, Gérard Bossuat, Anne Deighton, Klaus Schwabe, and Antonio Varsori.
Additionally, I am thankful for important insights and information from 
exchanges with political scientists, jurists, and economists studying the novel 
phenomenon of European integration. Collaboration in different interdisciplin-
ary and often international work groups and project groups has, insofar as I can 
gain an overview, led to mutual stimuli along with the beginnings of a common 
scholarship of integration. Special thanks in this context goes to my friend and 
colleague in Cologne, Wolfgang Wessels, who knows better than anyone how to 
bring together colleagues of the most diverse origin and bent for joint work. Those 
wanting to gain a more detailed perspective on the operation of European insti-
tutions than is possible to provide in a presentation of their development would 
be well served by turning to the great overview of the institutional structure from 
the pen of Wolfgang Wessels.4
I would also like to express my thanks to the members of my staff in Essen. 
Sümeyra Kaya and André Postert have at different times provided important 
research support. André Postert has also been of assistance in getting the book 
to press and contributing judicious observations for the organization of the text. 
Raluca Frincu and Stephanie Hück have helped with the arrangement of the text; 
with disarming charm, Stephanie Hück has also seen to it that I was not exces-
3 Wilfried Loth,“Integrating Paradigms. Walter Lipgens and Alan Milward as Pioneers of Euro-
pean Integration History,” in: Fernando Guirao, Frances M. B. Lynch, and Sigfrido M. Ramírez 
Pérez (eds.), Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change, London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 2012, pp. 255–267.
4 Wolfgang Wessels, Das politische System der Europäischen Union, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2008.
 Afterword   443
sively burdened by demands of all sorts while focusing on the completion of the 
manuscript. The team spirit during my last years as holding a chair in Essen will 
never be forgotten.
The present book was firstly published in German language in February 
2014.5 In order to being up-to-date this English edition is in addition covering 
the developments of the year 2014. For this edition, very special thanks go to my 
translator Robert F. Hogg. His intuition, diligence, and continual engagement 
have significantly contributed to making a politically- and technically-com-
plex history comprehensible. Finally, I would also like to thank my editors at de 
Gruyter Oldenbourg, Martin Rethmeier and Elise Wintz. I very much appreciate 
their engagement for this book.
The story told in this book goes on. As one can well imagine, that fact has 
presented a special challenge in the writing but has also imbued the project with 
a special appeal. Whether the finished product can itself exercise any influence 
over the further unfolding of the story is of course highly uncertain and presum-
ably rather improbable. I ask however that the reader please allow me to regard 
such a development as an especially appealing prospect.
Münster, January 2015
Wilfried Loth
5 Wilfried Loth, Europas Einigung. Eine unvollendete Geschichte, Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 
2014.
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